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 REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO SAFETY IN THE 
LONG HAUL TRUCKING INDUSTRY 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
The Inquiry was established and coordinated by Motor Accidents Authority of New South to 
investigate safety in the long haul road transport industry. The aim of the Inquiry was to 
produce a report on safety in the industry, including occupational health problems. The final 
report was to include a Draft Code of Practice for improving safety in the long haul road 
transport industry as well as recommendations on changes to regulation, compliance 
infrastructure and policies where appropriate. 
 
The terms of reference of the Inquiry were; 
 
1. Impact of clients' and consignors' requirements on the drivers including: 
• Industry tendering practices; 
• Transport contacts between road transport companies and major clients;  
• Methods of pricing; 
• Lack of client responsibility for driving hours, driver performance and 
remuneration for drivers; 
• Client/consignor requirements as to delivery times. 
 
2. Extent of proper enforcement in the industry of driving hours, speeding and drug use. 
 
3. Current forms of regulation in the industry, whether a self-regulation or external 
regulation model is most appropriate for the road transport industry and what forms 
this should take. 
 
4. Whether current regulatory bodies with responsibility for the industry are properly 
co-ordinated with each other and sufficiently resourced. 
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INQUIRY PROCESS 
 
The Inquiry was established in April 2000 by the Motor Accidents Authority of New South 
Wales (MAA) with the approval of the Special Minister of State, John Della Bosca, the 
Minister for Transport, Carl Scully, and the then Minister for Industrial Relations, Jeff Shaw. 
The MAA is responsible for administering compulsory third party insurance of all motor 
vehicles in the state and the inquiry was established in response to steep increases in the 
premiums pertaining to heavy vehicles and a more general concern with regard to safety in 
long distance trucking.  
 
Preliminary to the actual inquiry a steering committee was set up. This committee consisted 
of representatives of the Motor Accident Authority, Roads and Traffic Authority, WorkCover 
NSW, Transport Workers Union and the Australian Trucking Association. After being 
established, notices advertising the Inquiry and inviting submissions were placed in major 
newspapers as well as trucking journals. Contact was made or letters written to a number of 
key parties (including agencies and other bodies interstate) asking for input and submissions. 
Informal meetings were arranged in April and May 2000 with a wide range of interested 
parties to obtain background information and to encourage both written and verbal 
submissions. These informal meetings involved academic researchers, insurers, motorist 
organisations, transport companies, representatives of clients, road transport associations 
(including specialist bodies such as those concerned with livestock) and various government 
agencies).  
 
These meetings also helped to identify previous state and federal government inquiries and 
other documents pertaining to safety in long haul road transport or relevant (even if only in an 
indirect or tangential way) to the issues being considered by this Inquiry. Over the last 20 
years there have been numerous reports and other documents prepared in relation to the long 
haul trucking industry or road transport more generally and it was deemed important to 
examine these to better inform the Inquiry’s own considerations. For example, issues like 
tendering practices have been raised in earlier reports and several reports had recommended 
compulsory accreditation or operator licensing – an issue initiative proposed by a number of 
parties making representations to the Inquiry. Within its tight time and logistical constraints, 
the Inquiry also sought information from some agencies, organisations and individuals in 
North America and Europe in order to gain a comparative perspective on safety issues in long 
road transport. One outcome from this was to invite Dr Michael Belzer to give evidence at 
hearings of the Inquiry. Belzer was a former long distance truck driver and expert on US 
trucking industry at the University of Michigan who had just published a book on the effects 
of trucking deregulation in the USA and had also just completed a study of safety in the 
second largest US haulage company. During his visit (funded by the Motor Accidents 
Authority) Dr Belzer spoke to a number of interested parties. Finally, the Inquiry examined 
the international scientific literature on safety and health in road transport. 
 
To provide detailed and systematic evidence on the OHS experiences of drivers Dr Claire 
Mayhew, a senior experienced OHS researcher with a record of prior research into road 
transport, was engaged to undertake a representative survey of 300 long distance truck drivers 
in New South Wales. Direct interviews were conducted on the basis of a semi-structured 
questionnaire similar to ones used previously in research into the health and safety 
experiences of road transport and other workers. Efforts were made to ensure the survey was a 
representative sample of drivers engaged in different routes (all major highways) and different 
categories of drivers (owner-driver, small fleet driver and large fleet driver). The Inquiry was 
also able to draw on the findings of two large surveys (in 1990 and a follow-up in 1999) 
undertaken by a team headed by Dr Ann Williamson, formerly with NOHSC and currently 
Director of the Injury Risk Management Research Centre at the University of New South 
Wales. These surveys focused on the issue of driver fatigue although they raise a wide range 
of other issues relating to safety and health. Taken together, the surveys provided a very solid 
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basis on evidence on OHS in the long haul road transport industry and both provided critical 
insights to issues central to the terms of reference of this Inquiry. Further, given that safety in 
long haul road transport is administered by a number legislative instruments and agencies, 
Richard Johnstone was engaged to produce a report on these overlaps and possible means of 
streamlining compliance and related issues raised in the course of the Inquiry. Johnstone is a 
Professor of Law at the Australian National University (and formerly an Associate Professor 
at the TC Bierne School of Law University of Queensland) and a leading expert on 
employment and OHS law, being the author of the standard text on the subject. 
 
The Inquiry received over 50 written submissions (listed at the end of the Report). Those 
making submissions included individual owner-drivers, individuals and community groups 
concerned with road safety, academics with expertise on trucking safety, the Transport 
Workers’ Union of Australia (federal and several state branches), Concerned Families of 
Australian Truckies (CFAT), small and large transport companies, the Australian Trucking 
Association and a number of state industry or more specialist bodies. Written submissions 
were also received from a range of government agencies with an interest in the safety of long 
distance trucking including the National Road Transport Commission, the NSW 
Environmental Protection Authority, WorkCover NSW, insurers and rail-freight 
organisations. Given the interstate nature of the industry a number of submissions emanated 
from organisations and individuals in other states (from as far away as north Queensland to 
Western Australia). Government agencies to make submissions included WorkCover Victoria 
and Western Australian Transport. 
 
Public hearings were undertaken between mid July and late August 2000 in a variety of 
locations including Sydney, Canberra, Newcastle, Grafton and Albury. A number of operators 
and others travelled considerable distances to attend hearings at their own expense and the 
Inquiry would like to acknowledge its gratitude. Given the interstate nature of the industry 
and the co-operation of government agencies in other states, hearings were also held in 
Melbourne and Brisbane. During the Brisbane hearing the inquiry heard submissions from 
transport operators based in Gatton, Rockhampton and Kingaroy. The hearings in Albury also 
included transport operators based in Victoria. These hearings were not held under oath but 
were aimed at elucidating evidence from a range of parties with knowledge of safety-related 
matters in the industry. In total over 60 individuals and groups/organisations made separate 
oral submissions to the Inquiry (if multiple attendance by particular organisations is included 
the number of persons making submissions exceeded 100). A full list of those who gave 
evidence at hearings can be found at the end of this Report. 
  
Throughout its investigations the Inquiry received invaluable assistance from a steering 
committee established by the Motor Accidents Authority, which included representatives of 
key organisations with an involvement in and knowledge of the long distance trucking 
industry. Bodies represented included the Australian Trucking Association (ATA) which is 
the peak body representing the trucking industry. The ATA’s membership consists of six 
State/Territory industry associations, sector associations (like the Australian Livestock 
Transporters Association), national transport companies (such as MPG Logistics and 
K&S/Scott group), ancillary companies with transport interests (Austalia Post and Boral), and 
representatives of owner/drivers and the Transport Workers Union. Formed in the early 1990s 
as the Road Transport Industry Forum following major trucking safety disasters in the late 
1980s, the ATA has strategic interests in safety, environment, taxes/charges, regulation and 
viability. With its headquarters in Canberra, the ATA has taken a strong role in promoting a 
nationally coordinated approach to industry regulation. It should be noted that the largest 
single transport company in Australia, Toll Express, is not a member of the ATA although it 
belongs to the various state industry bodies (the Inquiry spoke to representatives of this 
company as well as other large companies). 
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In terms of government agencies, aside from the Motor Accidents Authority itself (which 
administers the compulsory third party insurance scheme covering all vehicles in NSW), there 
were representatives of the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) and WorkCover NSW. Like 
its counterparts in other States, the RTA is responsible for road safety and traffic management 
on NSW road and undertakes enforcement of road transport laws in conjunction with the 
NSW Police Service (which declined an invitation to send a representative to the committee 
but cooperated fully with the Inquiry). WorkCover NSW is the administering agency for the 
NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act and also has coverage of road transport activities 
where, like the road freight industry, they involve workplaces and work activity. Another 
major stakeholder represented on the Steering Committee was insurers who provided a 
number of forms of coverage for the industry (compulsory third party, comprehensive motor 
vehicle insurance and workers’ compensation). Finally, the principal union - the Transport 
Workers Union - that covers truck drivers (as well as other transport-related occupations) was 
represented. While the union’s membership is mainly composed of employee drivers it has 
some owner/driver membership. 
 
For the purpose of the Inquiry long haul trucking was defined as a truck travelling with a load 
on a single trip to an unloading destination of over 100 kilometers. This definition 
corresponds with the regulatory requirement for logbooks to be kept and carried and the 
definition used in the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et al, 1984). Further, to 
confine consideration to interstate trucking would be to exclude long distance intrastate 
trucking. There was no logical reason to do this since intrastate trucking is significant, 
involves single trips of which could typically be around 400km and might well exceed 600km 
within NSW (and even longer distances in larger states), and arguably entails the same issues 
as interstate trucking. The term long haul and long distance is used interchangeably.  
 
Finally, this Report wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contribution to the Inquiry process 
of Leicester Ramsey and Associates. Leicester was appointed by the Motor Accidents 
Authority to assist with the Inquiry. This involved a wide range of tasks including arranging 
and playing an active role in both meetings and hearings, collecting information, as well as 
providing valuable input, ideas and suggestions. To describe his contribution as invaluable 
would be an understatement.  
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REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO SAFETY IN THE 
LONG HAUL TRUCKING INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Evidence of Major Safety Problems  
 
During the course of the Inquiry, numerous submissions were received from a wide 
range of parties, expressing grave concern with safety in the long haul trucking 
industry. The parties included individual drivers and operators, individuals and 
community groups, motorist organisations, insurers, government agencies, the TWU, 
Concerned Families of Australian Truckies and several industry associations. There is 
ample evidence to support these concerns. 
 
Compared to other modes of transport or other industries more generally, long distance 
road transport has a poor safety record. Indeed, truck driving remains one of the most 
dangerous occupations and these risks extend, in a substantial way, to other road users. 
Some indicators of the extent of these problems are: 
 
• In 1999 189 Australians died in crashes involving articulated trucks (or about one 
tenth of all road fatalities that year), with 51 of these being truck drivers. In absolute 
terms there has been no trend improvement in either the number of fatalities (truck 
driver or other road user) or the number of fatal crashes involving articulated 
trucks after 1991.  By way of contrast, since 1991 there has been an improvement in 
the total number of fatal all-vehicle crashes and fatalities. 
• Crashes involving articulated trucks constitute almost 9% of all crashes and account 
for just under 10% of all vehicle fatalities. These ratios have been steady over a long 
period indicating improvements here could have substantial benefits to the 
community.  
• In comparison to the USA, the UK and Finland, available evidence indicates that 
Australians are almost two times more likely to die in a crash involving a heavy 
vehicle. 
• As the most populous state and as the hub of interstate transport on the eastern 
seaboard, NSW recorded the largest number of deaths (64 including 13 truck 
drivers) in 1999. There has been, at best, no trend improvement after 1991 (with the 
possibility of an upward trend since 1995). The number of crashes (all categories of 
seriousness) involving articulated trucks on NSW roads has increased from 948 in 
1991 to 1,520 in 1999 (no comparable figures are available for Australia). 
• In 1999 figures supplied by the RTA indicate that of 1595 persons killed or injured 
on NSW roads in heavy truck crashes, truck driver speeding was seen to contribute 
to 170 casualties, truck driver fatigue to 98 casualties and insecure loads to 25 
casualties. Of 830 persons killed or injured in crashes involving articulated trucks, 
truck driver speeding contributed to 130 casualties, driver fatigue to 70 and insecure 
loads to 15 deaths or injuries. 
• In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the claims cost of compulsory 
third party insurance involving heavy vehicles in NSW, forcing a rise in premiums. 
Private insurers believe existing premiums still do not cover claim costs and 
expressed similar concerns about the trucking industry in relation to comprehensive 
vehicle insurance and (to a lesser extent) workers' compensation claims. 
• Ignoring single vehicle incidents, truck drivers were at fault in roughly one quarter 
of crashes, Australia-wide for the years 1990-1996.  While these figures counter the 
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public image of unprofessional drivers, they are still unlikely to assuage community 
concerns.  In single vehicle incidents the truck driver was deemed at fault in over 
90% of cases (a significant number of these were fatigue related). 
• Quite apart from the toll in terms of human suffering, the poor safety performance 
of the long haul road freight industry entails significant economic costs to the 
community. In the early 1990s it was estimated that the cost per person of a road 
crash was $771,800 in the case of a fatality and $131,800 for a hospital admission 
injury. Expressed in terms of current dollar values these figures would be far higher, 
but even using the unadjusted figure would result in a total cost of injuries and 
deaths running into hundreds of millions of dollars. Further, even a relatively m 
•  
•  
•  
• inor truck smash can involve significant costs (for towing, repair, traffic disruption, 
and police and emergency services staff time to name but a few obvious areas). 
During the course of its investigations, the Inquiry also became aware of a number 
of substantial economic externalities in relation to the industry which means that the 
a significant component of economic burden of poor safety performance is being 
passed onto the community. It is arguable that these and other externalities amount 
to a subsidy to the road transport industry that is undermine competitive neutrality.  
 
Official statistics on death or serious injury in a collision is only one indicator of the 
serious health and safety issues associated with long haul trucking.  
 
• A representative survey of 300 long distance truck drivers commissioned by the 
Inquiry revealed that around 14% had experienced a crash in the past 12 months, 
with the figure being highest for small fleet employee drivers (17.3%) and 
owner/drivers (13.1%).  Further, small fleet drivers and owner/drivers were around 
twice as likely as large fleet drivers to report serious crashes (and about half as likely 
to report little crashes that didn’t stop them working). Almost a quarter of drivers 
reported a crash in the last five years, with small fleet drivers again reporting most 
(26%). Compared to large fleet drivers, owner/drivers and small fleet drivers were 
more likely to report serious crashes (20.2% and 18.3% respectively). While a third 
of crashes reported by large fleet drivers were deemed as not serious, only just 
under one eighth of owner/drivers labeled their crash as 'just little ones that didn’t 
stop me driving'. The indication that owner/drivers are more likely to be involved in 
serious crashes is supported by insurance company data (similar comparisons by 
fleet size were not possible).  
• Workers' compensation claims data seriously understates the extent of work-related 
injury and disease in the road transport industry due to reporting/claim problems 
and the fact that most owner/drivers do not take out workers' compensation cover 
(and a not insubstantial number have no insurance cover whatsoever). The Inquiry 
survey found that over 15% of owner/drivers had no cover or were uncertain of 
their cover and that a significant number (15.4%) of small fleet employee drivers 
were uncertain about their cover. The Inquiry received submissions that some small 
fleet operators actively discourage workers' compensation claims (urging them to 
use Medicare etc) - a potentially serious problem.  Given the evidence, the Inquiry is 
inclined to accept this practice occurs although its extent is unknown. 
• The Inquiry survey of drivers sought to bridge these gaps. It found over a quarter of 
drivers reported an acute injury or illness, with owner/drivers being far more likely 
to report minor injury ('usual little things’) than small or large fleet drivers. A more 
disturbing finding was that over half the drivers reported a chronic injury, a 
response that should be of grave concern to those concerned with the long term 
health and wellbeing of drivers. Over one third of owner/drivers and small fleet 
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operators reported a chronic back injury (the figure for large fleet drivers was 
23.5%). On the other hand, more large fleet drivers reported hearing loss (29.4%) 
than small fleet (19.2%) and owner/drivers (16.2%) though this difference could 
reflect more testing of the former. Whether the high incidence of chronic back 
injures is in any way linked to vehicle vibration problems raised elsewhere in the 
Report demands urgent attention. The incidence of hearing problems may even 
more directly suggest truck design issues. Alarmingly, seven drivers reported poor 
eyesight. 
• The survey also assessed driver psychological well being using the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ), an internationally recognised medium for measuring distress. 
The survey results revealed an overall mean score of 10.3, which is in the high range 
(a score of 8.59 is relatively normal), with owner/drivers having the highest mean 
score (11.5) and especially those working on the Hume Highway (mean of 13.1).  
Nearly 16% of drivers had scores of 14 or more (almost half were owner/drivers), 
which is deemed to constitute an extreme risk to health. In short, long distance truck 
drivers operate under considerable stress. Evidence presented to the Inquiry 
suggesting an abnormally high suicide rate amongst drivers provides additional 
cause for concern.  
• Low-level occupational violence is a serious problem for truck drivers. About half 
the drivers surveyed reported experiencing occupational violence in the past 12 
months, most often in the form of verbal abuse or threats, although nearly 1% of 
owner/drivers and large fleet drivers had been physically assaulted. Owner/drivers 
experienced more occupational violence (54.5%) than small fleet (45.2%) and large 
fleet drivers (42.3%). About 20% of all drivers had experienced 'road rage', most at 
the hands of other road users rather than other truck drivers.  
 
Aside from these health and safety indicators, the Inquiry collected evidence of serious 
risks to health and safety, including excessive hours of work and other dangerous 
practices. 
 
• As indicated in the recent federal House of Representatives Inquiry, long hours of 
work and fatigue remain a significant concern in the long haul industry, increasing 
the risk of collisions and having other health effects. For the years 1993 to 1998 the 
RTA has estimated that fatigued heavy truck drivers accounted for 80.8 casualty 
crashes (or 7.6% of total casualty crashes) in NSW and fatigued articulated truck 
drivers accounted for 58.7 (or 5.6%) casualty crashes.  The RTA identified an 
upward trend in both the numbers of crashes and casualties over time. These 
concerns are echoed in a recent national survey of fatigue amongst 1,000 long 
distance drivers undertaken by Dr Ann Williamson and colleagues and 
benchmarked against an earlier (1991) survey. The survey found there had been 
increase in the work required of long distance drivers, entailing longer trips and 
with a reported earlier onset of fatigue. Most drivers did some midnight to dawn 
driving (when there are far higher risks of crashing), over 20% had exceeded the 72 
hour working hour limit in the last week and around a quarter admitted breaking 
driving hours regulations on every trip. In short, many drivers work excessive and 
dangerous hours and the situation is if anything, getting worse.  Long hours also 
make it very difficult for drivers to juggle work and family commitments. 
• A direct consequence of the long hours worked by drivers is resort to stimulant 
drugs. Drivers use drugs not for pleasure but to combat fatigue and stay at the wheel 
longer. Although the precise level of drug use in the long distance trucking industry 
is unknown, the evidence available to this Inquiry leads to a firm conclusion that it is 
widespread. The recent Peak Hill incident is indicative of the elaborate supply 
chains that service this use. More to the point, aside from serious long-term health 
effects, the consequences of drug use by drivers has been graphically illustrated by 
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the tragedies at Cowper (NSW) in 1989 and Blanchetown (South Australia) in 1996. 
Drugs are a long-term feature of the industry and are structured into the work 
process in a way that can be found in no other occupation (except perhaps 
prostitution). This situation cannot be permitted to continue. 
• Speeding heavy vehicles are significantly over-represented in crashes. Despite the 
use of speed limiting devices, speeding by long distance trucks remains widespread, 
with RTA detection using Culway sites indicating that the proportion of trucks 
exceeding the speed limit ranges from 30 to 50%, depending on the route/highway. 
The Inquiry received considerable evidence to show that speeding trucks 
represented a pervasive and serious safety issue. 
• In addition to these issues the Inquiry received evidence on a range of other safety 
issues including overloading of trucks, inadequate load restraint, poor vehicle 
design/configuration and maintenance, inadequate rest areas and roadhouses, 
hazardous loads, as well as hazards associated with subcontracting/labour hire. 
 
These serious safety problems in the long distance trucking industry require urgent 
attention. However, many of the problems just identified are symptoms rather than the 
root cause of poor safety performance in the industry. It is to the question of underlying 
causes that attention now turns. 
 
Commercial Practices and Safety 
 
A key term of reference of this Inquiry - and one that differentiates it from many earlier 
inquiries - was to investigate the link if any between commercial practices, including the 
role of customers and consignors, and safety. In particular the terms of reference 
required the Inquiry to investigate of client and consignor requirements on tendering 
practices, contracts, methods of pricing, delivery times and lack of client responsibility 
for driver hours, performance and remuneration. 
 
The Inquiry drew on evidence from a wide range of sources, including numerous (often 
detailed) submissions as well as examining the evidence presented to earlier inquiries 
into the road transport industry, commissioned research and relevant evidence from 
overseas, most notably the USA. Putting this evidence together, the Inquiry reached the 
following conclusions: 
 
That current commercial arrangements between an array of parties to the transport of 
freight, including load owners/clients and receivers, consignors and brokers, freight 
forwarders, large and small fleets as well as owner/drivers have a significant influence 
on safety. Customer and consignor requirements on price, schedules and 
loading/unloading and freight contracts more generally, in conjunction with the 
atomistic and intensely competitive nature of the industry, encourage problematic 
tendering practices, unsustainable freight rates and dangerous work practices. The 
situation is accentuated by an oversupply of operators, itself fostered by ease of entry 
into the industry (in both a financial and regulatory sense), and poor business practices 
on the part of a significant number of operators. Perhaps the most disturbing signs are 
clear evidence that many operators are economically non-viable and even large 
companies have been experiencing problems in recent years (resulting in a series of 
takeovers, restructures but not ones that appear to be leading to a more stable and 
viable industry). 
 
Some of the more specific evidence and findings of the Inquiry were: 
 
• During its own investigation the Inquiry discovered earlier inquiries, coronial 
inquests and commissioned research into the road freight industry since the 1980s 
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that identified a strong association between commercial practices and safety. This 
included detailed research by Hensher and colleagues during the 1990s that found a 
clear and significant link between scheduling pressures, unpaid waiting time, 
insecure rewards and access to work, and hazardous practices such as speeding, 
excessive hours and drug use by drivers. Unfortunately, apart from the National 
Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et al 1984), this evidence appears to have had 
little impact on policy recommendations or implementation (and the key 
recommendation of the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry namely operator 
licensing was enacted but not implemented). Similarly, a recent inquiry into truck 
safety in New Zealand emphasised the significant role of economic incentives in 
regulatory evasion. 
• Tendering practices common in the industry contained a number of elements clearly 
not conducive to safe operation.  For example, tenders often took little explicit 
account of how a task was to be completed or other safety related issues and often 
quoted ‘all in’ prices that placed cost burdens on the transport company even for 
events beyond its control or due to customer inefficiency. Contracts often did not 
impose/enforce waiting time charges meaning that the customer had no incentive, 
other than their own convenience, for unloading trucks promptly. Given that local 
delivery drivers were paid on an hourly basis there was often an incentive to leave 
long distance trucks waiting. Delays exacerbated pressure to arrive early to beat the 
queue or race to get to the next job, especially amongst owner/drivers but also fleet 
drivers. 
• Very persuasive evidence was presented to the Inquiry that there are serious 
questions in relation to the ongoing economic viability of many operators, if not the 
industry more generally. Detailed analysis by Dean Croke found that for most of the 
1990s returns to not only small to medium operators but also large operators did not 
provide an adequate rate of return for long term sustainability and this, in turn, was 
incompatible with safe operation. Other evidence as well as submissions from 
owner/drivers, small fleet operators and more unexpected sources like insurers 
supported this interpretation. Low freight rates were widely seen as a direct threat 
to safe operations because they encouraged pushing the margins (cuts to 
maintenance, more trips in given period, speeding etc). Low freight rates were seen 
to originate from: 
• the pressure of customers in a strong bargaining position (and without the 
restraint of any accompanying OHS responsibilities) exacerbated by 
expectations of freight-rate cuts fostered in conjunction with the GST(see 
evidence in the Report) 
• intense competition amongst transport operators exacerbated by the ongoing 
relatively easy entry of new and often heavily indebted operators who in their 
desperation to survive will accept almost any rate for work and the use of 
pyramid subcontracting by larger firms to capture work at reduced rates. 
• poor business practices on the part of many (especially small) operators who 
focus on cash flows rather long term sustainable returns (though note the limited 
bargaining power of such operators may also make it difficult for them to charge 
more ‘realistic’ rates). 
• a regulatory environment where failure to abide by safety and other standards is 
not only possible but may actually deliver an economic advantage.  
• externalities (such as the full cost of the resulting injuries, deaths and illness) and 
the absence of competitive neutrality (for example, in terms of road/rail 
infrastructure investment/cost recovery and regulatory requirements) act as a 
hidden subsidy to freight rates. 
• the use of performance base payment systems (including industrial agreements) 
and widespread evasion of minimum award entitlements for drivers that 
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effectively encouraged illegal driving practices and enabled cost savings to be 
made (see below).  
• job insecurity fears of both employee and owner drivers make it more likely that 
they will accommodate to dangerous work practices rather than registering 
complaints to transport companies or customers. 
• Research by Williamson et al, and the Inquiry’s own survey, provide compelling 
evidence of an association between tight schedules, delivery time bonus/penalties and 
performance-based payment systems (eg kilometer-based rates) and both chronic 
injury and the propensity of drivers to engage in dangerous practices (such as 
speeding and excessive hours). Yet bonus/penalty systems remain common (if not in 
the largest firms) and if anything payment-by-results systems have become more 
widespread over the last 10 years - a consequence in the view of this Report of 
operator attempts to remain viable in a climate of low returns and client pressure. 
• Detailed evidence presented to the Inquiry on the US trucking industry, by Professor 
Michael Belzer, from the Trucking Industry Centre at the University of Michigan 
indicated that deregulation of the industry from the 1970s had led to intense 
competition which benefited clients but imposed serious costs on the industry itself. 
These included increased bankruptcy amongst small carriers and greater business 
volatility more generally, reduced freight rates (especially for larger manufacturers 
and shippers) and a substantial decline in the wages of truck drivers. Further, while 
environment and safety laws were retained (and indeed strengthened in areas like 
the carriage of hazardous substances and drug testing of drivers), economic de-
regulation exacerbated risks to drivers and public road users more generally. As in 
Australia, Belzer found the result was strong incentives to violate rules designed to 
encourage safe operations. Belzer also identified problems endemic to the Australian 
trucking industry, notably unpaid waiting time, low pay (he labelled trucks as 
sweatshops on wheels) and excessive hours of work. Further research by Belzer of 
the second largest trucking company in the USA demonstrated a clear link between 
pay levels and safety/crashes. Belzer et al found that the more wasted (ie unpaid) 
time drivers have the more likely they are to squeeze too many hours into a day, 
forcing schedule irregularity and excessive hours. Belzer argued that the consequent 
safety risk could be reduced by charging shippers and consignors for delay time and 
paying drivers for this time so they log it on as duty (measures to reduce driver 
turnover were also advocated). These findings are consistent with many submissions 
made to this Inquiry and earlier Australian research by Hensher and colleagues. 
• In sum, commercial/ industrial practices affecting road transport play a direct and 
significant role in fomenting hazardous practices. Until such time as these issue are 
addressed there is unlikely to be any significant improvement in safety performance 
across the industry. 
 
Extent of Proper Enforcement of Driving Hours, Speeding, Drug Use etc 
 
A key term of reference for the Inquiry was to examine the adequacy of enforcement 
practices with regard to critical safety issues. 
 
• Despite the fact that long distance drivers are legally permitted to work hours that 
would be regarded as excessive in almost any other occupation (ie 72 hours per 
week) evidence presented to this Inquiry showed that breach of driving-hours 
regulations was widespread. Further, the logbook system used to monitor hours was 
widely abused, a finding that echoes earlier inquiries. Limitations with the logbook 
identified including fraudulent entries, the keeping of two books, manipulation of 
the 100-kilometre trip requirement for a logbook to be kept, and the low and 
insufficiently differentiated fines imposed for logbook offences. Police expressed 
concern that the difficulty of enforcing logbooks had been made even more difficult 
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by the introduction of more flexible fatigue management regimes. Police also 
expressed concern at civil liability in situations where in interests of the safety of 
other road users they would want to order a fatigued driver not to proceed until they 
had rested but the freight was perishable. All these issues demand attention. 
• As with driving-hours regulations, there is evidence that present enforcement 
activities are finding it difficult to counter widespread speeding by trucks. Both the 
RTA and Police expressed concern at recent trends in the incidence of speeding and 
the difficulty of both detecting and prosecuting this. The NSW Police reported a 
substantial increase in the number of infringement notices (from 6,767 in 1998 to 
8,644 in 1999) and widespread use of illegal radar detectors as evidence of the 
inability of sections of the industry to set realistic schedules and the problem of 
existing sanctions curbing behaviour. The RTA has employed Safe-T-Cam at 21 sites 
across NSW to detect speeding and other offences, and while this has won 
widespread support (with calls to extend it other states), attempts to evade the 
system have been at least partially successful. In the past 12 months 34 NSW drivers 
and 85 interstate drivers had their privileges suspended for avoidance behaviour. 
Like a number of other states, NSW has also adopted the 'three strikes and you're 
out' scheme that targets persistent offenders, and by providing for the cancellation 
of truck registration, is designed to focus on operators not merely drivers. While the 
scheme has had a measure of success, there are serious problems in relation to 
enforcement on interstate and especially federally registered trucks because not all 
states operate the 'three strikes' scheme. Evidence of this is detailed in the section on 
coordination. At this point the Report would observe that existing enforcement 
practices in relation to speeding, while more effective than those in relation to 
driving hours, are failing to curb a serious level of offending by sections of the 
trucking industry. 
• Enforcement practices in relation to the use of stimulant drugs by truck drivers 
largely rely on on-road detection and, as police giving evidence to the Inquiry made 
clear, this often represents a time-consuming task only likely to detect some of the 
most extreme cases. The Inquiry received disturbing evidence about the ready 
supply of drugs and measures used to disguise drug use, including the ‘removal’ of 
drugs and other incriminating evidence by tow truck operators from heavy vehicles 
involved in collisions.  The recent police raid at Peak Hill indicated the potential 
benefit of targeting supply chains though regular raids of this nature would be 
required to have a significant impact (and even then the wide array of drug supply 
options behoves caution). Overall, existing enforcement activities appear to be 
having a limited effect. More systematic attempts to prevent drug use including 
random testing of drivers at particular companies or on particular routes may have 
some effect although the Inquiry’s admittedly limited investigation of mandatory 
drug testing of drivers in the USA identified a number of problems. Action against 
companies that either supply or tacitly accept drug use amongst their drivers might 
also have some value. However, it is the view of this Report that only after 
addressing the underlying reasons for drug use, are more targeted enforcement 
measures such as those just discussed likely to succeed. 
• In relation to the overloading of trucks and the use of load restraints a number of 
problems were identified such as the absence of weighbridges in number of key 
locations and police difficulties with more complicated load restraint requirements.  
• The Report identifies a number of general problems with current enforcement 
practices under road transport legislation. In particular, despite some efforts to 
target other parties affecting safety in the long distance trucking industry, existing 
enforcement remains too driver-focused. While truck drivers have legal 
responsibilities that must be met, focusing enforcement activities at the driver fails 
to address the root cause of many serious safety problems, presumes this action can 
alter behaviour (when there are strong pressures to evade), and represents a 'bottom 
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of the chain' mentality. Evidence presented to the Inquiry makes it clear that even 
those involved in on-road enforcement, such as highway police, are only too aware of 
this limitation. 
• In recent years the NRTC has sponsored an attempt to address this problem 
through the introduction of  'chain of responsibility' provisions into road transport 
legislation. Like other states, NSW amended its laws in 1999 to accommodate this 
change. There is strong support for this principle within the industry and the 
concept is a good one long established in areas like environmental and OHS law. At 
present the chain concept only applies to a limited array of problems (fatigue in 
NSW), the penalties for serious offences, while an increase on previous road 
transport legislation, are minuscule in comparison to those found for OHS and 
environmental legislation, and there have been few prosecutions (none in NSW). 
Many submissions expressed the hope that 'chain of responsibility' would change 
'safety culture' in the industry it is the view of this Inquiry that such a shift is 
unlikely in the near future. Even making these provisions work in the medium to 
long term will require a significant broadening and strengthening of the legislation, 
retraining those charged with enforcement, and a serious commitment to 
prosecution. While 'chain of responsibility' has potential, the industry's problems 
are too urgent for reliance to be placed on it in the immediate future (ie the next five 
years). Indeed, it astounded the Inquiry that concepts so long accepted in OHS and 
environmental law have taken so long to find their way into the road transport 
industry and then only in what can only be described as a muted form. 
• The NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act covers the road transport industry 
and contains arguably the most effective remedies for dealing with very serious 
offences by operators, consignors or clients. However, no real effort has been made 
by the responsible agency, WorkCover, to investigate or prosecute such offences 
even though this has support not only from the RTA but the union, industry 
associations, insurers and other parties. As this Inquiry has shown, there is evidence 
of a depressingly large number of cases where there are indications of corporate 
criminality warranting serious investigation. It should be noted that OHS agencies 
in other jurisdictions like Victoria are becoming more active in undertaking 
prosecutions in the trucking industry. 
• Evidence presented to the Inquiry, supported by submissions from drivers, the 
union and the NSW Road Transport Association clearly show that ensuring drivers 
are paid minimum award rates is a crucial safety issue. However, present award 
enforcement measures in NSW and elsewhere is largely complaint-based and, as far 
as the Inquiry could determine, has not prevented widespread evasion. A better-
resourced and more proactive approach to award enforcement is required.  
• Like the federal inquiry into fatigue, this Inquiry also received evidence of industrial 
agreements (AWAs) that effectively sanctified what can only described as an unsafe 
system of work. Again, as the federal fatigue inquiry indicated, this issue requires 
urgent attention.  
• The inquiry received a number of submissions on technological devices to aid 
enforcement including the use of tachographs (already mandatory in a number of 
countries but opposed by the industry here), driver-specific smart cards, and global 
positioning technology. Some of these devices have potential but past experience 
indicates that of themselves they are unlikely to work, as some sections of the 
industry have proved adept at disabling or modifying a succession of technological 
devices (like speed limiters) over many years. Tachographs may prove useful as an 
additional auditing device but only in conjunction with a new compliance system 
that addresses root causes not symptoms. 
• In sum, if ‘proper’ enforcement means enforcement activities that effectively deter 
dangerous practices, then it must be judged that without suggesting current 
practices have no effect and recognising some positive recent initiatives, there are 
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serious deficiencies in current enforcement regime. These deficiencies require urgent 
attention. In particular, without entirely foregoing existing driver sanctions, there is 
need for more vigorous enforcement activities that target the parties and practices 
(in relation to scheduling, remuneration and the like) that are the root causes of 
dangerous practices like speeding, excessive hours at the wheel and drug use.  
 
Current Forms of Regulation and Which Model is Most Appropriate 
 
The Inquiry was also asked to examine current forms of regulation and evaluate which 
types of regulation were most effective. A critical issue here was considering the relative 
merits of external regulation by state agencies and internal or self-regulation involving 
collaborative ventures between agencies and the industry itself. The former include the 
prescriptive requirements of road transport and industrial relations legislation, plus 
chain of responsibility and the mixture of performance and prescriptive standards in 
OHS legislation, aspects of which were described in the last section. The latter include 
accredited or self-audit management systems such as TruckSafe run nationally by the 
ATA and Transcare (a more recent Victorian initiative of the Victorian Road Transport 
Association with the support of WorkCover Victoria). Other examples of collaborative 
approaches to internal regulation are a number of fatigue management regimes 
(Transitional Fatigue Management Scheme, Fatigue Management Program) that 
provide more flexible hours arrangements than the standard hours regulations where 
companies can demonstrate they can manage driver fatigue according to an excepted set 
of criteria. Finally, the use of voluntary codes, such as that recently proposed nationally, 
can be seen as another form of self-regulation. 
 
In evaluating the relative merits of external and self-regulation, the Report found the 
following: 
 
• In the course of investigation the Inquiry became aware of number transport 
companies (with some notable exceptions, mostly medium to large firms) that have 
made assiduous efforts to manage driver fatigue and other safety-related issues. 
Their efforts should be recognised and applauded. The problem is that these 
operators have to be viewed as exceptional rather than typical of industry practice.  
• A number of the collaborative ventures appear to have merit although the numbers 
involved in most are either too small (such as the Fatigue Management Pilot scheme 
being trialed in Queensland) or the initiative too recent (such as TransCare in 
Victoria) to make definitive judgements. 
• The major exception is TruckSafe that has around 350 accredited members and has 
been operating, under various titles, for about 10 years. TruckSafe attracted a large 
number of both positive and negative assessments in submissions. Opinion was 
divided not only amongst drivers and operators but also insurers (although by far 
the largest did favour TruckSafe), regulators/enforcement agencies and other 
parties. On the positive side TruckSafe has indicated that the industry is willing to 
take a more systematic approach to safety, driver wellbeing and lift the standard of 
existing practices. On the negative side, TruckSafe in no way amounts to a 
comprehensive OHS management system (even many of its supporters believed it 
needed to be developed further to take in issues like subcontracting – and moves are 
afoot in this regard) and concerns were raised about the auditing process.  On 
balance, this Report would conclude that TruckSafe has a valuable role to play but it 
would achieve more credibility if it involved parties beyond the ATA and if it was 
subject to random rigorous audits by government inspectors (in addition to an 
improved version of the existing audit process).  
• However, it is also the firm view of this Report that the TruckSafe accreditation 
system will not and cannot change the ‘safety culture’ within the industry as whole. 
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During its existence TruckSafe has been unable to capture more than a small 
fraction of operators, and while this includes many (though by no means all) large 
operators its coverage of the overall long distance trucking fleet remains small. With 
some notable (but impressive) exceptions, the great majority of owner/drivers and 
small fleets show no interest in TruckSafe (and many the Inquiry spoke to were 
hostile and dismissive). Nor (even ignoring companies losing accreditation) is there a 
pattern of growth discernible that makes it likely that the coverage of TruckSafe will 
expand in the foreseeable future to a level that would raise general standards. 
Suggestions that incentives (such as discounts to insurance premiums) could be used 
to expand the coverage of TruckSafe (or other schemes like Transcare for that 
matter), do not, in the view of this Inquiry, represent a solution to this problem for a 
number of reasons. First, the offering of such incentives was opposed by a number of 
insurers (including at least one supporter of TruckSafe) as not being justified on the 
basis of performance by TruckSafe accredited firms (the largest insurer disagreed 
on this score). Second, such incentive schemes are known to be susceptible to 
manipulation of claims incidence (without any comparable changes in the incidence 
of claimable incidents). Third, insurance incentives will not influence the large 
number of predominantly small operators and owner/drivers who are under-insured 
(even non-insured) or who push the regulatory envelope even though these are 
precisely the ones who most need to meet accreditation requirements. Fourth, the 
incentive approach is liable to be defeated in practice by the elaborate 
subcontracting networks that already exist (by enabling firms to disguise 
risks/claims through outsourcing). The most direct and arguably effective way to 
achieve comprehensive and higher levels of performance through accreditation is to 
make it mandatory. 
• The Inquiry also looked at voluntary codes of conduct but has come to the view that, 
at least as far as the transport industry is concerned, these devices are essentially 
impractical for the following reasons. First, voluntary codes are not a new idea in 
the industry having been discussed and proposed since the late 1980s (and arguably 
far earlier if you include the agreement on payments to owner/drivers that resulted 
from the Razorback protests of the late 1970s). The question then becomes if these 
measures have failed to be implemented or to be effective in the past, what is going 
to make another attempt any more successful? Second, the reasons these codes have 
failed are not hard to find in terms of the structure of the industry and other issues 
already highlighted in this Report. The intensely competitive, fractured and volatile 
nature of the industry means that, as has occurred in the past, enough operators will 
break ranks to place pressure on others and a snowball effect will progressively 
unravel the agreement within a relatively short space of time. It is noteworthy that 
even amongst majority of drivers, including owner/drivers, and small fleet 
operators, there was severe skepticism verging on complete disbelief in the prospects 
of self-regulation working in the road transport industry. In the view of this Inquiry, 
voluntary codes in this industry amount to little more than symbolism and will not 
effect significant changes in safety. 
• Further, efforts aimed to improve safety in the industry must recognise the influence 
that load owners and consignors exert in relation to freight rates, scheduling and 
waiting periods spent waiting to load or unload. Thus far, none of the 
collaborative/self-regulatory compliance regimes or voluntary codes address this 
dimension although the Inquiry understands the ATA has recently held discussions 
with the ARA on mutually agreed principles. The TWU has proposed codes of 
conduct to retailers but these are by way of a signed agreement rather than a 
voluntary code.  
• Transport operators should be encouraged to take ‘internal’ responsibility for the 
health and safety of drivers and members of the public using or living close to roads. 
However, it is the firm view of this Report that this can only be achieved by 
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stringent, rigorously enforced external regulation. In this industry there is ample 
evidence over a long period that self-regulation amounts to little more than a 
deregulated ‘law of the jungle’ where ethical operators are punished by those 
prepared to evade the most basic legal standards relating to driving hours, rest 
breaks, speeding, overloading and the like. Only mandating and enforcing improved 
safety standards through external regulation is likely to change ‘cultures’ or set of 
attitudes and practices that have been shown to been entrenched over a long period 
of time. 
• A number of submissions called for 'smart compliance' or the attempt to maximise 
enforcement impact given limited resources. The ATA argued that schemes such as 
TruckSafe provided the opportunity to concentrate resources on operators making 
no obvious effort to improve OHS through accreditation or other voluntary 
schemes. The Report accepts that enforcement processes can differentiate and adapt 
to meet the different demands of those operators with an OHS management system 
and those without. This depends on those voluntary systems being externally vetted 
to ensure they meet the purported standards in practice (such as the problem of 
'paper compliance'). As yet there are insufficient guarantees in this regard (and 
changes are therefore needed). Further, the limited coverage of TruckSafe and other 
schemes means that even if these conditions were met the resources freed up are 
likely to be quite limited at the present time. If a proactive approach to lift operator 
standards generally was introduced that placed the burden of compliance far more 
heavily on the operator, then a differentiated approach might be sustainable. The 
Inquiry makes a number of recommendations in this regard with one being 
mandatory operator licensing (see below). At the same time, the Report accepts the 
more general point about the need for a more strategic compliance program. Other 
recommendations on this are identified below (with more detailed observations in 
the main sections of the Report)  
• As indicated in the section on enforcement, the existing regulatory package needs to 
be reorientated so that it more effectively addresses the full range of parties and 
commercial/industrial arrangements underpinning unsafe driving practices. This 
includes making significant use of OHS legislation, especially in relation to higher 
order of seriousness or systemic offences. As has been shown in other industries, this 
legislation covers a wide range of parties, has substantial penalties and includes the 
performance standards that encourage employers and others to adopt internal 
responsibility. As the level and reliability of payments made to both employee 
drivers and owner/drivers can be shown to affect safety, these need to be addressed 
in a proactive and serious manner. The recommendations below address these 
issues. 
• Further, the minimal OHS standards and poor business practices of many existing 
operators, and the ease of entry of similarly deficient operators, need to be 
addressed in a proactive and comprehensive manner.  In 1984 the federal National 
Road Freight Industry Inquiry, which more than any subsequent inquiry prior to 
this one, examined the links between commercial practices and safety, called for the 
introduction of operator licensing and federal legislation to achieve this was enacted 
but never implemented. Put bluntly, road freight is the only mode of long distance 
transport where no form of operator licensing exists in Australia (see for example 
rail, air and sea transport). All that is needed is a truck and a truck driver’s license 
or licensed driver. The absence of operator licensing may be acceptable in some 
businesses like a clothing shop where the consequent risks to the public are minimal 
but it is not acceptable where the lives, health and wellbeing of hundreds if not 
thousands (counting serious injuries) of Australians are put at risk. Moreover, as the 
rail freight industry was at pains to point out, the demonstrably more dangerous 
road freight industry is able to operate without a license while rail operators must 
undergo a rigorous form of operator licensing. This situation can hardly be justified 
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on grounds of economic efficiency/competitive neutrality let alone driver and public 
health and safety. A number of other countries such as the UK and New Zealand 
already have an operator licensing system. The recent federal Inquiry in fatigue in 
transport recommended that mandatory operator licensing be looked at by the year 
2002.  Amongst the considerable number of parties raising the issue of accreditation 
to this Inquiry there was virtually a unanimous view that some form of accreditation 
was needed but opinions differed as to whether it should be mandatory or voluntary. 
As already indicated, available evidence indicates reliance on a voluntary system to 
fill this gap in the industry is wishful thinking. This Inquiry can see no justification 
in delaying this matter further. It recommends immediate steps be taken to 
introduce a national licensing system that requires operators to demonstrate basic 
business skills, a business plan, knowledge of OHS (including fatigue management) 
and other essential elements before they can gain entry to the industry. License fees 
and ongoing regular audits of operators to retain their license should be designed to 
recover costs of administering the system and providing appropriate 
educational/certification packages. 
• In sum, this Report strongly recommends that external regulation be used to lift the 
baseline of safety performance across the industry and to encourage operators to 
improve their internal management of OHS. Voluntary schemes such as TruckSafe, 
TransCare and the Queensland Fatigue Management Pilot Scheme should be used to 
facilitate operators achieving higher standards of OHS performance. That is, they 
represent a potentially important adjunct to the regulatory system but not a 
substitute for vigorous and targeted external enforcement. 
 
Coordination and Resourcing of Regulatory Bodies 
 
The last major term of reference of the Inquiry was to assess the coordination and 
resourcing of regulatory bodies. In terms of regulating road safety there are two distinct 
but overlapping areas of coordination. First, there is the coordination between different 
regulatory agencies within each jurisdiction, in this case New South Wales, a 
responsibility for trucking safety (most notably the Police Force, RTA, WorkCover and 
the EPA but also arguably including the courts [including the Coroners Court]). Second, 
since the long haul trucking industry moves beyond the confines of any state or territory 
and is governed by a national framework there is also the question of coordination 
between jurisdictions and with national bodies (most notably the NRTC). Investigation 
by this Inquiry indicates there are serious problems in relation to both areas of 
regulatory coordination. The Inquiry was also asked to examine whether existing 
regulatory bodies were sufficiently resourced. This issue overlaps to some extent with 
the coordination issue (as it depends on which agencies or arrangements will achieve the 
most effective use of available resources). Hence, it will be dealt with under this heading 
rather than separately. 
 
At the level of coordination of agencies responsible for trucking safety in the state of 
NSW a number of serious problems were identified. 
 
• There is clear evidence, overwhelmingly supported by submissions to the Inquiry 
(including submissions from agencies themselves), that there is, at present, 
inadequate coordination amongst regulatory bodies responsible for safety in the long 
haul road transport industry that needs to be addressed. Although there is a degree 
of information sharing and collaboration between the NSW Police and the RTA this 
cooperation could be enhanced. With regard to the other two agencies with 
responsibilities for some health or safety aspect of long haul road transport, namely 
WorkCover and the Environmental Protection Authority the latter had some 
dealings with the RTA but WorkCover has remained largely outside the loop. 
WorkCover preferred to take a residual role at best, seeing the RTA as the lead 
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agency. In support of this view, WorkCover also pointed to a number of technical 
problems in relation to the NSW OHS Act. It is the view of this Report, backed by 
an independent legal assessment by an expert in OHS law, that the latter difficulties 
are not insurmountable (and one relatively minor amendment would assist in this 
regard). Further, there are compelling reasons why OHS legislation must be brought 
into play in the industry if a reasonably rapid change in safety performance is to be 
achieved. Put simply, the OHS Act contains general duties applying to a range of 
parties, an array of penalties more likely to have real deterrent value, and a proven 
record of successful implementation. This legislation can achieve now and better 
some of the key objectives of 'chain of responsibility' legislation.  In Victoria, these 
options are now being actively explored (further, the Victorian Road Transport 
Association has worked to bring coroners into the loop). By getting a more balanced 
mix of road transport and OHS legislation and greater cooperation amongst the 
agencies a number of the serious limits with the current approach can be addressed.  
• Drawing the foregoing points together, there is a pressing need to better coordinate 
the implementation of road transport, OHS, EPA and industrial relations laws, and 
the various bodies responsible for them, in both an operational and policy sense. 
Each of these laws and agencies has an important role to play and to achieve an 
optimal mix of compliance activity but as yet there is insufficient dialogue and no 
mechanism to achieve this. A more coordinated approach would not only yield a 
better mix but also offers the potential for collaborative campaigns, blitzes etc. A 
mechanism to achieve this, and address other problems identified in this Report, is 
recommended below. 
• A more coordinated approach will have advantages in terms of increasing the 
impact of measures, evaluating their effectiveness and getting the optimal impact 
from a mix of information dissemination, local blitzes, high-chain prosecutions and 
the use of publicity. The Inquiry received a number of submissions, including some 
from industry representatives as well as insurers, the TWU etc, to indicate that 
current resourcing of enforcement by the police, RTA and industrial relations 
inspectorate was inadequate. The Inquiry accepts these submissions but has tried to 
indicate in what areas resources should be prioritised. 
 
In terms of national coordination too, a number of problems or sources of concern were 
identified 
 
• Since the early 1990s the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) has been 
responsible for coordinating national improvements in the economic/cost efficiency 
of road transport and safety, including promoting a consistent national framework 
of road transport legislation. Almost all parties acknowledged the advantages of a 
national approach to regulating the trucking industry, however, a number of parties 
heavily qualified this or were highly critical of particular developments. The 
criticism emanated from a wide range of interests including drivers, some industry 
associations, insurers, motoring organisations, academics and the TWU. The main 
criticisms made were: 
• The re-configuration of trucks by length, size, capacity etc was primarily 
dictated by commercial advantage and insufficient consideration had been given 
safety consequences for drivers or the community 
• That in the mid 1990s a longer span of driving hours had been considered by the 
NRTC which was viewed by the NRMA and several other bodies as nothing 
short of alarming. That the issue was even raised did nothing to imbue 
confidence in the NRTC’s safety agenda. 
• That these reforms failed to take sufficient account of differing road conditions 
including terrain, population and the level of road usage in specific states which, 
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for example, might translate into differences in terms of acceptable vehicle 
configurations and enforcement levels.  
• The problems posed when enforcement of trucks travelling in one jurisdiction 
depended on another jurisdiction given disparities in compliance practices (see 
for example discussion of the ‘three strikes’ scheme below). 
• That the national load restraint code developed by the NRTC was too complex to 
be readily enforced by Police. 
• That staff of the NRTC were largely economists and lawyers who lacked 
expertise in OHS and that, until recently, safety had not been accorded sufficient 
weight in the reform agenda in comparison to economic/commercial 
considerations and industry needs. 
• Criticism of a (relatively small) national body with the difficult task of dealing with 
multiple state agencies to achieve co-ordinated outcomes is hardly surprising, and 
consequently should be assessed cautiously. Some issues (like the load restraint code) 
might be seen as teething problems.  The NRTC pushed the concept of ‘chain of 
responsibility’. It can hardly be blamed for limited enforcement although it might be 
argued this approach should have been a priority when the body was established 
and insufficient attention was paid to successful models already found in relation to 
OHS and environmental law. The NRTC has also pushed the concept of fatigue 
management, widely accepted as a positive step in the industry, and has recently 
sponsored important research with regard to this. On the other hand, it is fair to say 
that there have been significant gaps in the NRTC trucking safety agenda, both in 
research and policy terms (such as considering the impact of commercial practices 
or detailed analysis of the underlying reasons for fatality/crash trends). Further, the 
difficulty of juggling both economic/commercial and safety considerations has not 
enhanced the NRTC’s credibility at least in the eyes of a number of key groups. 
• The RTA has identified a extremely serious flouting of road rules by trucks 
registered under the Federally Interstate Registration Scheme (FIRS) who were 
effectively evading the 'three-strikes' scheme. While FIRS trucks constitute only 2% 
of the national heavy vehicle fleet as at 25 May 2000 they had recorded 740 strikes 
or 47.1% of the total (NSW registered trucks recorded 267 strikes or 16.9% and 
Victorian registered trucks 335 strikes or 22.6%). Evasion is further facilitated by 
the fact that stamp duty is not levied on the transfer of FIRS vehicles so an operator 
can shift registration of their truck to avoid a sanction at little cost. A number of 
requests by the NSW Minister for Transport to repeal FIRS legislation or make it 
possible for states like NSW to take direct action against operators met with no 
response from the Commonwealth although the Inquiry understands the matter is 
now being addressed. The belated response to this problem hardly adds to the 
credibility of a national regulatory system. 
 
Recommendations: Industry Code of Practice 
 
The Report finds that a combination of commercial/industry practices and structural 
features of the road transport industry constitute a significant underlying reason for 
unsafe practices and the industry’s poor overall safety performance. It is the view of this 
Inquiry that past intervention has failed because it focused on symptoms of the problem 
(such as driver behaviour in relation to drugs, speeding, hours at the wheel etc) rather 
than the commercial/industrial practices that encourage unsafe behaviour. Given a 
choice between economic survival/keeping their job or obeying the law it is only too 
clear that many drivers and operators have opted for the former. 
  
The key recommendations of the Inquiry are to establish a Code of Practice for the long 
haul road transport industry, including four key elements and a number of supporting 
elements. The four key elements are: 
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First, there is a pressing need to address a serious coordination problem amongst 
regulatory agencies responsible for safety in the long distance trucking industry to 
achieve a more coordinated, strategic and effective compliance program. The preferred 
recommendation of the Inquiry is that a Long Distance Trucking Safety Authority be 
established in New South Wales with the responsibility of coordinating safety strategies 
in relation to the industry and undertaking its own investigative and compliance 
activities. The Authority should include a small inspectorate to undertake targeted 
compliance programs under the NSW OHS Act. Inspectors will also have powers under 
Road Transport and Industrial Relations legislation. The Inquiry recognises that, while 
a statutory authority is its preferred option, another structural arrangement may 
achieve the same outcome, namely establishing a Permanent Taskforce chaired by the 
Motor Accidents Authority and with representatives of all the relevant government 
agencies to carry out the role identified in relation to the Authority. If the latter option is 
pursued then suitable safeguards (including meaningful benchmarks and reporting 
requirements) should be put in place to ensure the Taskforce can and does carry out its 
task of facilitating a more coordinated and proactive approach to regulation. Further, if 
the Taskforce rather than Authority option is pursued then suitable arrangements will 
need to be made for administering the licensing system, inspectorate and other 
compliance measures proposed below. As the New Zealand experience all too clearly 
shows, if the compliance regime is not suitably resourced and implemented then it will 
amount to little more than tokenism. 
 
• Second, the Authority will be responsible for administering a compulsory licensing 
system covering operators (including owner/drivers), freight forwarders, consignors 
and brokers/agents. The licensing system will ensure all operators meet basic 
business skill, OHS and other performance standards so they can undertake their 
tasks safely and so other parties, like consignors and agents are fully aware of their 
OHS and public safety responsibilities.  
 
• Third, the existing logbook system should be abolished. In its place it should be 
required that all trucks undertaking one way trips of more than 100km in NSW 
carry a Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement with copies of the plan 
to held and signed off by both the transport company and the client/consignor. This 
requirement will apply to any truck travelling within NSW or trucks crossing into 
NSW from other states that travel more than 100km in NSW. Failure to comply with 
the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement requirement is to be 
deemed as a breach as of regulation in its own right as well as prima facie evidence 
of a breach of the general duty provisions of the NSW OHS Act. The components of 
the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement are detailed in the Report. 
 
• Fourth, minimum award rates to employee drivers and safety-based payments for 
owner/drivers are essential for long-term safety in the industry. To address these 
overlapping issues there two sets of recommendations are made. First, it is 
recommended that additional resources be allocated to award enforcement in NSW 
and that more proactive forms of enforcement be undertaken. Further, the NSW 
government should seek the collaboration of other jurisdictions in matching 
measures. Second, that minimum legally enforceable 'safety rates' be established for 
owner/drivers to be decided by panel of the Industrial Relations Commission of 
NSW from applications made to it by the Long Distance Trucking Authority. 
Further, it is recommended that the NSW government seek corresponding measures 
from other jurisdictions. 
 
Other recommendations in connection to the Code of Practice are: 
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• Prohibit bonus/ penalty payments in relation to delivery time/scheduling 
• Protect police and other authorised officers from civil liability in cases where a 
vehicle had been ‘grounded’ in the interests of public safety 
• The expression “while they are at the employer’s place of work” should be removed 
from section 8(2) of the OHSA 2000 (NSW), so that it resembles section 22 of the 
Victorian OHS Act. Similar amendments should be made to section 9 of the OHSA 
(NSW) (the self-employed person’s duty). 
• Protection for contractors and drivers who refuse to engage in unsafe working 
practices 
• That the RTA involves industry associations and the TWU in developing and 
implementing an action plan on the upgrading of parking bays/rest areas. Measures 
for enhancing the quality/suitability of food, comfort and rest afforded by 
roadhouses should also be explored. 
• That current driver training methods should be evaluated with a view to identifying 
deficiencies and to also to provide a basis for progressive enhancement of driver 
competencies. Driving a truck should be regarded as a life long learning experience, 
with periodic re-testing and upgrading of skills. 
• That WorkCover NSW take measures to address the lack of knowledge and access 
to workers' compensation amongst long haul truck drivers, by raising awareness of 
entitlements and the need to have some insurance cover in the case of owner/drivers. 
Further, WorkCover should investigate complaints of active claim suppression by 
some companies as well as undertaking random audits designed to detect such illegal 
practices. 
• There is a need to improve road user understanding of sharing the road with heavy 
vehicles, including those issues most relevant to safety such as overtaking/length, 
turning characteristics of long/articulated vehicles and breaking distances. The 
addition of these issues in driver education and license testing should be considered 
as well as support for programs such as the National Sharing the Roads with Heavy 
Vehicles scheme. 
• The RTA should investigate heavy vehicle mass, configuration and vibration 
concerns raised by Dr Arnold McLean and others and report its findings to the 
Minister for Transport. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Measured in terms of freight rates, timeliness, geographic spread/distances travelled and the 
vast array of diverse goods (from steel girders, timber or car parts to live cattle or mangoes) 
moved to docks, markets, warehouse, stores, factories and other workplaces, long haul road 
transport in Australia achieves an outstanding level of economic efficiency. Long distance 
trucking makes an often under-estimated but very substantial contribution to the Australia 
economy and society. The transport and storage sector as whole comprises about 6% of 
Australia's GDP, with the GDP of road transport amounting to almost $14.7 billion in 1997 
(Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 1999). As in most 
industrialised countries, road transport is by far the dominant mode of internal transport. In 
1992 the Bureau of Industry Economics estimated that the direct or indirect contribution (per 
$100 of final output) of road transport to produce certain products ranged from as low as 
$2.64 for machinery up to $6.25 for petroleum and coal, $6.70 for milk and meat, and $8.51 
for non-metallic mineral products (Department of Communications, Information Technology 
and the Arts, 1999:3). Though comprising only a small component of road transport, the long 
haul road freight sector has an economic and social influence well beyond its size. Any 
serious disruption to long haul trucking would have nothing short of disastrous effects on the 
Australian economy (which is not to discount the critical role played by rail freight). 
 
The social significance of road transport is no less important. Long haul trucks play a vital but 
often invisible part in the lives of every Australian. For example, few Australians visiting 
their supermarket are aware that of the vast array of products on the shelves, much has been 
transported long distances by road. As with products for other clients like manufacturers, 
goods have often been delivered to meet tight schedules; to minimise warehousing 
requirements (as part of the growing use of Just-In-Time practices) or to ensure product 
freshness. Thus, for example, those living in Sydney and nearby cities or towns are 
accustomed to have tropical fruit on their supermarket or fruit-barn shelves that was picked 
less than 24 hours before in northern Queensland. A thousand kilometres further south in 
Melbourne produce from the same origin has arrived in less than 36 hours after 
picking/packaging.  
 
In winter tomatoes grown in central Queensland are trucked south while asparagus from 
Victoria is shipped north. In summer, cherries and other stone fruit are available at all ends of 
the continent alongside tropical fruit. The transport network has, in conjunction with 
refrigeration and the introduction of new varieties, extended the season of particular products. 
Fresh fish and a wide variety of other perishable goods are available all year round, often 
being shipped vast distances. Elaborate logistical networks between growers, freight 
forwarders and loading agents, supermarkets and other buyers, transport companies and 
drivers (including owner/drivers) assures both rapid movement to diverse destinations and 
makes use of climatic differences across our vast continent to ensure a wider array of fresh 
produce and extended seasons. Rationalisation in the meat and dairy industries has meant that 
these products too must often travel long distances. Likewise, processed food products also 
move large distances (from canned fruit and juice manufactured in Brisbane to breakfast 
cereals and food-bars made in northern Victoria. The achievement of this vast logistical and 
transport network can readily be appreciated if you were to simply compare the array of fresh 
fruit and vegetables available to Australian consumers in mid-winter to those available to 
their Northern European counterparts in autumn (let alone winter). 
 
As already noted, the achievements of the road transport industry are by no means confined to 
the movement of fresh produce or goods for supermarkets. These examples were chosen 
because they most readily demonstrate the vital everyday contribution that the long distance 
trucking industry makes to the community. Nevertheless, similar illustrations could be 
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provided in relation to the movement of steel products, white goods, furniture, car parts, 
chemicals and a host of other products that are moved rapidly over the long distances 
separating major urban centres in Australia as well as the network of regional centres and 
country towns. 
 
Contrary to popular images of the industry, the long distance component only accounts for 
around 20% of road freight movements in Australia (ie 80% of the total road freight tasks 
involve trips of less than 100 kilometers). Many truck owners use them in connection to their 
principal business which is not transport (such as the delivery of goods they have produced) 
and do not seek to use them as a means of earning income by undertaking paid freight tasks. 
Further, most road freight movements are short distance. According to the ATA (written 
submission, ATA page 10) about half of road freight services occur within urban areas and 
most are intrastate. Indeed, the 1000 million tonnes of freight moved by road each year travels 
an average haul of 90 kilometers. The other mode of transport that most directly competes 
with road transport is rail. Despite recent efficiency improvements and growth in absolute 
tonnage moved, rail freight is largely confined to bulk commodities like coal (again mainly 
intrastate) and has been progressively losing its overall share of the total land freight task to 
road transport. The other major transport modes have little bearing on road transport. Sea 
freight is mainly used for moving bulk commodities over long distances (ie interstate or 
overseas) while airfreight focuses on moving high value or urgent goods over long distances. 
Overall, road transport accounts for a substantial and increasing component of land transport. 
 
These achievements of the long distance trucking industry come with a cost. These costs 
include safety problems facing drivers and the general motoring public. In the early 1990s the 
total number of fatalities involving articulated vehicles on Australian roads declined from the 
horror years of the late 1980s (epitomised by the tragic Cowper and Clybucca smashes in 
northern New South Wales) and has remained at roughly this level since. Though not an 
insubstantial achievement given the expansion of the industry, incidents involving articulated 
vehicles still account for a significant and disproportionate number of all road fatalities (only 
in about a quarter of these is the truck driver held responsible) and truck driving remains one 
of the most dangerous occupations. At Tarcutta on the Hume Highway between Melbourne 
and Sydney the steady addition of names to a memorial wall to drivers killed on the job (a 
rare if not unique monument) provides testimony to the risks drivers confront on a daily basis. 
Despite this ongoing toll, on-road incidents resulting in death very rarely lead to detailed 
investigation let alone prosecution of employers or other parties that might have had a 
responsibility (and despite Victorian research indicating frequent there is prima facie evidence 
of corporate criminality in a large number of cases). 
 
In other industries like mining the death of four or more miners in a single incident typically 
leads to a major official investigation or royal commission. However, there has never been a 
similar inquiry into whether there are systemic reasons for the dozens of truck drivers killed 
on our highways each year or the relationship of hours/fatigue to single-vehicle fatalities. 
There is also an important public safety dimension here. While multiple deaths are common 
in collisions between articulated vehicles and other trucks or between articulated vehicles and 
cars, utilities etc driven by other road users this has aroused little public debate or official 
inquiry (beyond a coronial investigation and, in some instances, subsequent court proceedings 
against the driver). Thus, four, five or six people may die in a road-related incident involving 
a heavy vehicle (such as the crash in North Queensland in November 2000) with a limited 
official response. A similar number dying in an airplane or train crash leads to considerably 
more media attention and invariably an official investigation.  
 
There are other indications of the hazardous nature of the industry. Claims on compulsory 
third party insurance (CTP) involving heavy vehicles have escalated in recent years and 
despite recent increases the insurance industry has made it plain that existing premiums do not 
cover the cost of claims by a substantial margin. For example, one insurer argued that the 
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premiums for heavy goods carrying vehicles needed to be 30% above the current level and 
added: 
 
The magnitude of the problem is best explained by comparing the experience of heavy Goods 
Carrying vehicles to that of passenger vehicles. For vehicles based in the metropolitan area 
the claim frequency for trucks >16t GVM is 4 times that of passenger vehicles and the 
average cost is 1.4 times higher than that of passenger vehicles (John Vallance written 
submission on behalf of MMI).  
 
The problem extends to comprehensive insurance where commercial vehicle insurance rates 
have risen dramatically (in many instances by more than 30%) since October 1999 (written 
submission, NTI Insurance, page 4). New South Wales appeared to be the worst case, with 
one insurer reporting that NSW accounted for about 30% of its total trucking business but 
almost 85% of its underwriting losses nationally (written submission truck insurer). Further, 
the experience and views of insurers appeared to vary little between those who specialised in 
road transport insurance and those for who the area was more a sideline. In other words, even 
the companies with the largest market shares and best databases of risk information were 
experiencing difficulty because, in their view, premiums simply did not match the escalating 
cost of claim payouts. 
 
There are other ways of evaluating safety in the long haul trucking industry. The incidence of 
deaths and injuries associated with moving goods by road – an index of its safety performance 
– is far worse than the main alternative form of land transport, namely rail. This is despite the 
fact that far more funds have been expended on upgrading roads than in maintaining an 
ageing rail network. 
 
Beyond statistical measures there are also more subjective assessments by drivers, their 
families, the Transport Workers' Union, motoring organisations and individuals who come 
into regular contact with long haul trucks (such as those living near major highways). As 
evidence presented later will show, these parties all share a deep concern that the safety 
performance of the long distance trucking industry is seriously deficient. Many expressed the 
opinion that they believed things were getting worse rather than better. While this view may 
be expected from those groups and individuals it is also a view that finds support amongst a 
number of key regulatory agencies. Further, it is view shared by at least some industry 
associations and a large number of individual operators who made submissions to the Inquiry. 
Nor are these concerns confined to NSW. For example, in a letter to Queensland Transport in 
June 1999 the CEO of one medium-sized fleet wrote: 
 
…we are constantly at the coalface with respect to the management and driver behaviour of 
other transport companies and what we see is not only depressing but most alarming. It is 
commonly accepted by responsible and knowledgeable industry people from magazine editors 
such as Andrew Stewart through to operational management and particular drivers that 
unsafe linehaul practices are not only rife but becoming worse. [Named own company] 
drivers work with the knowledge that their lives are at constant risk from getting taken out by 
another semi. They know what is going on as we do, but like most if not all in road transport 
want to "PROTECT THE INDUSTRY'S GOOD NAME" by keeping it "in house" (taken from 
copy of correspondence attached to written submission, Queensland-based transport 
operator). 
 
For many years the industry has complained of a few bad operators or "cowboys" destroying 
its reputation and this Inquiry heard many references to this. However, such suggestions 
simply do not match the overwhelming body of evidence presented to the Inquiry and were 
often contradicted by other observations in the very oral and written submissions which 
referred to a fringe of "cowboy" operators. Rather, without demeaning the achievements of a 
number of very responsible operators, the picture that emerged was one of systemic problems, 
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with intense competition and pressures from clients causing many operators had to find ways 
to cut costs and corners in terms of scheduling. The Inquiry was given numerous examples by 
a wide array of parties of supply chains where, as best, scheduling made no allowance for any 
contingency and at worst presumed illegal practices. For example, returning to case of fresh 
produce, the Bowen mango that arrives and is the shops in Canberra on Monday morning in 
time for those on their way to work would have been unloaded at around 3am in the Sydney 
markets the same day. The mango had been picked and packed on Friday afternoon/Saturday 
morning and left Bowen around lunchtime Saturday, with the truck then covering around 
3,000 kilometers to the Sydney markets in around 39 hours (assuming departure at precisely 
12 noon). Even at an average speed of 90 kph - a heroic assumption given road conditions and 
speed limits - the driving time would be around 33 hours or in excess of the legal driving 
limits. More accurately, as one former operator who completed this task (oral submission) 
observed 'that truck had to do trip to Sydney, around 3,000 in quick time, a lot of law 
breaking, a lot of speed but nonetheless the mango's fresh when you go to work.' This trip 
could be achieved legally (using driver changes) but this was not the practice. Yet as far as 
this Inquiry is aware such supply chains are seldom if ever subject to systematic investigation 
by regulatory agencies. 
  
The adverse implications of these and other practices for safety are clear and well known 
within the industry itself.  
 
A Note on Industry Structure and Characteristics 
 
Before turning to a more detailed consideration of safety performance in the long haul 
trucking industry and assessing the reasons for this, it is important to identify a number of 
significant characteristics of the industry and its operations which set an important context for 
what is to follow. 
 
Road represents by far the dominant mode of land transport in Australia and, as in Europe and 
North America, has been progressively increasing its share of the total freight task. The total 
road freight task has been growing steadily and is projected to increase by 67% over the next 
decade in Australia (Draft Trucking Industry Code of Conduct - Commercial Practices, 
2000:2).  
 
As more than a few submissions to this Inquiry observed, the long distance freight sector of 
the road transport industry is very competitive. Indeed, as the RTA submission observed it is 
close to a textbook definition of a competitive market. The industry is characterised by a large 
number of operators, relatively low barriers to entry and fierce competition for both loads 
which all impact on freight rates. The Report of the Inquiry into National Road Freight 
Industry (May et al, 1984:39) noted that easy entry into the industry could be attributed to an 
absence of scale economies, minimal product differentiation, low equity costs of acquiring a 
vehicle and minimal licensing requirements. 
 
Intense competition puts significant pressure on transport companies to maximise the return 
on physical and human capital and achieve cost savings wherever possible. At the same time, 
as observed by the RTA and numerous other parties, it also results in pressure on some 
drivers to work too long (rest too little) and too hard. Road freight operators not only compete 
with each other and other transport modes (most notably rail) for business but to some extent 
must also compete with trucking fleets maintained by potential and actual clients. In July 
2000 there were 218,816 fleets operating freight carrying trucks over 4.5 tonnes GVM in 
Australia, with only 31,810 of these being hire/reward operators, of which about one third are 
involved in long haul tasks (TL Consultants, TransEco, BTE, NRTC, 2000). In other words, 
specialist or for profit road-freight operators represent less than 20% of trucking fleets, with 
the major industries operating not-for-hire trucking fleets being agriculture/forestry (121,923 
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fleets), building and construction (17,959 fleets), manufacturing (11,568) and 
wholesale/retailing (27,856).  
 
In many cases the not-for-hire fleets are small. In agriculture/forestry and building 
construction single vehicle fleets constitute around 75% of the total fleet and once small fleets 
of 2-4 trucks are added the figure jumps to well over 90%. In manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail over half the fleets are single vehicle and the addition of 2-4 truck fleets 
again lifts the figure to over 90%. However, small fleets are also the dominant business type 
amongst for-hire freight operators, there being 21,762 single truck operators (all 
owner/drivers) or just over two thirds the total, and another 7,803 2-4 truck fleets (including 
some owner/drivers) which together accounts for over 90% of all operators. In other words, 
self-employed drivers and very small fleets (where the owner often also drives) account for 
the vast majority of the trucking of the trucking workforce and this is also characteristic of (if 
not more pronounced with regard to) the long haul/ling distance component of the industry. 
Self-employed drivers constitute a significant and growing component of the trucking 
workforce in countries/regions such as Canada (Bess, 1999:17) and the European Union, and 
the Inquiry received submissions that a similar trend was occurring in Australia at least partly 
as a consequence of more elaborate subcontracting of freight tasks (see Section3 of this 
Report). 
  
At the other extreme, the Australian for-hire road freight industry includes 211 operators with 
20-49 trucks, 42 with between 50 and 99 trucks and 30 fleets with 100 or more trucks. It was 
suggested that the six largest transport companies accounted for around 20% of the total for-
hire freight task. There are some large fleets in the not-for-hire category. In some industries 
the vertically integrated operations of large employers have led to medium to large not-for-
hire fleets. In agriculture/forestry 72 fleets consisted of between 20 and 49 trucks and one 
fleet had between 50 and 99 trucks while in building and construction there were 51 fleets of 
20 to 49 trucks and 31 fleets of 50 to 99 trucks. However, it is manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail where larger fleets are common. In the former there were 154 fleets with 20 
to 49 trucks, 82 with 50 to 99 trucks and 20 fleets had 100 or more trucks. In wholesale/retail 
31 fleets had between 20 and 49 trucks, 72 had 50 to 99 trucks and 21 fleets had 100 or more 
trucks. 
 
As might be expected, hire and reward fleets travel disproportionately further than ancillary 
fleets (accounting for well over half the total distance travelled by trucks) although around 
75% of these fleets operate over short journeys (and the same ratio applies to NSW). Only a 
small percentage of fleets operate long distance, a tiny fraction of all truck fleets, despite the 
prominent public image of this component as the 'trucking industry'. As might be expected, 
membership of industry associations is skewed to medium to large for-hire fleets and includes 
comparatively few small fleet and owner/operator members. 
 
Not all heavy vehicles are involved in long distance trucking although articulated trucks (a 
subcategory of heavy vehicles) are predominantly used in the long haul segment (as indicated 
by the RTA in its submission and not seriously questioned by any party). Given an inability to 
differentiate between short haul and long haul vehicles in most sets of statistics, data for 
heavy vehicles or articulated trucks is commonly used by bodies such like the RTA as a 
surrogate for data on long distance trucking. With regard to safety in particular this appears a 
reasonable convention, given the high incidence of casualty-crashes on roads and highways 
outside the major urban areas and the serious understatement of injuries to truck drivers in 
official statistics more generally that are identified in a later section.  It is a convention that 
will be followed in this Report both for the reasons just mentioned and because the picture 
painted by this data is overwhelmingly consistent with other evidence collected in the course 
of the Inquiry. 
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Without gainsaying the importance of long distance freight movements in the Northern 
Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia, it can be observed that well over 
90% of long distance road freight occurs in the three east coast mainland states of New South 
Wales, Queensland and Victoria. In other words, the east-coast corridor represents by far the 
most significant area of long haul road transport in terms of the number of trucks as well as 
the value and gross tonnage of freight moved. 
 
As the most populous state located between Queensland and Victoria (and therefore 
strategically positioned in terms of major east coast routes), the vast majority of interstate 
road freight (around 80% according to an ABS estimate cited in the RTA submission) moves 
through NSW. As a result NSW has the highest exposure to long distance road transport 
operations (and truck crashes according to the RTA) though the integral role of Queensland 
and Victoria in these movements needs to be recognised. 
 
Structure of the Report 
 
The remainder of the report is divided into six sections. Section 2 provides a detailed 
assessment of safety performance in the long haul road transport industry, using a range of 
indicators. Section 2 establishes the context for the next four sections specifically address key 
terms of reference for the Inquiry. Section 3 examines the role of commercial practices as a 
source of hazardous practices in the industry. Section 4 examines the adequacy of existing 
enforcement practices. Section 5 assesses different models of regulation. Section 6 examines 
co-ordination and the resourcing of regulatory agency activities in relation to trucking safety. 
Section 7 makes specific recommendations arising from the findings of earlier sections.  The 
appendices contain the terms of reference/advertisement details, a legal opinion on key issues 
arising from the Inquiry, a full report of a survey of 300 drivers undertaken as part of the 
Inquiry. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF SAFETY ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE IN 
LONG DISTANCE TRUCKING 
 
In the course of the Inquiry evidence was collected in relation to a wide range of health and 
safety issues in the long distance trucking industry. Although the principle focus of the 
inquiry was on the safety of drivers and other road users health issues cannot be ignored 
because they interact with safety in many ways. For example, excessive fatigue amongst 
drivers not only increases the likelihood of a collision or other serious incident, it also has 
long term health effects on drivers that will lead to a series of hidden costs such as additional 
medical/health treatment and the possibility of premature retirement. A similar scenario 
applies to the use of stimulant drugs. Effects also operate in the opposite direction. That is, a 
driver whose health is impaired by exposure to excessive vibration and noise, over-exertion, 
psychological stress or long-term drug use may well find it more difficult to operate their 
vehicle safely. 
 
This section of the report is divided into two parts. The first part examines the extent (in 
statistical, human and economic terms) of safety and health problems in the long distance 
trucking industry, including recent trends. The second part then looks at specific OHS 
problems and risk factors in detail, placing this in the context of findings from earlier 
inquiries/reports and other sources of evidence. The aim is to identify those OHS problems 
demanding most urgent attention (although the interaction of a number is not ignored) as well 
as to make some preliminary observations about causation. This will establish the context for 
later sections of the Report on the influence of commercial practices and the nature and 
effectiveness of existing regulations, compliance programs and agency-coordination 
arrangements. 
  
2.1 THE EXTENT OF SAFETY AND HEALTH PROBLEMS IN LONG 
DISTANCE ROAD TRANSPORT 
 
2.1.1 The pattern of crashes causing injury and death 
 
2.1.1.1 What the evidence shows 
 
Long distance truck drivers face a significant risk of being injured or killed in a single vehicle 
or multiple vehicle crash. Indeed, measured in these terms, driving a truck is by far one of 
most dangerous occupations. Further, collisions between articulated trucks and other vehicles 
(predominantly cars) as well as incidents involving passengers in heavy vehicles, pedestrians 
and bystanders means that truck drivers are not the only casualties. Indeed, most persons 
killed in fatal incidents involving heavy vehicles are not truck drivers but members of the 
public, adding a serious public safety dimension to considerations about the safety 
performance of the long distance road transport industry aside from the occupational health 
and safety dimension of driver safety. 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the annual number of fatal crashes and fatalities for the years 
1981 to 1998. Measured in terms of raw numbers (as opposed to incidence based on number 
of vehicles or kilometres travelled), in the period 1981 to 1989 there was a downward trend in 
the total number of crashes and fatalities involving all vehicles. However, as far as can be 
determined, this trend was not matched by fatal crashes involving heavy vehicles where, at 
the very least, there was a serious deterioration in the second half of the 1980s. This 
culminated in the horror years of 1988 and 1989 when crashes involving articulated trucks 
accounted for just over 10% of all fatal crashes and a slightly higher proportion of total 
vehicle crash fatalities (11.1 and 12% respectively). After 1989 a significant improvement is 
clearly discernible with a decline in both the number of fatal crashes and fatalities involving 
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articulated trucks. It should be noted that this shift corresponds with significant regulatory 
intervention in response to horror smashes such as that at Cowper where 20 people died and a 
widespread view that the industry was running ‘out of control’ (these incidents and issues are 
examined later in the Report). 
 
Table 1: Fatal Crashes and Fatalities, all crashes and articulated vehicles, Australia 
1981 to 1998 
Year Crashes Fatalities 
 All 
Crashes 
Articulated 
Vehicles 
Per cent All 
fatalities 
Articulated 
vehicles 
Per cent 
1981 2914 236 8.1 3321 n/a – 
1982 2872 251 8.7 3252 n/a – 
1983 2485 216 8.7 2755 n/a – 
1984 2508 232 9.25 2822 n/a – 
1985 2627 218 8.3 2941 n/a – 
1986 2577 194 7.5 2888 232 8.0 
1987 2487 199 8.0 2772 243 8.8 
1988 2572 260 10.1 2887 320 11.1 
1989 2406 250 10.4 2801 335 12.0 
1990 2050 205 10 2331 263 11.3 
1991 1874 156 8.3 2113 183 8.7 
1992 1736 154 8.9 1974 181 9.2 
1993 1737 171 9.8 1953 204 10.4 
1994 1702 151 8.9 1928 179 9.3 
1995 1822 165 9.1 2017 199 9.9 
1996 1768 161 6.2 1971 194 9.8 
1997 1603 146 9.1 1768 171 9.7 
1998 1580 151 9.5 1763 179 10.2 
   8.8   9.9 
Source: Road Fatalities Australia: 1998 Statistical Summary, FORS 1999 reproduced in Smith (2000). 
 
Overall, in 1998 the number of fatal crashes was less than two-thirds the figure for 1989 and 
the number of fatalities involving articulated trucks had almost halved. As far as the Inquiry 
could determine the precise reasons for this decline (including the role of better roads/dual 
carriageways; improved vehicles; more effective regulation; better management) has never 
been subjected to detailed investigation. The Inquiry was surprised by this gap in our 
knowledge, as it presumed the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) or Federal 
Office of Road Safety (FORS) would have commissioned research into such an important 
question. In the absence of such research, all that can said is that the trend occurred in a 
context where both number and average size of articulated vehicles was increasing although it 
should be noted the same applies to other vehicles where there is a decline throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. At the same time, it needs to be noted that both in the 1980s (Young, 1990) 
and now heavy trucks remain over-represented in fatal crashes (where the rate of involvement 
 40
in fatal crashes is compared to the proportion of vehicles constituted by heavy trucks). 
Further, articulated truck smashes still account for a significant component of the national 
road toll which has not declined over the last decade or more - indicating that action to 
improve safety performance in this area could yield substantial benefits.  
 
Importantly, closer examination of national and NSW figures paint a less optimistic picture in 
terms of raw numbers (ie unadjusted for number of vehicles or kilometers travelled) (see 
Tables 2 and 3). Table 2 shows that a marked decrease in the total number of fatal articulated 
truck crash fatalities occurred between 1990 and 1991 and after this time the trend is flat at 
best. This is also true for the total number of fatalities as a result of crashes involving 
articulated trucks (see Tables 1 and 3) and if 1995 is treated as a benchmark it could even be 
suggested that there has been a deterioration in NSW over the past five years. Figures for 
2000 and subsequent years could, of course, remove this apparent upward trend or confirm it. 
The Report cannot speculate on this. What can be said is that the trend since 1991, though 
arguably an improvement when increased vehicle numbers are taken into account (but see 
below), does not indicate an improvement in terms of total number of fatalities and fatal 
crashes involving articulated trucks. Examining all vehicle crashes and all vehicle fatalities 
for the same period (ie since 1991) show an improvement (see Table 1). In other words, at 
least in terms of raw numbers the trend with regard to articulated trucks do not match 
those of motor vehicle incidents more generally. These points need to made clear as a 
number of submissions to the Inquiry cited these figures an indicating a steady 
improvement in the safety performance of the trucking industry. 
 
Table 2: Crashes involving articulated trucks in NSW, 1990 to 1999 
 
Year All artic crashes1 Fatal artic crashes2 
 NSW Aust3 NSW Aust3 
1990 1,112 N/A 77 205 
1991 948 N/A 64 156 
1992 936 N/A 73 154 
1993 1,019 N/A 60 171 
1994 1,139 N/A 52 151 
1995 1,163 N/A 49 165 
1996 1,215 N/A 48 161 
1997 1,285 N/A 60 146 
1998 1,518 N/A 58 151 
1999 1,520 N/A 55 162 
 
1.  All recorded crashes; that is, those involving injury or tow-away. 
2.  At least one person involved in the crash was killed. 
3.  Source for Australian data: Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Transport Safety Statistics Unit. Table supplied 
by the RTA. 
 
Adjusting for the number of vehicles does not improve the picture. Two sets of data are 
available on the number of registered trucks. First, census based data produced by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (from ABS Catalogue 9309.0 supplied to the Inquiry courtesy 
of the RTA). This shows the number of heavy rigid trucks in Australia fell from 629,705 in 
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1988 to 291,251 in 1999 with much of the fall occurring between 1988 and 1991. During the 
same period the number of articulated trucks increased from 48,857 in 1988 to 63,295 in 1999 
or about 29.5% (this increase is fairly steady ie not concentrated between 1988 and 1991). In 
the same period the number of heavy rigid trucks in NSW fell from 186,056 to 82,031 while 
the number of articulated trucks grew from 14,881 to 16,278 or about 9.4%. For the same 
years the number of other vehicles grew from 8,928,365 to 12,027,694 Australia-wide (or 
34.7%) and from 2,822,371 to 3,599,702 in NSW (or 27.5%). A second set of data comes 
from the RTA's own registration records which are, of course, are confined to NSW. These 
records indicate that the number heavy rigid trucks fell from 85,423 in 1988 to 73,307 in 1999 
(rising again to 74,537 in 2000) while the number of registered articulated trucks actually fell 
from 15,668 to 14,145 in the same period (rising again slightly to 14,226 in 2000). For the 
same years the number of other registered vehicles in NSW increased from 2,991,999 to 
3,478,719 or 16.3% (with a further increase to 3,575,393 in 2000). As can be seen, there are 
major inconsistencies between the ABS and RTA data in relation to the heavy rigid vehicles 
(as a result of different criteria for a 'heavy vehicle' and perhaps the changeover from Tare to 
GVM). On the other hand, there is a fairly close alignment in relation to the figures for 
articulated trucks (even if the trend is reversed). 
 
Yet the choice of data set does not materially affect the observation that can be made when 
comparing road fatality statistics to trends in the number of articulated trucks and other 
vehicles. As noted, the absolute number of fatalities involving articulated trucks has remained 
steady or stagnant since 1991 while the overall number of road fatalities has fallen, the clear 
result of fewer fatal incidents involving other vehicles. Yet this trend in no way mirrors trends 
in the number of vehicles of different types travelling on highways and other roads. For the 
state of NSW both the ABS and RTA data record a substantial increase in the number of 
'other vehicles' that is in no way matched by the number of articulated trucks. According to 
the ABS data the number of articulated trucks increased by only just over a third of the 
percentage increase recorded for other vehicles. Using RTA data gives a 16.3% increase in 
'other vehicles' and a 9.7% decrease in the number of articulated trucks. Even using the ABS 
data for Australia as a whole, the 34.7% increase in 'other vehicles' is clearly greater than the 
29.5% increase in articulated trucks. In sum, reference to overall trends in vehicle 
numbers merely reinforces the greater improvement in relation to road safety of 'other 
vehicles' in comparison to articulated trucks.  
 
Further, Table 2 shows that in NSW there has been a general increase in the number of 
crashes (of all severities) involving articulated trucks over the years 1990 to 1999. Indeed, 
comparing the figures of 948 crashes in 1990 and 1,520 crashes in 1999 - an increase of over 
one third - is not unrepresentative of the overall trend. Unfortunately, no comparable data are 
available from the Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB). However, if a similar trend has 
occurred Australia-wide we are left with the question of explaining a significant increase in 
the number of articulate truck crashes but a steady number of fatalities relating to such 
crashes. Even if this trend was confined to NSW, it is certainly an issue of interest to NSW 
residents and given the significant contribution of NSW to overall truck-related fatalities and 
its centrality to interstate road transport, it has broader ramifications. Once again, the Report 
needs to observe that it is unaware of any detailed analysis of the reasons underpinning these 
trends. It could be speculated that the discrepancy can be accounted for in terms of vehicles 
becoming more crash-safe, roads and their immediate environments becoming more crash-
safe, a shift in the types of crashes toward those with lower severity, or more effective 
medical treatment. All these factors may have played a role in suppressing the number of fatal 
crashes despite the increase in total crashes. But the short answer is we don’t know. It is also 
worth noting that the above data and commentary do not distinguish between crashes and 
fatalities by the contributing factors.  The trends may be different, for example, if speed-
related or fatigue-related crashes and fatalities are analysed separately. 
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Table 3: Fatalities involving articulated trucks in NSW, 1990 to 1999 
 
Year Artic drivers killed Other road users killed1 Total killed 
 NSW Aust2 NSW Aust2 NSW Aust2 
1990 18 46 76 216 94 263 
1991 13 30 65 153 78 183 
1992 18 40 66 141 84 181 
1993 21 42 48 143 69 204 
1994 9 27 58 140 67 179 
1995 10 31 53 168 63 199 
1996 13 33 43 160 56 194 
1997 15 36 56 135 71 171 
1998 23 N/A 48 N/A 71 179 
1999 13 N/A 51 N/A 64 189 
 
1. In crashes involving at least one articulated truck 
2. Source for Australian data: Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Transport Safety Statistics Unit. Supplied by 
RTA. 
 
Turning to the breakdown of driver and other road user fatalities (Table 3) a similar pattern 
emerges. After 1991 there is no clear trend of improvement in relation to either the number of 
truck drivers or other road users killed in crashes involving articulated trucks for both NSW 
and Australia. Overall, truck drivers constitute about one third of all those dying in such 
crashes. Again, breaking down crashes by cause (fatigue, speed etc) and fault might result in 
somewhat different ratios. 
 
A written submission from Inspector Dave Evans of the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW 
Police Service raised concerns in relation to recent trends in crashes involving heavy vehicles: 
 
In 1999 within NSW some 96 heavy vehicles were involved in fatal crashes. This was an 
increase on 1998 when 91 heavy vehicles were involved in fatal crashes. There was very little 
change in the frequency of heavy vehicles involved in injury crashes as compared with 1998. 
In 1999 there were some 1,293 crashes as opposed to 1,297 for 1998. Non-injury crashes in 
1999 involving heavy vehicles stand at 2,101. In 1998 there were some 2,050 non-injury 
crashes involving these vehicles. Year to date figures for this year show another increase in 
fatal crashes involving heavy vehicles. 
 
As with the figures already discussed it is too soon to suggest that recent increases are 
precursors to an upward trend. However, both the RTA and the Police have expressed concern 
and careful examination of the figures indicates that serious consideration of underlying 
trends and the reasons for them is warranted. 
 
Given that the total road freight task has increased substantially since 1988, the only basis 
where the improvement of safety performance with regard to articulated trucks may be more 
significant would be in terms of kilometres travelled (after discounting the effect on freight 
tonnage movements of larger trucks). Tables 4 and 5 provide data on 
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Table 4: Road Crash Fatality Per 100 Million Kilometres Travelled: Articulated Trucks vs All Other Vehicles 
 
 NSW           Australia 
Articulated
Trucks 
All Other
Vehicles 
Articulated
Trucks 
All Other
Vehicles 
 Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatalities  Fatality Per
100 Million 
Travelled
Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatalities Fatality Per 
100 Million 
Travelled
Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatalities Fatality 
Per 100 
Million 
Travelled
Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatalities Fatality 
Per 100 
Million 
Travelled 
1988 1,400 151  10.8 51,452 886 1.7 3,836 320 8.3 153,907 2,567 1.7
1991 1,436 78  5.4 47,442 585 1.2 3,959 183 4.6 150,385 1,930 1.3
1995 1,725 63 3.7 50,690 557
1.1
5,094 199 3.9 166,509 1,818 1.1 
1998 1,735 71  4.1 57,225 485 0.8 4,921 179 3.6 173,312 1,584 0.9
1999 1,845 64  3.5 57,753 513 0.9 5,262 189 3.6 177,630 1,570 0.9
             
Sources 1) Estimated total kilometres travelled data from Australian Bureau of Statistics.  The data are likely to have been overstated for All Other Vehicles for both NSW and 
Australia for years before 1995.  Also, due to change of methodology, direct comparison of data before and after 1998 is not reliable. 2) NSW fatality data from Road Traffic 
Accidents in NSW South Wales, 1988, 1991, 1995; Road Traffic Accident Database, 1998 and 1999 (Table 10). 3) Australia fatality data from Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
monthly fatality database. The Inquiry is grateful to the ATSB for supplying this data. 
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Table 5: Fatal Road Crashes Per 100 Million Kilometres Travelled: Articulated Trucks vs All Other Vehicles 
 
 NSW           Australia 
Articulated
Trucks 
All Other
Vehicles 
Articulated
Trucks 
All Other
Vehicles 
 Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatal 
Crashes 
Fatal 
Crashes Per 
100 Million 
Travelled
Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatal 
Crashes
Fatal 
Crashes Per 
100 Million 
Travelled
Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatal 
Crashes
Fatal 
Crashes Per 
100 Million 
Travelled
Total 
Kilometres 
Travelled 
(million)
Fatal 
Crashes
Fatal 
Crashes Per 
100 Million 
Travelled 
1988 1,400 120  8.6 51,452 792 1.5 3,836 260 6.8 153,907 2,312 1.5
1991 1,436 64  4.5 47,442 521 1.1 3,959 156 3.9 150,385 1,718 1.1
1995 1,725 49  2.8 50,690 514 1.0 5,094 165 3.2 166,509 1,657 1.0
1998 1,735 58  3.3 57,225 433 0.8 4,921 151 3.1 173,312 1,429 0.8
1999 1,845 55  3.0 57,753 451 0.8 5,262 162 3.1 177,630 1,385 0.8
             
 
Sources 1) Estimated total kilometres travelled from Australian Bureau of Statistics.  The data are likely to have been overstated for All Other Vehicles for both NSW and Australia for years 
before 1995.  Also, due to change of methodology, direct comparison of data before and after 1998 is not reliable. 2) NSW crash data from Road Traffic Accidents in NSW South 
Wales, 1988, 1991, 1995; Road Traffic Accident Database, 1998 and 1999. 3) Australia crash data from Australian Transport Safety Bureau monthly fatality database. The Inquiry is 
grateful to the ATSB for supplying this data.. 
Notes  1) Figures of 1988 Total Kilometres Travelled are rounded up to the nearest million. 
2) It is a coincidence that the fatalities per 100m travelled for All Other Vehicles for NSW and Australia are the same. 
Calculations: All Other Vehicles = Total - Articulated Trucks.  It includes pedal cycle and pedestrian accidents. Fatal crashes per 100 Million Travelled = Fatal Crashes / Total kilometres 
Travelled (million) x 100 
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road crash fatalities and fatal crashes for articulated trucks and other vehicles for NSW and 
the whole of Australia in years where national data is available (data on rigid trucks is not 
included as coding problems makes this too unreliable). As can be seen from the first of these 
Tables (Table 4), there is a significant improvement in the number of articulated truck crash-
related fatalities per 100 million kilometres travelled between 1988 and 1999 for both NSW 
and Australia (but especially the former). This improvement is significantly greater than the 
improvement in the per kilometre fatality rate for all other vehicles over the same period 
(though coming off a far higher base). At the same time, the improvement has been marginal 
for both categories since 1995 and a substantial gap remains. That is, the rate of crash-related 
fatalities for articulated trucks per 100 million kilometres travelled is well over three times the 
equivalent figure for all other vehicles.  
 
The next Table (Table 5) on fatal crashes per 100 kilometres travelled between 1988 and 1999 
reveals a very similar pattern with a substantial improvement with regard to crashes involving 
articulated trucks outstripping the improvement recorded for all other vehicles, albeit coming 
from a much higher base. Again, there is little improvement (and arguably a deterioration in 
NSW) after 1995 and, if anything, the improvement in relation to all other vehicles is greater 
than that for articulated trucks Australia-wide after 1995. It should be noted that, for both 
tables, the ‘all other vehicle’ category includes heavy rigid trucks, so we are not just talking 
about a truck versus car/light truck scenario (and evidence on the higher crash-related 
insurance claim rate for trucks has already been cited). Moreover, there is still a substantial 
gap between the fatal crash rate of articulated trucks and other vehicles, with the former 
accounting for more than three times the number of fatalities per 100 million kilometres 
travelled. 
 
In sum, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that there was a substantial improvement in both the rate of 
crash-related fatalities and fatal crashes per 100 million kilometres travelled for articulated 
trucks between 1988 and 1999 and the improvement was greater than that for all other 
vehicles. However, after 1995 the improvement in crash-related fatalities (for both vehicle 
categories) Australia-wide is marginal and the improvement in the rate of fatal crashes is 
arguably greater for other vehicles than articulated trucks. If anything, the NSW specific data 
after 1995 paints a slightly worse picture for articulated trucks. Most importantly perhaps, 
while both the gap between articulated trucks and other vehicles in terms of the crash fatality 
and fatal crash rate per 100 million kilometres travelled has narrowed, it still remains 
substantial, and since 1995 this trend has slowed if not stalled.  
 
Again, the Inquiry is forced to conclude that while the safety performance of articulated 
trucks shows a substantial overall improvement since the late 1980s the record is by no 
means as outstanding as some submissions purported and indeed since the mid 1990s 
little improvement can be detected. Further, even in terms of per kilometres travelled 
articulated trucks still account for more than three times to number of fatalities and 
fatal crashes as all other vehicles. 
 
Another basis for assessing safety performance in the trucking industry would be to compare 
Australian fatality statistics with those of other countries. As Cairney (1991:10) notes such 
comparisons are fraught with difficulty given differences in definitions and reporting 
methods. Nonetheless, with these caveats in mind comparisons undertaken in the 1980s 
indicated that the rate of fatal accidents per 100 million kilometres travelled by trucks in 
Australia was 1.75 times the Finnish rate and 1.85 times higher than the US rates (Cairney, 
1991:10). That is, fatality rates in Australia were almost double that of other countries 
considered. Thanks to the cooperation of the Federal Office of Road Safety and the efforts of 
Peter Cairney it has been possible to update these comparisons. Using data for the year 1998, 
the fatal crash rate involving articulated trucks in Australia was 3.07 per 100 million 
vehicle/kilometres travelled while the road fatality rate involving articulated trucks was 3.63 
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per 100 million vehicle/kilometres. US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data 
for the year 1996 (the most recent available) indicates there were 1.63 fatal crashes involving 
large trucks (ie over 4.5 tonnes GVM) per 100 million kilometres travelled and 1.75 fatalities 
in crashes involving heavy trucks per 100 million kilometres travelled. For the UK the most 
comparable data for the year 1998 indicates that there were 1.2 fatal crashes involving heavy 
gross vehicles (ie over 3.5 tonnes GVM) per 100 million kilometres travelled and 1.79 
fatalities in crashes involving heavy gross vehicles per 100 million kilometres travelled 
(source, Tables 1b,7,9&25 RAGB, 1998). Again, it needs to be stressed that, as with the 
1980s comparisons, definitional and methodological problems mean that comparisons need to 
be treated with some caution (comparisons of injury/crash rates are if anything more 
problematic). Nonetheless, it would appear that there has been no discernible improvement in 
fatality/fatal crash rates relative to countries with which such comparisons of safety 
performance are normally made.  
 
Roughly speaking, the fatality/fatal crash rate involving heavy vehicles remains almost 
twice that of the USA (where trucks cover similar vast distances but with climate and 
road quality differences) and the UK. In sum, while international comparisons of 
fatality/fatal crash rates need to be treated with considerable caution the available data 
provides cause for concern. The results, if made public, are unlikely to generate a 
sanguine response from the Australian community. 
 
Another basis for assessing safety in the road transport industry is to compare fatality (or 
injury rates) with other industries or, of more direct concern to this Inquiry, to compare 
fatality or injury rates of truck drivers to other occupations. In other words, just how 
dangerous is trucking as a job? The short answer to this question is that driving a truck, and 
especially an articulated truck over long distances, is one of the most dangerous occupations. 
This applies equally to Australia and the USA (despite the comparatively lower fatal crash 
rate of the latter). In the USA almost 70% of truck drivers who die as result of work are killed 
in highway crashes (Toscano, 1997). Annual censuses of fatal occupational traumas in the 
USA consistently show truck drivers constitute the largest number of deaths (well over 10% 
of the total) and rank in the 6-8 most dangerous occupations when employment share is taken 
into account (Windau and Jack, 1996; Knestaut, 1997; Toscana and Windau, 1998). Around 
half of those drivers killed are in control of semi-trailers (and thereby overwhelmingly 
involved in long haul freight tasks. Toscano and Windau, 1990:37, NIOSH, 2000). The 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH, 2000:41) – the federal 
government agency responsible for OHS research - has recently identified an upward trend in 
both the absolute number of truck driver fatalities and the fatality rate per 100,000 workers. 
 
Truck driving also accounted for the highest number of non-fatal injuries in 1995 - a by no 
means atypical year. Most of these injuries were not related to crashes but other aspects of 
drivers’ work:  
 
Truck drivers spend many hours behind a steering wheel. Tight delivery schedules may mean 
drivers have little time to waste at delivery sites, so they move heavy items immediately upon 
arrival to save time. Strenuous activity after hours of sitting, without time to stretch stiff 
muscles, may help explain why drivers sustain these injuries (Knestaut, 1997 p3) 
 
Unlike the USA, there is no annual census of fatal occupational traumas in Australia, although 
the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission has produced two fatality censuses 
for the years 1982-1984 and 1989-1992. The most recent of these censuses indicated that 
transport and storage accounted for 22% of all fatal injuries. Transport and Storage had the 
third highest death rate of any industry (at 23 deaths per 100,000 persons employed) and of 
the 370 Transport and Storage workers killed between 1989 and 1992, 308 were truck drivers 
(NOHSC, 1999:3). Truck driver ranked as the sixth most dangerous occupation (at 41 deaths 
per 100,000 employed and behind fishermen/women, forestry workers, drilling plant 
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operators, mining labourers, and ship pilots/deckhands) at seven times the all industry average 
(5.5 per 100,000 employed).  More recent data on work-related fatalities in Victoria (for the 
years 1993/94 to 1996/97) confirms this pattern, with the transport industry accounting for 77 
(or 23%) of the total number of 332 recorded deaths (written submission, Victorian 
WorkCover, Attachment 2). 
 
Yet another but related basis for comparison is to measure the performance of the road 
transport industry against another transport sub-sector, and the one with which the long haul 
sector most directly competes, namely rail freight. In 1993 1953 Australians were killed in 
road smashes and 21,557 received injuries requiring hospital treatment at an estimated cost of 
$6.1 billion (representing 93% of the cost of all transport accidents, Department of Transport 
and Regional Services, 1999:3). Of those killed, 204 died in smashes involving articulated 
trucks and 42 of these were truck drivers (see Table above). By way of comparison in the 
same year 49 Australians died and 88 received hospital injuries in rail accident at an estimated 
cost of $69 million (or around 1% of total accident costs). That is, in 1993 – a year in no 
way unrepresentative of the pattern of trucking fatalities since 1991 – almost as many 
drivers of articulated trucks died on Australian roads as the total of number of persons 
killed throughout the entire rail network (passenger and freight) of the nation.  
 
Consistent with this attempts to directly compare freight-related deaths leads to an even more 
significant disparity. In 1998 the ARRB estimated road freight averaged 3.8 fatalities per 
billion gross tonne kilometres while the comparable figure for rail was 0.55 fatalities 
(Towards a Methodology for Comparative Resource Consumption: Modal Implications for 
the Freight Task, ARRB Transport Research Report ARR318 cited in written submission, 
FreightCorp, page 4). While road and rail transport are not complete substitutes (and indeed to 
a degree complementary) competition and therefore the capacity for substitution is significant 
with regard to long distance freight. Given the disparity in safety performance this means any 
significant shift between the two modes will almost certainly have equally significant safety 
implications. Some aspects of this are considered later in the Report because they were related 
to other safety issues raised in submissions to the Inquiry or key terms of reference relating to 
commercial practices and regulation (see below). 
 
Before proceeding further it is worth considering the issue of fault. Whenever a serious 
collision between an articulated truck and another vehicle is reported in the media the 
impression often created in the minds of the community is that the truck driver is at fault. 
Further, incidents where the truck driver was at fault and several people die (and there have 
been several notable cases recently) are more likely to receive media attention reinforcing 
public perceptions. However, as Table 6 shows, apart from single vehicle incidents (where the 
driver is liable to be the only victim) truck drivers were found to be at fault in only a minority 
of truck smashes. Indeed, for selected years between 1990 and 1996 truck driver fault 
averaged just over a quarter of multi-vehicle crashes, averaged under 20% of vehicles hitting 
pedestrians and averaged just over a third of all crashes. This finding appears roughly 
comparable with international data the Inquiry was able to obtain. For example, in the Ontario 
Ministry of Transport (1996:6) found that the truck driver had 'not been driving properly' in 
an average of 27.9% fatal large truck crashes for the period 1988 to 1996 (for the years 1990 
to 1996 the figure is little changed at 27.7%) 
 
That truck drivers are not fault in the great majority of fatal crashes is noteworthy, and 
industry representatives as well as drivers themselves, rightly made mention of it to indicate 
how misleading some media and community images of drivers were. The issue of fault also 
highlights the reciprocal relationship between truck drivers and other road users that later 
parts of the Report will specifically address (notably the problem of road rage and the need 
for car drivers to have a better appreciation of truck signage and turning/braking 
characteristics). 
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Table 6: Truck driver responsibility for crashes, heavy rigid and articulated trucks, 
Australia 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996 
Crash type Year All truck crashes Truck driver at 
fault 
Percent 
Single vehicle crash 1990 59 51 86.4 
 1992 40 38 95.0 
 1994 35 34 97.1 
 1996 33 31 93.9 
Multiple vehicle 
crash 
1990 257 74 28.8 
 1992 202 49 24.2 
 1994 199 48 24.1 
 1996 186 52 28.0 
Pedestrian crash 1990 28 5 18.0 
 1992 34 9 26.5 
 1994 32 5 15.6 
 1996 28 4 14.3 
All crashes 1990 344 130 37.8 
 1992 276 96 34.8 
 1994 264 87 33.0 
 1996 247 87 35.2 
Without single 
vehicle 
1990 285 79 27.7 
 1992 236 58 24.6 
 1994 231 53 22.9 
 1996 214 56 26.2 
Source: ATSB reproduced in Smith (2000). 
Notes: Fault is coded if the driver was fully or partially responsible for the crash 
Heavy rigid is coded >3.5t in 1990 and >4.5t in 1992, 1994, 1996 
 
At the same time, the pattern of fault in smashes involving articulated trucks does not indicate 
there are no causes for concern and there are other complicating issues that need to be 
considered. First, as professionals who drive for a living this result should be the case, even 
accounting for the immensely greater kilometers covered each year in comparison to the 
average car driver. Indeed, an even better result might have been expected. During the course 
of its investigation the Inquiry was impressed with the professionalism of many truck drivers 
and industry and union representatives. However, it also formed the view that this 
professionalism was often achieved under extreme pressure and in difficult circumstances that 
needed to be addressed if further improvements were to be achieved (including targeting less 
professional operators/drivers).  
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Table 7: Recent Tends in Truck Crashes in New South Wales 1997 – August 2000 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000* (YTD) 
Number of Casualty Heavy Truck 
Crashes 
   
TOTAL 1014 1139 1159 616 
Driver Speeding   136   143   130   58 
Driver Fatigued    92     81     87   40 
Insecure Load    19     18     18     9 
Number of persons killed or injured in 
heavy truck crashes 
   
TOTAL 1359 1575 1595 835 
Driver Speeding   157   175   170   67 
Driver Fatigued   116    92     98   45 
Insecure Load     22    20     25   10 
Number of casualty crashes for 
articulated vehicles 
   
TOTAL 519 618 610 330 
Driver Speeding 103 108   99   42 
Driver Fatigued   68   62   62   32 
Insecure Load   14   15   10     5 
Number of persons killed or injured in 
articulated truck crashes 
   
TOTAL 688 882 830 450 
Driver Speeding 120 127 131   47 
Driver Fatigued  77  67   70   34 
Insecure Load  16  16   15     5 
* Preliminary data only 
# Driver information relates to truck drivers only and is not related to “fault”. 
Source: Table supplied by the RTA. 
 
Second, the attribution of fault masks a number of important issues. Attribution of fault (or 
the laying of charges) against one party and not the other in a particular incident should not be 
taken to mean the behaviour of the 'no-fault' party was blameless or in no way contributed to 
an incident. Table 7 provides a breakdown of truck driver behaviour (speeding, fatigue or 
insecure load) in both heavy and articulated truck crashes in NSW since 1997. These figures 
do not entail a formal ascription of fault but should still be of concern in terms of both the 
overall crash numbers where high-risk practices were detected as well as the trend line (which 
shows no compelling pattern of improvement).  
 
Third, the attribution of fault to parties other than truck drivers (usually car drivers except 
where trucks collide) does not rule out a relationship between the presence of articulated 
trucks and deaths and injury to other road users. Increasing volumes of trucks using major 
highways as well as longer trucks that take more time to overtake may contribute to more 
high-risk behaviour on the part of car users. Increase in truck size also increases the chances 
of death and serious injury to motorists where a collision occurs. Further, damage to roads by 
heavy vehicles may also contribute to crashes by other vehicles. This is by no means an 
exhaustive list of scenarios. Without wishing to overstate their importance, the Report will 
consider several of these issues below. 
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2.1.1.2 Putting trucking fatalities into context 
 
Aside from measuring overall trends in the number of fatalities to drivers of heavy vehicles it 
is also pertinent to compare the risk of fatality to other occupations. This is by no means a 
simple exercise because of number of definitional issues and flaws in official data. As Perrone 
(2000) has all to clearly shown, determining when a fatality is work-related is by no means as 
simple as is often presumed (for example take the case of a driver who has a cardiac arrest 
while at the wheel or a driver killed while travelling as a passenger). Equally, official 
occupational death and injury statistics based on workers’ compensation claims are likely to 
omit many self-employed workers (a significant component of the long distance trucking 
workforce) and in practice compliance with requirements to notify WorkCover of serious 
incidents is by no means complete. Perrone’s (2000:41) own careful sifting of work-related 
fatalities in Victoria in the years 1987 to 1990 found that transport was by far the most 
dangerous industry in terms of total fatalities, accounting for 101 or 28.6% of the 353 work-
related deaths identified. Services (18.4%), farming (17.3%), construction (15.6%) and 
manufacturing (9.3%) followed by road transport.  The industry accounted for only about 
4.7% of the Victorian workforce during the period studied. In other words, the transport 
industry accounted for less than 5% of the workforce but well over 25% of work-related 
fatalities. 
 
Hopkins (1992 cited by Perrone, 2000:40) study of occupational fatalities in New South 
Wales found a similar pattern although transport accounted for an even larger proportion of 
work-related deaths (41%) and construction-related fatalities were around half the Victorian 
figure (ie 7%). While the great majority of these deaths involved road transport these figures 
of course do not isolate those transport deaths occurring amongst long distance truck drivers. 
It is also worth noting that the Perrone and Hopkins’ studies both found that the number of 
workers killed who were self-employed was 24.4% and 23.3% respectively – a figure that far 
exceeded their representation in the workforce. 
 
In sum, both Australian and USA data show that road transport accounts for more 
work-related fatalities than any other industry and a disproportionate share when 
adjusted for employment levels. Truck drivers killed in collisions (most on highways) 
constitute the biggest single group of road transport worker deaths (and again 
disproportionate to their share of overall employment in the industry). Truck driving 
remains a one of the most dangerous occupations and has certainly not improved its 
ranking over the past decade. 
 
The high incidence of highway fatalities (both drivers and other road users) involving 
articulated vehicles has significant - but often unrecognised - psychological effects on drivers 
and their families. These effects are, if anything, magnified by media reporting of cases where 
other road users are killed which tend to imply that the truck or its driver are at fault, 
irrespective of the evidence with headlines such as ‘Truck Kills’. After referring to the latter 
problem, the wife of an owner/driver expressed her view about the emotional pressures that 
the high-risk nature of the industry places on both drivers and their families: 
 
Whenever the news headlines mention a truck crash it suddenly changes the mood in my 
home. You rush to the television and sit glued to the screen. Your mind races; where is he 
today? Could it be him? You nervously stare at the screen, your eyes scanning desperately to 
see if you recognise the truck that has been involved. Your hands get sweaty and your heart 
beats so hard that you can hardly breath. You get that feeling in your stomach that you get 
just before you vomit. No it doesn’t look like ours, no it’s not anyone that you know…you sigh 
with relief. Then you feel guilty because you are so relieved that it is someone else and 
because you know that somewhere there is a family in tears and next time it could be you. 
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Does anyone ever stop to consider how the truck driver feels after he has been involved in an 
accident and people have been injured or killed? Regardless to whether he was at fault or 
not, the truck driver has to live with the memories of the accident for the rest of his life. The 
sights, the sounds, the smells, the feelings, they are always with him. 11 years ago my brother, 
brother-in-law and nephew were killed in a head on smash with a truck at Mildura. It was not 
the truckie’s fault. The car in which my family was travelling veered into the path of the 
oncoming truck [and] they were all killed instantly. To this day my heart goes out to that 
driver. The pain and suffering he must have gone through, and still be going through, would 
be equal if not greater than that which we experienced. On this occasion the driver was lucky 
because he had not been taking drugs, because if he had he would have been charged even 
though the accident was not his fault (written submission, wife of owner driver, southern New 
South Wales). 
 
It should be noted that the distress associated with involvement in fatal incidents is well 
recognised in other areas of transport, such as the provision of counselling and support for 
train-drivers in charge of trains that hit persons on the line (including suicides). However, the 
Inquiry was unaware of any similar facilities for truck drivers aside from the voluntary 
services provided by individual priests and the Concerned Families of Australia Truckies 
(CFAT), an association of the partners, family and friends of professional truck drivers. 
CFAT was established in September 1999, receiving support from the Transport Workers 
Union, Motor Accidents Authority and a number of other bodies. The association has 
established a network of branches to counsel drivers and their families affected by grief 
related to accidents as well as support for fatigue/long hour/separation pressures associated 
with the industry. Like similar organisations in Canada, the USA and elsewhere, CFAT has 
campaigned to raise public awareness of the pressures on truck drivers and to lobby 
government, transport companies and major clients like large retailers to bring about changes 
in the industry. 
 
2.1.1.3 Other evidence on truck crashes 
 
For reasons discussed more fully below, the evidence just presented provides a valuable but 
incomplete picture of the crash involvement of long distance truck drivers. Most notably, the 
figures presented do not directly measure the likelihood of a driver experiencing a crash, they 
do not allow a breakdown by employment status or other categories, and casualty-crash 
figures do not capture all crashes where an injury was sustained. To provide additional 
information on these and other issues 300 long distance truck drivers were directly 
interviewed at truck stops, depots and other work sites. The survey was undertaken by an 
experienced researcher Dr Claire Mayhew (assisted by P Doughty who provided a detailed 
list of truck stops and depots) using methods that had been successfully employed for road 
transport and a range of other workers over a number of years. Care was taken to ensure a 
relatively comparable sample of both small-fleet and large fleet drivers and owner/drivers. All 
drivers were interviewed in NSW but the survey sample included drivers from other states. 
The full survey, including methodology is included as Appendix 3 of this Report, and so 
major findings will only be reported here in summary form. 
 
In the survey drivers were asked to report on their crash experiences both in the last 12 
months and in the previous five years. Table 8 indicates that small fleet drivers (12.5%) 
admitted to having had more crashes in the previous 12 months than did owner/drivers 
(10.1%) or large fleet employees (5.9%). These differences were magnified when perceived 
seriousness of crashes was taken into account. Table 8 shows that large fleet drivers reported 
more ‘little crashes’ that did not stop them driving (7.1%) than did those employed in small 
fleets (4.8%) or owner/drivers (3%).  Of course what are termed ‘little crashes’ by drivers 
may not be identified as such by insurance companies. For example, there may be large 
financial claims following crashes involving cars at roundabouts where little damage has 
occurred to the trucks involved. Variations in the types of crashes could be identified between 
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city and country areas, rather than between highways.  City and country-town incidents 
typically involved cars at intersections or roundabouts as well as incidents at freight-
forwarding yards or delivery sites.  While truck drivers and their vehicles were rarely injured 
during these incidents, damage to cars was frequently extensive. This is not only of concern to 
insurance companies but also relates to problems with large trucks on narrow or busy roads 
and car-drivers lack of understanding of truck turning and braking characteristics. Both these 
issues are taken up later in this Report. In contrast, country incidents often involved animals 
on roads, other vehicles ‘running up the back’ of trucks, and occasional fatigue-related runs 
off the road.  These country incidents were often severe and resulted in significant injuries for 
truck drivers as well as extensive damage to their vehicles and large claims on their insurance 
policies. 
 
Table 8 (Table 19 in Appendix 3) 
Truck crashes experienced by 300 interviewed drivers in immediate past twelve month 
period 
 
 owner/drivers  
(n=99) 
small fleet 
drivers 
(n=104) 
large fleet 
drivers  
(n=85) 
other 
(n=12) 
None    86.9%     82.7%     88.2%  91.7% 
Yes    10.1%     12.5%       5.9%    8.3% 
just little ones that 
didn’t stop driving 
     3%       4.8%       7.1%     - 
Total with any 
crashes 
   13      18      11    1 
%  13.1%    17.3%     12.9%   8.3% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
 
Overall, the survey indicated that long distance drivers had a better than one in ten chance of 
being involved in a crash over the last year, and for small fleet drivers the figure was far 
higher. Large fleet drivers (12.9%) and owner/drivers (13.1%) cited fewer truck crashes in the 
immediate past 12-month period than did the small fleet drivers (17.3%) interviewed.   
Further, of those crashes reported large fleet drivers were more likely to cite ‘little crashes’ 
that didn’t stop them driving than did those employed in small fleets or owner/drivers (Table 
8).   
 
While the survey provides some insights into the incidence of crashes it does not provide an 
indication of severity (such as medical treatment required and size of insurance claims to 
trucks and cars involved in crashes). Some insurance claims data is presented elsewhere in 
this Report. Data about severely injured drivers who had exited the industry following major 
crashes would also provide valuable information about severity, especially if broken down by 
fleet size and employment status. Unfortunately, this data was not available to the Inquiry and 
for reasons made clear later, gaps in insurance data (both road transport and workers' 
compensation) means that it is, a best, a partial proxy for measuring severity.  
 
Reasons for the better self-reported crash record of drivers in large fleets may include better 
driver selection/training and equipment (large companies often employ trainers and replace 
trucks more regularly) and greater use of shuttle systems so drivers sleep at home more 
frequently. Other possible reasons include greater implementation of fatigue management 
schemes/ compliance with driving hour requirements, and comparatively lower levels of 
chronic severe fatigue.  The driver survey indicated large fleet drivers were, on average, much 
younger than owner/drivers with only 10.6% being over 55 years of age (as opposed to. 
21.2% of owner/drivers.  See Table 9 in Appendix 3).  It might be postulated that there is an 
age effect because older workers are known to be less able to cope with the demands of shift 
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and night work.  However, age does not explain the poorer crash record of small fleet drivers 
so other factors must be contributing to crash propensity.   
 
The Driver Survey also examined reported truck crashes in the previous five-year period (see 
Table 9 which reproduces Table 20 in Appendix 3). Small fleet drivers again figured heavily 
but, unlike the 12-month period, owner/drivers reported more crashes (20.2%). When 'little 
ones that didn’t stop me working are added to provide a combined figure the total reported 
crashes of small fleet drivers (26%) is higher than for owner/drivers (23.2%). Large fleet 
drivers reported fewer crashes (15.3%) but more 'little ones' (8.2%) than the other two groups 
(there may be a reporting effect here given more stringent rules about reporting all incidents 
in large companies). The reasons for the higher proportion of owner/drivers reporting crashes 
in the previous five years compared with the last 12-months are unclear, although an overall 
higher crash rate for owner/drivers is consistent with insurance industry data cited elsewhere 
in this Report.  One possible explanation of the lower reported crashes in the last 12 months is 
that the ‘healthy worker’ effect has intensified in this period - resulting in more owner/drivers 
exiting the industry after a severe crash. As with crashes in the immediate 12-month period, 
there were few variations between the different highways.  Rather, geographical variations in 
crash experiences were divided between (a) predominantly traffic-related crashes with cars in 
cities or regional towns; and (b) more serious crashes (for truck drivers) on highways in rural 
areas.   
 
Table 9 (Table 20 in Appendix 3) 
Truck crashes experienced by 300 interviewed drivers in previous five years 
 
 Owner/ 
drivers  
 
(n=99) 
small fleet 
drivers (n=104) 
Large fleet drivers
 (n=85) 
other 
 
(n=12) 
none 76.8% 74% 76.5% 91.7% 
yes 20.2% 18.3% 15.3% - 
just little ones that 
didn’t stop driving 
  3%   7.7%   8.2% 8.3% 
Total with crashes 23 27   7 1 
% 23.2% 26% 23.5% 8.3% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
It is hard to get comparable international data. A survey of just over 1000 French heavy 
vehicle drivers (Hamelin, 2000:23) asked them whether they had ever been involved a traffic 
accident causing injury. Just over 14% indicated they had been involved in an injury-causing 
crash. Given this survey used a question restricted to injury-causing injuries over an unlimited 
time period it is difficult to make comparisons. However, what is notable is that the figure 
was significantly higher with regard to for-hire carriers (17% overall and 22.7% for drivers 
under 40 years of age) than drivers working for companies transporting their own goods 
(9.2% with no significant variation according to age). The official Australian and NSW 
statistics on fatal road crashes cited earlier do not distinguish between heavy rigid or 
articulated trucks operated by for-hire freight carriers and those belonging to not-for-hire 
carriers. Nor was the issue explored by the driver survey undertaken for this Inquiry. 
However, the French data indicates that this issue warrants serious investigation to see if the 
same pattern applies in Australia. Such a difference, if not simply the result of differences in 
average kilometers travelled, would require serious consideration by policy-makers. 
 
2.1.2 The extent of other injuries and health problems in the road freight industry 
 
Fatal crashes attract the bulk of attention in terms of safety in the trucking industry. However, 
it needs to emphasised that, like other industries, fatal injuries represent only the most visible 
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tip of a much larger incidence of work-related injury and health problems. First, there are 
non-fatal injuries arising from crashes as well as the emotional stress that may accompany this 
or, as already alluded to, driver involvement in fatal collisions. Second, there are injuries or 
other health problems which are sustained by drivers in the course of their employment but 
which do not arise as a result of a crash. Some injuries or health problems may contribute to 
the risk of a crash in the future, the most obvious example being the prolonged use of drug 
stimulants. 
 
2.1.2.1 The extent of acute and chronic injuries amongst long haul truck drivers 
 
Some indication of the extent of the problems is afforded by workers’ compensation claims 
data for the road transport industry. National data for the year 1996/97 (excluding Victoria 
and the ACT) identified a total of 4,462 new cases in road transport (NOHSC, 1999:3). This 
represented an incidence rate of 44.62 per 1,000 wage and salary earners or almost double the 
all industry incidence rate (22.66) and ahead of mining (42.69) and manufacturing (39.81). 
For the state of NSW in 1998/1999 there were a total of 1,338 claims for injury and disease in 
the road freight industry (ANZSIC 6110), with truck drivers accounting for 72% of these 
claims (see Table 10). The claims entailed a total direct cost of $19.8 million (this excludes 
substantial indirect costs borne by the community), with 5 fatalities (mean cost of $229,974) 
and 262 instances of permanent disability (mean cost $38,973) accounting for well over half 
the total claims cost. 
 
Table 10: Workers’ Compensation Claims in New South Wales Road Freight Transport 
1998/99: Gross Cost and time lost by severity  
  Time lost Gross incurred cost 
Severity Number Percentage Total Mean Total Mean
Death              5            0.4    1,149,872       229,974 
Permanent disability         262          19.6  10,210,808        38,973 
Temporary disability – 
six or more months off 
work 
        147          11.0       6,105       42.1    3,625,250        24,662 
Temporary disability – 
less than six months 
off work 
        924          69.1       4,945         5.4    4,825,953          5,223 
Total       1,338         100.0      11,050       10.3  19,811,884        14,807 
Source: Information provided by WorkCover NSW 
 
Of course the figures cover the entire road freight industry and not just long distance road 
freight. On the other hand, the figure excludes interstate drivers injured on NSW roads. It also 
needs to be noted that, for a variety of reasons, not all injured employee drivers make claims 
(the Inquiry heard allegations that some companies discourage claims). Further, many owner-
drivers do not have workers’ compensation cover or are reluctant to make claims even when 
they do. Overall, even if the claims made in other jurisdictions were added, workers’ 
compensation claims data would still considerably understate the extent of work-related 
injury and death to long distance truck drivers. Most of the missing or omitted injuries are 
likely to be of a minor nature (though their aggregate economic and human cost would still be 
substantial) if the pattern is consistent with a 1993 Australian Bureau of Statistics survey of 
injury reporting amongst NSW workers (ABS, 1994). However, a still substantial number will 
be of a serious nature. One ready illustration of this is that while the above table includes only 
five fatalities for the year 1998/1999, data provided by the RTA indicate that 23 drivers of 
articulated trucks died in crashes on NSW roads in 1998 and 13 in 1999. Further, even with a 
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significant discount added, extrapolations from the number of long distance truck drivers who 
reported acute or chronic injury in the survey conducted for this Inquiry would lead to a level 
of workers’ compensation claims far in excess of the number actually received by 
WorkCover. 
 
The last point raises a broader issue, namely the problematic or partial coverage of the long 
distance trucking industry by the workers’ compensation system. This has implications for 
any attempt to assess the full extent (and economic, human and social cost) of work-related 
injury and disease amongst long distance truck drivers.  Since workers’ compensation claims 
data constitutes the prime source for official occupational injury and disease statistics in 
Australia, coverage omissions result in a substantial level of understatement. It also represents 
a serious OHS problem, since it means a substantial number of injured drivers and their 
dependents are unable to access workers’ compensation and must rely on generally inferior 
forms of private insurance, Medicare/social security or their own financial resources. The 
problem is not simply a question of the actual scope of coverage but also awareness of 
coverage and preparedness to use these entitlements. As the following Table shows, the 
survey of 300 long distance truck drivers undertaken for this Inquiry provides a clear 
indication of the extent of this problem. Drivers were asked to indicate who would pay their 
medical etc bills if they were injured at work. 
  
Table 11 (Table 21 in Appendix 3): 
Workers’ compensation and injury insurance coverage of 300 interviewed drivers 
 
 Owner/drivers 
(n=99) 
Small fleet 
drivers (n=104)
large fleet 
drivers 
 (n=85) 
other 
(n=12) 
No   6.1% - -   8.3% 
Workers’ 
compensation 
38.4% 78.8% 89.4% 41.7% 
Insurance policy 42.4%   4.8% 12.9%   8.3% 
Not sure   9.1% 15.4%   8.2% 33.3% 
Other   6.1%   2.9%   4.7%   8.3% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report  
Note: Some drivers ticked more than one box so percentage totals, especially with regard to large fleet drivers, exceed 100%. 
 
Table 11 shows that there is a significant difference in injury and illness insurance coverage 
between the different employment status groups. As might be expected, large fleet drivers 
(89.4%) and those in small fleets (78.8%) are more certain of workers’ compensation 
insurance coverage in the event of a work-related injury, crash-related injury, or illness. That 
is, fleet drivers are predominantly employees with standard workers’ compensation insurance 
cover.  Both the quantitative and qualitative data showed that owner/drivers are least likely to 
have workers’ compensation coverage (38.4%), are more reliant on insurance, but their 
qualitative data suggested cost was a barrier to owner/drivers taking out cover.  (Thus the 
terms and conditions of insurance policies are of crucial importance to owner/drivers – and to 
the social security/Medicare systems on which they may ‘fall back’ if insurance cover is 
insufficient or absent.)  Those in ‘other’ employment situation have a similar pattern of 
coverage to owner/drivers – except very few have insurance cover.   Drivers in ‘other’ 
employment situations (33.3%) and in small fleets (15.4%) are most likely to be unsure of 
their workers’ compensation and insurance coverage; perhaps because many are in an 
ambiguous employment situation, or on short-term contracts, and may not be fully aware of 
all details of their agreements.   
 
Further, in their comments some drivers in all employment status groups indicated that they 
were afraid to make claims on their policies in case this affected continued employment, no-
claim bonuses, or future contracts (see Appendix 3).  Problems with coverage, awareness and 
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preparedness to make workers’ compensation claims identified in this survey are consistent 
with earlier surveys of road transport workers, an ABS survey of injured workers in NSW, 
and studies of self-employed/precariously employed workers more generally (James et al, 
1992; Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999). In other words, it is fair to say that the vast majority of 
owner/drivers do not have workers’ compensation cover and a significant number (over 15% 
according the survey) have no private insurance or are uncertain with regard to their cover. A 
substantial number of employee drivers, especially those in small fleets, are uncertain about 
their compensation entitlements. Finally, employment/work insecurity made a number of 
drivers reluctant to make claims.  
 
The survey findings were supported by submissions to the Inquiry by individual drivers and 
some organisations. As part of its written submission the Concerned Families of Australian 
Truckies included a number of driver experience profiles. One concerned a employee semi-
tipper driver carting grain for a small transport company, which actively discouraged 
workers’ compensation claims, urging its drivers to use Medicare as otherwise workers’ 
compensation premiums would go up. The driver in question did this when he injured his 
knee but when another driver made a workers’ compensation claim after being admitted to 
hospital following an accident in Melbourne the company manager ‘really harked up’. An 
insurance/accident investigator (oral submission, Victorian-based investigator) also confirmed 
his experience of situations where the company employing a driver who was injured in a 
crash was subsequently found to have no workers’ compensation cover. Oral submissions 
from Victorian-based drivers made similar points about company pressure to use Medicare or 
their inability as owner/drivers to take out adequate workers' compensation or personal injury 
cover. 
 
By themselves, these allegations would need to be treated cautiously. However, in 
conjunction with the survey findings and other evidence they suggest there is a serious 
problem in relation to the awareness and capacity of truck drivers, especially 
owner/drivers and those in small fleets, to exercise their right to workers’ compensation 
when injured. The Inquiry believes this matter warrants investigation and action by 
WorkCover NSW.  
 
A number of the observations just made are relevant to later sections of this Report. However, 
for the immediate purposes of this section it is enough to suggest we need to move beyond 
workers’ compensation data to make an assessment of the extent of health and safety 
problems in the long haul trucking industry. The Driver Survey referred to earlier (see above 
and Appendix 3) sought to provide more detailed information on the pattern of injuries in the 
long haul road freight industry.  
 
The Survey asked a series of questions about injuries, with around 25% of drivers reporting 
they had experienced a work-related injury or illness in the immediate past 12-month period 
(Table 12).  Large fleet drivers cited more injuries in the immediate past 12-month period 
than did small fleet and owner/drivers.   However qualitative data from the Survey indicated 
injury types and severity were similar across employment status groups, as were overall 
incidence patterns when ‘yes injured’ and ‘usual little things’ were combined. The level of 
acute injury reported by long haul truck drivers (one quarter reporting an injury in the 
last 12 months) is significant, well above the norm, and suggests safety problems in the 
industry extend well-beyond the incidence of fatal crashes that tends to occupy public, 
media and policy-maker attention.  
 
Apart from WorkCover, very few parties to the Inquiry raised this issue. Again, as with the 
incidence of crashes it is hard to make international comparisons (though note some 
observations made about the US situation elsewhere in this Report). A French study of 1006 
heavy vehicle drivers referred to earlier (Hamelin, 2000:23) asked them whether they had 
experienced a work-related accident but without specifying a time limit. Just over one third of 
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drivers (33.6%) stated they had experienced an accident. There was no significant difference 
in the overall response drivers with for-hire carriers and those working for not-for-carriers but 
over half of the drivers under 40 years of age reported an accident (with a somewhat higher 
figure for for-hire carrier drivers). 
 
Returning to the driver survey, as can be seen in Table 11, owner/drivers had more ‘little 
things’ and the small and large fleet employee drivers checked the ‘yes injured’ box more 
frequently.  One explanation for these minor variations in injury patterns is that normalisation 
of injury was more common amongst owner/drivers. While injury incidence and severity was 
similar across employment status groups, there were differences in levels of treatment.  
 
Table 12 (Table 14 in Appendix 3):  
Work-related injuries of 300 drivers in immediate past 12 month period 
 
 Owner/drivers  
 
(n=99) 
Small fleet 
drivers 
(n=104) 
Large fleet 
drivers 
(n=85) 
Other 
 
(n=12) 
None 75.8% 74.03% 71.8% 100% 
Yes injured   6.1% 15.4% 15.3%   - 
Usual little 
things 
22.2% 10.6% 12.9%   - 
Total injured 24    27  24   - 
% of drivers 
with any 
injuries 
24.2% 26% 28.2%   - 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
Large fleet drivers sought treatment by a doctor/nurse/hospital more frequently than did small 
fleet drivers or owner/drivers. Similarly small and large fleet drivers more commonly 
declared that their injuries required time-off work while owner/drivers rarely took time off.  A 
possible reason for these differences is that the acute financial pressures on owner/drivers (for 
truck repayments etc) means they are more liable to self-treat injuries or continue working 
while injured than those in a more secure situation (and with readier access to workers' 
compensation). Similar findings have been made in relation to self-employed subcontractors 
in other industries (Mayhew and Quinlan, 1997). This interpretation is supported by the 
pattern of chronic injuries. 
 
 
Table 13 (Table 15 in Appendix 3): 
Chronic work-related injury experiences of 300 interviewed drivers 
 
 Owner/drivers  
 
(n=99) 
small fleet 
drivers 
(n=104) 
Large fleet 
drivers 
 (n=85) 
Other 
 
(n=12) 
No 45.4% 51% 43.5% 75% 
Yes back injury 35.3% 33.6% 23.5% 16.7% 
Yes hearing 
loss 
16.2% 19.2% 29.4% 16.7% 
Yes other 15.1%   9.6% 16.5% 8.3% 
Total  55 50 46 3 
% with any 
chronic injuries 
55.5% 48.1% 54.1% 25% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
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Unexpectedly, the Driver Survey (see Table 13) found that chronic injury incidence was 
around double the level of acute injury or illness. Many drivers had more than one chronic 
problem (for a distribution of the major types of injury, see Table 13). As the Survey itself 
noted (Appendix 3) the level of chronic injury amongst all groups of drivers is of grave 
concern.  Overall, 55.5% of owner/drivers, 48.1% of small fleet and 54.1% of large fleet 
drivers cited a chronic injury, although the types of chronic injury varied across the 
employment sub-groups.   
 
Chronic back injuries were more common amongst owner/drivers (35.3%) and small fleet 
drivers (33.6%) than amongst large fleet drivers (23.5%) - differences which.  This may 
reflect differences with regard to involvement in loading/unloading or improved access to 
mechanical loading/unloading equipment for drivers in larger operations. On the other hand, 
chronic hearing loss was more common for large fleet drivers (29.4%) than for small fleet 
(19.2%) and owner/drivers (16.2%).  One possible explanation is a reporting effect in that 
more large fleet drivers have been scientifically tested for hearing loss and so the condition is 
liable to be more widely recognised amongst this group. Most disturbing perhaps, seven of 
the 300 drivers interviewed commented on poor eyesight as a chronic injury. This has to 
be of concern to regulatory authorities as well as any road user.   
 
Surveyed owner/drivers were older, had worked in the industry for longer periods of time, had 
driven older less well-designed trucks more, and worked longer hours (see Tables 4,5,9 & 11 
in Appendix 3) which meant they had been more exposed to hazards and risks.  These 
characteristics appear to apply in other countries. For example, Labour Force Survey statistics 
for Canada also indicate that self-employed truck drivers worked appreciably longer hours on 
average than employee drivers (Bess, 1999:16). 
 
2.1.2.2 Distress and Suicide: Other indicators of the health and well being of long haul truck 
drivers 
 
Injury risks are by no means the only significant health and safety problem confronting long 
distance truck drivers. Aside from working far longer hours than most other workers there is 
also a perception that drivers operate under considerable stress due to factors such as time 
spent away from their families, tight schedules etc. To gain some reliable evidence on this, the 
‘General Health Questionnaire’ (GHQ) was administered as part of the survey of 300 drivers 
already discussed. Designed two decades ago the GHQ is a simple but reliable (it has been 
exhaustively assessed) and internationally accepted tool (with benchmarks) for assessing the 
current mental health status of interviewees. Past studies have indicated that a score of around 
8.59 is relatively normal, and a score greater than 14 is so clinically significant that the person 
probably requires urgent medical treatment.   A high total score on the GHQ not only 
estimates current mental health status but also predicts future negative physical health impacts 
from this.  For reasons identified in the full survey report (see Appendix 3) using the GHQ in 
relation to blue-collar workers like truck drivers is not unproblematic and therefore some 
caution is warranted in interpreting the findings. Nonetheless, the GHQ was the most reliable 
instrument available and, as far as can be determined, no comparable evidence has previously 
been collected in relation to long distance truck drivers in Australia. 
 
For the 290 drivers who completed the GHQ, the overall mean was 10.3, which would be 
regarded as high compared with many other groups (reasons for this are explored below). 
When broken down by employment status the mean score for owner/drivers was 11.5, 9.8 for 
small fleet drivers and 10 for large fleet drivers.  Table 14 (reproducing Table 28 of the Driver 
Survey in Appendix 3) separates the results by the highway on which individual drivers were 
working on the day/night of interview (results for the Sturt and Great Western/Mitchell 
highways, and in the greater Sydney area should be treated with caution given the low number 
of respondents). As can be seen owner/drivers had higher mean scores than employee drivers 
for all routes. At the same time, the highest mean GHQ score recorded for owner/drivers was 
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on the Hume Highway and it was this route that also recorded higher mean scores for 
employee drivers, especially those working for large fleets.  
 
 
Table 14 (Table 28 in Appendix 3): 
GHQ mean scores - employment status by highway 
 
 Owner-
drivers 
(n=93  ) 
Small fleet 
drivers 
(n=103) 
Large fleet 
drivers 
(n=82) 
‘other’ 
drivers 
(n =12 ) 
Total 
drivers 
(n=290) 
Hume highway 13.1 10.2 11.6 10 11.8 
Newell 11.3   9.1 10.6   3.5   9.8 
Pacific 11.2   8.9   8.7   7   9.4 
New England 10.4 12   8.8 - 10.5 
Sturt   7.6   8   9.1   5.2   8.1 
Great Western 
and Mitchell 
  9.3 12.4 10.4 15 11 
greater Sydney 11.2   9   9.2 -   9.6 
overall 11.5   9.8 10   6.7 10.3 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
As identified in the Driver Survey Report (Appendix 3) the Hume highway has distinctive 
characteristics, being the major route between Australia’s two largest cities  (Melbourne and 
Sydney) and carrying far more long distance heavy vehicles per 24 hours than any other route.  
Apart from a section near Albury the highway is dual carriageway throughout (relatively 
unusual in Australia given its small population and the vast distances of many routes). For a 
variety of reasons (including the distance of just below 1000 kilometers and customer 
demands) the majority of heavy vehicles are driven overnight.   The Driver Survey Report 
(Appendix 3) identifies a number of other critical features: 
 
Because of the high volume, truck drivers can virtually always get return loads the next day.  
As a result many drivers routinely drive 6 legs a week – and hence they do not get held-over 
waiting for loads as they might in Brisbane or Adelaide; simultaneously drivers do not get 
long rest breaks waiting for loads.  Many truck drivers interviewed commented on the Hume 
highway being dual carriageway throughout with few towns – which was therefore to some 
extent ‘boring’ to drive on.  Finally, freight-forwarding agents organising consignments 
along the Hume highway offer very competitive freight rates.  Quoted rates on offer have 
ranged from $1.65 per km, to $1.10 per km, and even down to $0.98 per km.  The type of 
vehicle generally determines the size and weight of potential loads, with B/doubles having a 
larger capacity.  
 
In short, the Hume Highway is busy, intensely competitive and involves a lot overnight 
driving to meet short deadline schedules. The pressures this puts on truck drivers are well 
known to older drivers. More than a few of the experienced owner/drivers who made 
submissions to the Inquiry volunteered that they avoided this route and favoured longer routes 
where they had more control over how they planned their trip and when they took rest breaks. 
The highway has a longstanding reputation as being a place for younger drivers. Amongst 
drivers and operators alike the Hume Highway is colloquially known as 'Sesame Street' 
or as one driver put it 'where the young come out to play'. The presence of so many young 
inexperienced drivers and dangerous practices (such as speeding and drug use) frankly 
frightened older drivers who were worried about being 'taken out' by another truck. An 
owner/driver summed up his views: 
 
I run Melbourne/Brisbane most of the time, sometimes into North Queensland. Most of the 
older drivers seem to congregate in that particular neck of the woods as opposed to the Hume 
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Highway. [and in response to the question - 'why is that?'] I will give you a blunt answer … 
it’s a lot of younger drivers - most of the older blokes tend to steer away from this side of it 
because of the enforcement, because of the ratbag element and that is not the majority - that 
is just a minority… Yes it’s the nursery. (oral submission, southern NSW based-driver of 30 
years experience, previously as employee driver now owner/driver). 
 
The underlying reasons for high GHQ scores will be examined in detail in a later section of 
this report. 
 
Aside from the GHQ scores there are other indications of the pressure on long distance truck 
drivers. One disturbing piece of evidence presented to the Inquiry was in relation to suicides 
amongst truck drivers (though this data was not confined to long haul drivers). A Death 
Claims Report on the TWU Superannuation Fund (Cescon and Nelson, 1999) identified 
suicide as the cause of death in 10% of cases or over three times the national average of 
3.2% for Australian males. The Fund had examined 452 of the 491 claims received 
between 1 July 1995 and 9 July 1998 and suicide emerged as the fourth most frequent 
cause of death. Victoria recorded the highest number of suicides followed by South 
Australia, Queensland and New South Wales. The Report noted that suicide figure could be as 
high as 30% of claims received by the fund because the original figure excluded cases under 
coronial investigation and those classified as 'unknown' or 'drug overdose', all of which could 
include suicides. In other words, the 10% figure is a cautious estimate that almost certainly 
understates the number of suicides.  
 
Those drivers (all male) committing suicide were young (18 to 35 years old) and had young 
children (when combined with coronial investigation cases they left 239 dependents or 30% 
of the total dependents left behind). In most cases where the TWU Superannuation Fund 
carried out further investigation it was found that the driver had recently (ie within six 
months) had a break down of their marriage or de facto relationship. Moreover it was 
ascertained that the drivers were under severe financial pressure. It may be deduced that the 
financial pressures would have substantially contributed to the relationship problems and the 
resultant suicides.  
 
For every driver that commits suicide, there are likely to be many more who are under similar 
pressures. The evidence presented here is by no means comprehensive (many drivers, 
especially owner/drivers, would not belong to the TWU Superannuation Fund) but neither is it 
a small unrepresentative data set. The level of suicides identified in TWU Superannuation 
Fund represent a sad and alarming set of statistics that certainly warrants further 
investigation, especially as it is consistent with other evidence of pressure on drivers 
presented in this Inquiry Report. 
 
2.1.3 Insurance Claims/Premiums/Cover and the Economic Costs of OHS Problems in 
Long Haul Road Transport 
 
In addition to direct measures of the incidence of death and injury, there are other measures of 
the extent of safety and health problems in the long distance trucking industry. One such 
measure is the extent of (and historical trends) in relation to various kinds of insurance cover 
(compulsory third party, comprehensive vehicle and workers' compensation) carried by road 
transport operators. A related issue is the extent to which all operators take out cover. 
Compulsory third party insurance (CTP), as the name implies, is a non-optional cover to 
protect third parties (pedestrians, passengers or other vehicle users) injured by a vehicle or in 
the collision between several vehicles. Without CTP a vehicle cannot be registered (ie given 
the legal entitlement to be driven on NSW or other roads). Comprehensive policies insure 
against damage done to the vehicle and other vehicles in the case of a multi-vehicle incident 
where the driver of the insured vehicle is at fault (third party property insurance insures only 
against damage done to property/other vehicles). Comprehensive insurance is optional but 
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clearly an operator without this cover is running a high risk of financial loss (and perhaps 
bankruptcy in the case of a single owner/driver) if the vehicle is severely damaged or 'written-
off' in a traffic incident. Further, it is standard practice for finance companies to make 
ongoing comprehensive insurance a condition of lending funds to purchase a truck. Finally, as 
is the case with other employers it is compulsory for all transport operators with employees to 
take out workers' compensation cover. As noted already, this compulsion does not apply to 
owner/drivers (unless they also employ other drivers). These drivers may take out workers' 
compensation cover or private accident insurance. However, as already pointed out, a not 
insubstantial number have no cover whatsoever (meaning the costs of severe injury will fall 
on them and their dependents, the public health (ie Medicare) system and the federal social 
security system in the case of long term/permanent disability). 
 
MAA CTP claim figures demonstrate that the frequency of claims by heavy vehicles is more 
than double that of the rate for Sydney passenger vehicles. Further, the average size of claims 
for trucks over two tonnes was $60,799 in September 1999 compared to the average car claim 
of $47,673 (InforMAAtion 33). 
 
Trends in the costs of insurance claims are influenced by a range of factors not only the 
number and severity of crashes involving heavy vehicles. However, the trends identified by 
insurers and the MAA is disturbing and certainly not indicative of an improving level of 
safety performance. Indeed, both the MAA and road transport insurers have seen this trend as 
evidence of a serious situation that needs to be addressed - a view with which this Report 
would concur. Further, irrespective of its origins the translation of additional claim costs into 
higher premiums will place a heavier financial burden on operators, which as this Report will 
show, are already engaged in intense competition. 
 
Some insurance companies have moved to charge higher premiums on owner-drivers because 
of their higher claim rate. There were also significant disparities between well-run (usually 
large) fleets and smaller fleets. 
 
Our experience has shown us that well run large fleets are a much better risk than 
owner/drivers or poorly run fleets. Typically the average cost of claims in a good fleet is 15% 
below that of owner/drivers and poorly run fleets. More importantly the claim frequency for 
good fleets is 20% better than the average while owner/driver and poorly run fleets are 
approximately 20% worse than average. The combined effect of claim cost and claim 
frequency means owner/drivers and poor fleets should be paying significantly more than the 
premium a good fleet should pay. Restrictions in the current Bonus/Malus system prevent us 
from doing so (written submission, John Vallance, MMI). 
 
Quite apart from trends in claim costs and premiums there is a need to consider the issue of 
insurance cover. With regard to CTP the situation would at first sight appear to be 
unproblematic as this insurance is compulsory in order to have a vehicle (truck or other type) 
registered and insurers cannot refuse to offer CTP to an operator. However, unregistered 
vehicles are not unknown. Indeed, a survey of over 40,000 vehicles undertaken by the RTA in 
1992 identified 1.82% vehicles as unregistered, with subsequent surveys in 1998 and 1999 
yielding similar though slightly higher figures (1.85 and 1.89% respectively). These figures 
do not differentiate type of vehicle. Although it might be presumed that the running of 
unregistered heavy vehicles in the road transport industry is rare, this is supposition. 
Certainly, the problem has been a cause for concern outside NSW with unregistered vehicles 
and non-payment of third party insurance being one of a number key areas targeted under the 
randomised enforcement strategy (REDS) of the RTA's Queensland counterpart, Queensland 
Transport (written submission, page 25). 
 
The question of comprehensive insurance is quite another matter. An insurer is under no 
obligation to offer cover. In recent years the number of companies offering insurance to the 
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heavy vehicle/long distance trucking industry has declined from around 17 to just five. During 
the course of its investigation the Inquiry spoke to representatives of virtually all the 
remaining companies. Discussions with these representatives, corroborated by other evidence, 
indicated that companies were becoming much better informed about factors affecting claims 
rates and more selective in offering cover. That is, after a long period where they admitted 
undertaking inadequate research and monitoring of the performance of particular categories of 
operators (by size, primary activity etc) and drivers (employee or owner/driver, casual or 
permanent) these matters were now being addressed. The prevailing view amongst insurers 
was that the claims record of a section of the industry was so poor as not to justify cover or 
continued business. One consequence of this was that a number of transport operators have 
found it increasingly difficult to get or retain insurance cover with the same company. Some, 
including at least one large operator were effectively 'shown the door' by their insurer (by 
demanding an inordinately high premium known to be unacceptable).  
 
A representative from one of the larger insurers (written submission, Owen Driscoll, NTI Ltd) 
noted that the register of direct 'insurance declines' was growing continuously as heavy 
vehicle insurers avoided firms known to operate on the 'edge'. Given that all insurers were 
returning poor underwriting results, one decline could have a cascading effect as other 
insurers followed suit, leaving the operator unable to find an insurer or to afford a premium 
commensurate to the risk. Confirming this, another insurance representative stated that this 
year six trucking companies could not buy insurance from any of the five companies and this 
was a first in his experience (oral submission, Dean Croke, MMI/Allianz Australia). In the 
view of this representative and a number others spoken to, competition amongst insurers for 
business had kept insurance rates at artificially low levels in the past (the smaller number of 
insurance firms now operating has also enhanced their ability to identify high-risk operators).  
 
As already noted, while comprehensive insurance is not compulsory it is essential when 
financing the purchase via a loan from a recognised lending institution. For some 
owner/drivers and firms the inability to obtain cover or only at a very high price can lead to a 
loss of truck-financing arrangements and this, in turn, can effectively mean bankruptcy (ease 
of entry and bankruptcy is addressed elsewhere in the report). However, other operators will 
be able to run 'uninsured' either because they own their truck, have other sources of finance, 
or are able to keep this information from the finance company. With regard to the latter point, 
one insurance company argued that finance companies had become less resolute about 
chasing up this information: 
 
Gone are the days where financiers sought and demanded confirmation of insurance cover, 
with the threat of repossession. Needless to say this allegedly is now not occurring and 
indications are that some financed equipment continues to be operated without insurance. 
Many operators confirm that they seldom hear from their financiers on this subject these days 
(written submission, heavy vehicle insurer). 
 
It could be argued that the growing selectivity on the part of insurers is actually a good sign as 
it will eventually drive unsafe operators out of the industry and send a clear market signal to 
others to lift their performance. While this might be true to some extent two important caveats 
need to be noted. First, given the ease of entry into the industry such departures may be easily 
be replaced by new operators who ultimately prove to be equally unsafe and the resulting 
turnover may make it actually more difficult to lift overall safety performance. The previous 
history of the industry is far from ruling this out as a scenario, quite the reverse. Second, if 
anything the extent to which some operators are able to carry one business while uninsured is, 
from a public safety as well as OHS perspective, even more worrying. Such operators are 
likely to be confined to the very margins of the industry in terms of contracts and legality, 
with predictable safety consequences. The Inquiry was unable to obtain any detailed 
information on the number of operators without comprehensive insurance. A number of 
insurers expressed a belief that the number of uninsured operators was growing (similar views 
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were expressed by several other parties). The Inquiry was also told of cases in the far west of 
the State where a vehicle sustaining serious damage (but not serious injury to the driver or 
other road user) at certain times could be removed before it was the subject of an RTA or 
police report/surveillance. In the absence of more evidence, the Report can express no view 
on the matter except to say that it warrants further investigation given the serious 
consequences that are likely to flow from a significant or growing number of uninsured 
operators. 
 
The third body of insurance is that related to the workers' compensation cover carried by 
firms with employee drivers or taken out by owner/drivers, with the latter also being able to 
take out private accident insurance. In its submission (page 2) the Insurance Council of 
Australia stated that the workers’ compensation premium in NSW for “carrying/carting” had 
increased from 8.36% of wages to 9.4% of wages in 2000/2001 which represented one of the 
highest rates determined by the NSW WorkCover Authority. While long haul trucking 
represents only one part of this category, this provides further evidence of the poor safety 
performance of road transport. Moreover, there is evidence of similar trends in other 
jurisdictions. For example, between 1994 and 1997 road transport represented the second 
most costly industry in terms of workers’ compensation claims in South Australia. Keith 
Brown, the CEO of WorkCover South Australia (1998), noted that road transport made up a 
disproportionately large share of workers’ compensation claims and costs in South Australia, 
had an elevated risk of worker fatality, and the growth of claim rates and costs was outpacing 
the expansion of the industry. In Queensland, too, analysis of data for the year 1996-97 
indicates that both the number of injuries and the number of severe injuries per 100 workers 
in transport and storage was significantly higher than the all-industry average. The average 
duration of absence resulting from injury in transport and storage (68.4 days) was also 
significantly higher than the all industry average (50.4 days). Road transport workers 
accounted for 44.3% of all injuries in the transport and storage classification, with truck 
drivers alone accounting for 25% of all injuries (Queensland Division of Workplace Health 
and Safety, 1998). 
 
As already noted the costs (and therefore premiums for the industry as a whole) associated 
with workers' compensation are understated because not all work-related injuries (including 
serious injuries) by truck drivers result in a workers' compensation claim. The Inquiry also 
received evidence that some smaller transport companies might not carry the requisite 
workers' compensation policy (running the risk of detection and being fined by WorkCover) 
or discouraged drivers from making claims. These problems are liable to be more pronounced 
in long haul than other areas of road transport due to the greater prominence of self-employed 
drivers and regional transport companies (that are less likely to be unionised and whose 
workers have fewer alternative job opportunities than those in major urban centres). As noted 
in the survey commissioned for this Inquiry, over 20% of employee drivers in small fleets 
were either unsure of their cover under workers' compensation or believed/had taken out some 
other form of cover. With regard to owner/drivers only 38% had taken out/or believed they 
were covered by workers' compensation, 42% had private insurance, around 9% were unsure 
of their coverage and 6% admitted having no cover whatsoever. As indicated by previous 
research even this understates the problem because not all owner/drivers with formal cover 
will make claims for reasons such as the need to maintain income and a fear of losing future 
work. 
 
Direct insurance costs represent only part of the total economic costs associated with safety 
and health problems in the road transport industry. Quite apart from its costs in terms of 
injury, death and associated suffering, the health and safety burden of crashes etc in the long 
distance trucking industry can also be measured in economic terms. The cost to the 
community when a trucking accident takes place – apart from tragic loss of life - includes the 
cost of police, ambulance, fire brigade, towing and repair, loss of produce and production. 
Some of these hidden costs are substantial. Even a small amount of time spent at an accident 
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scene by emergency services is costly. In NSW there are at least 75,000 vehicle incidents per 
year requiring a tow truck. The Transport Management Centre estimated that a saving of 15 
minutes in dealing with each accident that takes place in the greater Sydney area in each year 
would save approximately $846.45 million over that period (information provided by the Tow 
Truck Authority of NSW). No estimates are available for incidents involving articulated 
trucks or other heavy vehicles but it can be presumed it is substantial, especially given the 
tendency of truck incidents to be more serious in terms of damage to vehicles, towing 
expenses and injuries to those involved. In the case of death or serious disablement there are 
hidden but substantial costs in terms of the loss of skilled and experienced workers (both 
truck drivers and other road users) which insurance payouts seldom match. There is also the 
potential for very long term effects resulting from disruption to families and the education of 
children that accompanies death or disablement to the primary breadwinner. 
 
Other losses include the loss to the taxpayers via Medicare where an injured party is not 
covered by workers’ compensation. There are also increased insurance premiums for the 
general public when trucks are uninsured. If the industry is not economically viable operators 
will cut costs on things like comprehensive insurance. This amounts to a gamble with the 
public interest, the operator gambling that the vehicle will not be involved in an accident. The 
insurance industry has estimated that approximately 20% of the industry does not have 
comprehensive insurance. By failing to have proper insurance cover, this section of the 
industry is requiring the broader community to pay higher premiums to offset their 
shortcomings. 
 
Estimating the full economic costs of health and safety is a difficult exercise, since many 
indirect costs are difficult to identify let alone measure, and as a result underestimation is a 
common problem (the same applies to trying to measure the economic benefits of improved 
health and safety performance). A major report into OHS by the Industry Commission (1995) 
estimated that the indirect costs may outweigh direct costs (such as workers’ compensation) 
by a ratio of three to one and this is in line with estimates by other research, both in Australia 
and overseas. The Bureau of Transport Economics reported that the total cost of road crashed 
in 1996 was $15 billion dollars. 
 
More so than many other industries, road transport entails a significant element of public 
safety. In road transport many of the victims of truck-related incidents are other road users 
and so this calculation has to be added to those costs involving drivers and their families 
(there are also environmental costs). 
  
In its 1989 report, Concerning Alert Drivers and Safe Speeds for Heavy Vehicles, 
STAYSAFE (the Parliament of New South Wales Joint Standing Committee on Road Safety) 
used data from a variety of sources to estimate the cost of crashes involving articulated trucks 
in New South Wales.  The report estimated that the total cost of casualties from crashes 
involving articulated trucks in 1988 was $106 million, consisting of 151 fatalities (at an 
average cost of $486,000), 277 hospital admissions (average cost $99,000) and 492 other 
injuries (average cost $11,000). Using base information from the Road Safety Authority (later 
taken over by the RTA) STAYSAFE estimated that the average cost of crash involvement of 
articulated trucks was 7.6 cents per kilometre (calculated by dividing the $106 million by 1.4 
billion kilometres travelled. STAYSAFE 15, 1989:3). Thus, the safety costs for a truck on a 
typical trip of around 1000 km (the approximate distance between Sydney and Brisbane) was 
$76 or $23,000 if the truck completed 300 such trips in a year. It should be noted in passing 
that these figures are expressed in terms of 1989 dollars and converting them into 2000 
dollars would result in substantially higher figures. 
 
It should be noted that any attempt to estimate the total cost of safety problems in the long 
distance trucking industry needs to include some estimate of indirect as well as direct costs.  
These include substantial costs arising from the lost output of injured workers. In the United 
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Kingdom the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions recently estimated the 
value prevention of a fatal road casualty at £1 million (or around $2.8 million), with more 
than £300,000 of this being comprised of lost output. An effort must also be made to factor in 
the considerable number of injuries that result in no workers’ compensation or insurance 
claim. 
Table 15: Casualty Costs Per Person 
 
Casualty Type $ 
 
Fatality 771,800 
Admitted Injury 131,800 
Treated Injury 8,600 
Non-treated Injury 1,010 
Not Injured 390 
 
Source: ARRB, Preliminary costs for accidents-types, Research Report 217, 1992 
Indexed using estimates of Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) for NSW, ABS Catalogue no. 6302.0 
 
The RTA publishes economic costs of crashes in RTA Economic Analysis Manual, Version 2, 
1999 for evaluating the savings in accident costs on new road projects. Table 15 indicates the 
casualty costs per person while Table 16 indicates the generic costs per accident. Using these 
tables as a basis for calculating the cost of fatalities involving articulated trucks, it can be 
noted in 1999 the 189 fatalities Australia-wide cost $145.87 million while the figure for NSW 
alone was $49.39 million (or $10.03 million for truck drivers and $20.07 million for other 
road users).  
 
Table 16: Generic Costs Per Accident 
 
Casualty Type $ 
 
Fatality 937,000 
Injury requiring hospital admission 175,000 
Injury requiring medical treatment 27,000 
Injury not requiring medical treatment 17,000 
Tow away 12,200 
 
Source: Based on 1997 RTA accident data and costs by casualty class from Andreassen, D. Costs for accident types and casualty 
classes, ARR 227, ARRB TR 1992, updated for 1999 values.  
 
Using Table 16, the RTA estimates would indicate that total cost of fatal crashes involving 
articulated trucks in 1999 was $151.79 million for Australia as a whole and $52.47 million for 
NSW. According to these tables the total cost of non-fatal (hospital admission) casualties 
from crashes involving articulated trucks in NSW in 1999 was $100.95 million while the total 
cost of casualty crashes was $97.12 million. In other words, RTA estimates would indicate 
that the total cost of fatalities and casualties due to crashes involving articulated trucks in 
NSW in 1999 was over $150 million and basing the figure on the generic cost of crashes 
yields a very similar figure. To gain the full costs would require adding the cost of more 
minor injuries, tow away costs and fatal/casualty crashes involving heavy rigid trucks used for 
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long haul freight tasks (and deducting the number of articulated trucks involved in 
fatal/casualty incidents that were not engaged in long haul). 
 
In addition to the direct and indirect costs of those injured or killed in incidents involving 
heavy rigid and articulated trucks, there are other costs. These include those arising from 
vehicle damage, cargo loss, vehicle replacement, business disruption (especially in the case of 
small operators) and the loss skilled of professional workers (both truck drivers and others). 
Information provided to the Inquiry by the RTA and based on data supplied by one insurer 
indicated that the average cost of repairing a truck over 13 tonnes GVM was $12,409. The 
Inquiry was unable to obtain recent information on cargo loss and vehicle replacement. In 
1991 Cairney (1991:14) that vehicle damage, cargo loss and vehicle replacement amounted to 
between 17% and 21% of the fatality/injury costs of smashes involving articulated trucks 
(with the higher figure applying to non-metropolitan crashes). If these ratios were to hold they 
would add another $30 million to those figures just cited for the year 1999.  
 
All the estimates just cited should be treated with caution. Nonetheless, they indicate that 
crashes involving articulated trucks entail a substantial cost on Australia, and NSW in 
particular. Even a small improvement of say 5 to 10% would bring substantial economic 
savings to the community. Such savings need to be borne in mind in any debate over the 
'costs' of improving safety performance in the long haul trucking industry. 
 
2.2. THE NATURE OF HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS IN LONG HAUL 
ROAD TRANSPORT 
 
During the course of its investigation the Inquiry collected written and oral submissions as 
well as other evidence on different safety and health problems in the long distance trucking 
industry (for both drivers and other road users), as well as the immediate risk factors 
contributing to unsafe practices. An example of the latter is long hours of work and its 
connection (along with inadequate rest, irregular shifts and the timing of work) to fatigue, 
which in turn has an array of long and short term effects of driver safety, health and well-
being. The term immediate risk factors are used here to distinguish them from underlying 
causes. For example, demonstrating a link between long hours of work/inadequate rest, driver 
fatigue and truck crashes is important but it is at least as important to explore why drivers are 
working such hours or getting inadequate rest. Absence of the latter information not only 
results in a partial explanation but may also lead to policy interventions that fail. For example, 
if there are strong pressures for drivers to work long hours the implementation of a fatigue 
management regime that fails to address this is unlikely to succeed. The terms of reference for 
this Inquiry directly addressed this issue, explicitly requiring an investigation of links, if any, 
between a range of commercial and industrial practices in the transport industry (and the array 
of parties involved in these arrangements) and safety.  
 
In relation to the last point it should be noted that, while a number of issues will be touched 
on in this section, detailed analysis of the link between commercial practices and safety will 
be pursued in the following section of the report (and built on in subsequent sections). The 
primary purpose of this section is to examine the extent and scope of safety and health 
problems in the long distance road freight sector, and in so doing, provide a better 
understanding of the issues that need to be addressed. During the course of its investigations 
the Inquiry received submissions on a wide range of safety issues. This section provides an 
overview of these issues with some effort to assess their importance, using both the 
submissions themselves (a number from experts in the field) as well as other information, 
most notably: 
  
• data derived by a general OHS survey of 300 long distance truck drivers carried out as 
part of the Inquiry by Dr Claire Mayhew (see Appendix 3) and another survey of around 
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1,000 drivers carried out by Dr Ann Williamson and colleagues for the NRTC (and more 
focused on the issue of fatigue); 
• the published scientific literature on truck driver health and safety, both in Australia and 
overseas ; and  
• earlier reports and government inquiries which addressed safety in the long distance 
trucking industry in various Australian jurisdictions over the past 20 years. 
 
The survey data should be viewed as a central part of the Inquiry process itself.  The two 
other additional sources just mentioned provided the opportunity to assess submissions to the 
Inquiry in terms of their consistency with other available evidence, the relative importance of 
the issue, and helped to identify any trends in relation the nature or incidence of the problem.  
By drawing on earlier reports and inquiries this Inquiry sought to place its own findings in 
context, to give a picture of long-term debates about safety in the industry (and one beyond 
the confines of NSW) and avoid a reinvention of the wheel. This practice will be followed by 
subsequent sections of this Report. 
 
In sum, what follows is a discussion of various safety issues affecting the long distance 
trucking industry. For convenience, the most prominent risks to safety in the trucking 
industry, like speeding, fatigue and drug use are discussed separately even though there are 
important interrelationships (most obviously between fatigue and drug use). These links are, 
however, not ignored in this section of the Report, being identified and assessed at a number 
of points. These and other inter-linkages are explored in more detail in subsequent sections. 
 
2.2.1 Long Hours, Sleep Apnea and Fatigue 
 
Truck drivers are the galley slaves of the twenty first century  (oral submission, wife/partner 
of owner/driver) 
 
At the present time the long haul road transport industry is virtually unique in terms of 
standard working hours. Under current regulations truck drivers are permitted up to 12 hours 
in a day and 72 hours a week (almost twice the standard hours of many other workers) in New 
South Wales and other states. A similar limit applies in Canada and slightly more stringent 
limits apply in the USA (where the maximum is 60 hours per week) and the European Union. 
What is more, the maximum does not amount to a remote maximum limit that is seldom met. 
Rather, there is clear evidence from surveys spanning back well over a decade that the bulk of 
the truck driving workforce work close to this limit, with a sizable number substantially 
exceeding it on a regular basis. The high incidence of offences by drivers in relation to 
logbooks (a primary device used in driving hours compliance) provides additional evidence of 
this. In a survey of 820 drivers Hensher et al (1991:61) found 41% had received logbook fines 
in the past year, with the incidence being highest amongst small fleet drivers (53.5%) and 
lowest amongst large fleet drivers (31.1%). Long hours of work are, as already implied, not 
confined to truck drivers in Australia but also apply to drivers in Europe and North America. 
In Canada, Labour Force Survey statistics indicate that ‘for-hire’ drivers work considerably 
longer hours on average than other truck drivers (Bess, 1999:16). The Inquiry is unaware of 
comparable data for Australia but would suggest a similar situation is likely to apply in this 
country. The same Canadian survey (Bess, 1999:16) found that long haul truck drivers were 
most likely to be found amongst the 31% identified as working 60 or more hours per week in 
1998. 
 
It needs to be emphasised that long hours behind the wheel (12-14 hours in a day and up to 72 
hours a week under the current regulations) do not capture the full workload of long distance 
drivers. In addition to driving, drivers often spend considerable time loading/unloading and, 
especially in the case of owner/drivers, undertaking vehicle maintenance. Further, other time 
is spent waiting in queues at depots or client warehouses. These, again, are long term features 
of the industry. In their pilot study, Hensher and Battellino (1990:549) found that 80% of 
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owner/drivers were involved in loading and 60% were involved in unloading at their 
destination while the comparable figure for employee drivers was 60% for both loading and 
unloading. As might be expected owner/drivers spent almost three times more time on 
maintenance than employee drivers though when it came to time spent waiting the situation 
was reversed with employee drivers reporting spending far more time in queues (Figure 5 in 
Hensher and Battellino, 1990:549). 
 
Driver fatigue has a number of profound effects on safety and health, including increasing the 
risk of crashes as well as encouraging drug-use and other hazardous practices on the part of 
drivers. The latter may include the practice of “slipstreaming” where trucks travel nose-to-tail 
such as allegedly occurred when six semi-trailers and a rigid truck collided on the Hume 
highway near Albury in June 2001 (Daily Telegraph 15 June 2001). Though “slipstreaming” 
has often been seen as a device for saving fuel it has been suggested the principle factor 
underpinning the practice is an attempt by drivers to keep together in order to combat fatigue. 
Whatever the merits of these contentions, there can be little doubt that driver fatigue increases 
irritability and already substantial strains on work/non-work balances (due to long periods of 
absence from family) as well as having long-term health effects. Along with speed, fatigue 
has seen to be a serious factor in heavy vehicle crashes. An investigation of heavy vehicle 
crashes in NSW in 1988/89 found 60% involved an element of driver fatigue (Sweatman et al, 
1990 cited in Hensher et al, 1991:53). Other estimates have attributed 20-30% of highway 
fatalities and 40-50% of fatal single vehicle crashes to fatigue and these figures may 
underestimate the impact of some fatigue symptoms such as impaired judgement or 
anticipation (STAYSAFE, 1989 and McDonald, 1984 cited in Hensher et al, 1991:53). Using 
coronial records in Victoria, Haworth et al (1989) found that coroner’s attributed fatigue as 
the cause in 9.1% of fatal heavy vehicle crashes but their own judgement of the evidence 
placed the figure at almost 20%.  A survey of NSW truck drivers by Linklater (1980) 
concluded that drivers who spent over 55 hours at the wheel were more likely to be involved 
in crashes. A number of studies (see for example Haworth et al 1989 and Hensher et al 1991) 
noted drivers themselves tended to substantially underestimate the risk of fatigue. 
 
Other research has helped to indicate why fatigue is so dangerous. A number of studies have 
compared the extent to which fatigue and alcohol consumption impair driving performance. 
For example, a recent study for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by Williamson et al 
(2000a) found after 17 to 19 hours without sleep impaired performance on some tests 
corresponded to that associated with the current legal blood alcohol concentration (of 0.05%) 
while longer periods without rest led to results comparable to those receiving the maximum 
alcohol dose (0.1% blood alcohol concentration). In other words, like alcohol fatigue had the 
capacity to seriously impair driver performance and the periods without rest where these 
effects become serious are by no means atypical in the long haul transport industry. 
 
The importance of fatigue as a safety factor in trucking has been confirmed by overseas 
studies. For example, an analysis of 186 truck driver fatalities in heavy vehicle crashes in the 
USA by the American National Transportation Safety Board (1990 cited in Frith 1994:19-20) 
cited fatigue as the probable cause in 57 (or 31%). More recently, the US Department of 
Transportation (US DOT, 2000) has reported that truck driver fatigue is the main contributing 
factor in 15% of all commercial vehicle accidents, accounting for 755 deaths and 19,000 
injuries each year. The Department argued fatigue was a growing factor in accidents in all 
modes of transportation. 
 
International studies of truck drivers (McDonald, 1984; Jones and Stein, 1987; Lin et al, 
1993; Frith, 1994) have identified a significant and progressively higher risk of crash 
involvement (by an order of two to three) as the period of work without a break extends 
beyond 8-10 hours. A case control study of truck drivers in New Zealand (Frith, 1994) 
confirmed previous international research that driving time since the last significant period 
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had the strongest effect on crash risk. A US study by Mackie and Miller (1978) found fatigue 
effects became evident prior to 8 hours when drivers were on irregular shifts.  
 
In addition to the length and irregularity of shifts, there is also strong evidence that the timing 
of the shift also affects the risk of being involved in crashes. International evidence indicates 
night driving entails a substantially greater risk of crashing (twice as high according to 
McDonald, 1984) and is worst between 2am and 7am where circadian rhythms mean driver 
alertness is at its lowest (Abkowitz, 1989 cited in Hensher et al 1991:68. See also Harris and 
Mackie, 1972).   The last point is especially significant given the emphasis on overnight 
freight (the additional risk may be partly offset by the additional traffic encountered at 
daytime although this effect is yet to be measured). 
 
Overall, research on long distance trucking that highlights the increased risk of injury 
associated with long hours, irregular shifts and night work parallels the findings in relation to 
workers engaged under similar arrangements in other industries (Folkard, 2000). However, it 
can be argued that long distance trucking represents an extreme case because of the 
exceptionally long hours in comparison to other industries and the combined effects of all 
three factors just mentioned.  
 
Table 17 provides evidence on the number of crashes where fatigue was deemed to be a major 
contributing factor (a looser term than suggesting fatigue caused these incidents) in heavy 
vehicle crashes in Australia in selected years between 1990 and 1996. These indicate that 
fatigue was a significant contributor to just over 10% of heavy vehicle crashes that was higher 
than the equivalent figure for all vehicle crashes. Further, in this admittedly short time frame 
there is no evidence that the impact of fatigue was declining. However, it should also be 
observed that even in heavy vehicle crashes the fatigue contribution applied to the driver of 
the 'other vehicle' in around half (the small numbers mean these figures should be treated with 
caution Smith 2000:5, Moore and Brooks, 2000:2). 
 
Table 17: Fatigue and crashes, all crashes and heavy vehicles, Australia 1990, 1992, 
1994, 1996 
Year All 
Crashes 
Fatigue Per cent Heavy 
Vehicle
s 
Fatigue Per cent LV 
fatigue 
HV 
fatigue 
1990 2010 123 6.1 217 22 10.1 15 7 
1992 1688 97 5.7 163 16 9.8 7 9 
1994 1682 128 7.6 160 15 9.4 8 7 
1996 1767 149 8.4 166 18 10.8 11 7 
Source: ATSB: FORS fatality database 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996 reproduced in Smith (2000:5) 
Notes: heavy vehicle: articulated truck or long distance coach 
Fatigue is coded where driver fatigue has been nominated as a major contributing factor to the crash 
 
This Inquiry received further information from the RTA on the number of fatigue-related 
casualty crashes (ie death or injury causing) by both heavy trucks and articulated trucks on 
NSW roads for the six years 1993 to 1998. In this period there was an annual average of 
1,041.8 casualty crashes involving heavy trucks. Of these, the RTA stated that fatigued heavy 
truck drivers were involved in an annual average of 80.8 casualty crashes (or 7.6% of the 
total) with drivers of articulated trucks accounting for over two thirds of these crashes (an 
annual average of 58.7 or 5.6% of the total). Crashes involving fatigued heavy truck drivers 
accounted for annual average of 98.3 casualties, with those involving fatigued articulated 
truck drivers accounting for 68.5 or (again) over two thirds of casualties. The RTA argued 
that over the six-year period there had been a tendency towards an increasing number of 
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crashes and casualties involving fatigued articulated truck drivers (written submission, RTA 
page 6).  
 
The importance of fatigue in serious truck crashes is emphasised by information provided by 
other jurisdictions. In its written submission (Attachment 2) Victorian WorkCover noted that 
between 1993/1994 and 1996/97 there were 77 work-related fatalities in the transport 
industry. In 28 cases (or 37%) fatigue was identified as a factor and 20 of these cases (or 26% 
of the total) involved trucks, single vehicle truck crashes accounting for 16, representing 57% 
or over half of all fatigue-related fatalities in transport and 75% of all fatigue-related truck 
deaths. Of the remaining four fatigue-related truck fatalities, two entail multi-vehicle 
incidents, one involved a truck/train collision and one involved a truck hitting a pedestrian.   
In its written submission Queensland Transport also emphasised the serious relationship 
between fatigue and truck crashes. It noted that Queensland data for the period 1992 to 1998 
12% of crashes involving articulated trucks were attributed to fatigue, compared to only 2% 
of bus and coach crashes (written submission, Queensland Transport page 7). 
 
Both FORS and RTA estimates of the number of fatigue-related crashes should be regarded as 
conservative because they only include cases where fatigue was deemed to be a major 
contributing factor to the incident. In an unknown number of other cases fatigue made a less 
significant contribution to the incident, serving to exacerbate other problems. Further, crashes 
are only one outcome of fatigue.  
 
As fatigue in the transportation sector was the subject of recent federal inquiry by the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts (Beyond the 
Midnight Oil: Managing Fatigue in Transport, 2000) this Report does not wish to belabour 
discussions of the extent of fatigue problems. Nevertheless, a study that has only recently 
become available is worthy of mention. The Inquiry was able to obtain more information on 
the fatigue problem from a national survey of just over 1000 long distance truck drivers 
undertaken by Drs Ann Williamson, Anne-Marie Feyer and two colleagues for the National 
Road Transport Commission. This recent study focused specifically on fatigue and, most 
valuably was benchmarked against a similar survey undertaken in 1991. The study 
(Williamson et al, 2000) found that there had been an increase in the amount of work required 
of long distance drivers since the earlier survey, entailing considerably longer trips and with 
drivers reporting an earlier onset of fatigue. Most drivers did at least some midnight to dawn 
driving and over 20% had exceeded the 72 hour limit of current working hours regulations in 
the week before they were surveyed (a greater proportion of owner/drivers in the second 
survey may partly explain this result). About a quarter of the drivers surveyed admitted 
breaking driving hours-regulations on every trip. 
 
One especially disturbing survey finding was that one in five drivers reported a fatigue-related 
dangerous event on their last trip such as crossing lanes, nodding off or near misses. In other 
words, potentially serious lapses of concentration are a relatively common experience for 
truck drivers. While periodic lapses of attention or even ‘mini-sleeps’ are known to occur 
amongst other transport operators such pilots and train drivers (especially at night), it is 
arguable that the risks are greater for truck drivers (and the public). In Australia the long 
distance truck driver is typically in control of a 40 to 60 tonne GVM vehicle travelling at 100 
kph on an often-narrow single lane highway. Unlike a plane (with autopilot) or train (on a 
track and with other safeguards like the deadman’s hand) the driver must maintain continuous 
attention. Even a second or two of inattention can have the vehicle leaving its lane or the road 
altogether (as any driver who has ever experienced nodding off and survived will know).   In 
the field of occupational health and safety it is well recognised that near misses are a good 
predictor of future injuries/serious incidents.  
 
The Inquiry received a considerable number of submissions alleging that driver fatigue 
problems were considerably exacerbated by the lack of consideration they received from 
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customers. Typical were these comments from the Victorian Road Transport Association 
(written submission): 
 
Drivers are the end of the food chain as far as the freight customer is concerned. No 
consideration is given to their welfare upon arrival or prior to departure. All the customer is 
interested in is getting his or her product from point A to B. No rest facilities or amenities are 
provided. Drivers are required to be available at a moment's notice in all weather conditions 
regardless of his or her physical preparedness. 
 
The issue of the contribution of customer/client practices to safety problems in the long haul 
trucking industry was a central term of reference for this Inquiry and this issue is explored at 
some length in succeeding sections of the Report.  
 
Sleep Apnea 
 
The Inquiry received a number of submissions that raised the issue of sleep apnea (a spectrum 
of conditions linked to loss of a normal pattern of breathing during sleep) as a sleep disorder 
which could constitute a source of fatigue in addition to hours of work and sleep length. One 
body to raise this issue was the NRMA: 
  
A related problem, which NRMA believes may be a ‘hidden’ problem, is the extent of the 
condition of sleep apnea amongst drivers. Recent international research reported at the 6th 
World Congress on Sleep Apnea has suggested that as many as 4% of men suffer from sleep 
apnea, with those in middle age and overweight having the highest risk profile. Many long 
distance drivers would fall into these categories. Recent Australian research with transport 
drivers (Howard et al, 2000) concluded that a large proportion of a sample of 168 drivers 
had excessive daytime sleepiness and a high probability of having sleep apnea. NRMA’s view 
is that more research needs to be done to identify the prevalence of this condition among 
truck drivers, and appropriate measures taken by companies in relation to driver health to 
assist drivers (written submission NRMA). 
 
In relation to the NRMA’s comments it should be noted that the connection between obesity 
and a sedentary occupation involving long hours of work (with limited opportunities for 
exercise), often at night, and with meals at odd times (and with a limited dietary selection) 
needs to be recognised. In other words, there are connections between work, obesity and 
lifestyle that should not be ignored when labelling any category of workers as susceptible to 
sleep apnea. 
 
A submission from researchers at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital/University of Sydney 
drew attention to a large research project they were undertaking on the extent of obstructive 
sleep apnea amongst truck drivers and assessing a potential medical remedy (written 
submission, Grunstein and Desai). The submission pointed to US research, which if 
extrapolated to Australia, would suggest that sleep apnea is prevalent amongst truck drivers 
and may be responsible for a significant number of fatigue-related crashes. Attempts to 
estimate the extent of sleep apnea and its connection to fatigue-related truck crashes are 
currently based on fragmentary estimates although this evidence is sufficient to warrant 
further investigation. The research of Grunstein and Desia will hopefully help to fill some 
gaps in our knowledge of sleep apnea. Over a decade ago the Office of Motor Carriers 
(1990:5) in the USA argued “individuals with suspected or untreated sleep apnea (symptoms 
of snoring and hypersomnolence) should be considered medically unqualified to operate a 
commercial vehicle until the diagnosis has been dispelled or the condition has been treated 
successfully.” 
 
The Report believes further investigation of this potentially serious issue is warranted. At the 
same time, care needs to be taken to ensure that research into sleep apnea does not become a 
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substitute for investigating other sources of fatigue amongst truck drivers, most notably the 
hours and timing of work and rest breaks. 
 
Other health problems association with long hours/fatigue 
 
An increased likelihood of crashing is the most overt but by no means the only health and 
safety outcome of long hours of work at odd hours and irregular intervals. For example, the 
combination of long hours and the sedentary nature of their work means that truck drivers are 
at risk of developing recurrent deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary thromboelolism. These 
risks have been known for some time (see Office of Motor Carriers, 1990:43) but has not 
received any where near the recognition or publicity recently accorded to the risk of deep vein 
thrombosis in airline passengers. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
There can be no question that fatigue is a widespread and serious issue in the long distance 
trucking industry that places drivers and other road users at risk. Even using the most 
conservative assumptions, available evidence indicates that fatigue related casualties are at a 
level that the community would find hard to accept and that should not be tolerated. If these 
figures were publicised they would undoubtedly arouse concern in the community and less 
conservative but still eminently defendable estimates might well lead to widespread alarm and 
calls for urgent action by government and other parties. Such concerns would be magnified by 
the assessment of authoritative bodies like the RTA (which used conservative estimates) that 
fatigue situation in relation to articulated trucks has been deteriorating over the last six years. 
 
2.2.2 Speeding 
 
There can be no doubt that speeding by long distance trucks poses a severe risk to both 
drivers and other road users (including pedestrians and bystanders). The connection between 
speeding and crashes involving heavy vehicles has long been established. For example, a 
study of heavy vehicle crashes on NSW roads between 1982 and 1988 found 28% were 
associated with excess speed by the truck involved (Sweatman et al, 1990 cited in Hensher et 
al, 1990:43). In its submission the RTA stated that data continued to show that speeding 
heavy vehicles were over-represented in crashes (from 1994 to 1999 the heavy vehicle 
involvement rate [accidents per 10,000 vehicles] was twice that for passenger cars).  
 
In their written submissions to this Inquiry both the RTA and NSW Police provided evidence 
to suggest that speeding by heavy vehicles was widespread. This is despite the fact that since 
1991 all heavy vehicles with a gross vehicle mass (GVM) of over 12 tonnes are speed-limited 
to 100kph, and this would cover most long distance trucks. The RTA collects instantaneous 
speeds at a number of fixed Culway sites (concealed in ground equipment measuring heavy 
vehicle axle weights and speed) across NSW. The RTA noted that an analysis of speeding 
trends over the 18 months from July 1998 indicated that speeding by heavy vehicles had 
increased at almost all sites. Further, as can be seen from Figure 1, Culway data indicates that 
speeding by heavy vehicles is widespread on virtually every major highway/freight corridor. 
Speeding trucks constitute at least 30% of heavy vehicle traffic on all but two routes and 
considerable exceed this figure on the Pacific Highway, Hume Highway (northbound), New 
England Highway and Cobb Highway.  
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 Figure 1: Heavy vehicles exceeding 100 kph & 115 kph through 
Culway Sites, July 1998 to December 1999
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The NSW Culway results are matched by evidence from other states. Using passive weigh-in-
motion technology on the Bruce Highway about 100 kilometers north of Brisbane, 
Queensland Transport found that of a sample of 60,732 vehicles about one third were detected 
exceeding the speed limit. Of these 30% of the total sample were travelling between 100 and 
110 kilometers per hours, 3% at between 110 and 120 kilometers per hour and 0.3% in excess 
of 100 kilometers per hour (written submission, Queensland Transport, page 5). 
 
NSW Police painted a similar picture of the speeding problem to the RTA. The Traffic 
Services Branch of the NSW Police Service pointed to a substantial recent increase in the 
number of infringement notices issued to heavy vehicles for speeding (from 6,767 in 1998 to 
8,644 in 1999). It argued that the perception of police in the field was that the incidence of 
speeding was becoming more frequent. There were also systematic efforts to evade 
enforcement measures on the part of some sections of the industry (this will be discussed in 
more detail in a later section of this Report).  
 
For their part, industry associations accepted that speeding was an ongoing problem. In its 
written submission (page 19) the ATA stated: 
 
The issue of speeding trucks has long been a curse for the industry as operators willing to 
flout the speeding laws for commercial advantage have tarnished the industry’s safety record 
and image. 
 
The significance of the speeding issue was attested to from other sources, including mototist 
reports to the NRMA. 
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Speeding is one of the main issues which NRMA members identify in regard to trucks, 
particularly long haul trucks. Members commonly report instances of trucks travelling at 
speeds well in excess of the posted limit, let alone the special limit for trucks of 100km/h 
(written submission, NRMA). 
 
The Inquiry also received submissions complaining about speeding by trucks from individual 
road users and persons living close to highways or roads used by heavy trucks. In one case a 
northern NSW resident kept detailed records to justify claims that heavy vehicles exceeding 
the speed limit by 10kph or more through their town was widespread, and this tendency to 
speed was disproportionately higher in comparison to light trucks and cars passing the stretch 
under all conditions. The submission alleged that speed-reading indicated that car drivers 
traveling in company with heavy trucks cars tended to increase their speed to match the trucks 
(written submission, highway resident NSW). The submission also complained of aggressive 
behaviour on the part of truck drivers such as tailgating slower vehicles. The writer of the 
submission consistently raised instances of speeding (where the vehicle had been identified) 
with relevant transport companies (details of 39 letters of complaint to these companies along 
with speed data etc were included to substantiate the claims) but complained this yielded 
evasive or token responses. The writer had also raised their concerns with the police, the RTA 
and the Minister for Police and had received responses from all three. Other complainants 
were less assiduous in their record keeping and diligence but the general tenor of their 
complaints were similar and referred to regions/routes such as the Pacific and Hume 
highways. 
 
Some care is required in evaluating the understandable concerns of motorists and those living 
close to major trucking routes. Complaints about aggressive behaviour on the part of truck 
drivers also need to be balanced against evidence of aggression or just plain insensitivity on 
the part of other road users that is discussed elsewhere in this Report. At the same time, the 
claims in relation to speeding are not inconsistent with more systematic and comprehensive 
data collected by the RTA and the police and add weight to concerns about speeding as a 
critical safety issue. 
 
2.2.3 Drug Use 
 
Drug use by long distance truck drivers understandably raises deep concern in the community 
and has been the focus, sometimes unreasonably, of media attention. While stimulant drugs 
are taken to combat fatigue they: 
 
…do not guarantee driver alertness, and can even cause hallucinations and sudden 
drowsiness whilst driving. Linklater (1977) found that of drivers using stimulants, 28.8% 
reported experiencing hallucinations whilst driving within the preceding year (Hensher et al, 
1991:63). 
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The problem was perhaps most graphically illustrated by an incident on 20 October 1989 
when a semi-trailer carrying canned fruit from Brisbane to Sydney veered onto the wrong side 
of the Pacific Highway colliding with a passenger coach and killing both the semi driver and 
19 passengers on the bus. The resulting coronial inquest heard evidence that the truck driver 
had an Ephedrine level in his blood that was 80 times the normal therapeutic dose, indicating 
he was a chronic user of the stimulant (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:38). Such chronic 
usage is associated with (amongst other effects) hallucinations and the driver had suffered 
from this at least once prior to the incident. Given this, and eyewitness accounts of the crash, 
the Coroner accepted suggestions that the most likely cause of the incident was that the driver 
had experienced such an episode and swerved to avoid something that wasn’t there. The 
Coroner recommended that Ephedrine be added to Schedule N of drugs proscribed under the 
Motor Traffic Regulations – a measure rapidly undertaken by the NSW government.  
 
At the same time, drug use amongst truck drivers should not be seen in isolation from other 
factors affecting the industry, and the Cowper case well illustrates the point, with a wide-
range of safety-related issued being brought to attention of the Coroner. Of these, it is worth 
noting that the incident occurred early in the morning and for several reasons, including 
waiting for the load, the truck driver had little rest prior to departure. The driver was 
employed under a subcontracting arrangement that the Coroner found to be disturbingly 
loose. While viewed by colleagues as a reliable operator, the Coroner found he had a poor 
driving record (accumulating a considerable number of infringements and holding driving 
licenses issued by several states – something that undermined the effectiveness of the penalty 
point system). It is also perhaps worth mentioning that driver was separated from his wife (see 
the issue of work/non work balances discussed below). 
 
Since the Cowper smash there have been a number of well-publicised incidents where a truck 
driver using drugs was involved in collisions killing other road users or bystanders. As in the 
Cowper case, these incidents often indicate that drug use was not a stand-alone cause but 
linked into a chain of events.  
 
While drugs may appear to assist drivers in combating fatigue their effects on health, safety 
and well being extend well beyond those already mentioned. Used to excess or over long 
periods of time stimulant drugs may lead to a build up of ‘fatigue debt’, resulting in sudden 
impairment as the drug effect dissipates. There is also a very real risk of addiction and a 
steadily increase in dosage to maintain the stimulant effect. Aside from hallucinations, 
extreme or long-term abuse can lead to aggressive, risky driving behaviour or personality 
disorders (several incidents in recent years suggest this possibility). Very high dosages may 
cause sudden and severe brain damage by elevating blood pressure. Further, given the illicit 
nature of many stimulants, there are issues in connection with reliable dose and quality as 
well as information about hazardous interactions with other drugs. 
 
The use of drug stimulants by truck drivers to combat fatigue has long been a feature of the 
long distance trucking industry in Australia (since at least the 1970s). Not all drug-use by 
truck drivers is work-related.  Like other members of the Australian community, some drivers 
use drugs such as cannabis and alcohol for recreational purposes. Nevertheless, the weight of 
available evidence indicates that drug use is both common and related to drivers’ work tasks, 
particularly efforts to maintain alertness at the wheel over long hours. Indeed, it appears that 
these demands may also limit the use of some depressant drugs like alcohol. In its written 
submission (at page 12), the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) noted that alcohol was 
used by long distance truck drivers but it did not figure prominently in crash statistics. The 
RTA attributed this to drivers soon learning that alcohol magnified the risk of falling asleep at 
the wheel although it might be used to offset an excessive dose of stimulants (note the earlier 
discussion comparing the effects of alcohol and fatigue on driver performance. See 
Williamson et al, 2000a). 
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Given the illegality of many stimulant drugs, obtaining accurate information on the extent and 
nature of the practices has always been difficult. It is therefore impossible to discuss the use 
of drugs with complete precision. Nevertheless, earlier inquiries and research as well as 
evidence presented to this Inquiry strongly suggest a consistent pattern whereby drug-use is 
widespread and associated with the hours of work (both length and timing) and pressure on 
drivers to meet tight schedules or financial commitments (in the case of owner/drivers). 
 
The connection between long hours, fatigue and drug use has been raised or at least hinted at 
by a number of previous studies. A study of 615 drivers by Dawn Linklater in 1977 found 
they worked an average of 71.6 hours per week, 40.7% used stimulant drugs and 28.8% 
reported hallucinations while driving. Analysing questionnaire responses, Linklater deduced 
heavy vehicle drivers exceeding 55 hours of driving a week had an increased risk of crash 
involvement (cited in STAYSAFE 15). In their small pilot study of 46 drivers Hensher and 
Battellino (1990:549) found that 22% of drivers reported using ‘stay awake’ pills on every 
trip while another 35% used pills on some trips. The total of 67% was higher than the 
Linklater study and also indicated a higher overall reported use of drugs amongst 
owner/drivers (69%) than employee drivers (51%). This study was notable in suggesting a 
connection between drug use and speeding. Hensher and Battelino (1990:551) found drivers 
not using ‘stay awake’ pills undertook trips at a significantly lower average speed than their 
counterparts using drugs. As discussed in a later section, they found speed was in turn 
connected to economic pressures on drivers. In a follow up survey of 820 drivers (Hensher et 
al, 1991:101) 46% of drivers admitted taking stimulant drugs on at least some trips – a figure 
just a little higher than that disclosed in Linklater’s study undertaken well over a decade 
earlier. Drug use was highest amongst small fleet drivers (11.5% used drugs on every trip and 
48.5% on some trips) and lowest amongst owner/drivers (7.4% every trip and 30.3% 
sometimes) and large fleet drivers (3.3% every trip and 37.7% sometimes. Hensher et al, 
1991:62). 
 
A study conducted by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC, 
1992) found over 75% of the 960 truck drivers surveyed believed tiredness was a serious 
problem - a view confirmed by the finding that driver fatigue was a factor in at least 20% of 
road accidents involving articulated vehicles. The report found that, despite legal limits on 
driving hours of 11-12 per day, an average trucking run covered 1260km in 27 hours and one 
third of drivers admitted using stimulants in order to meet schedules. Another NOHSC funded 
study (Arblaster et al, 1996) found that almost half of the drivers interviewed at truck stops 
reported taking stimulants on most trips. Time-use diaries revealed that few drivers had more 
than 6 consecutive hours of sleep and many drove on the basis of only 3-4 hours sleep in a 24-
hour period. Most recently, a study of truck drivers in Western Australia found 13% used 
illicit drugs (Hartley, 1999).  
 
A number of parties to this Inquiry submitted evidence relating to the use of drugs, which was 
generally consistent with previous research and indicated that drug use remains a widespread 
phenomenon in the long distance trucking industry. A written submission from the Traffic 
Services Branch of the NSW Police Service stated: 
 
The absolute involvement of drugs within the Heavy Vehicle industry is unknown. However, 
we know they are there and we know they are used to overcome the symptoms of fatigue. 
Police are active in the area of detecting drug affected driving by heavy vehicle drivers. 
Recent operations have seen Police participating with other government agencies specifically 
targeting the heavy vehicle industry. In one four day period 402 heavy vehicles were stopped. 
Areas of those trucks were swabbed and then underwent an Ion Scan. 141 or 35% of those 
vehicles scanned returned positive swabs for amphetamines or other drugs. In another four –
day period of similar operations 38% of heavy vehicles swabbed returned positive readings 
for drugs. 
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It should be noted that several driver witnesses giving evidence to this Inquiry pointed to a 
number of measures used to defeat swab tests such as rubbing the steering wheel with WD 40 
and other chemicals. The Inquiry was unable to determine the extent and actual effectiveness 
of such practices but to the extent they are effective then swab tests may understate the use of 
drugs. More importantly perhaps, reference to these practices provides just one example of 
numerous devices used to evade regulators in the area of drugs and other safety issues that the 
Inquiry was informed of.  
 
During the course of its own investigation a number of witnesses to the Inquiry indicated that 
the use of drugs was by no means uncommon, although to label every driver as a likely drug-
user would be a gross exaggeration. One driver estimated that slimming pills, speed and 
“shakers” were used by about one third of truck drivers, which is remarkably consistent with 
available survey evidence. 
 
Witnesses and written submissions from drivers and their wives made repeated references to 
the work pressures that caused drivers to use drugs. 
 
The combination of long hours and drugs can have implications not only for on-road safety 
but also has long-term health effects on drivers as well as impacts on their families. Drivers 
and their wives are not unaware of these effects. This is well illustrated by the comments of 
the wife of one owner/driver: 
 
Drivers resort to taking drugs out of necessity; it is not for recreational purposes. Many 
drivers spend large amounts of money on drugs so they can make the miles needed to earn 
enough money to support their families. What should be considered is that the drivers taking 
drugs know that they are risking their own health and well being in doing so. Amphetamines, 
ephedrine, shaker, whatever they may be taking, all have short and long term effects on their 
health. All drugs, which are central nervous stream [sic], have the ability to cause problems 
with raised blood pressure and increased heart rate. They can cause renal problems, heart 
and lung damage, there is the possibility of stroke if there is a brain aneurysm and indirectly 
there can be harm done to the liver and kidneys. Of course there are also problems that arise 
through sleep deprivation. Ask any wife that has been the recipient of a dressing down over 
the phone by their husband just because he is so damn tired that he has to vent his anger and 
frustration at the only person that will understand how he is feeling. Drivers do not glorify in 
the use of drugs; in fact most are usually ashamed of it. They try to keep it to themselves for 
fear that their children may find out and get the wrong impression – the impression that 
taking drugs is ok. But what are their choices? Well there really isn’t any (written 
submission, wife of owner/driver southern New South Wales (written submission, wife of 
owner/driver, southern NSW) 
 
Another witness pointed to scheduling pressure: 
 
You take drugs, not because drivers want to take them but because they’re forced to take them 
or they will get the sack for being late (oral submission, female driver, NSW) 
 
In his evidence to the Inquiry, Dr Michael Belzer from the University of Michigan made 
essentially the same point, stating that drivers in the US used drugs to stay awake because 
they felt under pressure to get loads to their destinations in time or face the sack.  
 
Drugs are, according to witnesses, comparatively easy to obtain. One driver, for example, 
claimed that he could obtain any drug we cared to mention within two hours of leaving the 
venue of the Inquiry hearing in a regional city. 
 
Since the commencement of the inquiry police have carried out several raids on truck stops 
dealing in amphetamines and other drugs, including a major drug supply point at Peak Hill 
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where a number of arrests were made. These raids confirm that oral evidence given to the 
inquiry was not just hearsay.  
 
The allegation by witnesses that some road houses, including some on the New England 
Highway, were being used as drug supply points was echoed in several written submissions 
and appears not to be confined to New South Wales. The author of one submission from 
Western Australia stated: 
 
I have worked at a roadhouse where I saw drugs being stored in the staff quarters (written 
submission, Western Australia) 
 
Most disturbing of all were allegations that some transport companies supplied drugs to their 
driver. A number of drivers told the Inquiry that some small companies handed out sachets of 
speed or other drugs in pay envelopes. Other parties, including an experienced accident 
investigator, also claimed that some companies were supplying drugs. The Report is inclined 
to accept allegations about the supplying of drugs to drivers by transport companies presented 
to this Inquiry as there is recent evidence in another jurisdiction to confirm this practice 
occurs. On 3 August 1996 a semi-trailer (the prime mover being federally registered) 
belonging to WRB Transport Pty Ltd that had been travelling erratically for some time 
collided with two cars near Blanchetown, South Australia resulting in the death of six people. 
The semi driver, who survived the smash, was later found to have drug residues (Phentermine 
- a derivative of amphetamine, Ephedrine and Tetrahydrocannabinol - found in Cannabis). 
The Coroner found that a number of company personnel (named in the inquest) had 
knowingly supplied drugs to the driver and this was a common practice in response to the 
'ludicrous hours many of the drivers spent at the wheel' (Coroners Court of South Australia, 
1999:32). During the Inquest the Coroner undertook the time-consuming and almost certainly 
unusual step of interviewing many of the drivers for WRB enabling him to corroborate the 
existence of the practice (and despite an unsuccessful appeal by the company to have the 
Supreme Court rule the evidence inadmissible).  
 
While accepting that some transport companies supply drugs to drivers the number of times 
this allegation was made would seem to indicate that it is a practice involving only a small 
minority of companies (worrying enough). In its submission the NSW branch of the TWU 
provided evidence that at least one company openly counsels its drivers on the 'safe' way to 
use drugs. The union supplied a set of hints to ‘safe drug use’ published in the company’s 
staff newsletter/journal. Again, there is nothing to indicate this is a common practice although 
the company concerned had a reputation of being at the more respectable end of the spectrum 
rather than an acknowledge rogue operator. The Inquiry heard submissions from some 
companies that adopted very strong stance on drug use by drivers but this was by no means 
typical, reflecting the degree of tacit acceptance of drugs in the industry. 
 
The Inquiry heard evidence from long-term drivers about how the types of drugs had changed 
over time since the 1970s. A report by Hensher et al (1991) found that the use of 
amphetamines by long distance truck drivers exceeded that of the general population and this 
use was associated with the working conditions of drivers. Their survey of 820 drivers 
confirmed the widely held belief that long distance truck drivers used stimulant drugs to stay 
alert on long trips (Hensher, 1991:62).  
 
It is comparatively easy to sensationalise the issue of drug-use in the long distance trucking 
industry. The image of a ‘spaced out’ or ‘bug-eyed’ driver barrelling down the highway in a 
vehicle with a GVM of anywhere between 40 and 60 tonnes is certain to alarm the 
community, especially in the context of the Cowper incident in 1989. It is therefore not 
surprising that periodic reports of drug use in the industry receive prominent coverage in the 
print and electronic media. Understandably, such media images cause immense distress to 
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responsible drivers and transport companies that avoid drugs. At the same time, drug-use is a 
major problem and the only way to effectively address this issue is to alter this situation.  
 
Summarising the above, a number of points can be made. First, though evidence is 
fragmentary, all available information indicates that drug-use has been common in the long 
distance trucking industry over many years and this remains the case. Second, the use of 
drugs has a number of effects on health and safety, not simply the commonly recognised 
problem of ‘spaced-out’ drivers hallucinating and smashing into another vehicle. These 
effects include evidence suggesting a connection between drug use and speeding as well as 
long-term health problems for drivers (premature aging etc) 
 
The weight of evidence presented to this Inquiry is that drug-use by long distance 
drivers widespread such practices are tolerated or at least not actively discouraged by 
companies to the extent that might be expected. This situation, which exposes both 
drivers and other road users to an avoidable risk, must be addressed. 
 
2.2.4 Occupational Violence, Road Rage and Sharing the Road 
 
Over the past five years there has been a growing recognition of the significance of 
occupational violence, a phenomenon that can range from verbal use or non-verbal forms of 
intimidation through to threats of and actual physical assault (including murder). 
Unfortunately, as yet there have been few attempts to collect systematic data on the extent of 
this problem. The survey of 300 drivers conducted as part of the Inquiry (see Appendix 3) 
tried to address this gap by asking drivers a specific set of questions in relation to 
occupational violence that had been successfully used for an earlier series of surveys of other 
groups of workers. The survey results indicated that around 45% of long distance truck 
drivers reported experiencing some type of occupational violence, with the figures for 
owner/drivers being somewhat higher and those of large fleet employee drivers being 
somewhat lower. Verbal abuse was by far the most common form of occupational violence 
with comparatively few drivers being either threatened or even more rarely physically 
assaulted.  
 
At the same time, a range of intimidatory behaviour specific to those using the roads, namely 
road rage, was a common experience of long distance truck drivers. Around 20% of truck 
drivers reported experiencing road rage incidents, a figure that varied little between 
owner/drivers, small and large fleet drivers. Since drivers mostly experience road rage at the 
hands of other road users while in the course of earning their living, it must be viewed as 
work-related violence. While many of these incidents were at the lower end of the spectrum 
(the hurling of abuse, beeping of horns and aggressive gestures) road rage also entails more 
dangerous behaviour such as sharp manoeuvres by angry car drivers and, in two cases, threats 
with a gun. Given the tighter controls on gun ownership in Australia the latter would be 
rightly view as far more exceptional and dire than similar action might be seen in the USA. 
Nevertheless, the general level of road rage against truck drivers is significant if somewhat 
unexpected. Even dismissing a common but misleading stereotype of truck drivers as 
typically aggressive/combative (an image epitomised and popularised in the 1970s film Duel), 
it may still seem surprising that those in charge of a vehicle often weighing 40-60 tonnes 
GVM are victims of aggression from car or other vehicle drivers.  However, the level of road 
rage amongst road users generally appears to be rising, and the combination of congested 
traffic and a failure of motorists to appreciate the turning etc characteristics of a large 
articulated vehicle (as raised elsewhere in this Report) make the scenario less surprising. 
Further, the evidence speaks for itself. Road rage is a widespread problem for long distance 
truck drivers. Given the pressures drivers are already under from long hours at the wheel etc, 
even emotional upset and distraction of relatively minor instances of road rage may prove 
unduly disruptive to driver wellbeing if not their immediate safety.  
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Three distinct types of violence were identified, namely verbal abuse and road violence from 
other motorists; abuse and threats from staff at freight forwarding or loading yards; and  abuse 
by customers when deliveries were delayed or more expensive than expected.  The sruvey 
found severity appeared amongst these different types, with road violence most likely to lead 
to physical assault and abuse from customers least likely to entail physical assault. Overall, 
about two thirds (67.1%) of incidents could be classed as road violence; 16.1% emanated 
from staff or bosses at freight forwarding yards or depots; and 9.8% from customers.  A 
further 5.6% were interpreted by the drivers as RTA/police harassment of some kind, and 
1.4% of incidents could not be clearly allocated to one or other category.   
 
 
Table 18: (Table 18 in Appendix 3) 
Occupational violence experiences of 300 interviewed drivers 
 
 owner/drivers  
 
(n=99) 
Small fleet 
drivers 
(n=104) 
Large fleet 
drivers  
(n=85) 
Other 
 
(n=12) 
no 45.4% 54.8% 57.6% 66.7% 
verbally abused 36.4% 35.6% 25.9% 25% 
threatened 10.1%   6.7%    5.9%   8.3% 
assaulted 1% -   1.2% - 
road rage 21.2%  19.2%  21.2% 33.3% 
total number 54   47 36 4 
% with violent 
experiences 
54.5% 45.2% 42.3% 33.3% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
Qualitative and quantitative data derived from the Survey indicated that there were distinctly 
different causes for these three types of occupational violence. First, road violence most 
frequently occurred in heavy traffic situations near roundabouts or red lights, or on highways 
when heavily laden vehicles drove slowly up hills.  An important contributing factor is the 
lack of general motorist understanding of truck stopping limitations, and space requirements 
for turning at roundabouts. This issue is examined later in the Report. Another factor is that 
road violence perpetrators typically have similar socio-demographic features to other violent 
individuals: male, young, lower socio-economic group, aggressive, sometimes abusing licit 
and illicit substances etc.  Second, with regard to abuse and threats at freight-forwarding yards 
only one variable stood out namely that: violence and economic pressures (loading delays, 
undercutting on quotations, cutting-in on queues, covert incentives provided by some drivers 
to queue-jump, and mistakes by forklift drivers fueled tensions) were closely linked in nearly 
all incidents. and sometimes resulted in lower-level occupational violence. Third, with regard 
to customers economic and time pressures were again an issue, with many customers relying 
on a Just-in-Time approach that narrowed the window of delivery time and was conducive to 
tension where any delays occurred.  
 
Overall, the Survey revealed that occupational violence is a significant but poorly recognised) 
OHS problem for heavy vehicle drivers.  Owner/drivers and drivers in small fleets 
experienced more violence (especially verbal abuse) than did large fleet drivers.  Road 
violence had been experienced by around 20% of all drivers in the past 12-month 
period, with car drivers the most common perpetrators.  Three drivers had missiles 
thrown at them and two drivers had been shot at in the immediately previous 12-month 
period.    
 
The issue of road rage was not a significant issue in either written submissions or evidence 
given to hearings of this Inquiry, although the not unrelated issue of the failure other road 
users to understand truck handling, braking and turning characteristics did receive significant 
attention. Likely reasons why violence/road rage didn’t figure in submission include the fact 
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that the issue was not explicitly mentioned in the terms of reference and there is less public 
awareness of it as an OHS problem. Further, the issue was not directly raised with those 
making submissions, partly because survey evidence on the phenomenon only became 
available when these processes were already well under way (and hence no questions were 
asked about the issue during hearings). So not too much should be read into the fact that the 
issue received limited attention from those volunteering information to the Inquiry. 
 
As already implied, the issue of occupational violence and more especially road rage can be 
seen as an extreme case of the general relationship between truck drivers and other road users. 
While the Inquiry received several complaints about the aggressive behaviour of truck drivers 
it also received complaints from truck drivers and operators about motorists failing to 
understand truck signage, the handling/turning and braking characteristics of heavy vehicles, 
or how to overtake long vehicles on the open highway. Specific mention was made of the fact 
that some car drivers expected trucks to have similar performance characteristics and appear 
to have received no indication of the significant differences as part of their driver education. 
The Inquiry received a detailed written and oral submission from a B-Double tanker driver, 
Rod Hannifey, on his involvement in a number of activities aimed at improving mutual 
understanding between truck drivers and other road users. These activities included a caravan 
survey/caravan CB, National Sharing the Road with Heavy Vehicles Program, Truckies Top 
Ten Tips, School Survey (Dubbo) and a 'Truckmate' school activity. The National Sharing the 
Road with Heavy Vehicles Program has the support of the Australian Trucking Association 
(ATA) and in the past year has been promoted in the print media and on radio in regional 
NSW and Queensland. Truckies Top Ten Tips is also promoted on radio (one issue per 
month) and specifically targeted at tourists travelling on highways, regional roads etc. 
Hannifey also pointed to the value of school visits in terms of educating young people about 
the road environment they would encounter as future drivers. The Inquiry was impressed by 
the time and commitment Mr Hannifey had devoted to this issue (with the full support of his 
employer) and the very positive results to a number of initiatives, such as the school survey.  
 
It is worth noting that this issue has also received attention in the United States. Under the 
Intermodal Surface Transport Efficiency Act, 1991 (section 4002 (g) (6)) provided an 
allocation of funding to educate the motoring public on how to share the road safely with 
commercial motor vehicles. Since this time a Share the Road/No-Zone Campaign has pursued 
a broad based strategy, working in conjunction with regulatory agencies, to increase public 
recognition of truck and bus limitations and so influence their driving behaviour. 
 
Together with other evidence, the Inquiry formed the view that inadequate understanding of 
heavy vehicles amongst other road users is an issue that needs to be addressed both because it 
exacerbates safety risks to other road users and places additional unnecessary pressure of 
truck drivers. It should be noted that a number of measures are already in place (and have 
RTA involvement), including the establishment of a ‘Sharing the Roads’ taskforce to identify 
conflict between different types of road user (not just trucks but pedestrians and cyclists. 
Faukes and Irwin, 1999).  
 
Nonetheless, there appears to be a strong case for expanding existing programs in 
relation to heavy vehicles. There is also a strong case for including a small but vital 
component on heavy vehicle characteristics (signage, braking, turning etc) in the formal 
training of car and other vehicle drivers (and as part of license testing). 
 
2.2.5 Driver Training Schemes and Driver Quality 
 
The issue of adequate training does not only apply to other road-users but also truck drivers 
themselves. At present in NSW drivers can obtain a license to drive an articulated vehicle 
either by taking a test run by the RTA or undertaking a competency-based training program 
with an accredited trainer. The Inquiry received submissions from drivers, current and ex-
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trainers, ex RTA officers, industry associations and range of other parties that were critical of 
either or both of the existing systems.  
 
On the one hand, the examination-based system was criticised as too narrow and failing to 
sufficiently differentiate between different classes of vehicles. It should be noted that the 
heavy vehicle driver’s licensing handbook (see RTA, 1999) includes information on different 
vehicle configurations (and where they are permitted to operate), correct loading and braking 
procedures, coupling/uncoupling, maximum vehicle dimensions and correct loads (including 
position and anchors), loading/unloading, drugs, fatigue, record keeping, and a host of other 
matters. The criticism seemed to focus on issues like the amount of training received from 
experienced operators in terms of correct restraint. On the other hand, the competency-based 
system was praised for addressing issues like load restraint but some criticism was registered 
about the selection/experience of some trainers. For example, it was suggested that some 
trainers lacked sufficient knowledge of the industry to perform their task effectively (oral 
submission, competency-based trainer southern NSW). 
 
At the same time, a number of submissions to this Inquiry argued that a new more stringent 
and comprehensive scheme was needed to improve driver standards and professionalism. In 
its written submission, the Victorian Road Transport Association, for example, saw a need for 
both enhanced operator and driver licensing/accreditation. It pointed to (oral submission) 
problems in relation to limited training given to B-Double drivers (in terms of load restraint, 
coupling and negotiating narrow bridges) based on presumptions they would be involved in a 
very restricted set of routes and tasks - presumptions that no longer hold. The Association also 
cited an inquest by the state coroner into a truck-driver fatality where the coroner observed 
that a driver's license was not a certificate of competency, and in this case the driver should 
have undertaken more advanced training. 
 
A not unrelated concern expressed by a number of bodies was that the truck driver workforce 
was aging and it was difficult to attract sufficient quality young applicants because of the 
occupation's low skill image. There was a fear that there was a looming shortage of drivers 
that would affect the ability of the industry to meet the expected substantial increase in the 
road freight task. In response to this the NSW Road Transport Association has held discussion 
with the Transport and Distribution ITAB with a view to addressing this problem by 
establishing transport industry traineeships, involving TAFE level training (written 
submission and Attachment 'A'). The aim of the scheme would to secure an adequate supply 
of trainee drivers (and related occupations such as forklift drivers) and to enhance the 
professional recognition and quality of the profession.  A number of existing drivers, 
including owner/drivers, saw advantages in TAFE or equivalent base training not only as an 
entry point into the industry but also to upgrade the skills of existing drivers. The Inquiry was 
impressed with the professionalism of many drivers who made submissions and the stress 
they placed on the need to gain experience and to keep learning through the course of their 
driving career. It was also struck by US evidence pertaining to the problems that can arise 
when the industry becomes the domain of recent immigrants with little training. Of course the 
standing of drivers is not unconnected to the wages earned and while this will be examined in 
more detail later it is enough to observe that low earnings may play a large part in future 
shortages of fully professional, qualified and experienced drivers. At the present time it 
should be stated that, in the view of the Inquiry, moves to upgrade the training of drivers have 
considerable merit, especially if this includes areas such as occupational health and safety, 
relevant regulatory requirements (road transport, OHS and industrial relations) and 
communication and business skills.  
 
The move towards a National Driver Licensing Scheme for multi-combination class vehicles 
might have be seen as a logical conduit for this, especially as it has entailed a project for 
identifying the requisite competency standards and a suitable training package based on those 
competencies (see Austroads, 2000). Under the new scheme, individual jurisdictions will still 
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have to tailor courses to meet jurisdiction-specific requirements in relation to private training 
providers, competency-based training and the like. Unfortunately, examining a recent paper 
on proposed competencies (Austroads, 2000) this Inquiry could find little or no mention of 
OHS or a number of the other areas just mentioned. Rather the competencies largely dealt 
with the technical skills required to drive a truck and road transport regulations. The Inquiry 
believes this training base is too narrow for a driver operating in a commercial industry such 
as long haul road freight. 
 
Debates over driver quality/training are by no means confined to Australia. In 1997 a report 
commissioned by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the USA concluded only 
31% of entry-level truck drivers got adequate training (Johnson, 1997). To address this the 
Administration proposed mandatory HFWA-registered training, tougher commercial driver's 
license tests and further initiatives on driver training. However, trucking companies opposed 
these moves, preferring '…to regulate themselves' (Johnson, 1997:66). 
 
The Inquiry finds that current driver training methods should be evaluated with a view 
to identifying deficiencies and to also to provide a basis for progressive enhancement of 
driver competencies. Driving a truck should be regarded as a life long learning 
experience, with periodic re-testing and upgrading of skills. 
 
2.2.6 Work/non-Work Imbalances 
 
The extraordinarily long hours worked by long haul truck drivers, and the consequent long 
periods of separation from their families, makes it difficult for them to balance work/non-
work responsibilities. The resulting problems have been pointed to in earlier research. For 
example, a study of South Australian drivers (Arblaster et al, 1995:71-79) found that the 
pattern of long periods of absence/short periods of presence was disruptive to family life. This 
included tiredness/irritability at home, alienation from children and attempts to redress this 
with gifts or lenient discipline that interfered with the authority of partner primarily 
responsible for caring for the children. About half of the partners of the drivers interviewed 
commented on a high divorce rate in the industry and a number of ex-drivers gave this as a 
reason for leaving the industry. 
  
The Inquiry received considerable evidence on the emotional strain and family pressures 
associated with long hours that were consistent with those just referred to. This evidence 
came from drivers, the wives of drivers, members of the Concerned Families of Australian 
Truckies (CFAT), police officers and others including a priest. The latter observed: 
 
The families are the recipients of all the issues, many of them brought up here today. So the 
church I think has been the presence, being available…I think is terribly, terribly important. 
We see breakdowns - breakdowns of marriages, the whole issue of tragedies on the road and 
the associated issues with that, the deaths, the grief and bereavement. Truck drivers and their 
families need to know…that priests are available… As you move around mixing with people, 
meeting with people, particularly in the trucking industry, it is very apparent to me that…I've 
seen acute pressure, families are broken up for long periods of time…(oral submission, 
Catholic priest, Northern NSW). 
 
A survey of 300 long distance drivers undertaken by the TWU revealed that 66% believed 
work was putting pressure on their family life and personal relationships, with 79% spending 
two nights or less at home per week (only 6% spent five or more nights at home). In terms of 
hours spent with their family, 63% of drivers reported spending 20 hours or less at home with 
their family each week and 32% said they spent 10 hours or less. Over 90% of drivers 
reported feeling tired or sleepy while driving in the past 6 months and 62% said they had been 
involved in accidents or near misses due to fatigue in the last six months. Around two thirds 
(66%) of drivers believed their hours of work had increased over the past five years, 62% 
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believed the hours they worked were dangerous to their personal health and safety and 80% 
stated that work schedules required them to work illegally by spending excessive hours 
behind the wheel.  Over half the drivers (59%) indicated that they didn’t think they could 
continue as a professional driver under the present conditions until retirement (oral and 
written submission, TWU NSW Branch). While such findings need to be treated with caution, 
the general thrust of the results is consistent with findings of independent surveys and other 
evidence presented to the Inquiry. It should be noted that even the time spent at home may 
entail limited interaction since, as the Inquiry was repeatedly told, drivers arrive home 
emotionally and physically exhausted. 
 
Evidence was given in relation to pressures placed on drivers and a lack of empathy, 
understanding or accommodation even in extreme situations of personal distress. Judy Penton 
from Concerned Families of Australian Truckies described an incident where a driver was 
told to complete his journey and refused leave to comfort his wife/make funeral arrangements 
after learning his newborn child has just died of sudden infant death syndrome. The wife of an 
owner/driver who worked in a truck stop roadhouse in southern NSW described a similar 
incident. 
 
I remember he was a regular. He came in obviously distressed so I took my coffee break and 
sat with him and watched him cry into his steak in front of a dining room full of men. I sort of 
pushed him until he sort of opened up. He was crying because he hadn’t been home in three 
and half weeks and he had a little boy who was quite ill and he wanted to get home.  He rang 
his boss and said "look I just want to get home for the weekend to see the wife and the kid" 
and his boss said "you are going to Brisbane."…[the driver pleaded] "Cut me a bit of slack, 
home for the weekend - just so I can see the kid" [manager's response] "You go where I tell 
you or you can go home and stay home." Now this guy didn’t have a choice because he had a 
mortgage to pay, he had financial commitments so the only [way] he could do that was 
earning a wage. So he just had to drug himself up to the eyeballs to do what his boss told him 
to or he'll be sacked. Who takes responsibility for that? (oral submission, wife of 
owner/driver, southern NSW). 
 
These incidents, which are clearly an abuse of the employment relationship and would deeply 
affront most members of the Australian community, may represent the worst type of case but 
submissions to the Inquiry demonstrated that insensitivity to driver's home and family life was 
not atypical but common in the industry. The Inquiry received many comments to this effect 
from drivers, owner/drivers, the wives/partners of owner/drivers, the TWU and CFAT 
representatives. Not all companies behave in this way. The Inquiry received evidence of 
companies that go to some lengths to avoid making excessive demands on their drivers 
(examples of this are cited later in the Report). However, submissions and other evidence 
indicates that intense competition and pressure from customers, as well as enforcement 
regime that focuses on drivers and leaves managers and others largely exempt from legal 
responsibility for their actions, discourages operators from treating their drivers with dignity 
or compassion. 
 
The evidence indicates that the pressures presently imposed by the industry on many drivers 
of long distance trucks is having a damaging effect on their personal lives and causing severe 
strains to family life. The long hours of work, the lengthy periods away from home on the 
road, the physical strain involved in carrying out the job means that a driver is put into a 
situation where it is very difficult for them to maintain a normal balanced family life. Not 
only are drivers away from home for long periods of time but, when they do come home, they 
are often in such a state of exhaustion that all they can do is sleep much of the time until the 
next job. In this circumstance, it is almost impossible for a driver to make any meaningful 
contribution to child-minding/rearing responsibilities to assist their partner, and the situation 
is especially difficult when - as appears often to be the case - both partners are working. 
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Since many of the problems just described are a consequence of the long hours of work, and 
especially the long periods spent away from home, it is difficult to see how these issues can 
be addressed without altering arrangements that are accepted as standard practice throughout 
the industry. In May 2000 the NSW Anti Discrimination Amendment (Carers 
Responsibilities) Act was introduced to enable workers to better juggle work and family 
commitments by prohibiting direct or indirect discrimination in employment on the basis of 
an employee’s caring responsibilities. Under the Act the employers have two defences, 
namely that the person cannot perform the inherent requirements of the job or that complying 
with the request would impose an unjustifiable hardship on the employer (Burke, 2000). 
While long hours and lengthy absences would seem hard to avoid in the long haul road 
transport industry it is by no means clear that the present extreme situation could not be 
ameliorated (some larger companies already do this). The lodging of a complaint under this 
legislation may appear unlikely. However, it is worth noting that two recent English cases 
over long working hours that relied on similar legislation both involved transport workers 
(Edwards v London Underground and Cowley v South African Airways cited in Burke 2000) 
indicating that such a claim is by no means unfeasible and could make for a very interesting 
debate. Rather than waiting for such a case, there is a need for the industry, the union and 
others to look for solutions. It can be argued that standard employment practices in long 
distance trucking make it one of the most family-unfriendly of all industries and the impacts 
on driver wellbeing could well be having negative consequences for safety performance (both 
directly and indirectly via driver recruitment/selection).  
 
2.2.7 Overloading, Load Restraint, Vehicle Design/Maintenance and Poor Road 
Conditions as Safety Issues 
 
2.2.7.1 Overloading and Load Restraint 
 
Like speeding and excessive hours, overloading of vehicles has been an issue in the long 
distance trucking industry over many years. Overloaded trucks are more susceptible to both 
single and multiple vehicle crashes (due to tipping, loss of control or diminished breaking 
performance) and do considerably more damage to roads on which they travel than properly 
loaded trucks. Further, damage to the chasis and suspension systems as a result of overloading 
can lead in turn to vibration problems that affect driver comfort and health (both directly and 
indirectly by exacerbating fatigue). 
 
The Inquiry also received a written submission on risks associated with the use of flexible 
tanks (bladders) used extensively in the eastern states to transport liquid products such as 
molasses due to poor filling practices, excessive age/poor maintenance, damage from a 
stone/abrasive object and inadequate restraint. Citing several incidents, the submission called 
for the introduction of a national code governing the maintenance, use and regular testing of 
such tanks. The issue was not raised in oral submissions to hearings but may warrant further 
investigation. 
 
2.2.7.2 Vehicle Design, Mass and Configuration 
 
Safety concerns have been raised in connection with B-Doubles virtually since they were 
introduced. The Coroner conducting the inquest into the 1989 Cowper tragedy (see above) 
pointed to road-user concern at overtaking such lengthy vehicles. He urged that there be no 
further expansion in B-Double road activity until highways like the Pacific were widened to 
minimise these risks (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:22). A Report by the Staysafe 
Committee (Staysafe 16, 1990) raised serious concerns about 12 of the 23 routes where B-
Doubles had been approved and recommended tighter controls on the approval process and 
routes where B Doubles were permitted. Despite this, there was a strong push for B-Doubles 
on economic grounds (given that they could carry 40-50% more freight than a normal semi-
trailer configuration) and a case was made that their use would also bring safety benefits. The 
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Cairney (1991:23) Report on improving trucking safety argued that the greater load capacity 
of B-Doubles meant that the number of trucks needed to complete a set freight task could be 
reduced by a third and Canadian experience suggested the safety record of B-Doubles was no 
worse than that of semi-trailers.  
 
In the ensuing years there have been a series of further evaluations of B-Doubles (and 
specification changes to them) looking at road impacts, safety and a range of related issues. 
For example, in November 1994 Ian Manion and James Hurnall prepared paper on road and 
bridge wear and swept-path performance for an Australian Local Government Association 
Seminar.  The following year the 25m B-Double Monitoring Group set up by the NRTC 
prepared a paper dealing with a wide range of issues, including road impacts; industry 
considerations, including productivity; and road safety. In 1998 Blanksby, Sweatman and 
McFarlane produced a report on the trial of 25m B-Doubles for the South Australian Road 
Transport Association. In 1999 L Bruzsa and J Hurnall prepared a report ‘Technical 
Comparisons of 25 m and 23 M B-Doubles’ for the Queensland Department of Transport: 
Brisbane. This year the NRTC has released a report on the length of B-Doubles. 
 
The argument that using larger trucks would have safety benefits by reducing the overall 
number of trucks was suggested a number of times during the Inquiry. It was usually put 
forward by industry representatives and usually in responses to questions about the safety of 
B-Doubles or whether the move to bigger trucks was driven by economics rather than a 
concern for safety. The same argument has been mounted in other countries. However, it is 
not an argument that won favour with a recent New Zealand inquiry into truck crashes 
(Storey, 1996). Pointing to the use of this argument in conjunction with industry pressure to 
permit larger more cost efficient rigs the report observed: 
 
In the United States supporters of larger trucks claimed that fewer trucks would be needed in 
the transportation of goods because they were longer and wider. Advocates also believed that 
the increased use of twin-trailer trucks (truck tractors pulling two trailer units) would have 
little overall effect on highway safety because the reduced number of trucks would offset the 
small possible increase in crashes. Experience has shown that the predicted reduction in 
truck movements has not occurred. Increasing the size of trucks has apparently reduced the 
expense of distribution with the consequence of more business using this mode of transporting 
goods. The result has been a steady increase in the number of larger trucks to the point where 
large trucks now account for over 50% of vehicle traffic on some highways. Research 
indicates [cites Garber and Black, 1995] a likely increase in large truck crashes, particularly 
on two-lane secondary roads as motorists move from congested interstate and primary roads 
on to the secondary road system. 
 
During the inquiry we heard public concern about the possibility of larger trucks on the 
roads. There was considerable apprehension about their safety, noise, speed and fears of 
increased intimidation (cited in Storey 1996:56). 
 
It should be observed that debate over introducing 60 tonne GVM trucks in New Zealand at 
this time was already resolved in Australia.  
 
The Inquiry was unable to undertake a detailed consideration of the impact of the introduction 
of larger truck configurations such as B-Doubles (and to a lesser extent B-Triples and road 
trains) on overall vehicle numbers in Australia.  However, the impression gained from 
submissions to the Inquiry was in keeping with the New Zealand report’s comments on US 
experience, namely that the effect if any has been marginal with the economic gains largely 
being used to secure more road freight business. The Inquiry was repeatedly told that the 
economies of B-Doubles were passed on to the consumer in terms of a discounted freight rate. 
The Inquiry also heard that this in turn, placed pressure on owner/drivers, most of whom 
continued to rely on the conventional semi-trailer (it was suggested that freight tasks 
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undertaken by most owner/drivers did not the justify the additional cost of a B-Double). At 
the same time, some owner/drivers complained of competition from B-Doubles. It should also 
be noted that the size/configuration and GVM of both semi-trailers and B-Doubles was 
increased at several points during the 1990s. As would be apparent to any long-term road 
user, even a conventional semi-trailer has increased significantly in size and weight over the 
past 20 years. These changes have been overwhelmingly driven by commercial 
considerations.  
 
There is solid evidence to show that, not surprisingly, occupants of cars and light trucks 
colliding with heavy vehicles are far more likely to suffer serious injury or death than the 
truck driver than would be the case had they collided with a car or light truck (Young, 1990).  
What is not so clear is whether the increasing size of trucks significantly exacerbates the rate 
of serious injury or death in collisions. Certainly, the Inquiry received a number of 
submissions from motorists and others expressing concerns about the size, and more 
especially, the length of articulated trucks, on roads they believed were barely suitable at best 
for their operation. For example, the written submission of an ACT-based motorist stated: 
 
In my observation, overtaking a very long articulated truck travelling at 105km on a dry open 
road takes nerve and concentration for an experienced driver. It would be very testing for a 
probationary, or learner driver. This situation is made worse if it is raining and doubly worse 
if it is raining after dark. Because they are elevated well above the road drivers are not 
affected by the spray in the same way as car drivers, so they maintain a constant (high) speed. 
A car driver attempting to overtake a truck in these conditions faces a curtain of spray from 
the truck's wheels, a very long way to travel in the dark down the tunnel between the truck 
and its trailer and the road edge, the effect of the car's headlights reflecting off the spray and 
the metal truck sides, further distracting light effects from the "Christmas trees" that many 
trucks carry and the full, or partial, glare from the headlights of oncoming trucks. It is always 
a frightening experience. 
 
The Report is unaware of any detailed research on this issue in Australia although it might 
have been presumed that such a consideration would have formed an essential component of 
deliberations to introduce larger vehicle configurations as part of the national road transport 
reform agenda. As noted already, vehicle configuration is not simply a technical issue but has 
significant commercial ramifications. The Report will have more to say on this issue in the 
section dealing with national coordination of safety in the long distance trucking industry. 
 
At this point, it is important to note that the issue of the safety of longer or heavier trucks was 
raised in a number of submissions to the Inquiry. As noted elsewhere, the submission of the 
NSW Police Force expressed concerns about turning/overtaking issues in relation to long 
trucks like B-Doubles. Operational police echoed this concern. For example, a commander for 
southern NSW witnessed the B-Triple trial on the Hume Highway and strongly objected to it 
being granted access to the single lane section for use (the trial was reported in the RTA’s 
heavy vehicle owner and driver newsletter, PrimEmoves, August 2000:1-2). He also 
expressed general concern about the lack of understanding amongst car drivers of overtaking 
longer trucks (such as B-Doubles) on single carriageways (including the remaining section of 
this on the Hume Highway) and referred to a recent fatal incident to illustrate this (oral 
submission, police commander, southern NSW). 
 
Recent US research (Apparies et al 1998) has found that those driving longer and more 
demanding truck configurations had a higher measurable heart rate which could have 
implications for driver fatigue, and their health and safety more generally. Unfortunately, the 
comparisons were between single trailers and triple trailers (both A and C dolly) and so 
cannot be readily translated to the Australian context. A critical review of the research 
evidence on safety considerations associated truck size and weight by Robert Clarke (1998) 
from the US Department of Transportation (DOT) noted the importance of making 
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comparisons under equivalent exposure conditions. This includes adjusting for the proportion 
of time spent on different road types (rural roads, main highways etc) by particular vehicle 
configurations, such as the greater tendency of multi-trailer combinations to use interstate 
highways relative to rural roads than single trailer combinations. When these adjustments 
were made they made a substantial difference to results. For example, what originally 
appeared to be a lower fatal crash rate for multi-trailer combinations than single trailer 
combinations was transformed into a higher crash rate when compared on the same rural 
roads. Under conditions of unrestricted usage Clarke (1998:43) found multi-trailer 
combinations could be expected to experience an 11% higher overall fatal crash rate. Clarke 
(1998:44) identifies a number of serious difficulties in assessing the impact of larger and 
heavier vehicles on safety which existing regulatory assessment and approval processes are 
failing to address. Arguing the pressure to achieve productivity gains must be balanced 
against a wide array of public concerns including safety, Clarke (1998:45) advocates a 
cautionary approach and the need to develop a new set of standards and conditions (rigorously 
enforced).  
 
Without ignoring differences in truck configuration between Australia and the USA, 
these US findings suggest the health and safety implications of longer/larger and heavier 
trucks and particular trailer configurations require more serious consideration, unless it 
can be shown the Australian research has taken all the above-mentioned factors into 
account. The Inquiry was unable to assess this matter fully but believes it warrants 
further investigation. 
 
It would probably be matter of some concern to the community at large if they were aware of 
the limited knowledge of the safety performance associated with the dimensions and mass 
characteristics of different truck configurations travelling on Australian roads and highways. 
The Performance Based Standards Project initiated under Austroads and National Road 
Transport Commission (NRTC) funding in 1999 has begun a process of defining performance 
measures and initial standards (see Prem et al 2001), and identifying the dimension and mass 
characterisation of the Australian heavy vehicle fleet (Ramsay et al 2001). In recognition of 
limitations of using a specified reference set of 84 vehicles based on Weigh-In-Motion data 
the latter report (Ramsay et al 2001) is seen more as a discussion paper. Further, it represents 
a welcome but only a preliminary step towards a better understanding of the safety 
implications and appropriate performance standards for different heavy vehicle 
configurations. Overall, there seems to be a disturbing lag between the approval of different 
truck configurations and knowledge of their safety performance although in fairness to the 
NRTC it might be suggested it is addressing a problem not entirely of its own making. 
 
In addition to the debate over B-Doubles and long trucks more generally, the Inquiry received 
a series of very detailed submissions on heavy vehicle vibration and fatigue from Dr Arnold 
McLean, a senior lecturer in engineering at the University of Wollongong. In submissions 
(which included photos of tyres and engine mounts and videos) derived from both testing 
vehicles and working with around 40 drivers, Dr McLean identified a number of problems 
with existing truck configurations he believed exacerbated fatigue and other risks to safety (eg 
handling problems and cracking of axles). According to Dr McLean, design 
flaws/maintenance problems exacerbating fatigue included higher exhaust system cabin 
thermal load (due to the fact trucks were originally designed as left hand drive), tyre 
scalloping, over-size fuel tanks, excessive load on front suspension pins and bushes, and 
inadequate driver seats. Other design/specification problems identified included vehicle 
tendency to wander, veer or dart (especially on high camber roads) and inadequacies with 
slow-response airbag suspension systems (as well as long-term irreversible vibration 
problems following overloading-related damage). Dr McLean cited evidence that the 
physiological demands on drivers required frequent rest breaks. He also raised a question as 
to whether the bulk of prime movers designed for major highways (like the dual carriage-
ways) but often used on minor highways and country roads here might cause premature 
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damage to the truck (as well extensive as road damage), vibration and driver fatigue. In 
support of these claims, Dr McLean provided both photographic and physical evidence of 
worn parts that indicated premature wear/vibration in his written and oral submissions. One 
remedy to the health/serviceability issue, suggested by Dr McLean, was to introduce a 120-
day identification period for suitability/serviceability into financing arrangement for truck 
purchases (present clauses require the operator to sign off on this before it enters service). 
 
A key point of Dr McLean's submission was the reconfiguration of articulated trucks over the 
past decade, notably the increase in size/load capacity and more powerful engines to optimise 
economic efficiency, were achieved partly by compromising the distribution of loads on the 
prime mover.  A key parameter here was to increase freight load capacity (including wheel-
base length on the prime mover) without exceeding load limits on the steer wheels. Extensive 
involvement with drivers had convinced him that drivers had had to adapt their driving 
practices such as braking to accommodate some of the consequences of these changes. 
Implicit here is the suggestion that, notwithstanding widely acknowledged improvements in 
the comfort and capacity of heavy vehicles over the past 20 years, the effort to introduce more 
efficient configurations may also have entailed some trade-offs in terms of driver 
comfort/fatigue and safety. Indeed, Dr McLean explicitly confirmed that this was his view. 
Essentially similar views were expressed by a number of others making submissions to the 
Inquiry including an experienced insurance/accident investigator (oral submission). 
 
Dr McLean’s argument about financial considerations affecting vehicle configuration in ways 
that had adverse health and safety affects on drivers was also echoed by a number of drivers 
when referring to prime mover wheelbase and use of and particular suspension systems. One 
driver argued that air-bag cabin suspension rather than solid rubber mounts should be a 
minimum condition, especially on short wheelbase prime movers. He alleged that in many 
cases trucks were purchased without this in order to make a small cost saving and because 
those making the purchase did not have to drive the vehicle or consider its impact on the 
driver (written submission, B-Double driver, mid west NSW). A Victorian driver of almost 30 
years experience (oral submission) claimed that use of short wheel-base primer movers on B-
Doubles, a measure designed to maximise the load capacity, compromised safety because it 
could lead to situations where the trailer steered the prime-mover not vice versa. He also 
alleged the trucks became hard to handle or 'skittish'. He called for a shift to the US system 
where length measurements were based on the freight-carrying component of the truck/trailer 
not on the overall length of the vehicle (as is currently the situation in Australia). Problems 
with short wheelbase prime movers were raised on a number of occasions. Another argument 
raised that new longer trailers able to accommodate 24 pallets and since four of these were 
behind the wheels of the trailer the fear was expressed these would cantilever weight of the 
drive wheels of the truck, especially on rough roads.  
 
A not-unrelated issued was a claim by a Victorian driver (oral submission) that B-Double 
regulation did not prohibit trucks running with the second or B trailer loader and the first or A 
trailer (that is the trailer directly behind the prime mover) unloaded. He argued this practice, 
banned with regard to other multi-trailer combinations like road trains, affected steering, led 
to 'hopping' and was generally unsafe. Another driver, who had owned a B-Double claimed 
they were responsible for road damage, especially corrugations on rises cause hopping, due to 
strain placed on the drive wheels dragging two trailers. 
 
Issues about truck/trailer configuration (and specific model/makes in relation to this) and 
safety were raised by a number of drivers and small fleet operators making oral submissions 
to the Inquiry. The issue was raised by substantial number of drivers and some small fleet 
operators (often those who continued to drive themselves) and evoked a depth of feeling (that 
the issue had more resonance in some areas may say something about differences in terrain). 
For example, it was the primary point made by one small fleet operator who travelled all the 
way from Taree to attend the hearing at Grafton (making complains about several 
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make/models of truck, including one identified by Dr McLean). He complained about the 
distribution of weight in the new trucks, especially with regard to the prime mover. Another 
driver referred a different make/model (again mentioned by Dr McLean) where, despite 
having only done limited kilometres, there had been air-bag suspension and steering 
problems: 
 
This truck’s wandering about, the suspension’s gone…When you go into a certain corner the 
truck gets this unsteady feeling. (oral submission, owner/driver of logging truck, northern 
NSW). 
 
In response to a series of similar complaints, the Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS) 
commissioned an investigation into ride vibration and truck handling/steering by a consultant 
(Roaduser International Pty Ltd) which commenced in November 1998 and recently issued its 
final report (see Sweatman and McFarlane, 2000). The investigation involved advertising for 
complaints and the detailed testing of a number of trucks. With regard to vibration the final 
report noted the small number of complaints received (13). However, given their own 
findings of high seat vibration on a number of vehicles and the significance of driver fatigue 
in heavy vehicle safety, the authors stated that research was needed on the connection 
between vibration and fatigue. A more recent report on heavy vehicle seat vibration and 
fatigue prepared by Mabbott et al (2001) for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau found 
there was only limited evidence on a connection between fatigue and low frequency vibration 
typical of heavy vehicles and pointed to the need for further research. However, the report 
also noted that there was sufficient evidence that exposure to vibration amongst drivers could 
lead to back injury and other health problems (Mabbott, 2001:19). Given evidence indicating 
high level and prolonged vibration exposure amongst Australian heavy vehicle drivers the 
report urged further research, drawing on ISO 2631-1997 (it was noted that the Australian 
Standard for whole body vibration is not cited in state OHS regulations), to develop 
appropriate standards for trucks sold in Australia. 
 
With regard to vehicle handling, the Sweatman and McFarlane report found no evidence that 
the characteristics investigated affected handling, although some problems were found with, 
for example, one vehicle generating significant unwanted steering effects under certain 
conditions (Sweatman and McFarlane, 2000:vi). Overall, the report identified some types of 
vehicle/suspension arrangements requiring immediate attention. At the same time, given the 
complex issues identified, the report also urged a collaborative approach on the part of 
government, manufacturers, industry and operators to research and other measures designed 
to address vehicle specification and driver health and safety in the long term. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that in the USA the federal government has recently established a partnership 
with nine truck and diesel engine manufacturers to improve the safety of all trucks (Quinlan, 
2000:33).  
 
Dr McLean prepared a detailed response to the Sweatman and McFarlane Report he made 
available to this Inquiry (McLean, 2000). In this response Dr McLean noted that the report 
had only tested a relatively small number of vehicles, had not tested a several complainant 
vehicles fitted with Neway suspensions, driver vibration dose was not assessed in accordance 
with ISO 2631. In addition, Dr McLean argued that two vehicles (F1 and F6) experienced 
major safety deficiency incidents but were not reported in Table 6 as having darted and 
another vehicle (F3) was modified with quick acting Hadley air bag bogie suspension. Dr 
McLean identified other issues requiring further investigation that are too numerous to list 
here and beyond the expertise of the Inquiry in terms of evaluating them. In the view of this 
Inquiry Dr McLean is a credible and knowledgable witness, who has made a contribution to 
the activities of STAYSAFE.  
 
Dr McLean was not the only technical expert to echo concerns of the drivers of problem 
vehicles or to express concerns with the Roaduser International Report. The Inquiry received 
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a paper from an engineer, Mr John Lambert (see Lambert 2001), who had been involved in 
the FORS investigation while an employee of Roaduser International in 1999. Mr Lambert 
expressed a number of criticisms of the Roaduser report that were similar to Dr McLean (such 
as the limited number of vehicles tested). He estimated that problems of vehicle wander, dart 
and excessive vibration affected between five and fifteen percent of vehicles capable of 
towing 42.5 tonnes or more. Mr Lambert also identified a number of reasons for why some of 
these problems had not been reported in Europe and the USA including the problematic 
conversion of vehicles from right to left hand-drive, very different axle mass and 
dimension/mass limits and the fact that interstate highways in these countries were generally 
rigid pavement of a high construction standard. 
 
The issues about truck configuration, suspension and thermal exhaust raised by Dr 
McLean and others are serious and require further investigation. It can be noted that 
the recent federal inquiry into managing fatigue in transport House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:88) made a similar 
recommendation in relation carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide levels in truck cabins 
 
Community groups, motorists and others also raised the issue of truck configuration, although 
their primary concern was simply the size of trucks and the risks they posed to other road 
users. A number of motorists and individuals suggested that the increase in truck size showed 
a maximum of concern for industry economics and a minimal concern for safety. For 
instance, one motorist wrote: 
 
In conclusion, the economics of truck operation have led to ever larger commercial vehicles 
being put on our roads. As a taxpayer I deeply resent this because I believe that is poor 
transport planning and that rail should be taking more of the loads that presently travel by 
road. 
 
Nor are these complaints confined to Australia. For example, in a Canadian community 
organisation, Canadians for Responsible and Safer Highways (CRASH) has repeated claimed 
that government policies on truck size, permissible routes for larger vehicles, driving hours 
and the like were essentially dictated by the interests of the industry (CRASH News release 
July 1998).  
 
Finally, it should be noted that there are almost certainly hidden safety effects in the shift to 
larger mass trucks where a commercial dimension is unambiguous. Most notably, it is not 
simply a question of overall truck numbers but also impacts in terms of the distribution of 
freight across different modes of land transport. As noted earlier, rail freight clearly and 
substantially outperforms road transport in terms of safety and this means any shift of freight 
movements away from rail to road transport is almost certain to result in a net diminution in 
overall safety performance (including the improvements that might otherwise have occurred).  
By altering the costs of road freight changes to the load carrying capacity of trucks can affect 
the competitiveness of road freight in relation to its major rival rail freight. In 1997 as part of 
a Mass Limits Review the NRTC commissioned a report by the Melbourne Institute of 
Applied Economic and Social Research of the effects of increased mass limits for heavy 
vehicles on road and rail demand. The NRTC had calculated that implementation of this 
review would lead to around a 2% reduction in road freight rates and a 1.54% increase in road 
freight demand. The report (NRTC, 1997) found the most likely impact (more extreme 
outcomes were considered less probable) on rail freight demand would be between 3.6 and 
4.4% on the Sydney/Melbourne corridor, between 1.5 and 1.8% on the Brisbane/Sydney 
corridor and 0.27 to 0.33% on the Adelaide/Perth corridor. At the same time, the report found 
this would lead to a reduction, not an increase, in the number of trucks. Yet, even if this were 
the case the shift would still arguably have effects on overall transport safety performance 
given the superiority of the rail sector in this regard. 
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Further, other bodies have come to different conclusions about the effect of increased mass 
limits/larger vehicle configurations on truck numbers. Two years earlier a paper by the 
Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics (1995:17) argued the cost efficiency of 
B-Doubles would cause a modal shift to road from rail and this would counteract the 
reduction in vehicle numbers produced by higher payloads. 
 
As far as the Inquiry is aware no retrospective analysis has been undertaken to verify the 
effects of changes in vehicle mass on the respective share of road and rail, though the freight 
task share of the latter is certainly falling. Nor is the Inquiry aware of an attempt to estimate 
the implications of these shifts in terms of overall transport safety performance. The Inquiry 
finds it hard to understand why such calculations were not an explicit and critical part of 
assessing standard changes liable to affect the balance between road and rail freight. There are 
further safety implications to the competition between road and rail freight that will be raised 
later in the Report. 
 
2.2.7.3 Poor road conditions/use of trucks on inadequate roads 
 
A number of submissions argued that poor road conditions had adverse effects on both 
equipment and driver health.  
 
NSW would have to have some of the worst highways in Australia. The Hay Plains between 
Waddy and Narrandera call this the highway to HELL. Another is the Newell Highway near 
Moree we call that part the Moree Rough. When you have to drive over this type of roads day 
in and day out it takes its toll on the driver and his equipment (written submission of South 
Australian based owner-driver). 
 
Another submission from a mid-western NSW based driver argued that there was inadequate 
recognition that road and surface conditions, pavement failures, road design (including 
camber, bumps/dips and bridge aprons) and signage (or their location) affect trucks 
differently to cars. He stated that this point became apparent to road engineers and other RTA 
staff who had travelled in his truck (a B-Double) and it was imperative for all engineers and 
relevant staff to be get similar experience and to begin to address these issues. It was also 
argued that road characteristics, especially bumps and dips that resulted in the driver being 
thrown continuously against the seatbelt sash (as well as a lack of roll-over protection) was a 
factor making drivers resistant to wearing seatbelts as now required by law. The Victorian 
Road Transport Association (written submission), too, argued road engineers had no 
appreciation of the problems of controlling large vehicles on rough and undulating roads. 
  
Improved road conditions, including the construction of dual carriageway, have long been 
seen as a way to improve safety. For example, converting the Pacific Highway into dual 
carriageway was the major recommendation of the coronial inquest into the 20 deaths arising 
from the infamous Cowper smash in October 1989 and the death of 35 others in a coach 
smash at Clybucca two months later (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:53-58).   
 
In addition to submissions from organisations representing motorists or concerned with road 
safety generally, the Inquiry received several submissions in relation to the dangers posed by 
trucks to local residents. These submissions often implicitly or explicitly raised the suitability 
of road conditions in terms of design capacity/congestion as well as load restraint, speeding 
and other matters. One such submission was received by CHIPSTOP – an anti logging group 
based in Bega – which alleged that the large number of trucks travelling to the Daishowa 
woodchip mill near Eden caused considerable road damage and posed a threat to public 
safety. In relation to safety, the submission argued that the trucks carrying loads of 25-30 
tonnes (and more on newer vehicles) passed through small towns on roads often unsuited to 
large vehicles and pointed to several incidents where logs were shed from moving trucks 
(written submission, CHIPSTOP). The submission called for an assessment of road damage, 
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the placing of tighter limits on truck speeds and loads, and increased surveillance/compliance 
measures in relation to these vehicles.  The issue of adequate load restraint and the capacity 
to enforce current requirements was raised by a number of other parties, including the NSW 
Police Service, and is discussed in more detail in a later section of this Report. 
 
2.2.8 Parking Bays/Rest Areas and Road Houses 
 
There can be little doubt that the ability of drivers to take adequate rest breaks on road can 
and does affect safety. The issue of inadequate parking bays was raised in a number of oral 
and written submissions to the Inquiry. While several acknowledged that there had been an 
improvement in this area in recent years it was suggested there was need for further 
upgrading. The need to ensure rest and recuperation areas were strategically located was also 
raised. Several submissions indicated that rest areas compared unfavourably with those found 
on Victorian highways but while this may be the case it appears the problem is not confined 
to NSW. Indeed, the Victorian Road Transport Association (written submission) pointed to 
poorly defined and designed rest areas and call for more adequate and strategically located 
parking bays along major routes.  
 
During the course of its investigation the Inquiry visited/observed a number of parking bays, 
noting several excellent arrangements as well as others clearly in need of further upgrading. 
 
One interstate trucking company suggested that the RTA should develop an action plan 
covering all major routes in conjunction with the road transport industry (that had already 
undertaken considerable research in this area). Another Sydney-based company commended 
the role the ATA had played in upgrading facilities in NSW and elsewhere. While the RTA 
already has a upgrading plan in place there seems grounds for further improvements, using 
input from both industry and driver representatives. The recent federal inquiry in managing 
fatigue in transport (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, 
Transport and Arts, 2000:76) also identified this issue as demanding attention, and 
recommended the federal Minister for Transport and Regional Services should fund a national 
audit of roadside rest areas. 
 
Several submissions also raised the issue of roadhouse conditions which discourage drivers 
stopping and do not make adequate provisions for drivers to shower or rest: 
 
Roadhouses I’ve visited and worked at are dirty and anti truckie…The cooperation of 
roadhouse needs to be sort (sic) as well as fuel companies who own roadhouses to improve 
cleanliness and facilities for truck drivers (written submission, former roadhouse worker, 
Western Australia). 
 
In one roadhouse we visited in Grafton a small room next to the cafeteria was set aside with 
four beds which would enable drivers to sleep outside their cab. 
 
2.2.9 Subcontracting/Employment Status, Labour Hire/Leasing and Safety 
 
Subcontracting, or the subletting of work usually to smaller firms and owner/drivers, has 
always been a widespread practice in the road transport industry although there is a prevailing 
view that these arrangements have become if anything more pervasive in recent years (there is 
no accurate data to confirm this). Knowledgeable observers of the industry identify one 
reason underpinning this growth as an attempt by larger firms to maintain market share or 
contracts in a climate of intense competition/low freight rates by using subcontractors as a 
lower cost option to employing their own drivers. Leaving this issue aside, there is substantial 
Australian and international evidence that subcontracting often leads to a significant 
deterioration in safety across a range of industries (Quinlan et al, 2001:335-414). Evidence 
indicates the primary reasons for this are underbidding/overwork/corner-cutting on safety by 
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subcontractors; the creation of more disorganised work settings and fractured management 
structures; and by undermining conventional regulatory regimes. The Inquiry received 
submissions indicating subcontracting was associated with serious safety problems in the long 
haul road transport industry. For example, the move to greater subcontracting has been a 
cause for a number of trucking insurers because of the relatively poorer claims performance 
record of owner/drivers and its impact on the claim record of larger companies moving to 
replace employee drivers with subcontractors. 
 
As already indicated, financial pressures on subcontractors can pose serious risks to safety. 
Later sections of this Report will consider the impact of low freight rates and indebtedness on 
the safety performance of small firms and owner/drivers in some detail. At this point, it is also 
worth noting that financial pressures on owner/drivers are often exacerbated by delayed 
payment from principal contractors. The Inquiry received numerous submissions from 
owner/drivers complaining of lengthy delays in payment as well as a somewhat smaller 
number of complaints about unreliable or dispute payment. In one typical case submitted to 
the Inquiry an owner/driver signed an agreement with a Brisbane-based company that 
specified the payment period as two weeks. Despite this, the driver was later told that 
payment would be made five weeks from receipt of paperwork and a further seven weeks 
from the receipt of full invoices relating to fuel used – a total delay of 12 weeks (written 
submission, CFAT, page 8). At the time of the submission the owner/driver was owed almost 
$5,000 and was in severe financial difficulty. During the course of investigation the Inquiry 
received other submissions claiming far high amounts were owed. The Driver Survey 
undertaken for the Inquiry (Appendix 3, Table 24 page 65) confirmed this as a serious issue 
for owner/drivers. Over 20% of owner/drivers surveyed nominating slow/nil payment as one 
of three biggest issues they faced (over 35% nominated freight rates/GST and over 17% 
nominated low pay). In sum, both the survey and other evidence presented to the Inquiry 
makes it clear that delayed payments to owner/drivers are a serious issue. These practices are 
no unknown in relation to subcontractors in other industries like building. However, it is 
arguable that the potential consequences for safety in the road transport industry can be 
especially serious, as in a case where a subcontractor tries to take on extra work to ‘make up’ 
for a delayed payment and, in so doing, exceeds their driving hours. 
 
In sum, all the evidence available to the Inquiry indicates that delayed and unreliable 
payments to subcontractors are a serious safety issue. As will be shown later in this Report, 
many owner/drivers are operating at the very margins of financial existence and such 
additional burdens (not counting the associated stress) are hardly conducive to stability in the 
industry or safe operations. 
 
Unlike other areas of road transport casual employment and labour leasing are not, as yet, 
prominent features of the long distance trucking although the latter appears to be growing off 
an admittedly small base. One driver alleged that at a Western NSW depot where he worked 
casuals failed to obtain shifts unless they were prepared to work long hours beyond the legal 
limit (written submission, former NSW based driver). Few witnesses to the Inquiry raised 
labour hire as an issue. However, there were some exceptions.  
 
One experienced driver who had worked for a labour hire firm for over 5 years pointed to a 
number of safety problems related to labour leasing. He alleged the practice of leasing drivers 
was conducive to situations where drivers were unfamiliar with the vehicles they were being 
asked to drive and the routes they were required to take. He also argued leased drivers were in 
a weak bargaining position when it came to raising concerns about defective vehicles, 
overloading and the like (verbal submission, truck driver, Newcastle).  
 
The NSW branch of the TWU also raised concerns in relation to labour hire. It argued (oral 
submission) that one consequence of the increasing use of leased labour was to circumvent 
state transport award clauses setting a minimum ratio of permanent to casual staff as well as 
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requirements to establish a workplace OHS committee under the NSW Occupational Health 
and Safety Act. While the union conceded there was as yet limited use of leased labour in the 
long haul sector of the transport industry it was concerned that this practice would grow, as it 
has elsewhere.  
 
Given recent experience in other industries where labour hire has become widespread these 
concerns are, in the view of this Report, well founded and any significant move to labour 
leasing should be viewed with concern. One factor that may limit labour leasing in the long 
haul sector is the potential damage that could be done to expensive equipment by drivers 
because they are unfamiliar with it, the routes taken or because their short-term employment 
does not encourage a 'protective' attitude to the equipment. The Victorian branch of the TWU 
(oral submission) referred to operators who eschewed further use of leased labour on 
precisely these grounds. Since subcontracting is integrally linked to commercial practices 
within the transport industry it will be examined further in subsequent sections of this Report. 
 
 
2.2.10 Safety implications of road and rail modes of long distance freight movement 
 
The Inquiry received a number of written and verbal submissions from organisations in rail 
freight industry. Further, individuals and community road safety groups also presented 
arguments for a shift in land transport away from roads and in favour of rail. For example, in 
its written submission the Highway Safety Action Group of New South Wales Inc argued: 
 
The HSAG has consistently lobbied to have our railway infrastructure upgraded so more 
freight can be put on trains, thereby removing trucks from our state roads and improving 
safety conditions. We regard this as integral to discussions on the long haul trucking industry 
and recommend its inclusion in this inquiry (HSAG, 2000). 
 
Similarly, an experienced driver with tertiary qualifications in industry economics argued that 
active government policies to encourage rail and water-based transport over road transport for 
long-haul tasks would not only reduce cartage costs in the longer term but also cut the number 
of vehicle accidents, emissions of exhaust gases and oil consumption. He argued it would also 
reduce road maintenance expenditure: 
 
…as it is well-known that the most road damage is caused by the heaviest trucks (written 
submission, ex driver, Victoria).  He called for additional expenditure upgrading the rail 
network and the imposition of a ‘road abuse’ tax to discourage the use of heavy vehicles on 
already congested routes such as the Hume Highway. 
 
The Inquiry terms of reference did not specifically ask for a consideration of the relative 
merits of road and rail freight transport. However, some matters arising from the issues raised 
in these submissions were relevant to the Inquiry terms, namely: 
 
• To what extent have competitive advantages in road transport been achieved via hidden 
subsidies to this mode (a competitive neutrality argument) or an undercutting of safety 
standards (an externalities argument)? 
• Does road transport gain a competitive advantage due to the nature of its regulatory 
regime and the level of compliance activities (an argument integral to consideration of 
types of regulation and enforcement)? A related issue is the possibility of lessons that can 
be learned from examining methods for regulating safety in the rail freight sector. 
 
In relation to the first issue, the following points can be made. When the Inter-State 
Commission (1986) investigated cost recovery arrangements for interstate land transport it 
found that there were substantial hidden subsidies to the railways and close to full cost 
recovery for articulated trucks. However, over the past 15 years there have been quite 
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profound changes to rail freight (including corporatisation in NSW and privatization in some 
states and the removal of captive markets) at the same time as rail infrastructure expenditure 
has in no way matched expenditure on roads. An assessment by the Productivity Commission 
(2000:91) identified substantial productivity improvements by rail freight operators (though 
still 30% below the technical efficiency of the best performing countries studied) and an 18% 
reduction in freight rates between 1990 and 1997. The same report noted that rail had been 
placed at a serious disadvantaged due to inadequate capital expenditure to upgrade the rail 
network. 
 
While rail freight operators have become more cost efficient it can be argued government 
favouring of the road system in terms of funding represents an important disadvantage. 
Independent research lends some weight to the claims that current government policies do not 
achieve competitive neutrality in relation to road and rail transport, with the former acquiring 
an increasing share of the land freight task. Road transport has also gained from improved 
technology and the licensing of larger and more efficient truck configurations while limits to 
tracks restrict the capacity of rail to move in similar directions. A study (Laird, 1996) of the 
efficiency of road and rail freight along the eastern seaboard (Melbourne to Cairns) found that 
a $6 billion upgrading of highways since 1974 had provided major benefits to the road freight 
industry while, by comparison, federal government expenditure on rail track upgrade was 
minuscule. Laird argued over 40% of the mainline interstate track in NSW failed to meet fast 
freight train standards and that improving ‘such track and moving to full cost recovery from 
heavy trucks would save over 200 million litres of diesel by 2015’ (Laird, 1996:1). Laird 
(1996:23) also argued that the NRTC charging regime for articulated vehicles was unrealistic 
and, unlike the New Zealand system, did not amount to anything like complete cost recovery 
on the part of trucks. In its submission to the Productivity Commission (2000) report on rail 
reform, the NRTC conceded its charging structure under-charged heavier vehicles.  
 
Laird argued road transport also gained by being able to operate in a more deregulated 
environment where the important externalities of death and injury related to articulated trucks, 
and its considerably worse performance in this regard compared to rail, were not considered 
part of the competition equation. In their written submissions, rail freight organisations 
FreightCorp and the Australasian Railways Association claimed trucks have far higher 
greenhouse emissions per gross tonne kilometre than rail and heavy trucks were responsible 
for a highly disproportionate share of highway damage.  
 
In 1996 a study of by the Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics (1996) argued 
an expenditure of $3.4 billion upgrade of the rail network over the next 14 years would 
tansfer up to 40% of inter-capital road freight to rail. This, in turn, would yield net social 
benefits due to reduced transit times and lower rail operating costs (mainly from lower 
maintenance) that would offset the capital costs, although the Bureau felt aggressive 
responses might make a 40% shift to achieve in practice. In the context of an significantly 
expanding overall freight task (Butcher, 1990:11) it is not essential that a growth in the rail 
freight share should lead to a reduction, let alone a serious reduction, in road transport share – 
especially given the adaptability and competitiveness of the latter. Providing greater 
encouragement for rail transport may have a number of hidden advantages. A recent report 
noted that the growing interest of some road transport operators in inter-modal operations was 
due in no small part to the increased competitiveness of rail freight (Department of 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 1999).  
 
Turning to the second dot point dealing with the competitive advantage gained according to 
different regulatory regimes, a number of points can be made. Most notably, rail freight is 
subject to a much more stringent (and therefore operator costly) regulatory regime than road 
transport including mandatory operator licensing, more stringent driving hour limits/fatigue 
management, and regular testing of train drivers. Given the significant disparity in safety 
performance between the two modes, this Inquiry will have far more to say about this issue in 
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a later section. However, several observations can be made here. In its report on the progress 
of rail reform (conceived of in terms of microeconomic reform) the Productivity Commission 
(2000) did address the issue of safety regulation but its overwhelming focus was on 
inconsistent safety regulation and the challenges that current forms of operator licensing 
posed to new entrants. Greater coordination has clear advantages so long as it does not entail 
a lowest common denominator approach to safety standards (and issue addressed later in this 
Report).  Reducing barriers to entry via operator licensing requirements that are designed to 
maintain minimum safety performance levels is more contentious issue, as evidence presented 
later in this Report will amply attest. 
 
A key recommendation of the Productivity Commission was the need to establish a consistent 
national framework and the National Road Transport Commission was proposed as model for 
this. What the Productivity Commission failed to do was to consider the comparative safety 
performance of road and rail transport, including the assessing effectiveness of the NRTC in 
improving safety outcomes, as part of its assessment of rail safety regulation. In the 
subsequent chapter (10) dealing with, amongst things government policy affecting 
competitive neutrality between rail and road transport the issue of safety regulation is raised 
in the is designated under the policy area of access, regulations and operating procedures. 
However, in the subsequent discussion the Inquiry could find no examination (and certainly 
no detailed or serious examination) of the issue of the relative stringency/costs (especially 
when compliance levels are taken into account) or outcomes of the road and rail safety 
regimes. Safety is also conspicuous by its absence from the next chapter on the social 
dimensions of reform. The Inquiry was very disturbed that an examination of reform in the 
rail sector, with detailed assessments of competitive neutrality, could ignore a significant 
disparity in safety regulation/outcomes between road and rail transport. As this Inquiry has 
already indicated the extent of this disparity is substantial even if measured only in economic 
terms (ignoring the human and social consequences) and the basis for making such estimates 
was available.  
 
The importance of ensuring that the road freight industry is not advantaged over rail freight 
operators by having to meet inferior safety standards, and at least as importantly the 
equalisation should entail levelling up not reducing standards, has been addressed in a recent 
inquiry into Tranz Rail in New Zealand. In advocating the extension of OHS legislation to 
Tranz Rail the inquiry (New Zealand, 2000:47) stated: 
 
…we see considerable force in a submission by Tranz Rail that, in a situation where it 
competes directly against road transport operators, it should be competitively disadvantaged 
by having greater responsibilities placed upon it than its road transport competitors. The 
Government may therefore wish to consider whether the protective provisions of the HSE Act 
should be applied with equal strictness to truck operators (We note that this was indeed a 
recommendation of the 1996 report of the Transport Select Committee on its inquiry into 
truck crashes). 
 
It is, indeed, a pity the Productivity Commission did not demonstrate a similar level of 
awareness that there is more involved here than regulatory costs and that genuine competitive 
neutrality should not entail placing workers and the community at greater risk. Compounding 
its errors, the Productivity Commission report advocates further outsourcing in the rail sector 
without considering the adverse safety consequences of this in terms of injury rates, hazard 
exposures and reduced OHS knowledge - effects now well established by international 
research. A review of published scientific research on the OHS effects of outsourcing, 
covering a range of countries and industries, found outsourcing was associated with 
deterioration in OHS in 23 of the 29 studies reviewed (the remaining six studies were deemed 
indeterminate due to the absence of a control group, benchmark or baseline). Indeed, a 
negative effect was found in all the studies where an effect was measurable and no study 
found outsourcing had a neutral let alone positive effect (Quinlan et al, 2001:335-414).  
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Considering all these issues the Inquiry was surprised to discover that although there is a 
national body coordinating regulation in the road transport industry (the NRTC) there was no 
equivalent body dealing with rail or a more general body coordinating policy on land 
transport more generally (as in New Zealand). Whether the NRTC model of combining safety 
with economic reform is the most appropriate model (as suggested by the Productivity 
Commission) is a moot point. In a later section the Inquiry will examine the role played by the 
NRTC in some detail, as part of its consideration of regulatory coordination. 
 
In sum, the long haul road freight industry has received significant commercial 
advantages over rail in terms of the relative expenditure on upgrading highways when 
compared to that expended on the rail network. Other factors that might have 
advantaged rail in the past, notably captive markets and issues of cost recovery (when 
compared to road freight) no longer apply (quite the reverse). Safety outcomes have not 
figured at all the consideration of competitive neutrality and it can be argued the 
community is currently bearing the costs of this imbalance. Barring a major in 
improvement in the safety performance of road transport, these imbalances will have 
long term implications for the overall level of safety performance in the transport sector 
into the foreseeable future.  
 
2.2.11 The transportation of hazardous substances/dangerous goods 
 
The transportation of dangerous goods has been seen to be a major issue in the long distance 
trucking industry, as in road transport more generally. This is hardly surprising since 
collisions or spillages involving hazardous materials could have disastrous effects. During the 
1980s and early 1990s particular concern was raised about this issue both in New South 
Wales and elsewhere. For example, in 1992 a three-day road blitz conducted in Victoria 
identified a large number of trucks transporting hazardous chemicals across Melbourne had 
breached key safety laws (such as the Dangerous Goods Act, 1985). The safety breaches 
identified included unroadworthy vehicles, carrying chemicals without a license, poor safety 
equipment and unsecured loads (Perrone, 2000:71). 
 
In the course of this Inquiry relatively few references were made to this issue by either 
witnesses or in written submissions (with the obvious exception of the Environmental 
Protection Authority). One possible reason for this may be the greater deterrent effect and 
more targeted enforcement of environment protection legislation (see the section on 
enforcement). 
 
2.2.12 Other safety issues 
 
A number of other safety issues were raised in the course of the inquiry. 
 
2.2.12.1 Passenger Coaches 
 
In the course of the Inquiry a number of submissions were received in connection to 
interstate/tour coaches and two coach drivers were also interviewed as part of the driver 
survey because they were keen to participate (one was also a truck driver and to have refused 
them would have caused undue offence). The Inquiry did not see it as part of its brief to 
consider safety issues in relation to long distance passenger coaches. However, it is 
appropriate to note that these submissions and interviews raised a number of concerns that 
very much parallel the trucking inquiry, including the use of improperly maintained vehicles 
(in terms of brakes and tyres but also including claims some buses were unregistered and 
uninsured when driven). As with truck drivers, the suggestion was made that drivers were 
reluctant to raise complaints or refuse to drive such vehicles because they feared this might 
jeopardize future work prospects. Other issues raised that were not a prominent feature of the 
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investigation into trucking were the use of casual drivers and ‘re-engineering’ employment 
arrangements through the transfer of contracts and corporate ownership. In its submission, the 
Queensland Branch of the TWU, also detailed complaints it had received from coach drivers, 
including converting them to owner/drivers and excessive hours imposed on them by 
companies (with several drivers claiming they had worked between 23 and 25 hours straight). 
This report can make no comment on these allegations (and based as they were on very 
fragmentary sources) other than to suggest they may warrant further investigation by the 
appropriate regulatory agencies. 
 
2. 3 CONCLUSION 
 
This section of the report has examined evidence on the extent of safety and related health 
problems in the long distance trucking industry. Various measures of safety performance were 
examined including: 
 
• crashes, including those causing fatalities 
• the incidence of both acute and chronic injuries 
• road rage/violence against drivers 
• drug abuse 
• speeding 
• abuse of driving hours (fatigue) and log book falsification 
• work/non work conflicts and family breakdowns 
• the level of driver distress (GHQ) and suicide 
• insurance claims, uninsured vehicles (comprehensive) and unregistered vehicles  
• overloading, vehicle configuration and inadequate vehicle maintenance 
• workers compensation data and omissions from this 
 
Taken as whole, these measures paint a picture which gives cause for genuine concern not 
only about the current state of affairs but also likely future trends.  
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SECTION 3  
 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, CLIENT AND CONSIGNOR PRESSURE AND 
SAFETY 
 
What I’ve noticed over the last 11 years is a decline in the safety standards in the trucking 
industry and there are a number of areas that have brought about that. One is that the return 
to the drivers is diminished over a number of years and it’s become more competitive and 
there’s been more pressure put on drivers to meet deadlines… I see more of it because I go to 
see the drivers, the drivers’ widows and they produce documents and receipts and hours 
[records]. I go out to the accident scene and I look at defective trucks and I wonder how 
people have been put into defective trucks. A driver was sent from here to Brisbane with 
leaking exhaust in the cabin and when he got to Brisbane he said “can we have the truck 
fixed” the owner said to them “no, its too expensive, put your head out the window”. And on 
the way back they’ve rolled the truck…that chap’s… a quadriplegic. I’ve done deaths and the 
standard of truck maintenance has fallen off, mainly because the owner/drivers can’t afford to 
maintain the trucks, they’re not getting the return from the industry that allows them to 
maintain a safe standard… I see the defective welds on trucks, I see the trucks with the bald 
tyres, trucks with the joints that are worn, steering… They’ll [drivers] pull their logbooks out 
and they’ll show us their invoicing and they’re not making money out of it…and then I go 
back to the employers or the people who consign the freight and I talk to them.  And their 
attitude is “so what, there’s another truck driver out there”. They’re a commodity, they’re 
expendable. You can lose one, bad luck, you can get another one…  They [customers] don’t 
care. All they see is that their freight has to be from Sydney to Melbourne, has to be there at 6 
o’clock Friday… I know for a fact if you go to the wholesale market here in Victoria the stuff 
that’s coming down and arriving there is not arriving legally. If you went out and checked the 
hours of those drivers coming from Cairns, Bundaberg, Brisbane – they’re not arriving there 
legally. (oral submission, professional insurance and accident investigator for past 11 years, 
covering NSW, Victoria and South Australia) 
 
A central term of reference for the Inquiry was to investigate the connection between the web 
of commercial arrangements (and parties to this) that determine the movement of goods by 
road and safety. In particular, the Inquiry was asked to investigate the impact of clients' and 
consignors' requirements on the drivers including: 
• Industry tendering practices; 
• Transport contacts between road transport companies and major clients;  
• Methods of pricing; 
• Lack of client responsibility for driving hours, driver performance and 
remuneration for drivers; 
• Client/consignor requirements as to delivery times. 
 
Investigation of these issues indicated that the impact of client and consignor requirements 
must be examined in the context of a broader set of commercial practices within the industry 
and the structure of the industry itself, especially the large number of small operators and 
widespread subcontracting of freight tasks. Account also needs to be taken of the role of 
government competition policies. 
 
3.1 Earlier evidence/reports linking commercial/industrial practices to safety 
 
3.1.1 Earlier Inquiries and Other Evidence Pertaining to the Australian Trucking 
Industry 
 
When this Inquiry examined earlier reports and inquiries into the long distance trucking 
industry it was rather surprised by the substantial amount of evidence linking commercial 
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practices and safety performance. The association between commercial/industrial practices 
and safety in the long distance trucking industry had been repeatedly identified in reports and 
inquiries over many years. In addition to factors such as driver fatigue/the concentration 
required to drive large trucks over long periods, poor road conditions, inadequately 
maintained trucks and ‘cowboy’ drivers; reference has been made to a range of 
commercial/industrial practices and competitive pressures. These include intense competition 
for loads leading to depressed freight rates, tight schedules imposed by freight forwarders 
(themselves under pressure from load owners or consignees) and reward systems (notably per 
kilometre rates and delivery time bonus/penalties) that encourage overwork and speeding. 
This Report felt it necessary to summarise findings of earlier inquiries and reports to show 
that the evidence collected in the course of the current Inquiry in large part confirms what 
should have been known, indeed has been known, but which has not been acted upon in the 
past. 
 
As noted by Hensher and Battellino (1990) over a decade ago these commercial/industrial 
issues had been repeatedly raised over many years, including in the 1984 Report of the 
National Road Freight Industry Inquiry.  The National Road Freight Inquiry had been 
established to investigate industry efficiency (including competition from rail freight) and 
practices, truck financing practices and the involvement of heavy vehicles in road crashes. 
This broad brief enabled the Inquiry to investigate the link between commercial practices and 
safety. The final report was very clear about the bargaining power that consigners and 
shippers could exert over freight forwarders and transport operators in relation to freight rates. 
Just a few quotes illustrate this point. 
 
Large consignors, through their ability to obtain competitive quotes, are able to lower the 
rates they pay by exercising their considerable bargaining power over forwarders (May et al, 
1984:30). 
 
Large shippers may negotiate discounted (or contract) rates well below the schedule rate, 
especially when the individual forwarder is faced with actual or potential competition for the 
business in question (May et al 1984:32). 
 
It should be noted that when this report was written the residual effects of a number of earlier 
regulatory controls and impediments to competition within the industry (including some that 
the Trade Practices Act introduced a decade earlier had yet to effect) were still being felt. 
 
Looking specifically at the relationship between commercial practices and safety the Inquiry 
Report noted that not only was flouting of speed, weight limits and other regulations 
widespread but this was hardly surprising given the commercial advantages to do so. It noted 
that an instance of overloading of one tonne per trip might yield $1500 in additional revenue 
at the risk of only expecting to pay a fine or around $250 if the offence was detected (May et 
al 1984:184). In terms of commercial pressures the Report noted a survey of long distance 
owner/drivers by the NSW Freight Transport Industry Council which concluded they were: 
 
…overloading and speeding in order to get and keep regular work with companies. They are 
working excessively long hours and attempting to cut costs on comprehensive and personal 
insurance and sometimes on vehicle maintenance (WD Scott, 1984 cited in May et al, 
1984:184). 
 
The Inquiry also heard suggestions that ease of entry of entry into the industry, including the 
lending practices of finance companies (discussed below) intensified competition for work 
and downward pressure on freight rates (May et al, 1984:197).  
 
Too many of the entrants to the industry are insufficiently aware of the capital requirements 
that are usually necessary to stay in operation. The safety implications of this are developed 
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elsewhere and are the primary motivation behind the Inquiry’s recommendations in relation 
to quality licensing which tackles the problem of the poorly prepared and uninformed 
operators (May et al 1984:204). 
  
The Report identified two major structural flaws in existing arrangements for maintaining 
safety in the road freight industry. 
 
Firstly, the detection and enforcement system focuses almost entirely on the driver of the 
vehicle, and exclusively so in the case of the long distance owner-driver. The Inquiry however 
received consistent evidence that the freight forwarder, agent and broker also have a 
considerable role to play in influencing the observance and non-observance of safety 
regulations. Secondly, the existing system turns solely around the detection of breaches in 
specific cases on the road. As such it does not attempt to monitor the performance of 
operators over a period, although this is the most effective way to gauge safety behaviour, 
and cost-effective devices and systems appear to be available to permit this to be achieved 
(May et al, 1984:166). 
 
To resolve these problems Inquiry recommendations included a substantial increase in fines 
for breaches, introduction of short licence suspension, the use of tachographs and the 
introduction of an operator licensing system that would include freight forwarders, brokers 
and loading agents. The aim of operator licensing was to lift the standards (including business 
skills) that affected safety and a key role of the licensing body would be to identify persistent 
offenders who could then be targeted with effective sanctions, including suspension of their 
operating licence. These recommendations were not acted upon at least partly due to fierce 
resistance to them on the part of the industry. This might well be regarded as a tragic outcome 
in the light of what occurred over the next five years, culminating in the Cowper smash and a 
final widespread acknowledgment that the industry was running ‘out of control.’ The crisis of 
the late 1980s/early 1990s generated a new round of inquiries and reports which drew 
attention to the impact of commercial practices on safety although once again none of the 
regulatory changes brought in to address safety effectively addressed these issues. 
 
In its 1989 report, Concerning Alert Drivers and Safe Speeds for Heavy Vehicles, 
STAYSAFE pointed to reward and other pressures on drivers and argued that operator 
accountability could only be improved if the incitement to misbehave was addressed: 
 
14.1.1 STAYSAFE received substantial anecdotal evidence of drivers being rewarded for 
achieving delivery times which necessitated speeding and inadequate rest, and of drivers 
being penalised for failing to achieve such deadline. In some cases, contracts threaten 
penalties if deliveries are late without adequate excuse. 
 
14.1.2 Some drivers claimed that they were told by owners or freight forwarders “get it there 
by 7.00 am, or don’t bother to come back for more work.” The “just-in-time” (JIT) 
manufacturing strategy was suggested as possibly contributing to this problem. STAYSAFE 
accepts that such practices probably do occur and sees them as very difficult to stop. 
 
14.1.3 STAYSAFE understands that an exploration is in hand within the Roads and Traffic 
Authority of means of prosecuting unscrupulous freight forwarders. STAYSAFE considers 
that rewards or penalties inciting illegal operations should themselves be clearly illegal, 
and those offering such inducements, regardless of driver explanation, should be subject to 
substantial penalties (emphasis in original, STAYSAFE, 1989). 
 
As far as this Inquiry is aware the mooted RTA response never eventuated nor was there any 
other regulatory response to this strong recommendation. 
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Within a year a similar raft of issues was raised before the Coronial Inquest into the 1989 
Cowper tragedy including unreasonable trip schedules, arrival time penalties/bonuses, 
requiring drivers to load, and using refusal to renew contracts to pressure owner/drivers to 
engage in unfair dangerous practices. The Coroner found evidence of excessive demands on 
drivers almost wholly anecdotal but added that the truck driver causing the incident that led to 
20 deaths was: 
 
Paid a fee per trip plus a fee per kilometre travelled. The more trips he fitted in, and the 
further he drove each day, the more he was paid. Such a method of remuneration is decidedly 
unhealthy (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:27). 
 
It should be noted in passing that despite this observation 10 years later trip-based payment 
systems remained pervasive in the industry, frequently applying to employee drivers as well 
as owner/drivers. It has been linked to more recent serious incidents such as the Blanchetown 
road crash where a truck driven a by a fatigued driver ploughed into several cars killing six 
motorists. The Coroner’s comments echo those of his Cowper disaster counterpart. 
 
The extent to which the current system, whereby drivers are paid by the trip, or by the 
kilometre represents an incentive to break the law (the evidence from this inquest certainly 
proves that it does), and whether it is possible to design a different system which provides 
drivers with more incentive to comply with the law, and with safe work practices (cited in 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and the Arts, 
2000 page 96). 
 
It should be noted that the driver in this case was an employee not a subcontractor. However, 
what is perhaps notable about road transport is the similarity in payment systems between 
many of those in either category, narrowing the differences that might otherwise be expected. 
The Report will return to issue of payment by results systems. At this point it is worth noting 
that the Coroner identified a situation where the driver and other drivers employed by the 
same company were regularly doing trips that should take two and half days (if logbooks 
were properly abided by) in a day and half. Drivers were encouraged to undertake trips in this 
time by a mixture of reward pressures (receiving $440 for Adelaide/Sydney return trip) and 
scheduling pressure imposed by the company (in relation to the Blanchetown smash an early 
arrival was specified on both the written manifest and on an envelope). After interviewing a 
range of drivers employed by WRB the Coroner formed the view that, despite management 
claims to the contrary, unrealistic schedules that breached both road transport and OHS 
legislation were the norm. Describing a typical Adelaide/Sydney trip time of 17 hours 
Coroner Chivell observed that the company: 
 
…had made no effort to provide accommodation or other systems of work with which drivers 
could comply with their statutory obligations, apart from during one period when they were 
carrying "time sensitive" freight. At this stage, they were obliged by contract to run a "shuttle 
service", and their drivers were provided with accommodation at Goulburn, and later at 
Golgol. This practice was discontinued when they lost the contract (Coronors Court of South 
Australia, 1999 page 22). 
 
In many respects the Coroner’s findings in relation to the Blanchetown incident mirrored 
earlier comments of District Court Judge Lowrie when sentencing the truck driver involved 
(Brian Douglas Snewin) on a charge of causing death by dangerous driving. It is worth 
reproducing some of these comments, as they highlight the interconnection between low 
pay/trip based payment and scheduling pressures/long hours with safety, and the judge’s view 
that these problems were by no means atypical. 
 
It is not the first time I have heard how wage rates relate kilometres driven and the physical 
demand at times put on drivers by irresponsible employers to comply with schedules. I am 
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mot surprised with those submissions. It was said that you worked for one major trucking 
company, an interstate company, and found you could not financially survive because of the 
long hours and the small amount of remuneration and, of course, not assisted by vehicle 
breakdowns. 
 
I am told you resigned from a number of positions because of the nature of these driving 
schedules and turn around times and delays. You clearly could not cope financially. Again I 
have heard of these difficulties with these so-called log books. It was mentioned that in one 
State, for instance, there is no requirement for log books and subsequently there is the 
impossibility of monitoring driving situations. 
 
These matters really must be addressed by not only legislation but the industry…The details 
of your driving in the prior week from Adelaide to Sydney are simply unbelievable but no 
doubt you accepted the tasks as directed by management of this firm. And, indeed, looking at 
those hours and schedules it always spelt disaster. 
 
I am told it was a common practice with this company to supply you with stimulants. When I 
look at these schedules…It is no wonder you had no concentration on that day or the next 
day…The conduct of those companies and the schedule is extremely culpable conduct (R v 
Brian Douglas Snewin, 1997 sentencing decision at pages 1-2). 
 
Returning to the Cowper inquest the Coroner there drew attention to other commercial 
practices that impinged on safety. Turning to the issue of chain of contractual arrangements 
from those offering the loads to the actual driving of truck by a driver using a prime mover 
and trailer (with several worn tyres at the time of incident) owned by other parties, the 
Cowper disaster Coroner observed: 
 
It is those drivers most dependent on loading contractors for their livelihood who are 
susceptible to unreasonable demands.  
 
In this regard it has been submitted that these loading contractors should themselves be 
licensed, so that the opportunity by them of breaches of safety laws could result in they 
themselves being punished, and having their own licenses suspended.  
 
Both Mr McPhee and Mr Robertson of the Road Transport Association were critical of 
loading agencies, which act as middle men, getting jobs done as cheaply as possible and 
taking his margin. It often follows that the owner-driver who is so dependent on them is 
forced to his own loading in addition to his own driving, so adding to the risk of fatigue.  
 
The evidence at the inquest showed that the arrangements between the deceased truck driver 
and the owners of the prime mover and semi trailer were very loose, and not conducive to 
safe, careful driving. Tragedy resulted. 
 
A case has been made out for the licensing of loading agents to ensure that they carry out 
their work in a responsible way, with a concentration on driver welfare as well as profit 
margins. 
 
It has been reported (SMH 29-2-1990) that at a road safety summit organised by the major 
trucking companies the setting of unrealistic delivery schedules was criticised, and it was 
decided that freight consignors should be made accountable for checking that drivers can 
make their journeys with speed and time limits. 
 
In view of other recommendations made, I do not recommend that action in this regard 
commence immediately, but rather that the RTA give the matter earnest consideration with a 
view to implementing such a scheme in the future (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:28-29). 
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Again, as with the 1989 STAYSAFE report, the Inquiry is unaware of any action being taken 
in this regard. Trip-based payment remains common throughout the industry, 
consignors/loading agents were not licensed, unrealistic delivery schedules remain a common 
source of complaint (see below) and subcontracting arrangements remain loose and 
unregulated (at least when it comes to enforcement). 
 
Much of the evidence collected by various inquiries linking safety to commercial/industrial 
practices was anecdotal although it should be added that this label could equally apply to most 
evidence tendered to inquiries, coronial inquests and the like via written or verbal 
submissions. Further, given that drivers and other parties had made these claims over many 
years would suggest, at the very least, that they warranted serious investigation.  
 
However, it would be entirely wrong to believe that the evidence on the effect of 
commercial/industrial practices on safety is either entirely anecdotal or only based on 
testimony given to inquiries or coronial inquests. Indeed, the first attempts to systematically 
measure these effects were undertaken more than a decade ago. In 1990 Hensher and 
Battellino published a paper entitled ‘Long-distance trucking: why do drivers speed’ which 
specifically tested a number of hypotheses about the impact of commercial/industrial 
conditions and practices on driving behaviour. Their evidence was derived from a pilot survey 
of 46 drivers (31 employee-drivers and 15 owner/drivers) undertaken at a outer Sydney truck 
terminal in September 1989. In terms of age and level of experience the survey sample 
revealed that most had been driving trucks over 10 years. Hensher and Battellino (1990:541) 
observed that this profile, as well as details on earnings was not consistent with media 
portrayals of drivers as being in the industry for ‘quick rewards’ at the expense of safety. It 
should also be noted in passing that this workforce profile is consistent with the survey 
evidence collected for this Inquiry (see Appendix 3) and other (large and representative) 
surveys (see NOHSC, 1992 and Williamson et al, 2000). While the media no longer 
emphasises the ‘quick returns’ scenario (hardly surprising given driver complaints about they 
capacity to survive), a parallel argument has been mounted by some observers over the last 
decade to suggest owner/drivers would work excessive hours, speed etc even if their payment 
levels were improved. This contention, commonly raised in relation to the debate about 
minimum freight rates, is predicated on a ‘quick returns’ view of owner/drivers which, while 
it may apply to some, does not match up with the road transport workforce. If owner/drivers, 
and other drivers for that matter, were primarily driven by a desire for ‘quick returns’ most 
would have left the industry many years ago (and average length of employment in the 
industry would be far lower).  
 
Returning to the issue of commercial/industrial practices, Hensher and Battellino (1990:542-
543) found little evidence of imposed tight schedules on longer trips. However, drivers made 
constant reference to the requirement that shorter haul deliveries between Sydney/Melbourne 
and Sydney/Brisbane had to be overnight and the reasonableness of schedules was 
significantly affected by time spent getting loaded/unloaded. With regard to the latter, drivers 
complained of having to arrive early to avoid being caught in queues at warehouses, freight 
depots or manufactures; the need to travel across the city in peak hour or make multiple drops 
upon arrival; and preference given local/intra urban trucks in unloading. For the freight 
forwarder, warehouse or load recipient giving preference to intra-urban trucks was logical 
given that these drivers were being paid by the hour and time spent waiting therefore 
represented a cost. On the other hand, long distance drivers were typically paid on a per-tonne 
or per-trip/kilometre basis without demurrage, so delaying unloading of their trucks imposed 
no direct cost on the client. For owner/drivers in particular, delays at loading also increased 
the risk of missing another load or delivery time (Hensher and Battellino, 1990:543-544)..    
 
The weak bargaining position of owner/drivers in terms of accepting loads at particular rates, 
usually offered on a take it or leave it basis by load owners or transport companies, was 
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exacerbated by an over-supply of drivers. Disputing the view of an earlier (1979) inquiry into 
long distance trucking by the Bureau of Transport Economics that argued over-supply was a 
short-term disequilibrium problem that would ultimately correct itself, Hensher and Battellino 
stated: 
 
Our investigations in 1989 indicate firstly that there is possibly still an oversupply of drivers 
in the industry, suggesting that this is not a short term disequilibrium problem, but a 
structural feature of the industry, and secondly that it is not necessarily only the owner driver 
segment which is responsible for this oversupply situation (Hensher and Battellino, 
1990:545). 
 
With regard to freight rates Hensher and Battellino (1990:545-546) note a decline in rates 
over the previous decade and the intense level of competition on the large Sydney/Melbourne 
corridor (with its 10-12 hour trip times and emphasis on overnight delivery). They also refer 
to problems of low ‘backloading’ rates on longer routes to destinations (Perth, Adelaide and 
Brisbane) with a pronounced imbalance in terms of two-way freight movement. Whereas 
Linklater’s late 1970s studies had reported drivers earned high income-levels relative to their 
education, Hensher and Battellino (1990:546) found this had not been sustained into the late 
1980s, especially given the exceptionally long hours worked, with owner/drivers earning 
much lower incomes than employee drivers. They found that drivers were paid according to a 
diverse array of systems, ranging from fixed wages (22.6%) through to a percentage of the 
earnings of the truck (19.4%) or a set trip rate (25.8%). Examining the issue of average trip 
speed, Hensher and Battellino (1990:551-552) identified five significant variables. For 
employee drivers, higher average speed was associated with drug-use (drug-using drivers 
drove faster), payment system (drivers paid on a trip rate basis drove an average 15 kmh 
faster than those on fixed rates) and vehicle registration (vehicles registered in NSW travelled 
an average 15kmh slower than federal-registered trucks). For owner/drivers, increased 
average trip speed was positively associated with drug use, trip time/scheduling (those 
arriving before 10am had higher speeds), time spent waiting for a load prior to departure 
(those waiting had higher speeds) and length of trip (longer trips were associated with higher 
speeds).  
 
In concluding, Hensher and Battellino stated that they had: 
 
…confirmed our initial hypothesis that the underlying economic conditions in the industry are 
a significant contributor to the on-road behaviour of drivers. These conditions, which 
manifest themselves in declining freight rates, tightening schedules and increasing 
competition confront drivers daily as they try to forge a living on the road. If the problem of 
safety on our roads is to be addressed, and solved satisfactorily, it is important to look beyond 
the symptoms of speeding, infringement of driving time regulations, and driver fatigue and 
consider the underlying causes which result in this behaviour. The data collected in the pilot 
survey has provided a start in analysing the relationship between these symptoms and 
possible causes which we believe will add to the understanding of the structure and the 
operations of the trucking industry in Australia and form the basis for recommendations for 
changes which will contribute to improving safety on the roads (Hensher and Battellino, 
1990:553). 
 
It is worth noting in passing that this study was undertaken with a seeding grant from the 
Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS) in the federal Department of Transport and 
Communications. Following this result, FORS funded a more extensive study by Hensher and 
a number of colleagues (Hensher et al 1991) where a survey of 820 drivers was undertaken to 
explore much the same issues. In terms of workforce profile, findings confirmed the pilot 
survey. It revealed an experienced workforce (70% had been driving more than 10 years), 
working an average of 105 hours per week (65% of which were driving) and driving around 
200,000 kms per year for a relatively poor income (36% earned less than $15,000 in 1989/90). 
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The great majority of employee drivers (79%) were paid directly in relation to the earnings of 
the truck. For owner/drivers the heavy commitments occasioned in purchasing a truck was 
illustrated by the low deposit and short average repayment term of 4.25 years with average 
monthly repayments of $2500 (amounting to the second highest component of costs after fuel 
Hensher et al, 1991:100). The main issues confronting owner/drivers were low freight rates 
relative to their operating costs.  
 
As with the earlier pilot survey, Hensher et al (1991:101) found that drivers spent 
considerable time (an average of 3.5 hours) on off-road activities (loading/unloading, 
maintenance etc) before commencing a trip. When they sampled particular trips Hensher et al 
found that 35% of drivers were travelling to a set schedule but 60% of drivers reported that 
even where freight forwarders hadn’t set a schedule a self-imposed arrival time was set, 
primary due to concerns about queuing and getting the next load.  Of those drivers on a set 
schedule, a small proportion was offered incentives (2.7%) but a quarter indicated they would 
be penalised for late arrival (Hensher et al, 1991:48). Around half of all drivers felt freight 
companies demanded unreasonably tight schedules (the figure was slightly lower for large 
fleet drivers Hensher et al, 1991:51). Average trip speed was highest amongst small fleet 
drivers (82.01 kph) and younger drivers aged 17-24 years (84.72 kph) compared to a overall 
average of 81.06 kph.  
 
Econometric analysis paralleling the pilot study revealed a similar pattern of results. For both 
owner/drivers and employers of drivers, economic rewards were a major influence on the 
propensity to speed. In particular, Hensher et al (1991:96) found: 
 
There is very strong evidence to support the primary hypothesis that the trip rate received by 
the owner driver (ie gross earnings) and the freight rate obtained by the company using an 
employee driver have a significant influence on the propensity to speed. The negative 
relationship is stronger for owner drivers as might be expected…The main impetus of this 
study has been confirmed: on-road performance is strongly linked to economic reward. 
 
They draw a particular bead at the safety consequences of trip-based payment: 
 
Any deviation from a fixed salary tends to encourage practices designed to increase economic 
reward which are not synergetic with reducing exposure to risk (Hensher et al, 1991:102). 
 
As part of their study, Hensher et al (1991:28-29) had also considered the insecurity of 
owner/drivers without contracts or regular load arrangements and the problem of backloading 
(involving heavily discounted freight rates) where two-way freight movement imbalances 
made return loads scarce. Over 40% of drivers had rejected a load in the past 12 months the 
most common reason was that the rate was too low, with other reasons being the unreliability 
of payment by the customer (7.4%). Only a small number of loads were rejected on the basis 
of being overweight (4.5%) or that it would require exceeding legal driving limits (2.7% 
Hensher et al, 1991:30). The combination of competition, low freight rates and uncertainty of 
loads and consequent uncertainty of earnings had other safety-related effects, most notably 
that it encouraged: 
 
…the practice of the self-imposed schedules and the taking of stimulants to enable extension 
of the productive working week. While the extended working week does increase the earnings, 
the incidence of productive (ie driving) time decreases as total working hours increases. Any 
strategy which can reduce the uncertainty of earnings must reduce the hours of total work, 
increase the amount of sleep time and consequently reduce the incidence of self-imposed 
schedules and hence the use of stimulants. 
 
2. Regular contracts are a preferred form of load allocation, initially obtained by a process of 
competitive bidding, with possibly relatively short contracts in order to ensure that bid prices 
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remain competitive. This may be the only way to minimise the amount the amount of 
unproductive waiting time and to eventually prune the industry. Major implementation of 
competitive bidding in other transport industries is seen as a preferred alternative to 
complete economic deregulation primarily because of the inability of deregulation to manifest 
an acceptable program of internalising the negative externalities of unfettered competition 
(Hensher et al, 1991:102). 
 
In a later paper based on survey results for 402 drivers, Golob and Hensher (1994) echoed 
previous findings. As can be seen from Figure 1 the study considered a range of influences on 
speeding, including pressure from freight owners (and a similar figure can be found in 
Hensher et al 1991). The Report has included this Figure to demonstrate that a relationship 
between commercial practices, industry structures and safety is not a revelation, nor is 
recognition that load owners are part of this equation (however much this may appear to 
several parties to this Inquiry). 
 
In their study Golob and Hensher queried the drawing of a simple dichotomy between 
owner/drivers and employee drivers. (1994:29). They argued that small company drivers had 
some of the worst practices in terms of speeding, drug-use and traffic fines and that a more 
useful explanatory classification was in terms of the nature of contracts, work practices and 
the ability to secure loads. For example, drivers on regular contracts were less likely to use 
drugs or speed (though they attract a higher number of speeding fines) which Golob and 
Hensher saw as having important policy implications, along with the earnings issue more 
generally.  
 
Looking at the results in more detail it can be noted that once again it was found that earnings 
exercised a significant influence on on-road behaviour. Thirty seven percent of drivers had a 
schedule imposed by an employer or freight forwarder and, these drivers on such trips were 
more likely to be fined for speeding. For the remainder, propensity to self-impose a schedule, 
and speed/attract fines, was associated with the time spent securing a load and final delivery 
(carrying perishable goods and, to a lesser extent, heavier gross truck weight also influenced 
scheduling and other behaviour). Self-imposed schedules were, in turn, the most important 
influence on the propensity to take stimulant drugs. Golob and Hensher (1994:25) found the 
greatest influence on average trip speed was the earning rates of both owner/drivers and 
employee drivers. Drivers with higher earnings rates exhibit lower speeds, and this is 
particularly true for owner/drivers. The last finding in particular is important because it 
clearly suggests improving earning rates for owner/drivers would alter the on-road behaviour 
of owner/drivers contrary to the a priori reasoning of a number of other reports (such as 
Driving Forward) discussed below. This observation is also reinforced by other findings in 
relation to load/contract insecurity.  
 
Golob and Hensher concluded by arguing that, rather than focusing on truck-safety, it was 
essential to look at the totality of driver health and wellbeing, most notably the ‘lifestyle’ that 
evolved in connection to the job as well as substantial externalities associated with present 
arrangements. Taking the reward and insecurity pressures as a whole they stated: 
 
These positive and negative influences when taken together are expressing a ‘lifestyle’ 
phenomenon which in part is the historical product of pressures in the market to secure loads 
in order to earn an acceptable wage. Any assistance to this industry which can reduce the 
pressures in the market to a level which will reduce the reliance on pills must be desirable 
(even after allowing for the possibility of somewhat higher rates of moving goods). The 
current rates have not internalised the negative externalities rampant in this industry, which 
have spawned a lifestyle encouraging pill taking in order to stay awake long enough to 
improve the financial situation. The use of stimulants is as widespread in the employee driver 
sector as it is in the owner drivers and is regarded by many drivers as an acceptable practice 
(Hensher et al 1992, 1993). 
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…Lifestyle factors appear to have evolved as a result of the ease of entry to the industry 
coupled with its highly competitive nature which demands non-routine and unpredictable 
work practices for a significant number of drivers in the industry. There appears to be a case 
for much more stringent safety regulations centred on the health of the driver as distinct from 
the ‘health of the rig’. There is a great temptation for commentators to argue if someone 
wants to enter this industry, get burdened with high debts and work excessive hours to ‘make 
a quid’ then they should be allowed to. This may be acceptable wisdom if safety of human 
resources at large were not at risk. It is precisely because of the negative externalities aligned 
to safety that changes are required in the competitive practices in the industry (Golob and 
Hensher, 1994:28-29). 
 
In 1995 Arblaster and colleagues completed a report funded by a research grant from the 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) based on interviews with 57 
long distance truck drivers based in South Australia, 52 partners and a small group of 
managers and ex-drivers. Drivers also filled out a time-use diary over a two-week period. 
Though using quite a small survey population, the pattern of results was generally consistent 
with those of earlier studies already discussed. For example, the study found evidence of 
unrealistic trip schedules, such as a trip time of 24 hours between Adelaide and Perth that 
translated into an average speed of 112 kilometres per hour without breaks (Arblaster et al, 
1995:84). As with earlier studies they drew a strong connection between scheduling and drug 
use. Loading and unloading delays were another serious issue. Indeed, when asked to 
nominate solutions to OHS problems in the industry 88% of drivers nominated cutting 
schedule times and 74% nominated restructuring loading/unloading which aside from 
improved road conditions (63%), far outranked all other issues. 
 
It is worth noting that the most recent government inquiry that addressed safety in the 
trucking industry (aside from this one) namely the federal House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communication, Transport and the Arts inquiry into managing fatigue in 
transport received a number of submissions raising commercial issues. As with the present 
Inquiry the submissions came from a wide range of sources. For example, John Liszakam 
from NSW who had spent 37 years in the road transport in Australia and Europe in long 
distance driving (and five years in management positions) referred to the problems posed by 
scheduling pressure and customers stipulating overnight deliveries. Similarly, a submission 
from the Western Australian Minister for Transport, Murray Criddle, observed: 
 
The responsibility for the working arrangements of truck and bus drivers generally lies with 
the prime contractor or employer. They set the delivery schedule/timetable often in 
conjunction with the client. The driver may have the least amount of say on the scheduling of 
his trip. 
 
Company drivers and subcontractors may be paid by the trip or on the distance travelled. 
This type of reward structure encourages greater time behind the wheel and in the case of a 
subcontractor business survival may be dependent on achieving at least a minimum level of 
trips. The stories are legion of drivers who are told that unless they are prepared to do a run 
somebody else will be found who will. In many such cases the driver will be starting a trip 
already tired. 
 
Unless there are steps to prevent drivers doing excessive hours either willingly or under 
direction, sufficient provision for rest and sleep will be a secondary consideration. Ensuring 
drivers are well rested at the start of the trip and have opportunity for rest and sleep in a 
schedule is the responsibility of the prime contractor or employer as well as the driver. 
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(submission to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport 
and the Arts Inquiry into Managing Fatigue in Transport, page 3). 
 
In its report, the federal inquiry (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:93) noted the significant drive towards increasing 
economic efficiency in transport over the past 20 years wrought by a number of factors. This 
included changes to government involvement in providing and regulating transport, technical 
improvements, company attempts to contain costs and pressure from customers. The report 
went on to note there was now a growing body of evidence that a point was being reached 
where 'best practice in efficiency is jeopardising best practice in safety (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:93). The 
Report noted it had received many submissions that competitive pressures were the most 
important factor contributing to fatigue. In relation to road transport in particular, the report 
noted evidence on the impact of competition on freight rates and the effects of this, in turn, on 
safety as well as the dangers posed by paying drivers on the basis of kilometers driven.  
 
Without in any way disputing this evidence the Report then argues that there is little the 
government can do to intervene in economic matters, that some companies will make poor or 
good commercial decisions and government responsibility should be to protect third parties 
such as other road users. Some of the report's views are worth quoting: 
 
In the first instance, prime responsibility for ensuring that the market for transport operates 
in a fair manner lies with the industry itself. Not just with the individual operators who are 
pressured into making unsustainable decisions, but also with the customers and freight-
forwarders who have over the years, imposed unrealistic delivery expectations at the same 
time as benefiting from the reduced rates they have extracted. 
 
It is simply not feasible for governments to make and impose decisions about optimal staffing 
levels within individual transport companies; or about the rates of payment in haulage 
contracts; or about payment methodologies. These are matters which the industry itself needs 
to resolve. 
 
That said, governments do have a clear responsibility for protecting the safety of third parties 
(such as other road users), and there are some areas where governments may be able to help 
industry fix its problems (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, 
Transport and Arts, 2000:97).  
 
The Report then goes on to recommend that federal, state and territory governments 
collaborate to develop programs to enhance the business skills of operators (with funding to 
improve owner/operator access to them). Another recommendation is the federal Minister for 
Transport and Regional Services conduct a series of industry round table meetings to examine 
the extent that economic pressures pose a threat to public safety and what measures in relation 
to improve staffing levels and freight rates. The report urges that the Productivity 
Commission be directed to take fatigue and fatigue management into account in any future 
inquiries into transport. As this Inquiry noted in Section Two, health and safety issues (even 
purely in terms of their economic costs) received no meaningful consideration in the recent 
Productivity Commission inquiry into rail transport so the last recommendation is to be 
welcomed - if still long overdue. The suggestion in relation to enhancing the business skills of 
transport operators and operator accreditation/licensing will be examined below, as will the 
issues of commercial practices for which the federal report advocated industry-round-table 
discussion. 
 
Without prejudging its own findings, this Inquiry found some perplexing aspects in the logic 
of the federal inquiry, as indicated in the quote cited above. The federal report acknowledges 
that government provision of transport and regulatory policies (including competition 
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policies) have affected the level of competition in the industry but then goes on to say 
government has no business intervening in commercial arrangements. Does this mean we are 
to ignore past policies that may have contributed to the current situation or that policies 
promoting competition are fine but intervention designed to address any adverse health and 
safety effects of this are only acceptable where third parties (ie not workers) are put at risk? 
How are transport industry round tables to address the price and scheduling pressures on 
transport operators from customers (also acknowledged in the report)? This Inquiry would 
also make the simple observation that all markets and commercial arrangements are subject to 
some form of regulation. 
 
At other points the federal report recognises the need for government intervention to influence 
commercial arrangements, even if this is done indirectly. In a later section (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:106) 
argues for greater use of OHS legislation in relation to transport industry accidents. This can 
be seen as a means of reshaping commercial arrangements and the potential for this is 
explored in some depth by this Inquiry.  The report also (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:113-116) acknowledges the 
problem of too many operators and poor performance. It argued that if voluntary accreditation 
did not lead to a measurable improvement in performance by 2002 then a licensing system 
covering operators, freight forwarders, agents and brokers should be considered.  
 
3.1.2 Recent Inquiries into Truck Crashes in New Zealand and Road Haulage in the 
United Kingdom 
 
The Inquiry also examined a number of overseas inquiries into trucking safety to see if 
parallel issues were raised. In particular, it looked at the report of a recent inquiry into truck 
crashes undertaken by the Transport Committee of the New Zealand House of 
Representatives (Storey, 1996). The inquiry was sparked by the death of 118 people in 105 
crashes involving trucks in the previous year. The Committee identified a number of 
disturbing practices including the signing of contracts for owner-drivers that effectively 
required them to breach traffic laws, requiring drivers to work excessive hours and setting 
work schedules that encouraged drivers to travel at excessive speeds (Storey, 1996:9). The 
Report pointed out that breaches of law were widespread and a direct consequence of the 
commercial advantage pertaining to such behaviour. 
 
Until truck drivers and management start respecting and obeying the law, no attempts to 
reduce truck crashes will succeed. At present, lawbreakers are being given an economic 
advantage which will not disappear until a commitment to safety has a greater economic 
benefit. This severely handicaps the majority of responsible operators (Storey,1996:9). 
 
The Report argued that trucking safety was the responsibility of all those involved in the road 
freight task, namely freight forwarders, transport operators and the manufacturers and 
producers who organise transportation of their goods (Storey, 1996:9-10). Indeed, in defining 
management for the purpose of the inquiry, the report specifically included fleet managers, 
owner/drivers, tradespersons operating their own truck, freight forwarders and all those ‘who 
set delivery times, rates and other terms and conditions’ (Storey, 1996:19). In explaining an 
increasing level of risk taking the report placed particular emphasis on commercial pressures 
and policies that had intensified competition over freight rates and work. Four quotes from 
this part of the report illustrate the point. The first quote is from an experience truck business 
operator: 
 
The real fact of the matter is that those who keep the rates down are doing so by not paying 
their fair dues and cheating the system. The competition is not being done on a fair playing 
field. Uneconomic units on the road go a long way to contributing to the accident problem 
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simply because drivers have to work long hours, they get tired or they don’t have the cash 
flow to effect repairs to their vehicles (cited in Storey 1996:21). 
 
The Insurance Council of New Zealand was also concerned by the safety implications of 
intensified competition. 
 
Increased competition in the transport industry has resulted in drivers extending driving 
hours in order to maintain their income. The problem is especially acute for owner drivers 
who have been forced to reduce their charge out rate to maintain business. The Council 
understands many fleet operators add to the problem by pressing drivers to drive beyond 
legal hours or ignore the issue when their drivers do (cited in Storey 1996:21). 
 
Another experienced transport manager offered the following views on the impact of 
deregulation: 
 
Road transport operations in New Zealand have undergone significant change over the last 
ten years. Deregulation and the competitive NZ business environment have allowed transport 
operators to extend their operations over large geographical areas… 
 
The effect of these changes has caused many operators to stretch their operations to within 
fine limits in order to gain a competitive edge. This includes tight control on operating costs 
and the expectation of drivers to work to the limits of regulation. 
 
In some circumstances, those (ie freight forwarders, dispatchers) who cause the use of heavy 
motor vehicles are unaware of the regulations and transport management factors controlling 
the use of heavy motor vehicles. Under these circumstances the level of risk is extremely high. 
 
In many situations drivers are compelled to work under conditions that fail to have adequate 
control measures applied to those who are responsible for transport operations. Operators 
with strong internal policies, controlled procedures and reasonable expectations of their 
drivers are better equipped to operate within the current environment (cited in Storey 
1996:21-22). 
 
The report went on to cite examples of contracts, timetables and other evidence demonstrating 
how speeding by drivers was legitimated and how drivers were required to work excessive 
hours. The vulnerability of drivers to accept these conditions without complaint was 
illustrated by the response of one driver to Police after he had been pulled over: 
 
On 1 March 1995, I ran out of hours at Rotorua, I rang the manager and told him to come 
and pick the truck up. He told me that if I wasn’t going to go over my hours I might as well 
f… off (cited in Storey 1996:31). 
 
In its recommendations, the report urges that measures be taken to enforce a level playing 
field so that ‘an economic advantage is not given to those who break the law and those who 
play by the rules can compete fairly’ (Story, 1996:32. Other pertinent recommendations are 
discussed elsewhere in this Report) 
 
The overall picture painted in the New Zealand inquiry is consistent with Australian evidence 
already cited on the impact of commercial practices on safety. As will be shown, it is also 
consistent with evidence presented to this Inquiry. 
 
In addition to the New Zealand inquiry the Inquiry was able to examine an even more recent 
report undertaken by the UK House of Commons Committee of Environment, Transport and 
Regional Affairs and released in July 2000. A number of the findings of this report are 
discussed in a later section as they pertain to the issue of operator licensing. Nevertheless, a 
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number of the findings relevant to the current Inquiry can be summarised here. The report 
found that the profitability and viability of the road haulage industry had been undermined by 
a longstanding problem of very low haulage or freight rates (Committee of Environment, 
Transport and Regional Affairs, 2000:xxii). The report attributed three factors that had kept 
rates so low namely, entry into the industry was too easy creating an oversupply of operators, 
there was competition from other European competitors following the 1998 EU cabotage 
regulation, and some companies routinely ignored regulation to secure a commercial 
advantage.  
 
The Committee found that, despite the efforts of the Vehicle Inspectorate and police, a 
significant minority of operators flouted regulations relating to driving hours, vehicle 
maintenance/defects and other safety-related issues. The Committee (2000:xxvi) noted that 
there was all but unanimous support for the Inspectorate and Police to have the power to 
impound illegally operated vehicles even where this involved perishable loads. There was 
also strong support for substantially increasing resources to the Inspectorate and police so 
they could more effectively carry out enforcement, and especially to target illegitimate 
operators. One of the Committee's (2000:xxviii) recommendations was for an increased 
resourcing of regulatory efforts to target UK 'cowboy' operators and to undertake more 
inspections of foreign operators. The Committee (2000:xxxi) strongly supported the 
application of the European Union Working Time Directive but questioned the exemption of 
self-employed drivers was unjustified (fatigue is a problem for all drivers) and created a 
loophole that induced the movement of drivers into this category. 
 
3.1.3 Conclusion 
 
In sum, this Inquiry uncovered research evidence as well as evidence presented to various 
forms of inquiries attesting to a connection between commercial/industrial practices and 
safety in the long distance trucking industry since the early 1980s if not before. The evidence 
was more than anecdotal, it was sufficiently consistent to warrant concern, and it was known 
to at least some industry representatives and government agencies. Moreover, recent inquiries 
into the road transport industry in New Zealand and the United Kingdom reveal a number of 
essentially similar findings. 
 
The evidence suggested some clear policy responses to improve safety in the industry. Quite 
apart from examples of this already presented, a NRTC (1993:17) discussion paper on 
improving operator performance noted that: 
 
The suggestion that the road transport industry comprises a core of responsible operators 
(often larger companies) and a fringe of irresponsible operators can be challenged with the 
limited data reported in the Appendix… There is some evidence that the market power of 
freight forwarders, agents and consignors of freight contributes to unsafe practices on the 
road. 
 
But, as will be demonstrated later, while the report canvassed a number of options from 
mandatory operator licensing through to self-regulated accreditation, there appears to have 
been no systematic follow up on the issue by the NRTC for some years. 
 
It remains an intriguing but unanswered question as to why the observations and evidence 
presented above seldom if ever led to policy responses or regulatory changes. There appear to 
be two reasons for this. First, a number of those with knowledge of the industry who made 
submissions to the Inquiry argued that some interest groups have fiercely opposed any 
consideration limiting commercial or industrial practices from which they derived a benefit. 
For example, in detailed written and oral submissions Associate Professor Philip Laird from 
the School of Mathematics and Statistics at Wollongong University traced the history of 
regulation in the industry over the past 20 years. Amongst other things, Laird made a case that 
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a number of potentially crucial regulatory reforms such as mandating the fitting of 
tachographs and operator licensing had been delayed or stymied as a result of industry 
lobbying. Laird also expressed concern at the national regulatory reform process headed by 
the NRTC, arguing that the reconfiguration of trucks (notably the increase in dimensions and 
load carrying capacity) was dictated overwhelmingly by considerations of cost-efficiency 
rather than safety. With regard to truck configuration the latter interpretation found support 
from another University of Wollongong academic, Dr Arnold McLean from the School of 
Engineering and others (see Section Two of this Report). The view that safety has taken a 
back seat to commercialism is not unique to Australia, being repeatedly expressed by truck 
safety community organisations that have sprung in a number of countries over the last few 
years. For example, in a recent report Canadians for Responsible and Safer Highways 
(CRASH, 2000:1) stated: 
 
In a deregulated free trade environment, the trucking industry is under tremendous pressure 
to cut costs. In order to maintain or seek competitive advantage, provinces may be under 
pressure to allow bigger trucks, to allow truckers to work more hours and to otherwise 
downgrade safety standards. 
 
A second possible reason for the reluctance to address these commercial issues is one 
highlighted in the recent federal inquiry into managing fatigue in transport. This is the 
prevailing neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in policy making circles which is geared to 
promoting competition and seems to view any intervention with regard to markets or 
commercial practices, for safety or other reasons, as anathema. 
 
The Inquiry is not in a position to fully evaluate these contentions although further evidence is 
presented in later sections of the Report. Whatever the reason, the Inquiry found it extremely 
disturbing that clear evidence of the role of commercial practices in encouraging hazardous 
practices could be apparently ignored, and ignored over a number of years. The evidence 
collected in the course of the Inquiry reinforced this concern. This evidence overwhelmingly 
confirmed earlier findings. 
 
3.2 Evidence to this Inquiry  
 
The Inquiry received a substantial number of written and verbal submissions that intense 
competition, industry tendering practices, low freight rates and pressure from clients was a 
critical, if not the most fundamental, source of hazardous practices in the industry. The 
overwhelming majority of parties who gave evidence to the Inquiry accepted that commercial 
practices had a significant impact on safety. Indeed, the Inquiry was overwhelmed by 
responses/submissions addressing this point and it was extremely rare to find anyone with 
detailed knowledge of the industry who disputed this. It is notable that these views were 
expressed by a wide range of individuals and organisations, many with no obvious interest in 
presenting this argument and basing their interpretation on a disparate set of sources (not just 
anecdotes). The following comments are representative of the views expressed: 
 
In conclusion, rates paid to carriers and down the chain to owner drivers and drivers are the 
biggest issue, then the workload and work time not paid by some companies who pay a driver 
only a kilometre rate with no load/unload time etc paid or customers who won’t pay 
demurrage but still expect the freight on time. Delays deemed acceptable or totally ignored by 
consignors or consignees particularly major companies where time slots reign to suit them 
only and detention time just won’t be paid (or you won’t have the work), then road conditions 
and rules made and enforced by people who have mostly never been in a truck. These issues, 
if addressed, would change the industry for the better and vastly improve its safety (written 
submission, employee B-Double driver with 25 years experience in the industry, western 
NSW). 
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We keep hearing the word commerciality, we keep hearing the word marketplace…what I've 
come to realise over the past few years is that marketplace is nothing more than terminology 
for exploitation…its being used by freight forwarders to a lesser degree than some of the 
clients. The client want that [freight] moved from A to B  [for] the bottom dollar. They do not 
care - you can talk about chain of responsibility and all the rest of it. They don’t care - you 
can talk all you like about chain of responsibility - they do not care who I run over or what 
happens to me as long as they get that box from there to there with the cheapest rate… I have 
once challenged a major food retailer about their duty of care in Queensland - they weren't 
providing me with adequate sleeping quarters and a whole host of other things and I finished 
up by beating him… I had the law but I didn’t have any authority or anybody to back me up 
with what I was doing. To the point I was told 'you are not to come back in here again' and 
unfortunately for them I'm just pig-headed enough and didn’t go back again. (oral 
submission, owner/driver with 30 years in the industry, southern NSW).  
 
Nobody's denying that drivers are not working excessive hours and this is brought about due 
to the low freight rates, that people are trying to stay viable and trying to earn a living so 
they're working longer hours than would be desirable just to try and make ends meet… In a 
lot of instances [over the last 10 years] there hasn’t been any increase in freight rates and 
since the advent of the GST some freight forwarders that we work for have actually decreased 
our rate…when you question them about this they argue the ACCC.(CEO small fleet operator, 
Victoria) 
 
Today we see a relatively small proportion of operators who can only be described as 
deliberately and wilfully breaking the laws in regard to vehicle speed, overloading and 
excessive working hours. Unfortunately other operators, in order to compete, reluctantly 
resort to some to all or some of these activities either occasionally or regularly… In today’s 
manufacturing world of ‘just in time’ inventory the risk has generally fallen to the truck 
driver whereas there is clearly responsibility on management, loading agents and the end 
customers. There is a culture in Australia among some of the bigger users of road transport 
where buying power is being extended to drive unrealistic delivery requirements without 
accountability. These same ‘accountable’ parties regularly delay trucks for considerable 
periods of time at receival points which compounds the legal working time problems 
particularly for owner drivers. Some of this ‘market force’ power may have interesting 
possibilities within the Trade Practices legislation (written submission, large transport 
division manager with 35 years experience in the industry). 
 
Desparate FLEET operators lose any reality between the 'marketing/freight allocation 
division' and the 'safety division' of their businesses. Many FLEET and OWNER-DRIVER 
operations are not in a position to control their own destiny. There are many examples of how 
this desperation transpires; squeezing just one more week out of a set of worn tyres, 
consistently running overloaded, due to unloading delays, struggling to make a camera site to 
ensure they get a full 14 hours in the next 24 hour period, every piece of freight can be 
classified as 'just in time' to achieve the highest return, every trip becomes overnight, drivers 
demand payment on a kilometer rate etc etc. This desperation leads to rate cutting and the 
ridiculous situation that has been termed as backloading. These days it would appear that in 
too many instances, backloading rates are used as a benchmark! Without the introduction of 
some form of base freight rates, between major ports, transport operators will continue to 
bastardise their operation to justify some form of pathetic existence (written submission, 
Owen Driscoll from the largest truck insurer, NTI page 5). 
 
We believe the fundamental Road Safety problems with the trucking industry are excessive 
speed, driver fatigue and associated drug use. The primary cause of these problems is the 
lack of financial viability of the trucking industry…The lack of financial viability of the 
trucking industry is caused by what are seen as extremely low freight rates. In addition, 
unrealistically short delivery times can also result in drivers exceeding speed limits and 
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driving whilst fatigued…We believe freight forwarding companies and Transport companies 
that use subcontractors are a major contributing problem in this area. They place 
unreasonable and essentially impossible demands on their subcontractors that result in these 
unsafe practices (written submission, Dallas Booth for the Insurance Council of Australia 
pages 3-4) 
 
A large percentage of this sector of the industry are owner drivers or small companies that 
done have the financial ability or resources to identify their costs and rates. With no entry 
standards for either drivers or companies the only option to gain customers or market share 
is to cut rates or agree to unrealistic times or schedules. Low rates means longer hours and 
shorter time frames to achieve demands imposed. This group is subject to abuse by 
unscrupulous customers, freight forwarders and users of transport, particularly in the area of 
backloading. Anecdotal evidence indicates that even larger companies suffer from the effects 
created by these issues as they have to compete in an artificially competitive price market. In 
Australia there are 42,000 42.5 tonne GVM trucks competing for the freight dollar. Clearly 
the lack of entry controls makes it too easy to get into the transport business and be unable to 
maintain the safe standards that should be demanded (written submission Transport 
Management Australia and the Victorian Road Transport Association) 
 
In the highly competitive and cutthroat environment of the long distance trucking industry 
unfortunately rates are the weak and vulnerable link in the chain of supply and demand. As 
such they are usually the first to succumb to the pressure of competition. As a result, when a 
major client in the transport industry expects more ‘productivity’ or value for [the] dollar 
from their transport contracts rather than being prepared to pay more for the increased 
service they usually expect their costs to remain the same, if not fall. Consequently, the 
transport company or freight forwarder has two choices. First, they can choose to absorb the 
cost increases and deliver improved services at a reduced profit margin… Secondly, and 
more commonly however, they usually prefer to demand greater efficiency and productivity 
from their drivers or demand their drivers accept a cut in rates… Unfortunately, the only real 
limits to efficiency in the long distance trucking industry are notwithstanding legal speed 
limits are driving hours, how fast the vehicles can go and how fast and for how long the 
drivers can keep them on the road. For drivers in the industry, increased competition means 
increased pressure on rates. This is turn means they have to pick up more work, pushing 
themselves and their families over the limit, driving longer hard and faster just in an effort to 
maintain their standard of living (written submission, TWU NSW Branch, page 5). 
 
The intensely competitive nature of the transport industry is recognised by WorkCover as 
being a major contributing factor to the need perceived by truck drivers and owners to 
engage in practices which may lead to safety being compromised…a significant proportion of 
drivers are self-employed owner-operators. It would be fair to regard these drivers as being 
vulnerable to being confronted with unreasonable consignment conditions (including less-
than-generous remuneration) which are apt to be generated by fierce competition between 
transport contractors. It is realistic to expect that such competition may lead to exploitative 
behaviour within this industry. WorkCover's observations indicate a considerable body of 
anecdotal evidence which suggests that the manner in which freighting work is allocated by 
clients and consignors frequently creates an environment where safety considerations are 
seriously compromised and drivers, schedulers and others, are induced by commercial 
pressures to adopt a range of unsafe practices. Some of the practices that might compromise 
safety are: 
 
• Acceptance of piece rate methods of payment for long distance work, making some trips 
economically marginal or unviable. 
• Loading and unloading times not taken into account when determining safe driving hours. 
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• The need for local deliveries to be made after completing long trips and hence exceeding 
safe working hours 
• The elimination of driver changeover stations, once common for LHT companies. 
• Rostering practices not allowing sufficient recovery time between trips 
• Delivery times demanded by clients or economic pressure to maximise trips which may 
include speeding, exceeding safe driving hours, skipping or shortened rest breaks, driver 
fatigue, taking of drugs and stimulants, inadequate securing of loads, inadequate vehicle 
maintenance (written submission, WorkCover NSW, pages 11-12). 
 
Competitive pressures combined with the belief by offenders that they won't get caught, has 
given some commercial road-users the incentive for non compliance. Unfortunately, this 
attitude costs the community (including themselves) a large amount of money which could 
have been better used for community services (written submission, Queensland Transport 
page 24). 
 
 
However, whilst we are talking about drugs that is only a symptom of what is happening in 
the industry, and when you go back to crashes in the industry it comes from outside sources, 
we are talking about consignors, consignees, for example large supermarkets which have a 
time schedule from A to B… If you did research or asked a set of questions to core police, 
police officers who deal with them [truck drivers] on a daily basis …they would tell you the 
industry has changed.(oral submission, regional police traffic coordinator, southern NSW 
involved in highway patrol activities for the majority of his almost 30 years service who 
argued this view was based on direct experience and feedback from operational police) 
 
3.2.1 The Role of Poor Business practices 
 
It is important to note that a number of submissions argued that low freight rates and tight 
schedules were not only attributable to load owner/client pressure but were also the result of 
or exacerbated by characteristics of the industry itself. For example, a number of submissions, 
including that of the Australian Trucking Association (ATA), argued that intense competition 
for jobs by operators, many of whom lacked training in business skills, did not lead to 
informed decisions when costing work. The ATA highlighted the low level of training and 
education in the industry and argued it was imperative that training in business skills was 
made more widely available to the industry. 
 
The trucking industry currently employs 4.5% of the workforce nationally, yet only receives 
0.7% of the training budget (written submission ATA, page 3). 
 
In oral submissions, Mike Edmonds (ATA) and David Anderson (NatRoad) both emphasised 
that the industry needed to get more active in obtaining training funds, and pointed to a 
number of recent examples where this had occurred (including a widely distributed business 
skills/GST training package). Quite a number of others giving evidence to the Inquiry pointed 
to poor business practices, especially amongst small fleets and owner/drivers, as a major 
problem. 
 
Some argued that poor business practices were an industry-wide problem. In his submission 
Dean Croke from the insurer MMI/Allianz Australia argued: 
 
The ongoing financial management of business within the transport industry is an 
underestimated factor effecting long-term viability.  As mentioned, operators in road 
transport are largely operations driven and have traditionally relied on historical data from 
the accounting profession as a means of measuring operating performance. This presents a 
challenge to the industry as this type of reporting often includes tax planning strategies but it 
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does not adequately factor in the return on investment, and therefore does not present the true 
performance of the business. 
 
There are four main contributing factors to poor financial management in road transport: 
 
• industry dependence on accountants who have little or no understanding of the road 
transport industry as their only guide to business performance; 
• transport operators not requesting that financial reports be presented in a meaningful 
way such as in “management account form” rather than traditional tax profit and loss 
format;  
• transport operators dependence on historical data (end of financial year) to measure 
performance instead of more frequent reports as a management tool; and 
• industry’s inability to adequately interpret financial accounts produced by the accounting 
profession. 
 
As a result of these factors, the industry generally has a poor understanding of how to 
adequately assess their costs (written submission, Dean Croke, page 6).  
 
At the same time, the poor business skills argument needs to put in context. For example, 
while owner/drivers and small operators are seen to be in most need of enhanced management 
skills, most the Inquiry spoke to had been successfully operated their business over a decade 
or more and were able to provide detailed breakdowns of their cost structures and revenue 
flows. A number referred to business courses (some transport industry specific offered by 
TAFE and other providers) they had undertaken/were completing and at least one pointed to 
the business efficiencies they had gained through TruckSafe. This lent support to their 
argument that their current difficulties were not principally the result of poor judgements. 
While it is clear that some owner/drivers run far more efficiently than others, every 
owner/driver making submissions to the Inquiry complained that they were under pressure 
from rising costs and freight rates that had remained stagnant if not fallen over the past 
decade. 
 
Further, as is noted elsewhere in the Report, problems with ‘poor’ business practices do not 
reside simply with transport operators. The Inquiry received repeated complaints of 
substantial delays in payment (instances of up to three months or more were cited) to 
operators, especially owner/drivers, for work completed. Indeed, this appeared to be a 
systemic problem, and one not entirely uncalculated on the part of those who owed the 
money. Like other responsible businesses, a number of operators stated they chased payments 
(‘I hound them’) and, as a last resort, responded to unreasonably delayed payment by marking 
their records ‘do not do work for again’. However, they complained the continued to 
encounter the same problem with other clients. Others felt they had little choice but to accede 
to delays where substantial or long-term contracts were involved. While improved business 
skills may enhance the bargaining power of small operators it is highly unlikely to place them 
in an equal position with the usually larger and more powerful businesses upon whom they 
depend for work. 
 
Finally, it needs to be emphasised that ‘poor business’ practice was more often viewed as a 
partial rather than as a complete alternative explanation to the pressure emanating from clients 
and consignors. Nor are the two explanations incompatible. Indeed, the suggestion that poor 
business practices amongst some transport operators merely serves to exacerbate their already 
weak bargaining position with load owners seems highly plausible. 
 
For its part, the ATA argued that: 
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However, there is a second group that directly impacts on this issue – the customer/consignor 
sector. Research has proven that the trucking industry only controls 40% of the freight task 
and that customers and consignors need to be made more aware of their responsibility to the 
safety element of transport. This can be achieved through education and the enforcement of 
chain of responsibility (written submission, ATA page 4). 
 
3.2.2 Industry tendering practices 
 
The Inquiry received a large number of submissions arguing that tendering practices in the 
industry often amounted to little more than crude competition to see which transport operator 
could offer the lowest price for a freight task. This approach was seen as a consequence of 
intense competition within the industry, with a large number of small operators always at the 
margins of existence, along with an overriding concern on the part of customers to get their 
freight delivered at the minimum cost. Customers, it was suggested, almost always took the 
lowest bid even where they had reason to know or suspect that this price did not represent 
cost recovery for the operator concerned (and if a small subcontractor was involved almost no 
opportunity for cross-subsidisation with other trips).  
 
For its part, the ARA saw the structure of the transport industry as contributing to its 
problems in terms of under-bidding for work. The ARA noted that an investigation of 
tendering practices amongst its members had proved difficult in terms of making 
generalisations. Outbound freight was typically organised through standardised contracts that 
were negotiated directly by the larger retailers (smaller retailers and those in particular 
locations might use consignors or loading agents). The ARA offered the following 
observations: 
 
We do know in some cases there are ad hoc deliveries but generally it would appear that for 
the mainstream arrangements where there is a principal contractor, there is a tender. The 
tender specifies a range of things, price being one but commitment to standards of quality and 
driver training are other factors…. [in terms of average contract duration] the survey we did 
showed between one and three years. There were a couple, I think, that went a bit longer but 
generally between one and three years. And I think the issue that our people make is that 
going to the market with those tenders they request and ensure that part of the tender process 
is an understanding and expectation that people comply with their obligations. Now there’s 
an issue there, I think, once people walk out of there after they negotiate the tender. The 
structure of the industry of course lends itself to shaving of margins as you go down the line. I 
think that’s a concern we have - that we enter into contracts in fair and profitable way. We 
enter a commercial arrangement but regrettably its the structure of the industry that creates 
problems (oral submission, Bill Healey, ARA). 
 
A critical problem identified by the ARA was the subletting of work at reduced margins once 
a tender has been settled with a principal contractor, something it sees as consequence of the 
structure of the transport industry. Subcontracting is standard in major retail contractors. 
When the ARA asked member companies if their principal transport contractor/s used 
subcontractors 13 replied yes and only four said no. Those retailers relying on transport 
contractors who used subcontractors had a clear expectation that the principal contractor 
would manage their subcontractors and meet their legal obligations to the subcontractors (oral 
submission, Bill Healey, ARA).   At the same time, subcontracting was seen to effect not only 
price (ie the shaving of margins down the line) but also, according to the ARA, meant that the 
delivery schedule had been set for the owner/driver by the contractor that engaged them not 
the retailer. The Inquiry received other evidence that extensive use of subcontracting had a 
critical impact on tendering and the low freight rates paid to some operators and this issue is 
examined in some depth below. At the same time, the ARA emphasised that its members 
sought to enter into contracts in a due and proper way. While recognising that subcontracting-
 122
based shaving of prices might affect the overall freight rate the ARA also referred to these as 
outcomes of essentially commercial arrangements: 
 
I would have thought that there are problems given the nature of the industry that because of 
the existence of essentially cost shifting down the chain, because we make the point there that 
the drivers are price takers, you are in some cases getting prices put up that… in a different 
set of circumstances may not be sustainable. Now the question is in a commercial contracting 
relationship how far do you go in saying to someone your quoting too low. That’s the real 
challenge here and …its happening across the board… (oral submission, Bill Healey, ARA)  
 
The ARA stressed that while price was not the only determinant of retailer’s decisions to 
proceed too far down the path of pre-empting price negotiations would be to undermine if not 
invalidate the tendering process (oral submission, Bill Healey). Further, it argued that in some 
circumstances the tender price may be acceptable but it was ‘cuts’ taken by various levels of 
subcontractor that was the problem.  It saw the structure of the industry as the critical factor to 
be addressed if it was shown such arrangements were compromising safety. 
 
Large retailers, like most other large transport users, have a set of key performance indicators 
(including price, delivery time, quality/damage to freight/loss ratios, legal compliance and 
reliability) that are incorporated into both the tender process and final contract. Once a 
contract has started these indicators are monitored on a regular or ongoing basis, not just 
periodically (oral submission, Bill Healey). The ARA (oral submission, Bill Healey) went on 
to state that the requirement to meet all legal obligations, including safety, was either stated in 
general terms or implied, rather than being specified in detail. Retailers incorporate specific 
termination provisions for some contracts (such as the supply clothing via outworkers) but the 
Mr Healey was unaware if similar provisions applied to road transport contracts. In relation to 
the inclusion of more specific safety-related requirements in contracts with transport 
companies the ARA noted that some companies (notably Coles Myer) had already moved in 
this direction. The Coles Myer Logistics Code of Conduct, which now forms part of all 
transport contracts with the company, includes a requirement that the contractor have a 
fatigue management plan in place and ensure that all drivers, agents and subcontractors 
comply with this. Amongst some other retailers there were concerns as to what should be 
included in these contracts and the legal ramifications of this. This appeared to reflect 
concerns examined in the previous section of this Report as well as very practical issues. Mr 
Healey (oral submission) stated: 
 
That’s the other issue. It’s one thing to put it in there [safety clauses into contracts], and its 
another thing to say how you’re going to know.  
 
The Inquiry has given careful consideration to the latter issue. Mr Healey (oral submission) 
stated that he believed ARA members would look at model clauses such as that based on the 
fatigue management provision in Coles Logistics Code of Conduct mentioned earlier (the 
issue of raising customer awareness is addressed later in the Report). 
 
Addressing the issue of client responsibility and industry tendering practices the NSW Road 
Transport Association (written submission, pages 15-16) argued: 
 
It is fair to say that, up until recently the client or end user of the freight service paid little or 
no attention to the task of actually moving the freight. It was the freight carrier's task to get 
the freight from (a) to (b) and the less the client was involved the better. What's more, it was 
simpler for a client to get the cheapest price for the job by knowing nothing of the task 
 
This attitude pervaded the industry, and was instrumental in the fierce undercutting of rates 
that occurred in the past, and some say, still occurs today. There is, gladly a lessening of this 
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attitude in the more responsible carriers, but there is still a need for this to be completely 
eliminated… 
 
In the past, tendering processes made no mention of how or when a freight task was to be 
done. The task was to move (x) tonnes of freight from (a) to (b) when required to do so by the 
client. No request was made for information on: how long the driver would drive; how many 
drivers would be used; what was to happen if departure was delayed through no fault of the 
transport company; what was to happen at arrival at destination etc. 
 
The Association argued that questions of how and when tasks were to be accomplished as 
well as protocols for dealing with delays and unloading were essential to the tendering 
process if safety was not to be sacrificed. The Report fully endorses this viewpoint. Indeed, it 
finds it disturbing that these measures were not standard practice over many years. The 
Report also notes the tenor of the Association's examination of the issue is to indicate that 
both clients and transport operators shared responsibility for this state of affairs.  
 
The Inquiry received submissions pointing to other practices as contributing to under-bidding 
on contracts. For example, it was suggested that larger transport operators with diverse 
activities or warehousing facilities were able to reduce rates by cross-subsidising the freight 
transport task from other activities. Larger companies can also exploit their economies of 
scale, flexibility and ability to acquire remunerative return or offset loads, even if at much 
reduced rates. Such practices have been identified in other countries such as the USA (see 
Belzer, 2000) and no doubt they occur here although, evidence available to the Inquiry 
implied these practices, while they may affect some large contracts, were not the principle 
basis for under-bidding. Of course it may also be suggested that what is labelled under-
bidding is simply some operators securing contracts at lower rates but for which their greater 
efficiency still enables them to make a reasonable return. The Inquiry has no doubt some 
contracts have changed hands on this basis. However, evidence presented later in this section 
indicates the transport industry is experiencing low margins and that this also matches the 
findings of a number of overseas studies and official inquiries. 
 
In addition to the issue of rates, the Inquiry received numerous submissions relating to other 
pressures being placed on transport operators when tendering for work, especially client 
demands in relation to scheduling. Even large operators believe these demands had intensified 
in recent years. For example, a manager of one national company (oral submission) observed:  
 
The tendering process, from my experience in the last ten years, is that it has not changed a 
whole lot at all in that a majority of large companies [clients] do go out to tender every 
couple of years. However, it is very much and becoming more so that with those particular 
clients, large customers, tend to dictate what they want from go to whoa, not just on transit 
times, rating terms, on insurance, on everything…. They do leave the rates side open for your 
submission.  But they make it very clear in their tender documents that they want you to pick 
up ‘x’ amount of freight on a given day and then deliver it within so many days or a given 
time to state ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘z’.  So it’s very dictatorial. 
 
As noted earlier, concern with existing tendering practices that resulted in under-bidding on 
contracts/squeezed margins and unrealistic scheduling that undermined safety emanated from 
a wide range of parties, many with no obvious self-interest in promoting this assessment. 
Typical was the response of the leading NSW motorist organisation, the NRMA. 
 
NRMA does not have documented information on any of these issues…However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that industry practices regarding tendering, pricing and scheduling must 
impact on the level of safety of trucks doing long hauls. Scheduling is a key issue in this 
regard as an unrealistic schedule can only be achieved by a driver speeding, skipping 
required rest breaks, or both. 
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NRMA is extremely concerned that some companies may be winning tenders for a specific job 
with schedules which are patently unrealistic, given the regulations governing the industry. 
This practice puts enormous pressure on drivers to break regulations and endanger 
themselves and other road users. Such practices would contravene relevant occupational 
health and safety regulations which companies have a responsibility and a legal requirement 
to follow. 
 
NRMA believes that all transport companies should practice responsible management in 
regard to tendering, pricing and scheduling. This responsibility extends to clients who should 
not make unrealistic demands of transport companies to offer inducements for quicker 
delivery of goods. Strategies need to be identified to encourage companies to act responsibly 
in this area (written submission NRMA p3). 
 
As was noted in Section Two of the Report, there is a widespread (almost universal) view 
amongst those making submissions to the Inquiry that subcontracting of freight tasks is 
increasing and indeed already a pervasive practice within the industry. This impression is 
confirmed by a survey undertaken for the NRTC (oral submission, Barry Moore). The Inquiry 
heard evidence that subcontracting was being used enable larger operators to retain/secure 
business at lower freight rates than would be possible if they directly employed their own 
drivers in the task. Small fleets with lower labour costs (achieved through reduced pay and 
entitlement levels, discouraging workers’ compensation claims and direct award evasion) or 
owner/drivers (where award entitlements don’t apply) are able to undertake the task. It was 
common, the Inquiry was told, for trucks and/or trailers still carry the major fleet logos so to 
the casual observer, a member of the public or even a customer, it appears that an employed 
driver of the major fleet has undertaken the task.  
 
The view that most large transport operators made extensive use of subcontractors was 
confirmed by larger company representatives, with one for example estimating that only 
around 10% of the company’s drivers were directly employed. Another large company, which 
15 years ago engaged no owner/drivers, was now moving to meet a goal of only 20% directly 
employed drivers.  A few large transport companies did not fit this pattern, but they tended to 
be engaged in more specialised transport activities or where the for-hire fleet was an adjunct 
to a vertically integrated operation that accounted for the bulk of that company's trucking 
operations. In one such company about 20% of its fleet consisted of owner/drivers (these 
drivers owned the prime mover while the company owned the trailer, making them 
indistinguishable from company trucks, and worked exclusively for the company). Overall, 
available evidence indicates that most large operators now rely heavily on subcontractors. 
Reflecting this trend, the NSW branch of the TWU (oral submission, Tony Sheldon, state 
secretary) estimated that it had lost 500 members from the long distance sector over the past 
seven years. These membership losses overwhelmingly came from larger companies where 
union membership levels have traditionally been far higher than the long distance sector as 
whole (ie including medium and small operators and owner/drivers). The union believed most 
of these jobs had been lost due to subletting contracts to other fleets rather than to 
owner/drivers. This view was consistent with the pattern of subcontracting described by 
others making submissions to the Inquiry. The centrality of subcontracting to industry 
operations finds further support in the viability problems experienced by one large operator 
that tried to continue competing using directly employed drivers (at award rates and 
conditions). In a sense large transport companies are transforming into companies that 
manage freight movements (via arranging contracts, proving warehousing and logistical 
support) rather than being directly involved in shipping freight. The tendency of these 
operators to re-badge themselves as 'logistics companies' rather than as 'transport companies' 
has more meaning than most other road users would guess. 
 
When asked why subcontractors were cheaper one manager (oral submission) simply replied:  
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…because they don’t value their labour, all their labour component…he might pay himself a 
wage but that wage wont be any where near what an employed driver would get from a 
[names major company] etc. Generally, the interstate subcontractors won’t value the part of 
their wage that’s tacked on at the beginning or start of the trip.  
 
In other words, the cost savings of subcontracting are achieved not through the greater 
efficiency of subcontractors but rather their willingness to accept an effectively lower rate 
(either directly or when calculated according to total working time). These savings derive not 
only from lower direct labour costs but also indirect costs such as workers' compensation and 
superannuation. The NSW branch of the TWU (oral submission) claimed that larger transport 
operators were increasingly requiring subcontractors to incorporate thereby removing their 
need to provide workers' compensation, superannuation and payroll tax. While this allegation 
requires further investigation it seems clear that subcontractors are seen to provide greater 
flexibility (getting drivers when and as you need them) as well as advantages in terms of on-
costs (such as workers’ compensation). As noted in an earlier section, to the extent that 
owner/drivers take out inadequate accident insurance (to fill the void of workers' 
compensation) or superannuation they are likely to make greater calls on the social security 
system. This might be viewed as a hidden community subsidy to the freight rates regime in 
place although its size is unknown. These issues should be of interest to the Productivity 
Commission given its interest in competitive neutrality. 
 
The subletting of tasks may occur at more than one stage. That is, the subcontractor sublets all 
or some of the task at a lower price to another subcontractor, who may sublet and so on, 
resulting in a process known in the building industry as ‘pyramid subcontracting’. Where 
large contracts are involved, the principal contractor may sublet the freight task to a number 
of subcontractors (and some of these may not be small in the case of very large contracts), 
some of whom sublet and so on. The situation is also complicated by the fact that a number of 
large companies have subsidiaries, which can and are also brought into the subcontracting 
process. The Inquiry was told that three or four 'steps' of subcontracting (ie from client to 
those driving the truck) was not unusual. Instances were also cited where the chain had 
become so elongated that a subcontractor would arrive to pick a load without being fully 
aware of precisely who they were working for (usually where an owner/driver or small 
subcontractor obtained work at short notice via minor subcontractors). The Inquiry was 
unable to determine how elaborate (ie how many steps) the subcontracting networks had 
become (and this almost certainly varies widely) but the rationale for using them at least was 
clear. However, in explaining the reasons for this pattern of dependency it is important to 
recognise that subcontractors are not a homogenous group, ranging from single truck 
operators through small fleet operators and even including sizable fleets. Many single truck 
operators are country-based and given high unemployment in many of these areas have, in the 
eyes of some within the industry, bought themselves a job but do not understand their costs. 
However, even if they do understand their costs they are generally in a very week bargaining 
position. The situation may be less acute for small fleets with a number of reliable clients, 
able to undertake a greater diversity of tasks and able to sublet tasks at profit. Nevertheless, 
the difference is one of degree at best and the Inquiry found it difficult if not impossible to 
disentangle poor business skills and weak bargaining power in relation to dealing with larger 
transport operators and clients.  
 
However many steps are involved, evidence to this Inquiry made it clear that subcontracting 
was playing an increasingly pivotal role in the tendering process, with larger companies 
securing contracts at reduced rates and then farming out the work to subcontractors at even 
lower rates. Once initiated, competitive pressures from this type of tendering/subcontracting 
process are likely to cause other operators to imitate this tactic, reinforcing the effect.  
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One apparent change in the tendering process that further advantaged larger companies in 
securing contracts was their growing use of professional consultants to prepare tender 
documents. This may be in part a response to a better-prepared and more demanding approach 
to the tendering process on the part of clients (using their specialist staff or their own 
consultants). Representatives of larger companies suggested that in addition to quality and 
reliability considerations, clients were placing intense pressure on them to reduce rates by 
making this a condition of securing the contract. This view was supported by oral submissions 
from some employees of larger firms (including firms not directly interviewed by the Inquiry) 
who were responsible for supervising subcontractors or owner/drivers who they argued had 
been brought in recent years as a direct response to reduced freight rates. A depot-based 
worker for a major transport company described the situation where the owner/drivers he was 
'responsible for' were brought in following a freight rate cut, and associated backloading from 
regional centres, three years earlier. It should be noted that the Inquiry learnt from other 
sources that the contract involved, a large one held over many years, had been re-negotiated 
after the client initiated a new tendering round. In this round, the transport company's tender 
(based on its own costings) were undercut by other operators opting for thinner margins but 
the client offered the contract to the original company if it could match the price of the other 
bidders. The employee's contact with the drivers and familiarity with their tasks (having 
previously worked as an employee driver and having supervised others) indicated the 
subcontractors were working anything up to 20-hour days and exceeding their legal limits on 
a regular basis. The employee claimed the transport company, which had a good reputation 
with regard to safety, took a number of its own prime movers out of service. The contract, for 
which these owner/drivers performed the transport tasks, was between the transport company 
and a major retailer (oral submission, depot worker for national transport company, Sydney). 
This case is typical of others presented to the Inquiry. 
 
As will be noted below, smaller operators often tended to see the process more in terms of 
larger companies taking contracts/securing work, sometimes at the expense of smaller 
operators, by offering a lower rate and subletting the work. Evidence presented below tends to 
support the former interpretation (ie large companies using subcontractors in response to 
dropping freight rates) though this doesn’t exclude the latter.  Either way, owner/drivers and 
small operators were in a dependent and weak bargaining position in relation to the freight 
forwarder or large transport company that secured the freight task. 
 
The company’s that tender the freight set the rate for the owner/driver and small companies 
who do not have the time or the expertise to win freight on their own. Anyone can set up and 
quote the freight [rate] with no regard or experience with the truck costs for owner/drivers, 
as due to a lack of buying power pay more than larger companies for everything. The quote a 
cheap rate, take their percentage off the top, and offer the job to the owner/driver. Some 
companies quote good rates and take large percentages. If the company wins the job but 
cannot move the freight via a subcontractor, it rings another company who may have a 
subcontractor and offers the job to them at a better rate than they would pay their owner 
/driver. These kinds of tactics, along with the perpetual term of backloading rates, which 
discriminate against people with north bound freight as the south bound freight is usually 
considered backloading. No negotiation of rates of rates even when costs are rising, for 
example fuel…There are a lot of small fleets that are actually just glorified owner/drivers. 
They’ve got say three or four, maybe five trucks and they’ve got very little work of their own. 
They’re doing the same as us, they’re going through other companies (oral submission, 
wife/business partner of owner/driver, based in a town north west of Brisbane) 
 
It might be suggested that owner/drivers might be better off tendering for subcontract work 
from small fleets than large fleets/freight forwarders because they would be better able to 
negotiate the rate. A number of owner/drivers made the point that it was more possible to 
negotiate a rate with smaller transport operators than large operators. However, they also 
noted that this had to be balanced against their experience of having more problem getting 
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payment by small operators or as the wife of one operator put it ‘being between the devil and 
the deep blue sea’. Such experiences are consistent with the presumption that many small 
fleets would be in a marginal financial situation themselves, including those subcontracting to 
larger firms. In other words, owner/drivers may feel locked into a tendering process where an 
option of securing a better rate has to be balanced against concerns over security or 
promptness of payment. The Inquiry heard a number of submissions that would suggest 
delaying payment to owner/drivers is used deliberately for the financial advantage it secures 
(similar problems have been periodically raised in the construction industry and indeed were 
the subject of recent measures by the NSW government). 
 
As already noted, the subcontracting did not involve just owner/drivers but also medium and 
small fleets, although as the last quote highlights the distinction between an owner/driver and 
a small fleet is a blurred one. Even in fleets of more than five trucks driving by the owner on a 
regular basis is common. Nevertheless, the prevailing view amongst operators and industry 
observers was that subcontracting to small fleets accounted for much of the growth in 
subcontracting rather than subcontracting single vehicle owner/drivers (whose numbers were 
seen to be stagnant at best and more probably declining). Of course, with pyramid 
subcontracting both small fleets, including owner/drivers as well as single vehicle 
owner/drivers can all be involved in a single contractual arrangement to move freight. 
Whatever the precise configuration of subcontracting, the rationale for the process was made 
abundantly clear to the Inquiry on numerous occasions. 
 
Most of the national freight forwarders are using subcontractors to do their tasks. So they 
wouldn't necessarily have, employ company employees…I think its part of the 
problem…under the duty of care thing you undertake to do that job. Well as far as they're 
concerned you're starting fresh to do their task. They haven't given any consideration to what 
you might have done prior to doing their task… As I understand chain of responsibility it goes 
right down the line, but does it?(oral submission, small fleet operator, Southern NSW). 
 
In addition to the pervasiveness of subcontracting, this quote highlights that dis-articulation of 
commercial arrangements via subcontracting is associated with an analogous fracturing of 
OHS responsibility (although OHS legislation clearly provides that the prime contractor 
cannot outsource their responsibility and chain of responsibility legislation purports to have a 
similar effect). This is a common problem with subcontracting/outsourcing that has been 
identified in a number of industries (Quinlan et al, 2001:335-414). It also highlights the need 
for both management and regulatory systems to more closely intermesh the relationship 
between each trip undertaken in the road transport industry. Both these issues will be 
examined in the next Section of this Report. 
 
For small operators the under-bidding via subcontracting process involved either the offer of 
work at very marginal rates or the loss of existing contracts to lower-price tenders. In pointing 
to this process, a number of small operators described the implications for them, with the 
following being a typical response: 
 
That happened in Newcastle a while back. We used to get nearly a $3 premium for doing wire 
and a major company took it over and dropped it back to what you used to get for steel. Well 
they’re two totally different jobs. The steel you can get two deliveries on, on wire you get five 
deliveries on, and five deliveries around Brisbane from one side to the other takes a lot [of 
time] especially when you take half a ton and get $30 for it… Yeah the pressure does come 
down, they [larger companies] go in to get the work, they get the work and then they just go 
to the subcontractor [and say] “Well we’ve got the work alright but we’re only paying this 
amount per tonne (oral submission, small fleet operator, Northern NSW). 
 
There can be little doubt that greater use of owner/drivers and small fleets as part of pyramid 
subcontracting chains is liable to have serious consequences for safety performance. Referring 
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to one fleet where a company owned around half the prime movers and the rest were 
subcontracted owner/drivers an insurance company observed: 
 
The company owned vehicles performed quite well while the owner/driver trucks had very 
poor experience, which deteriorated over time. Eventually it got to the point where the fleet 
was unprofitable overall (written submission, John Vallance MMI). 
 
As already implied, in many instances independent owner/drivers (ie those not working 
exclusively for a large fleet or major client on a fixed term basis) rely on either transport 
companies or loading agents for freight tasks. The tendering for these contracts is often very 
informal or on a 'take it or leave it' basis. For example, to obtain a return load an owner/driver 
will contact and pay a fee of $30 or more to a loading agent. A number of drivers and union 
officials complained of practices such as 'double manifesting' (sometimes involving kick-
backs to managers in transport companies) where the manifest is made out to the loading 
agent rather than the driver. This meant payment was made to the loading agent not the 
owner/driver and drivers complained they received only part of the stated price (a Victorian 
driver referred to receiving $660 out of $880). The drivers making these submissions claimed 
that 'double manifesting' was widespread. Evidence was too limited to draw conclusions on 
this. A number of other problems were raised in relation to loading agents in the course of the 
Inquiry. 
 
Even leaving practices such as ‘double manifesting’ aside, owner/drivers and small operators 
in particular complained about what they saw as arbitrary deductions from the freight rate 
imposed by customers for administration, pallets and insurance cover (imposed even when the 
operator has their own cover). The wife/partner of one owner/driver stated (oral submission): 
 
Some of companies find a way of saying your minimum rate is $2000 but then they add an 
administration fee of $50, pallet fee…so it actually works out that you get $200 less than you 
first started out…  
 
It was argued that there was virtually no negotiation and while the operator could refuse the 
contract this was difficult when most others accepted such deductions. This partner referred to 
cases where a two percent deduction was made for insurance but the company refused to 
provide evidence of the policy. In its oral submission, the ATA confirmed these practices 
occurred. The practice of making arbitrary or non-negotiated deductions from freight rates 
would seem to be an abuse of the tendering process. The Inquiry was unable to determine the 
precise extent of these practices but every indication was that they were not uncommon. The 
Inquiry will have more to say on this issue in its recommendations. 
 
In at least some jurisdictions government attitudes to tendering for their own contracts do 
little to encourage a responsible attitude to safety on the part of transport companies because 
safety expenditure by them becomes a cost disadvantage rather than advantage in the 
tendering process. The Victorian Road Transport Association (written submission) observed: 
 
Too few companies make the commitment that some of our members do. A Large National 
Corporation spends many millions of dollars annually on training, vehicle acquisition and 
maintenance, driver safety and fatigue management education and amenities, and employee 
awareness programs. They also make substantial staff commitment to National and State 
industry forums and associations. Another member spends in excess of $150,000 annually on 
motel rooms for drivers. It also has satellite tracking devices installed in addition to on board 
monitoring devices. Driver caution notices for speeding are prepared prior to the driver 
arriving at the depot at the completion of his [sic] journey. This type of technology cost 
millions of dollars and yet the company gets no preference in obtaining government contracts 
and must compete against the less safety conscious when tendering for other jobs. 
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Overall, the evidence presented to the Inquiry indicates that while transport operators have not 
always been adept in their tendering processes but even large companies, where this is 
generally not the case, have felt obliged to reduce rates and accommodate to increasingly 
stringent customer requirements. If large companies, with their considerable logistical 
advantages and expertise, have felt this pressure it seems rather unrealistic to presume that 
smaller operators, let alone owner/drivers, would have the bargaining power to enter more 
favourable tenders, quite the reverse. There can be little if any doubt that pressure on rates has 
encouraged increased use of subcontracting (to small fleets as much as if not more so than to 
single truck owner/drivers) as a means of cutting labour costs. Further, once initiated 
subcontracting places further price pressures on those freight tasks which have not already 
adopted this approach (unless there are strong grounds for not using subcontractors). With 
some conspicuous exceptions due to special circumstances, large fleets are now typically 
composed of a small core of employee drivers and a majority of subcontractors. Even 
ignoring the issue of wage rates, the move to subcontracts appears to have often involved 
accepting illegal practices (excess working hours etc).  
 
It may be argued that unrealistic tendering practices (ie taking jobs which operators know are 
not really viable or remunerative according to their own costings) of transport companies 
rather than pressure from clients is to blame.  Clients, it might be suggested, are simply doing 
the best deal they can. As noted earlier, those within the industry prepared to admit that the 
industry itself has a responsibility for unrealistic tenders, are not hard to find. At the same 
time, two points need to be made. First, the pressure that clients are able to exert on such an 
atomistic and competitive industry is made clear in other evidence presented in this Report 
(see below). Second, the present structure of the industry with a large number of small 
operators, easy entry/over-capacity, high labour cost component of operating expenses, and 
intense competition amongst even large firms makes it extremely unlikely that the industry 
can overcome these problems entirely through its own devices. For every firm that takes the 
hard decision to reject uneconomic contracts there are always others prepared to take the 
work. In this circumstance, the professional operator will always be under threat unless they 
can find new sources of efficiency (relatively difficult given the fairly standardised 
technology) or clients for whom cost considerations are not the overriding concern (fairly rare 
as far as this Inquiry can determine). The outcomes of tendering processes, and the weak 
position of transport operators is made clear when we turn to the issue of freight rates and 
economic viability. 
 
3.2.3 Methods of pricing, freight rates and economic viability 
 
They’re atrocious…my husband’s a driver…he works on a percentage ratio. He’s quite happy 
with his company, he has no trouble with driving after his time’s up or anything…he works on 
a percentage so we get an idea of what they get paid and the pallet rate is absolutely 
atrocious. It’s got to be lifted and then half the problems are going to be helped. Truck 
companies aren’t going to have to push their drivers as hard if they are making enough 
money per load. I think its $30 a pallet of groceries from Brisbane to Port Macquarie, once 
you take out your truck payment, your fuel, your tyres, it doesn’t add up (wife of truck driver 
working for small fleet, Northern NSW). 
 
The Inquiry received a number of submissions and other evidence suggesting that freight rates 
were either too low or being squeezed (in relation to margins) to the point where they were 
conducive to unsafe practices in relation to driving hours/number of trips, speeding, drug use 
and vehicle maintenance. 
 
Pressure on freight rates is a long-term feature of the industry. A study undertaken by the 
Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics in 1988 indicated there had been a 33% 
reduction in real freight rates pertaining to the Sydney/Melbourne route in the decade from 
1978 (cited in Hensher and Battellino, 1990:545). Of course, freight rates must be evaluated 
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not only in relation to direct costs (fuel, labour etc) but also with regard to increased truck 
load capacity and efficiency, improvements in roads and the like (Hensher and Battellino 
1990:545). 
 
The Inquiry was fortunate that detailed research had been undertaken in this area by Mr Dean 
Croke, now employed by the insurer MMI/Allianz Australia but formerly involved in a family 
trucking company and having undertaken work for the ATA. In 1998 Mr Croke had prepared 
a report on the economic viability of the road transport industry and both this report and 
updated information submitted to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Communications, Transport and the Arts Inquiry into Fatigue in Transportation were made 
available to this Inquiry. In addition to providing his submission and report to this (ie the 
MAA) Inquiry, Mr Croke attended a hearing of the Inquiry in Canberra to give further 
evidence on these issues. It should be noted that the Report of the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee Inquiry placed some reliance on the evidence of Mr Croke. Further, his 
report was well known to a number of parties to this Inquiry and at no point was the veracity 
of his analysis questioned.  
 
In his written submission Croke noted that an array of factors affected the viability of 
businesses in road transport, including some within the control of the business (internal 
issues) as well as others outside its control (external factors). Internal factors included: 
 
Operations 
• Lengthy loading and unloading times affecting utilisation and driver fatigue. 
• Drivers failing to record actual loading and unloading time in logbooks. 
• Insufficient fatigue management and scheduling practices in place. 
Financial 
• Owners not adjusting business strategies to cope with low inflation. 
• High levels of gearing creating a comfort zone in the early years of equipment life cycles 
where running costs are lowest, which increase substantially with age. 
• Return on capital employed not adequately factored into current rates. 
• Investment in safety not adequately factored into current rates. 
• Many operators (large and small) not having a good understanding of their operating costs 
and contributing to the industries rate problem through unsustainable rate setting 
strategies. 
• Owner-Driver and Owner-Operator salaries grossly under-estimated in fixed costs. 
• Unrealistic return on investment expectations by major freight forwarders and industry 
customers creating downward pressure on sub-contract rates. 
• Lack of financial reporting through real time profit & loss reports and strategic planning 
within small business in road transport. 
• Duplication of carriers liability insurance imposed on sub contractors (up to 2.5% of 
agreed rate) by prime contractors. 
Technological 
• Industry’s willingness to pass on the majority of gains to customers (without productivity 
gains) resulting from such factors as increased vehicle capacity, improved technology, 
and increased access for higher capacity vehicles.  
Management 
• Small business unwillingness to adequately budget for marketing costs and accountancy 
fees. 
• Industry’s lack of knowledge of the OH&S Act and reported unsafe work practices and 
work environments resulting in a disproportionate number of injuries and deaths. 
• The increasing trend towards self regulation through accreditation schemes and the 
attachment of regulatory benefits as a reward for effort principle. 
• Competitive pressures from an oversupply of vehicles causing downward movement in 
rates. 
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• Industry’s failure to market itself effectively to overcome the “derived demand” 
syndrome (demand for transport is derived from external transactions). 
• Sales and Marketing strategies of major companies where the focus is on quantity of 
revenue, rather than quality creating a price driven market. 
 
External issues, on the other hand, included 
 
Government 
• Inadequate spending on road infrastructure to meet the growing demands of road 
transport. 
• Inconsistent application of road transport law and regulations to both conventional 
operators and Government business enterprises. 
• Inconsistent state government legislation and lack of national uniformity. 
Regulation 
• National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) proposed legislation on increased mass 
limits for heavy vehicles. 
• Impending legislation from the NRTC to address Operator and Customer Due Diligence 
and Duty of Care in the workplace. 
• Inconsistent transport regulations between states. 
• Ineffective management of driving hours under current regulations. 
Customers 
• Industry customer’s lack of understanding on the freight task performed by operators and 
willingness to take advantage of an over supplied market to drive down rates. 
Business Costs 
• Excessive levels of indirect taxation on operators, for example, diesel fuel excise. 
• Operator costs continually rising disproportionately to revenue (freight rates). 
• Industry based initiatives to improve safety and fatigue management, which impose a 
short-term cost to operators but deliver a longer-term benefit. 
• Reform of the Australian Taxation system and impending implications of a GST on 
industry. 
Competition 
• Increasing competition from other transport modes such as sea (high-speed and traditional 
coastal shipping) and rail. 
• Preferential treatment for those operators who have made the effort to obtain accreditation 
and adopt minimum standards (written submission, Dean Croke, pages 5-6). 
 
Croke argued this was not an exhaustive list and that a number of the listed factors interacted 
to affect overall viability (this Report has already noted evidence of how several factors may 
interact to affect safety such as the link between loading/unloading delays, self-scheduling 
and longer hours of work). Rejecting the financial/accounting methods upon which the 
industry has relied on in the past (see above) Croke based his assessment of viability on a 
value-added approach which looked at the relationship between the cost of capital and return 
on the assets used in the business. Under this approach, a business is regarded as viable when 
its Return on Net Operating Assets (RONA) is equal to, or greater than that business’s 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC).  These are calculated from the financial 
statements of a business, and from other market related statistical data from sources such as 
the Australian Stock Exchange. 
 
In terms of the transport industry, Croke argued that most operators are acutely aware of the 
consequences of not meeting debt commitments (a recall on their loan, often causing the 
failure of the business. At the same time, Croke argued that most operators were unaware of 
the consequences of their business not generating a reasonable return on equity funds 
(including vehicle replacement costs).  In these situations, the over medium and long-term the 
real value of equity could fall to the point where banks refuse further finance because the 
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business has become too highly geared, with bankruptcy a likely outcome. In the course of the 
Inquiry a number of witnesses described events that were entirely consistent with this 
scenario of a transport business where returns were so low in relation to commitments that it 
progressively exhausted its initial capital/equity base leading to bankruptcy and/or exit from 
the industry.  
 
Relying on analysis prepared by Rick Copping (from accounting firm Pannell Kerr Forster) of 
23,000 transport companies from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 1998 Business 
Performance Survey, Croke used value-adding performance to assess the viability of road 
transport operators.  The survey included 23 large companies with more than 200 employees 
(average number of employees 1,076) with the remainder classified as small to medium with 
an average employment size of 4.1 employees. The small to medium category was a very 
diverse one. It included single truck owner/drivers, the majority of whom work as 
subcontractors to large fleets, have little control over freight rates and are generally seen as at 
most risk in terms of maintaining a viable operation. Croke argued many medium sized 
operators, on the other hand, provide specialised freight services such as bulk liquid freight, 
dangerous goods freight, over-dimensional freight and local freight services.  By offering 
specialised services they were likely to exercise more control over freight rates they charged 
and would on the basis of this be expected to be more profitable. 
 
In the small to medium category, the data indicated (see Table 19) that the average operator 
had been trading viably in all years from 1992-93 through to 1997-98.  Viability dropped 
significantly in 1994-95, improved in 1996-97 and decreased slightly in 1997-98. According 
to Croke (written submission, page 9-10), average operators asset turnover fell from 2.8 times 
in 1993-94 to 2.0 times in 1997-98 (ie fewer sales generated for each dollar invested). 
Operator balance sheets also indicated a significant increase in the proportion of equity capital 
being used (from 47% of total capital employed in 1991-92 to 61% in 1997-98). Croke argues  
that, in combination, the two trends indicate that operators were not including an adequate 
rate of return on equity capital in their freight rates (ie the common costing problem referred 
to earlier). Croke (written submission, page 10) adds: 
 
Many operators have commented that they cannot cut costs any further without compromising 
the safety of their operations.  This suggests that, unless freight rates can be improved, more 
and more operators will have their viability threatened which in turn may induce operators to 
further compromise the quality of their operations. 
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Table 19: Return on Net Assets (RONA) by small and medium sized business units 
(SME’s) with fewer than 200 employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Road Transport Operators
Value added performance and value drivers
-
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
$14,000
Va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
-
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
RO
NA
 a
nd
Value added 4,862 5,434 12,180 5,190 4,784 8,136 6,696
RONA 12.7% 11.3% 15.4% 12.2% 12.0% 12.2% 12.4%
WACC 10.2% 8.9% 8.5% 9.1% 9.7% 8.8% 9.8%
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
/ (L
os
t)
W
AC
C
Source: Written submission Dean Croke/MMI page 10 Table 4 
 
 
 
Turning to the experience of large firms Croke found the average large operator has produced 
a RONA greater than WACC in only one year between 1991-92 and 1997-98 (ie 1994-95 See 
Table 20).  Croke noted a steady deterioration in average operator performance in the three 
years after 1994-95 despite a slight improvement in RONA from 4.7% in 1996-97 to 5.2% in  
in 1997-98). Average operator’s profitability (NOP/Sales) fell from a seven year high of 7.4% 
in 1994-95 down to 4.5% in 1997-98. Increases to labour costs (35% of sales in 1994-95 to 
38% of sales in 1997-98) and costs of sales largely drove the decline (58% in 1994-95 to 61% 
in 1997-98). Croke argued both trends could indicate that operators were not fully passing on 
their increasing costs to customers, and that the squeeze on operating margins could underlie 
relatively low rates these operators paid their subcontractors. Like small and medium 
operators, large operators significantly increased the proportion of equity capital used to 
finance their net operating assets, from 27% of total capital employed in 1991-92 to 57% (or 
more than double) in 1997-98.  
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Table 20: Return on Net Assets (RONA) in large businesses with more than 200 
employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Written submission Dean Croke/MMI page 11, Table 5. 
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Table 21: Return on Net Assets (RONA) for all transport companies combined 
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Source: Written submission Dean Croke/MMI page 12, Table 6. 
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When Croke combined the small/medium and large operator segments, trends were amplified.  
In 1994-95 average operators seem to have broken even, with RONA of 10.8% just exceeding 
a WACC of 10.7%.  However, by 1997-98 average operators RONA had fallen slightly to 
10% while the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) was 12.8%.  Croke’s analysis 
indicated many operators were unviable in each of the three years from 1995-96 to 1997-98. 
 
The Croke study contains a number of disturbing results. It suggests that freight rates are not 
sufficient to make many operators economically viable and that many firms have been eating 
into their reserves of equity capital – a trend that cannot continue indefinitely. The viability 
problem has traditionally associated with small operators and especially owner/drivers who 
have limited business skills and access to new technology (including more efficient rigs) and 
economies of scale. However, the Croke study indicates that even large firms are 
experiencing difficulty 
 
Croke (page 13) argues: 
  
…all operators are increasingly under pressure to remain viable as evidenced by the long-
term performance of this industry, increasing number of bankruptcies and exits from the 
industry.  The added pressure of shareholder expectations to achieve adequate returns for the 
large public companies, in a market where we are experiencing increasing costs and 
decreasing rates (both customer and sub contract rates), also impacts on all operators who 
sub contract to these public companies (who determine rates for the sub contractor). 
 
The added problem of a growing shortage of professional drivers in Australia (not dissimilar 
to America), will remain an obstacle for many small operators looking to increase vehicle 
utilisation beyond the legal limits of one driver. This problem is also causing concern for 
large companies who need to maintain high levels of customer service from an often-transient 
work force. 
 
In addition to this evidence Croke undertook 28 detailed case studies of particular operations 
and truck configurations on specific routes (eg Livestock 4x2 single trailer eastern states 
owner/driver; owner/driver flat top trailer Sydney/Adelaide; small fleet B-Double 
Sydney/Brisbane; and small fleet single trailer Sydney/Melbourne). While the calculations for 
each configuration lead to an array of results, the general trend was one of declining viability 
over the decade, with many businesses trading at below break-even points and operators who 
subcontracted being at most risk. Croke (1998 Road Transport Viability Report, page 52) 
argues that, given conservative assumptions about fuel prices, repair and maintenance costs, 
the actual position of businesses could be ‘much worse’ than the case study costing models 
indicate.  Irrespective of this, his conclusion was that the only way to sustain viability at 
reduced rates of return was to extract more revenue from each truck by completing more trips 
over a set period (such as an additional return Sydney/Melbourne trip every two weeks). The 
only way to do this without appreciably adding to labour costs is for the same driver to 
complete these trips (ie to work longer).  
 
During his oral submission to the Inquiry Croke repeatedly emphasised the connection 
between low freight rates/tight margins/low viability and safety: 
 
The two don’t work together. You don’t get a safe truck and a good viable business running 
really cheap (Dean Croke, oral submission 2 August 2000, Canberra). 
 
Croke’s assessment that in a climate where margins are being squeezed operators and drivers 
will need to work harder and longer was supported by numerous submissions to the Inquiry, 
with owner/drivers, for example, referring to the need to do more trips in a week. A number 
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of managers of transport companies also drew a connection between low rates/poor business 
practices and safety, with one (oral submission) observing: 
 
If a transport employer is working in a low rate regime or he is a poor quality operator then 
he’ll have poor quality equipment, he won’t maintain it very well and he’ll have a high driver 
turnover because he will ultimately only attract, excuse the expression, the dregs of the 
industry. The quality drivers tend to gravitate to bigger companies where they are driving 
quality equipment, regularly maintained, where there’s a regime of vehicle turnover and 
they’re respected in what they do.  
 
The Inquiry has spent some space summarising Dean Croke’s study because it addressed 
issues central to the terms of reference and it is by far the most detailed and representative 
study of viability undertaken in the industry. The methods and findings are accepted 
throughout the industry and, as far as the Inquiry can determine, by other interested parties. 
Further, survey evidence made available to this Inquiry and referred to elsewhere support 
Croke’s analysis. Other evidence considered by the Inquiry also supports his interpretation. 
For example, a confidential report prepared by financial products company on the prospects 
for selling investment products to those in the road transport industry found their financial 
circumstances was already so marginal marketing news product was out of the question. 
Qualitative research carried out as part of the report revealed a familiar refrain of complaints 
from operators about excessive competition, undercutting, declining and inadequate freight 
rates, with typical responses being: 
 
Undercutting by large industries…they will get a subcontractor to do it cheaper…stipulating 
that they will get someone to do it cheaper…its hard to make money. The rates for actual 
cartage has fallen…our costs have gone up, what's left in the middle is barely enough to exist 
on. 
  
The Inquiry was also able to examine the financial records of a number of owner/drivers that 
were, again, consistent with Croke's assessment of operators carrying a serious burden of debt 
and financial commitments relative to their income (in several cases the operator had indeed 
gone bankrupt).  
 
This disparity between the increase of costs and the increase in rates means that the 
transport companies are not making a proper or appropriate return on their capital 
investment. 
 
Evidence supplied to the Inquiry from other sources overwhelmingly confirmed Croke's 
analysis (though it is worth noting that Croke's rigorous work hardly needed support). For 
example, statistics provided by TransEco Line Haul for cost and rate index for the period 
from September 1988 to June 2000 indicated that there had not been viable rate increases over 
this period of time. The productivity increase since June 1991 has been 20.57% and the cost 
increase in the same period has been 34.71%. Over the same period the rate increase has been 
13.78%. There is a difference therefore of 20.93% between the increase of costs and the 
increase of rates over this period, which is nine years. Some of the smaller transport and 
haulage companies may well have found that the disparity over the same period has been 
considerably greater. 
 
Figures prepared for an owner/driver publication by Jerry Brown-Sarra also paint a 
pessimistic picture. Brown-Sarra did a comparison of the rises in costs and rates since 1971. 
These indicated that the cost of truck increased over this period by at least 1100% (eg: a 
Kenworth truck in 1971 cost $29,000.00 but today costs $342,000.00) while the cost of triaxle 
trailer increased by at least 750% (eg: a tri-axle trailer in 1971 cost $8,000.00 but today costs 
$60,000.00). The cost of tyres increased by 618% (eg: cost of a tyre in 1971 was $110.00 but 
now costs $680.00) and fuel costs rose by 1,220% (the cost reaching 86c/litre compared to a 
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cost in 1971 of 35c/litre). Measured on a per kilometer rate, the cost of wages increased over 
this period by 400% (in 1971 it was 6c/kilometre whereas in 2000 it was 24c/kilometre). 
However when the rates were examined the increases were vastly less than the above 
percentages for costs. Per tonne forwarding leg rates increased only by 250%. The situation 
was worse for backloading as per tonne backloading rates increased by only 44%. Full load 
forward leg rates increased by 300% and full load backloading rates increased by only 72%. 
Even factoring in improvements in productivity (due to larger and more efficient trucks etc) 
the disparity between percentages cost increases and rate increases underlines the reason for 
many of the present problems in the industry.  
 
Another indication that the industry is operating at a level of unsustainable costs or 
insufficient margins is the increasing level of bankruptcies, takeovers and closures amongst 
operators. ‘Churning’ amongst small operators is a long-term feature of the industry but, as 
noted elsewhere, the Inquiry was surprised at the number of long term owner/drivers and 
small operators who felt their viability was in question. What is perhaps even more 
noteworthy over the past decade has been considerable instability even amongst the small 
number of very large operators. A number of submissions from both industry representatives 
and insurers pointed to the number of large operators that had exited the industry over the past 
decade as indicative of inadequate returns (though conceding other factors have also played a 
part). Large companies experiencing financial difficulties in this period included TNT (a 
postwar success story prior to this that had grown from local operator to transnational 
transport giant). Another, Universal Transport Operations (UTO) was formed in the early 
1990s out of the MIM transport business before failing (resulting in the auctioning of trucks 
that profoundly affected the new truck sales market at the time). Other large companies to 
experience some measure of financial difficulty included Mayne Nickless, Brambles and most 
recently Finemores. Some firms sold all or part of their transport divisions to concentrate on 
more profitable areas. In recent years Toll Express has emerged by far the largest remaining 
player, growing in part through a process of acquisition (a mooted purchase of Finemores did 
not proceed). While poor financial judgements and a climate of low inflation undoubtedly 
played a part in some of the instability just described, low rates of return and the just-in-time 
demands of customers have also been seen as crucial by informed industry observers. The 
rapid ‘churning’ of transport operators in a climate of intense competition and low returns has 
also been observed in the USA (oral submission, Professor Michael Belzer). 
 
3.2.3.1 Freight Rates, Income Insecurity and Payment Systems for Drivers 
 
In the road transport industry there is a close association between freight rates and the level 
and type of payments made to truck drivers. The association operates at a number of levels. 
First, and most obviously, for owner/drivers the freight rate represent their ‘pay’ or at least the 
gross return that will determine earnings once operating and fixed costs (such as truck finance 
repayments) are deducted. Second, given the high labour cost component in road transport 
and since owner/drivers directly compete with operators using employee drivers for available 
work if owner drivers are prepared to accept rates that effectively translate into below award 
wages this places pressure on companies paying award wages. Evidence given to this Inquiry 
would indicate that owner/drivers being paid less than an award rates (and sometimes well 
below) is a common if not pervasive feature of the long distance road transport industry. 
Faced with such competition, operators with employee drivers must seek to reduce 
costs/improve efficiency (by offering a better service in terms of timeliness and 
responsiveness to customer needs, although it should be noted this may translate to greater 
scheduling and other pressure on drivers). While this may conceivably occur without recourse 
to direct labour costs, the absence of economies of scale, the centrality of price to customers 
and a lack of business skills amongst many operators do not encourage such a response. 
Rather, the two most obvious responses are to either fail to pay award rates to employee 
drivers or replace them with subcontractors. In practice, award evasion is easier for small to 
medium regionally based operators but relatively harder for large operators who are more 
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likely to be unionised and receive regular attention from union officials. Thus, for large firms 
subcontracting out so as to place the labour cost cutting at a distance represents a practical 
option. During the course of its investigation the Inquiry heard evidence that award evasion 
was widespread and larger operators were making increased used of subcontracting to small 
fleets/owner-drivers rather than their own employee drivers to maintain returns in the context 
of reduced freight rates (after accounting for operating costs). It was also suggested that large 
operators used subcontracting so as to put in otherwise unsustainable bids to secure contracts. 
These two scenarios for why large operators are using subcontractors are not mutually 
exclusive but indeed may be seen as mutually reinforcing. 
 
The Inquiry received a range of submissions on the connection between payment 
systems/income security and safety. 
 
The TWU argued that recent changes to the federal industrial relations system had permitted 
payment arrangements that not only encouraged unsafe driving practices and were 
incompatible with the standards laid down in road transport and OHS legislation. In the 
federal jurisdiction this applied to both certified agreements and Australian Workplace 
Agreements (AWAs). In its submission, the Victorian/Tasmanian branch argued that:  
 
…an analysis of agreements in the long distance sector reveals that real earnings are 
trending down but are camouflaged within the agreement by increasing the average speed of 
trucks. To compensate for lower earnings drivers are forced to work longer and harder with 
the result being that fatigued drivers are sharing the road with all other drivers and are 
therefore a potential threat to the public interest. The level of risk associated with this 
increases, depending on the nature of the load. The federal Transport Workers’ (Long  
Distance Drivers) Award which was made in consideration of the public interest, is 
constructed using 75 kph as the average speed. One recent non union agreement which was 
certified was based on an average speed of greater than 90 kph. An analysis of that 
agreement reveals on three typical journeys the following, Melbourne/Sydney/Melbourne, a 
round trip, the company offered for that trip the rate of $422.32 all inclusive. When we broke 
that down, the company provides for 18.3 hours for driving that journey…1,732 kilometres 
involved in the journey divided by the 18.3 hours comes to an average speed of 94.64 kph. It 
would be impossible to average that speed with speed limits in towns (oral submission, 
Nathan Niven, TWU Victorian/Tasmanian Branch). 
 
The Branch argued that an average speed of just over 82 kph was achievable (without 
breaching speeding laws) giving a total journey time of just over 21 hours. At the company’s 
own rate, the payment to the driver for this trip time would $472 or $50 more than the rate 
calculated by the company. For a Melbourne/Brisbane/Melbourne trip the company calculated 
a trip time of 37.3 hours driving over the distance of 3,362 kilometres that would average out 
at 91.3 kph and the company offered $797.70. Allowing for an average speed of 82 kph (still 
below the award benchmark), the TWU calculated that the trip would take 41 hours and 
would cost, at the company rate, $863 – almost a $70 saving. The union submitted that the 
proliferation of trip rates and ‘scams’ designed to lower earnings was contributing to fatigue. 
The TWU stressed that unlike awards, certified agreements and AWAs did not have to meet a 
public interest test in order to be certified. Attempts by the union to lodge an appeal against 
certification of this agreement under the no-disadvantage test were unsuccessful. 
 
The TWU had submitted similar evidence in relation to both certified agreements and AWAs 
to the federal inquiry into managing fatigue in transport. The federal inquiry also heard 
evidence of the removal of a number of fatigue protection provisions (eg rostering and 
accommodation) and the extension longer work arrangements such as 12 hour shifts. 
Considering all these matters, the final report of the inquiry expressed concern that neither the 
parties nor the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) or the Employment 
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Advocate had given sufficient consideration to the fatigue and safety implications of these 
changes. The Committee observed decisions: 
 
…are being made on the basis of perceived productivity: assumptions which value asset 
utilisation more highly than risks to personal and public safety (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:102) 
 
The Committee recommended that the Employment Advocate provide information on fatigue 
including government codes and regulations pertaining to the transport industry to the parties 
to AWAs and that the AIRC provide similar information to parties to enterprise agreements. It 
also recommended that the federal Minister for Transport, in consultation with the Minister 
for Workplace Relations, should review AWAs and enterprise agreements applying to 
transport industry to ensure they comply with OHS laws and accepted fatigue management 
principles (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and 
Arts, 2000:103). 
 
Like the Committee, this Inquiry views evidence of agreements that effectively undermine 
both existing OHS legislation and road safety regulations with great concern. It is hardly 
likely that the community would find it credible that a government or its agency would permit 
the making of legally binding agreements that are likely to place workers and other road users 
at increased risk. The full extent of these practices is unknown but the existence of any such 
agreements is extremely disturbing.  
 
Further, as with the federal inquiry, this Inquiry received evidence that trip or per kilometre-
based payment systems encouraged unsafe driving practices, especially given loading delays 
and the absence of demurrage. A Victorian driver noted (oral submission) that a truck might 
be held up for some hours behind local delivery vehicles (where hourly pay rates applied). It 
could then lose further time by being obliged to travel across town to secure a return load: 
 
And of course there's nothing in the logbook in relation to driving [across town] or work 
other than driving. Its always rest time because we're getting paid to do our interstate trip. 
We're not getting paid to unload or load so we're not going to put it into our logbook and 
restrict our money in the earnings area, which is doing the trip. 
 
A further issue not considered by the federal fatigue inquiry but raised in this Inquiry was the 
non-payment of award rates and entitlements to long distance truck drivers. It was suggested 
that one way some employers sought to remain competitive was to evade paying full award 
entitlements to their drivers. 
 
Survey evidence 
 
Submissions about the connection between payment levels and payment systems and safety 
were supported by evidence of two surveys of long distance drivers already mentioned in this 
Report, namely the national survey of driver fatigue conducted by Williamson et al (2000) 
and the OHS survey conducted for this Inquiry. Both surveys found that performance/task-
based payment systems were pervasive, with the historical comparison available to the 
Williamson et al (2000) study indicating that these payment arrangements were growing over 
time. The increasing use of payment-by-results regimes is consistent with Croke’s assessment 
of an industry where many operators are finding it more difficult to survive and are 
consequently trying to extract a greater return from drivers, including employee drivers. 
 
The national fatigue survey (n=1007) by Williamson et al (2000) found that most drivers 
(68.3% were paid per trip according to the kilometres travelled or the weight or volume of 
freight delivered while 14% were paid a flat load rate). Around 17% of drivers negotiated pay 
rates for each load while 43% of the remainder had ongoing contracts for some or all of their 
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loads. In terms of payment level, 63.2% of drivers were paid the award rate or better but 
17.1% were receiving less than the award. A further 19.1% were unaware of how their pay 
compared to the award (previous research would suggest many of these drivers would be 
receiving rates below the award).  
 
The survey of OHS experiences amongst 300 drivers commissioned for this Report found that 
52.7% of drivers were paid on a kilometre/trip basis (6.7% with a bonus) while for 17% 
payment varied with each job (a figure remarkably similar to the Williamson et al study). As 
can be seen from Table 22, direct payment according to award rates was only made to a 
minority of drivers (16.3%), even amongst those working for large fleets. Drivers working in 
large fleets were more commonly paid by the km/trip rate (68.2%) or award rate (24.7%), 
compared with those working in small fleets (51% and 21.1% respectively).  Small fleet 
drivers were sometimes paid on a partial piece rates basis (e.g. % of earnings); so in terms of 
payment mechanisms these drivers are mid-way between owner/drivers and large fleet wage 
systems.  In contrast, owner/drivers are rarely paid by the km/trip rate (23.2%) or by the 
award rate (5%), and in fully 38.4% of their driving contracts the rates vary from job to job. 
As can be seen in Table 22, 16.7% of 'other" drivers, 12.5% of those in small fleets, but only 
5.9% of large fleet drivers were paid under some form of 'km/trip rate plus bonus' (no 
owner/drivers interviewed were paid this way). In an unknown number of instances, these 
bonus payment allowances may have included money for meals etc en-route.  That is, bonus 
allowances are not always calculated on the basis of production. As the Survey report notes 
'With the wisdom of hindsight, it may have been appropriate to have included assessment of 
the extent to which allowances formed part of wages packages or contributed to an incentive 
payment bonus for long-distance interstate trips.' There may be a softening of the employment 
contracts of many small fleet employee drivers.  Over time the basis by which small fleet 
driver payments and entitlements are calculated are moving towards those enshrined in 
owner/driver contract conditions.   
 
Table 22 (Table 8 in Appendix 3): Basis by which payment is calculated in survey of 300 
drivers 
 Owner/drives 
 
(n=99) 
small fleet 
drivers 
(n=104) 
Large fleet 
drivers 
(n=85) 
Other 
 
(n=12) 
% of 300 
drivers   
Award rate   5% 21.1% 24.7%   8.3% 16.3% 
by the km or 
trip 
23.2% 51% 68.2% 33.3% 46% 
Km/trip rate 
plus bonus 
- 12.5%   5.9% 16.7%   6.7% 
Varies by job 38.4%    7.7%   4.7%   8.3% 17% 
Other 29.3% 10.6%   7.1% 33.3% 16.7% 
no answer   5%   1.9%   1.1%   8.3%   3% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
Overall, there appears to be substantial agreement in the results for both surveys, especially 
when account is taken of differences in sample composition (by employment status) and the 
precise categories of payment methods used. Turning to the relationship of payment methods 
and levels and safety each study will be discussed in turn. 
 
The national fatigue study by Williamson et al (2000:35) found drivers under a payment by 
results system were almost twice as likely to report having experienced fatigue on at least half 
of their trips than drivers paid on a time/hourly basis (32.5% as compared to 18.7%. The 1991 
survey yielded a similar ratio although the overall level of reported fatigue was higher). In the 
context of other evidence, the impact of payment systems on fatigue management assumes 
critical importance in the overall conclusions of the Williamson et al study. After dealing with 
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other sources of scheduling pressure such as freight forwarder and customer pressure 
(discussed elsewhere in this Report) Williamson et al (2000:111) state: 
 
The remuneration system is another pressure on drivers that appears from the survey, to 
influence drivers’ work schedules. Both surveys reveal that payment by results was the 
predominant method of remuneration for all drivers, even company employees, and this form 
of payment increased markedly across the period of the two surveys… Analysis of the 
relationship between payment type and experience of fatigue demonstrated that drivers who 
were paid in a payment-by-results mode were more likely to report fatigue as a substantial or 
major personal problem and to experience fatigue more often than drivers paid under other 
payment regimes. In addition, a significant percentage of drivers volunteered the strategy of 
standardising or regulating minimum payment rates as a way of managing fatigue. 
 
The pressures exerted by the payment by results system can also be seen in the influences on 
drivers to break the working hours regulations. The factors that distinguish drivers who 
frequently break the working hours regulations from those who do not are related to 
organisation of work such as the need to do enough trips to earn a living and to get in early to 
get the next load rather than personal reasons. This is further evidence that the way drivers 
are remunerated clearly has an adverse effect on the ability to manage fatigue well. This is 
another factor that should be examined further if fatigue management is to be truly achieved 
in this industry. 
 
A number of the points made by Williamson et al clearly parallel earlier research by Hensher 
and colleagues, as well as the submission of Dean Croke discussed above. At a later point in 
summarising their findings, Williamson et al (2000:113) note that since drivers are 
remunerated according to the amount of work (more accurately the amount of driving) they 
do, attempts to limit their access to work are unlikely to be favoured. In other words, so long 
as drivers are paid on a basis that encourages, if not requires, long hours of work direct 
attempts to restrict driving hours are liable to be resisted.   As Williamson et al also note, a 
significant number of drivers believe that a more standardised or regulated minimum payment 
system would be a more effective means of managing fatigue by obviating the need to work 
long hours. Consistent with this interpretation, a recent study of long distance truck drivers in 
the USA (Belzer et al 2000) discussed below provides some evidence that higher payment 
levels can lead to a measurable improvement in safety. The connection between payment 
systems and excessive hours was also raised by a number of submissions to the Inquiry, not 
simply by the TWU but also by insurers, some of those involved in enforcement and even 
several operators (or their representatives). 
 
The driver survey commissioned for this Report found evidence on the relationship between 
payment systems/income security and both chronic injuries and driver health/psychological 
distress that reinforces the conclusions drawn by Williams et al (2000). Each of these areas 
will be addressed in turn. 
 
As noted in Section 2, the Survey of 300 drivers showed that chronic injury is a major 
problem for long distance truck drivers. The distribution of chronic injury (Table 13) was 
compared against the payment method (Table 22) for each truck driver (see Table 23). Table 
23 indicates that owner/drivers with chronic injuries were disproportionately paid by ‘varies 
by job’ and ‘other’ payment methods. Drivers in small fleets with a chronic injury were 
usually paid on the basis of a km or trip rate, and drivers in large fleets with a chronic injury 
were usually paid on the basis of a km or trip rate or the award rate. That is, the group with 
the highest incidence of chronic injury (owner/drivers) were also those with the most variable 
payment levels.   While the precise causal links between variable payment and chronic injury 
require further investigation the general association is clear.  
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Table 23 (Table 16 in Appendix 3): 
Chronic work-related injuries of 300 drivers, compared against payment method 
 Award rate Km or trip km/trip + bonus varies by 
job 
Other 
% of all drivers 
paid this way (table 
8) 
16.3% 46% 6.7% 17% 16.7% 
% of  owner/driver 
with chronic injury 
7.3% 25.4% - 
 
43.6% 34.5% 
% of small fleet
drivers with chronic
injury 
20% 78% 8% 8% 18% 
% of large fleet
drivers 
with chronic injury 
39.1% 76% 4.3% - 
 
10.9% 
% of other
employment 
status drivers with 
chronic injury 
33.3% 33.3% - - 100% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
Returning to the issue of psychological distress as measured by the GHQ, it will be recalled 
that in Section 2 of the Report the Driver Survey revealed high average scores amongst 
drivers generally, but especially amongst owner/drivers and those driving on the Hume 
Highway. In the Survey (Appendix 3) all drivers with a GHQ of 14 or above were separated 
out for close scrutiny to identify any distinctive features. The score of 14 or more was 
selected because it has previously been identified as a level at which ethical researcher should 
caution an interviewee about their current health status as they are at extreme risk. The 
examination of very high GHQ scores was conducted to identify whether these workers had 
any shared characteristics that might help explain these outcomes. In all, 47 drivers scored 14 
or above; this was 15.7% of the interviewed population of 300 truck drivers.  Of these 47 
high-scorers, 21 were owner/drivers, 13 worked in small fleets, 12 in large fleets, and 1 had 
an ‘other’ employment status.  That is, owner/drivers were markedly over-represented in the 
very high GHQ score group. Four potentially important variables were separated out for 
comparison against the 47 high GHQ scoring truck drivers (hours worked per week, 
comments about illicit drug use, age, and highway on which driver was working).  Of these 
only the latter emerged as a significant variable (see Table 24). In other words, there was a 
clear association between high GHQ scores and work on the Hume Highway.  
 
Table 24 (Table 31 in Appendix 3) 
Highway on which drivers with a GHQ score of 14 or above were working 
 
Highway GHQ score 14 or 
above 
All drivers 
Hume 40.4% 26.3% 
Newell 12.8% 19.7% 
Pacific 14.9% 17% 
New England 17% 14% 
Sturt   2.1%   9.7% 
Great Western & 
Mitchell 
  8.5%   7% 
Greater Sydney   4.2%   6.3% 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
 143
The Survey sought to tease out influences on high GHQ score Hume Highway owner/drivers 
by comparing their responses to other owner/drivers.  In particular, the Survey analysed 
owner/driver responses in relation to qualitative indicators of economic stress that had 
emerged as the most commonly cited safety problem (based on responses to the question ‘list 
the three biggest problems in your job at present’). Three core sources of financial stress were 
identified (not ranked). First, were costs of running a vehicle such as fuel, registration and 
insurance cover etc. The second source of economic stress was low freight rates and the GST 
(the survey was conducted prior to the GST and as indicated earlier there was a close 
connection between the GST and freight rates). The third and final source of stress was slow 
payments or nil payments from customers. Added together these three economic stressors 
were the biggest safety issue cited by the interviewed truck drivers.   
 
 
Table 25 (Table 33 in Appendix 3) 
Frequency of economic stress comments by employment status and high GHQ scores 
 owner/drivers on 
Hume Highway 
All other 
owner/drivers 
owner/drivers 
as a whole 
% of 300 
drivers 
fuel, registration,  
insurance etc costs 
85.7% 50% 62.6% 26.3% 
freight rates, GST, 
financial  pressures 
68.6% 17.2% 35.3% 21.3% 
slow payments or nil 
payments 
28.6% 15.6% 20.2% 7.7% 
GHQ scores 13.1 10.5 11.5 10.3 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
 
While, as the Survey notes, analysing the association between qualitative indicators of 
economic pressure and GHQ scores is rather like comparing ‘apples and oranges’, the patterns 
are clear and overwhelming (see Table 25). The subgroup of drivers who had the highest 
GHQ scores were the same group who most frequently volunteered statements about 
intense financial pressures in the industry, and repeatedly named specific cost factors 
and other causes of their strained economic circumstances.  These findings also 
reinforce the association between economic viability and safety raised earlier in this 
section of the report. 
 
Finally, the Driver Survey also examined the relationship between the GHQ scores of all 
drivers (ie not just those with scores of 14 or more) and payment methods to test the 
hypothesis that those paid under variable (rather than standard) systems would be under 
greater stress (see Table 26).  
 
Table 26 (Table 34 in Appendix 3): 
Comparison of payment system against GHQ scores 
 
 Owner-
drivers  
Small fleet Large 
fleet 
‘other’ 
drivers 
all 300 
interviewed 
drivers 
award rate   7.4   8.6 10.9   8   9.4 
by the km or trip 11.5 10.5   9.7   5.7 10.2 
km/trip rate plus 
bonus 
-   9.3   8.5   5   8.7 
varies by job 11.7 11.2   9.5 15 11.5 
Other 11.7   8.3 10.8   5.5 10.3 
Source: Motor Accidents Authority Truck Driver Survey in Appendix 3 of this Report 
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Table 26 indicates that the lowest GHQ scores were recorded amongst those drivers with the 
most secure income, namely those paid by the km/trip rate with a bonus (not to be confused 
with a simple kilometre trip rate) or by the award rate. The highest scores were recorded 
amongst groups of drivers with a more variable/less secure income, namely those whose 
payment varied by the job and by owner/drivers paid by ‘other’ means or on a km/trip rate 
(which may be different to the rate paid to employee drivers). In sum, just as low freight 
rates, increasing vehicle running costs, and slow payments are intimately connected, 
variable payment methods (and therefore uncertain) income levels also contributed to 
stress. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Insecure income and output based payment is a pervasive feature of the long haul trucking 
industry. If anything, the practice has become more widespread as operators have sought to 
‘squeeze’ more from drivers in their efforts to offset low margins, themselves a product of 
intense competition and consequently low freight rates. While this may simply be seen as a 
sign of efficiency it also has serious consequences for safety. The evidence available to this 
Inquiry, including several substantial surveys, clearly demonstrate that insecure income and 
output-based payment systems pose a serious threat to safety in the long haul trucking 
industry. At one level, these are not startling findings. The connection has been more than 
obliquely alluded to by inquests into a number of tragic smashes involving articulated trucks 
such as Cowper and Blanchetown. The finding is also consistent with a number of overseas 
studies of truck drivers, both long haul and short haul. For example, in a recent US study 
(Hanowski et al, 1998:39) of short haul drivers nominated payment by the load as 
significantly increasing ‘time stress’ and argued it had such a negative effect on safety that it 
should be outlawed.  
 
Payment by the load or the kilometre is popular with transport firms because it enables them 
to maximise the output of drivers. It also has support amongst some (though by no means all) 
drivers, including owner/drivers because it enables them to meet identified gross income 
targets and boost otherwise low earnings. However, in both cases the result is working under 
pressure and working very long hours (often exceeding legal limits – work practices that 
endanger the health and safety of not only drivers but other road users. While payment 
systems are usually seen as a matter for employers and workers where they have serious 
effects on OHS and public safety the community has a right to intervene.  
 
The Inquiry finds that the use of kilometre and other output-based payment systems has 
serious consequences for safety in the long haul trucking industry and urgent measures 
should be taken to address this issue. 
 
3.2.3.2 Client/consignor pressure or poor business practices as the source of low freight rates 
 
Lots of people will tell you price is secondary and we all know that’s bull-shit (oral 
submission, manager in large transport company) 
  
To the extent that low freight rates compromise safety it is important to try and identify the 
causes or origins of this. One possibility is that it is due to pressure from clients and 
consignors on a very competitive and atomistic industry. Some load owners, such as BHP and 
the major retailers to name but the most obvious, are large organisations with considerable 
commercial clout. While there are some large transport companies the six largest still only 
account for around 20% of the total road freight task, and there are literally thousands of 
small firms and owner/drivers. Further, it might be argued that these smaller operators are in 
more direct competition with large transport companies than is the case between small and 
large retailers or small and large manufacturers. Several submissions claimed that large 
vertically integrated organisations in retailing, metal products and other areas might be cross 
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subsidizing their own transport activities in order to drive down freight rates more generally 
but the Inquiry was unable to investigate this allegation.  
 
Aside from the client pressure/competition argument, it could also be argued that the squeeze 
on freight rates originates from poor business practices, especially on the part of small 
operators who accept less than remunerative rates. Quite a number of submissions to the 
Inquiry referred to this problem, although by no means the number that raised the 
client/competition problem. 
 
These two reasons (ie client pressure/competition and poor business practice) are not mutually 
exclusive, especially if the second (ie poor business skills) is viewed as exacerbating the first 
(ie client pressure to reduce rates). 
 
Some organisations, such as NRMA (written submission), pointed to both problems, although 
the degree of emphasis placed on each varied. The Australian Trucking Association (ATA), 
for example, argued: 
 
The trucking industry by nature could be described as ‘price takers’ rather than ‘price 
makers’. To this end, it is imperative that the industry has the availability to receive training 
in regard to business skills so that they can make informed decisions when costing work. The 
trucking industry currently employs over 4.5% of the workforce nationally, yet only receives 
0.7% of the training budget. 
 
However, there is also a second group that directly impacts on this issue – the 
customer/consignor sector. Research has proven that the trucking industry only controls 
approximately 40% of the freight task and that customers and consignors need to be made 
more aware of their responsibility to the safety element of transport. This can be achieved 
through education and chain of responsibility principles (written submission, ATA p4). 
 
The Inquiry also received numerous written and oral submissions from individuals with 
knowledge of particular industries/types of freight or regional transport networks describing 
the relationships between load owners/clients, consignors, large transport companies, small 
operators and those receiving loads. Though such submissions need to be treated with some 
caution (it was impossible to test the veracity of all the claims made), the level of detail given, 
rather than being a series of sweeping generalisations, lent weight to their credibility. 
 
A common thread in many submissions was the respective bargaining power of the parties 
from load owners and consignors, large and small transport operators. 
 
Describing the haul of molasses from Queensland to Victoria, one written submission argued 
major consignors were well aware of safety abuses but were primarily motivated by the 
savings of lower cost operators. It was also claimed that consignors took the view, that as they 
did not directly contract with 'offending' operators (typically small operators) they had 
committed no illegalities - a view that current enforcement practices would do nothing to 
disabuse. The submission argued that the rates for moving molasses to Victoria were typically 
a much reduced backloading rate (this is consistent with evidence on backloading practices 
described elsewhere in the Report). Small operators were in a weak negotiating-position once 
they had 'geared up', were financially committed and typically made decisions on a cash flow 
rather than cost recovery basis, exacerbating pressure on rates. 
 
The negotiation by transport management firms (who control the freight) with smaller 
companies is generally for a given rate using a "take it or leave it basis". The logic applied to 
the operator is that the transport management firm will ultimately find someone desperate 
enough to do the work (this is often true)… 
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Most rates are now quoted on an "all in basis" this means that any problems are born by the 
transport operator even if it is caused by the freight owner eg waiting time (written 
submission). 
 
The last point on the "all in basis" of rates, that take no account of cost/time impositions on 
operators beyond their control, was supported by other evidence presented to the Inquiry and 
has significant implications for waiting time/loading delay issues examined later in this 
subsection of the Report. 
 
For its part, the Australian Retailers Association (ARA) saw the compression in freight rates 
as coming from a combination of poor business practices on the part of owner/drivers, and 
pressure from transport companies and forwarding argents: 
 
The structure and culture of the long haul trucking industry provides some unique problems 
and challenges for regulators. The industry includes a large number of small owner operators 
who possess little commercial acumen and have often entered into significant financial 
arrangements to purchase their truck. 
 
Transport companies and forwarding agents have substantial control over a limited number 
of jobs forcing owner-drivers to be “price takers”. This may encourage drivers to work 
excessive hours and breach safety guidelines in order to meet contractual arrangements and 
earn a reasonable income. This has been exacerbated over the past 12-18 months with 
increases in fuel costs and the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). 
 
Evidence to the Inquiry has suggested that current freight rates create safety problems. This 
presumes that if owner-drivers were paid more then they would not be under pressure to work 
excessive hours. However, there is a counterview, supported by international experience, that 
there are significant problems in implementing a minimum freight rate regime as they are 
often undermined by the owner-drivers as they compete vigorously in order to get the 
available work. It is therefore unlikely that an agreed minimum rate will ever be agreed to 
without some form of restrictions on driver entry into the industry. The ARA understands that 
such restrictions would be resisted by all sections of the industry. 
 
There is also no guarantee that owner-drivers will change their behaviour, even if rates were 
increased preferring instead to achieve a higher margin. Freight rates will remain low while 
ever the current culture and structure of the industry remain as it is today. 
 
The ARA therefore believes that greater effort is required to educate owner-drivers in key 
business principles to equip them with the necessary skills to make sound commercial 
decisions. The Government should also consider providing financial assistance to help 
marginal operators leave industry with minimal economic loss (written submission ARA pp7-
8). 
 
The ARA’s views raise several questions. First, since owner/drivers have been a significant 
feature of the long distance trucking industry for many years, why has the squeeze on freight 
rates increased during the 1990s? Second, why suggest transport companies and forwarders 
are cutting owner/driver margins without asking whether pressure from load owners may be 
contributing to this process? Apart from the ARA, there was general agreement amongst those 
making submissions to this inquiry that it was not simply owner/drivers that were “price 
takers” but the transport industry more generally.  Owner/drivers may be the most vulnerable 
to such pressure but the Inquiry received numerous submissions that medium to large 
companies were also subject to pressure, and that concerns about safety were simply not part 
of the equation. Typical were the views of one experienced and very professional medium 
sized hauler of fresh produce: 
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Transport contracts are often negotiated on the assumption that the most cost-effective 
company will get the job. Unfortunately little price is paid for safety. When we were first 
involved in the Fatigue Management Pilot, we had to inform our customers and advise them 
of the program and the requirements. Openly stating that we would operate in a safe manner 
cost us initially by losing some customers to other competitors. Unfortunately some customers 
did not believe that they should have to pay for the safety of our business. Until this culture 
changes and a higher price is put on and paid for safety by out customers, health and safety 
issues will remain, in their eyes, as a low priority. For safety to improve there must be 
industry viability. Unfortunately so many factors are not taken into the quoted price when 
negotiations occur. Waiting and unloading times can be many hours, and are not often 
reflected in the overall cost to do business. While transport operators have become 
increasingly competitive they have failed to be able to significantly increase freight rates. The 
massive increase in the price of diesel is one clear example of the difficulties of increasing 
freight rates (written submission, medium sized Queensland-based operator). 
 
The ARA argument that minimum rates might not prevent owner/drivers engaging in high-
risk behaviour needs to be treated with caution. While some drivers may continue these 
practices even with guaranteed minimum rates it is, in the view of this Inquiry, an over-
simplification to suggest that all or even a majority of owner/drivers would respond in this 
way. Further, consistent with observations by the ARA and other bodies about the cost 
shifting to owner/drivers, it could be deduced that enforcing minimum rates for owner/drivers 
may well affect the preferences of both transport companies and clients in relation to using 
either employed drivers or owner/drivers. 
 
It should be noted in passing that the ARA did not provide further information on 
international experience on the ineffectiveness of implementing minimum freight rates 
although other parties to the Inquiry identified difficulties (but not insurmountable ones) in 
this area. Further, the ARA asserts all sections of the industry would oppose restrictions on 
driver entry. The issue of entry restrictions or mandated accreditation for both drivers and 
operators is discussed extensively elsewhere in this Report. It can simply be noted here that 
there is divided opinion amongst industry associations and operators, although it is fair to say 
most industry associations prefer voluntary accreditation to operator licensing. While issues 
of practicality and acceptance cannot be ignored, the extent to which the views of industry 
should determine what is the most appropriate regulatory regime remains a moot point. At the 
very least, the views of other key interest groups (such as drivers, the TWU and motorists to 
state but the most obvious) also need to be given some weight. 
 
3.2.3.3 Freight rates and the introduction of the GST 
 
One issue to be raised in terms of the methods of pricing to be raised by many parties and on 
many occasions was the impact of the goods and service tax or GST. As part of the lead up to 
its introduction, the federal government indicated that implementing the GST package would 
by reducing/eliminating other taxes lead to savings in diesel fuel and other business-related 
costs affecting the road transport industry.  Given the government’s strong commitment that 
GST-related cost-savings must be passed on, this created a clear expectation of reduced 
freight-rates. The expectation was reinforced by the response of some transport companies. 
Linfox, for example, issued a newsletter to subcontractors (GST Newsletter No.1) in June 
2000 that stated: 
 
With the introduction of the GST from July 1, the Australian Government has legislated that 
savings achieved in business, as a result of GST related changes, must be passed on to 
customers. This means: 
 
- The savings you achieve must be passed on by Linfox 
- Linfox must pass on your savings together with our own savings to customers. 
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Significant penalties will be incurred by business that do not follow these rules. Based on the 
analysis work that Linfox has undertaken, these tax related savings will be significant. 
 
The newsletter then went on to list expected savings of 23 cents per litre on vehicles greater 
than 20t GVM as well as estimated reductions in repairs and tyres of 6% and 9% respectively. 
While noting that some of these savings might be offset by GST compliance costs, the 
newsletter noted that Linfox regional managers would be discussing the new rates that would 
apply from July 1. Tables in the back of the newsletter suggested an overall reduction to 
major costs (fuel, repairs, tyres) of 8.2% for linehaul B Doubles of more than 20t GVM and 
9.2 for linehaul single vehicles of more than 20t GVM.  
 
Another large transport operator, Toll (Express) also issued a GST Bulletin to its 
subcontractors. A copy of the April 20 issue obtained by the Inquiry also offers an indicative 
set of cost savings on fuel, maintenance etc (with an example given of a $183.17 net rate 
reduction for a trip between a Melbourne and Brisbane warehouse). Like Linfox, Toll told its 
subcontractors that it was obliged by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to pass these savings on to customer and that subcontractors would be obliged to do 
the same. Toll informed its subcontractors it was in the process of calculating new linehaul 
rates to take effect from 1 July 2000. 
 
As several hearings occurred around the time of the introduction of the GST it is perhaps not 
surprising that a number of operators, owner/drivers and small to medium fleets in particular, 
raised the issue that freight forwarders had been pushing for a reduction in freight rates. 
Freight forwarders were accused of using the ACCC as a justification, threat or reference 
point in their efforts to wind back rates. A number of operators responded by pointing to 
increases in fuel prices, WorkCover premiums and other expenses but others said they felt 
compelled to accede or at least not 'argue the case' where they were heavily dependent on the 
freight forwarder or specific customer for work. 
 
It is worth noting in passing, that compliance costs with the GST for small operators such as 
owner/drivers are not insubstantial. While the GST requirements might assist operators to get 
a better picture of the actual running costs the issue was whether many already marginal 
operators could cope with the change let alone exploit this side-benefit. During the course of 
investigation the view was widely expressed that many small operators would not survive the 
changeover but drop out of the industry - as occurred to well over 20% of operators when 
similar tax was introduced in New Zealand.  
 
Not surprisingly, during the course of its investigations the Inquiry heard evidence from both 
owner/drivers and transport companies that customers had either asked for a reduction in 
freight rates or had, on the basis of their own calculations, informed the transport provider of 
the new rates that were to apply after July 1. However, at least in terms of fuel costs, these 
predicted savings were never realised or more than offset with the price of diesel fuel rising 
sharply in the 12 month period immediate prior to the GST and continuing to rise after that 
point. The issue here is not so much whether these predictions were realistic, although given 
that it is a very competitive industry where firms act as ‘price takers’, there was little need to 
promote what might prove to be overly optimistic calculations on cost savings and indeed 
some grounds for caution. The real issue was the additional pressure placed on transport 
operators by customer expectations of reduced rates at a time when they already believed their 
thin margins were being squeezed. It also strengthened the already powerful hand of clients to 
impose even more stringent conditions on transport operators. 
 
As noted already, the immediate problems created by the hike in diesel fuel charges and 
pressure for rate cuts associated with the GST should be seen in the context of long term 
trends in the relationship of rates to costs. In short, the GST exacerbated existing problems. 
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3.2.3.4 The relationship of freight rates to operating costs 
 
The issue of inadequate freight rates was raised continuously by owner-drivers with many 
alleging that a historical trend for rates not to match trends in costs were placing them under 
unsustainable pressure. Typical responses were: 
 
One of convenors of a protest meeting of drivers held in May in Dubbo stated: 
 
“The main issue that concerns us is the rate of pay for the job done. I first came into the 
transport industry 35 years ago, at the time were getting 20 POUNDS a ton to go from 
Adelaide to Sydney, today we only get $60 a ton” (written submission, Robert J Harris 3 May 
2000). 
 
Much of the evidence on the risks posed by inadequate freight rates and tight scheduling was 
of an anecdotal nature. However, what was perhaps remarkable about this was the unanimity 
of these views and the fact that they were expressed by many groups and organisations that 
had no obvious vested interest in identifying rates and schedules as critical causal factors. 
 
Community road safety groups also expressed similar views about deadlines. For example, in 
its written submission, the Highway Safety Action Group of NSW Inc – a body formed by 
400 people attending a meeting in Orange in 1992 – stated: 
 
Much of our evidence is anecdotal, gleaned from our years in looking at transport issues 
across NSW. In its eight-year life the HSAG has received innumerable calls from the wives of 
heavy vehicle drivers concerned about: 
• The excessive demands placed upon drivers to meet unrealistic deadlines: 
• Lack of consideration for human capabilities and compliance with driving hours; and 
• The fact that log books record driving hours only and that time spent loading and 
unloading is not taken into consideration. (HSAG, 2000). 
 
3.2.3.5 Freight rates and owner/drivers 
 
For owner/drivers freight rates represent not simply a commercial exchange but their income.  
 
The report entitled Driving Forward (chapter 6.6) on public vehicle and industrial carriers 
legislation prepared for the NSW Industrial Relations Minister in 1993 considered arguments 
that special industrial agreements for contract drivers were warranted on safety grounds. The 
report identified three possible connections between low rates and safety that might be 
averted by regulated minimum rates. Namely, regulated rates will eliminate the pressure of 
low returns causing drivers to drive too long, too far and too fast; that low rates affect the 
quality of drivers; and that low rates discourage proper maintenance of vehicles (Driving 
Forward p31-32). Each of these arguments was rejected, though entirely on a priori rather 
than on evidentiary grounds (for contrasting evidence see the Hensher studies above).   
 
Concerning the first argument, Driving Forward contends the ‘provision of assured or excess 
returns for contract driving’ is ‘just as likely to provide incentives for drivers to undertake 
extra work so as to capture the (elevated) rewards, and so encourage drivers engage in the 
conduct it is intended to prevent.’ While such a response cannot be discounted on the part of 
some drivers, the overwhelming weight of evidence presented to this Inquiry was that drivers 
are working harder and longer than they want in order to either meet pressure from their 
employer or to try and make ends meet. As the evidence of Dean Croke showed, the break-
even point for a truck deteriorated over the course of the 1990s such that more trips needed to 
be undertaken to cover costs. The Inquiry found frequent use of the term ‘excess returns’ in 
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Driving Forward in no way matched the almost universal references to the existence of rates 
which were too low, if not unsustainable, according to informed observers such as insurance 
companies. Further, the research undertaken by Professor Michael Belzer and colleagues 
(2000a and 2001) in the second largest trucking company in the USA (JB Hunt) established a 
strong and unambiguous relationship between payment levels and safety that was confirmed 
by a cross-sectional study.  Belzer found a significant increase in wage rates delivered a 
substantial improvement in the number of truck crashes being experienced by the firm. It 
needs to be demonstrated, not presumed, that owner/drivers would respond in a fundamentally 
different way for Driving Forward’s interpretation to be sustained. 
 
In relation to the second argument Driving Forward (1993:31) contends:  
 
…the judgement by a principal contractor of whether a contract (or any other) driver is safe 
is itself a matter of skill, and largely independent of the presence or absence of statutory force 
in the determination of the level of reward for the driver.  
 
Again, we are given no evidence to support this point and the submissions made to this 
Inquiry as well as other evidence are not, by and large, consistent with the proffered 
interpretation. It could be equally argued that the general level of reward may affect the pool 
from which such choices can be made. It should be noted that one of the factors for the 
improvement in safety in JB Hunt identified by Belzer was that the increased wage rates 
enabled the company to attract the very best drivers. It is also worth noting that the US road 
transport industry is characterised by high levels of labour turnover that contribute to safety 
problems and make it difficult for employers to be selective about drivers. It is arguable that 
there is a nexus between low wages, high turnover, average driver quality and poor safety. 
The Inquiry also received evidence that the costs of undertaking additional training 
discouraged drivers from doing this, especially in the context of low returns. The long haul 
driver workforce is ageing and, despite the rapid growth of the industry, attracting good 
quality drivers may prove increasingly difficult in the long term. Driving Forward highlights 
the potential distributional consequences of regulating contract rates. What it fails to consider 
is that undercutting by owner/drivers creates a level of competition between them and 
employed drivers that may well affect the health and safety of both. Nor are the distributional 
effects in relation to other modes of transport discussed. For example, it could be argued that 
artificially low rates applying in road transport have resulted in a shift of business away from 
other transport modes with superior safety performance, most notably rail. 
 
In relation to the third argument concerning the impact of contract rates on vehicle 
maintenance and operating safety Driving Forward (p32) argues that such an association 
based on incremental changes in income is unlikely given the overall volatility of driver 
incomes due to weather, changes in demand etc. Again, this interpretation simply does not 
accord with the verbal and written evidence given to this Inquiry about how competition and 
low rates led to shortcuts in vehicle maintenance, delays in the purchase of tyres etc. The 
Inquiry was repeatedly given examples of how low returns affected vehicle maintenance 
decisions by owner/drivers. Without wishing to belabour the point, it is worth providing just 
two typical statements (oral submissions) by very experienced owner/drivers, the first based 
in the Hunter Valley and the second in Victoria: 
 
People are bypassing things, where they need tyres replaced they're re-grooving them. You 
see a lot of trucks on the highway with steel hanging out of the tyres. Instead of heaving their 
brakes re-lined they're going a bit longer….I lot of these blokes are re-grooving retreads that 
should be thrown away…I have seen people re-grooving steer tyres…the tyres off the steer of 
the truck, took them off and had them re-grooved. Could'nt afford to replace them…its highly 
unsafe, they're the two most important tyres on the truck… You see on the highways, it speaks 
for itself, the number of old [tyre] cases on the road…if we don’t have an enforceable rate 
structure we are where we are now, we are unsafe, we are unviable.  
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This whole thing…resolves basically around the rates because whether we like it or not I 
would be the first one to admit in my 27 years I have taken a hand-full (of drugs) every now 
and again. I've driven too fast. I've driven too long. I've put too much on. All the things that 
makes us monsters I can say that I'm guilty of…. Now, the only reasons they're being done is 
because I need to do them to survive. You take away that need and you'll take away an 
enormous amount of problems. But, to the same value, if you don't take away that need we're 
wasting our breath because I for one will continue to break the law, I will continue to drive 
too fast or I will continue to overload….because I am trying to survive, I am trying to do what 
I have to do for my wife and my family and my future, what future I've got left. So I see that 
(rates) as the being the underpinning thing for the whole, entire problem. 
 
While the industry has always had a rogue element prepared to cut corners on safety, the 
evidence presented to this Inquiry was that there were commercial/viability pressures to do 
this and it was affecting long-term operators. Such operators demonstrably knew 'something' 
about survival, and some now feeling pressure to cut corners on safety had eschewed such 
practices in the past. 
 
3.2.4 Client/consignor requirements as to delivery times, responsibility for driving 
hours, driver performance and remuneration for drivers 
 
3.2.4.1 Introduction 
 
We’re in a better position than a lot of people because we own our truck and we’re just 
paying off for our second motor and we’ve nearly come to the end of that so we can turn 
around and say no we don’t want to do the work. But we have at times been turned round by 
people who’ve said to us “if you don’t get there by say eight o’clock tomorrow morning you 
get docked a hundred dollars off your amount.” I’ve just turned around, or my husband has 
turned around and said “take it off because we don’t need that pressure.” This is the sort of 
pressure that the truck owners are getting… (oral submission, wife/business partner of 
owner/driver, Queensland) 
 
The Inquiry received submissions from a wide range of other parties arguing clients (both 
load owners and load receivers) and consignors were putting undue pressure on both transport 
companies and individual drivers in ways that compromised safety. This included 
submissions from parties with no vested interest in ascribing a particular cause to speeding 
and other offences. For example, the written submission of the Traffic Services Branch of the 
NSW Police attributed a rise in the number of speeding infringement notices to the inability 
of some sections of the heavy vehicle industry to set realistic schedules and attempting to 
circumvent existing on-road enforcement measures.  
 
The point about client pressure was also made in submissions from government agencies in 
other jurisdictions such as WA Transport: 
 
Getting clients to be more responsive to the needs of truck drivers is a significant issue. We 
have spoken to a number of large users of freight services in the State to make them aware of 
the role they play. We point out there are three issues they face if they require delivery times 
that compromise safety and the standards in the Code. They are if there is a crash: 
 
• the actual loss of their freight 
• a tarnished image 
• potential for being sued for damages 
There are other things customers’ can do to help drivers including managing queues and 
providing access to facilities. Feedback from operators is that they need some assistance to 
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explain the position to customers and we will be producing a brochure explaining customer 
responsibilities that the industry can use to more effectively negotiate with customers. 
 
Already a number of major transport users in the State will only use operators who have a 
fatigue management system in place (written submission, Lance Poore, Regional Policy 
Section, WA Transport). 
 
Not all submissions accepted that clients as well as consignors and load receivers placed 
unreasonable expectations on operators and drivers on a regular or systemic basis. Further, as 
in other areas the very complexity of the transport supply chain means that it is not always 
clear for which party the pressure is originating or if the pressure results from commercial 
pressure, incompetence or favouritism in the awarding of freight tasks. The Inquiry received 
submissions alleging all three factors played a part and the perception of the key players could 
be determined very much by where the operator or driver was located (ie as a principal 
contractor or an owner/driver). In its submission the ARA highlighted a number of these 
points, including the influence consignors might exert independent of the time frames 
established by the retailer and the need to educate staff making decisions, especially in the 
context of chain of responsibility legislation. 
 
The feedback we’ve had in relation to consignment agents is that quite often the lead time’s 
appropriate but the problem is the consignor or the freight forwarder takes time…   They take 
some commercial decisions as to how they are going to get it delivered and quite often by the 
time the deals done a lot of the lead-time has been eroded and therefore it becomes 
unreasonable. And so all the owner/driver sees is the fact that they’ve got this unreasonable 
delivery time. Now you’ve got to ask if that’s our fault or is it the broker’s fault. Our 
understanding is that when we enter into an arrangement for delivery whether with the 
principal contractor or a consignor that we would be expecting the delivery to be done in the 
context of the law. If chain of responsibility comes in and people …aren’t conscious of the 
ramifications of if you breach well that’s something their going to have to learn to live with. 
And it’s a key issue for us to educate people and our people that when they are arranging 
these things they have to act in accordance with the law .. We’ve got no evidence that anyone 
would force someone to deliver in a way that would make them break the law. However, it 
may be from time to time they don’t consider the implications … (oral submission, Bill 
Healey, ARA).   
 
Other issues to arise include how a customer might instruct a loading agent or consignor 
about what to do in the case of an unavoidable delay or whether this responsibility should 
reside entirely with the consignor or agent. It is not difficult to envisage situations where 
commercial interests might discourage a consignor from informing a customer that it was 
necessary to reschedule a freight task to a time later than originally proposed. Equally, those 
staff of a customer charged with arranging transport directly may not wish to be seen to ‘fail’ 
to meet a deadline. It is perhaps at this point that the need for establishing an environment 
where such pressures don’t have serious safety consequences is most apparent.    
 
While all these complications need to be recognised, evidence presented to the Inquiry and 
detailed below overwhelmingly indicated that customers frequently placed expectations on 
long haul truck operators and drivers that placed them under some pressure to say the least. 
The Inquiry received a number of very detailed submissions, illustrating the connection 
between client expectations and safety in particular sectors of the long haul road freight 
industry.  A number showed how client expectations were shaped not simply by insensitivity 
to the needs of transport companies (although this certainly was a factor repeatedly identified) 
but by their own commercial interests and market pressures. The complex array of factors that 
shape transport arrangements, including scheduling pressure on companies, is well illustrated 
by the case of one company that is arguably typical of the fresh produce market. 
 
 153
 
3.2.4.2 Transporting Fresh Agricultural Produce: An Example 
 
The company is a medium sized, and generally acknowledged as an efficient and responsible 
transport operator located in an agricultural district outside NSW but whose operations 
typically involve bringing agricultural produce into NSW, including the Sydney fruit and 
vegetable market. Figure 3 provides a simple illustration of the relationships involved – in this 
case fairly simple because the company concerned does not employ subcontractors and has a 
long-term relationship with growers.  
 
The producers in this region grow crops sold throughout Australia, with some produce being 
exported. These growers normally deal with a produce agent who organises sales to chain 
stores, markets, individuals and others. Produce prices are volatile and may alter on a daily 
basis leading to substantial variations in returns to growers. At the other end of the chain, 
price variability and perishability of goods makes stores keen to minimise potential product 
loss by carrying as little stock as possible. In combination, these demands result in strong 
pressures on transport companies to deliver promptly (usually over-night and with scheduled 
arrival early in the morning) and at short notice (with trucks often being left waiting while 
produce is picked). These pressures exacerbate pressure on drivers.   
 
Since markets, stores and individuals control times for delivery, logistical planning by the 
transport company, including driver shifts, has proved extremely difficult. Services must be 
highly reactive to highly tuned customer needs for just-in-time delivery in a very competitive 
market. The grower will wait for the most opportune ‘price-window’ to harvest and transport 
their produce for sale at the most profitable destination (creating uncertainty in this regard as 
well). Once the driver arrives, they must often wait without facilities or opportunities to rest 
and having to arrange a load for the return journey. In its submission, the company stated: 
 
Due to competition and an over supply of reactive services past and present, it has become 
somewhat the “expected” for [the] driver to drive directly through to the destination for their 
customers. Whilst this may have been done in exceptional circumstances and as a favour for a 
particular customer/grower, it has unfortunately become somewhat the norm and not the 
exception. 
 
Lack of communication between the agent – grower – receiver and Transport Company 
always exists, often transport is arranged by the agent, but can also be booked through the 
grower. Whilst there are “Duty of Care” provisions in the legislation more often than not a 
lack of understanding and education is displayed. People’s general perception is that “It 
won’t happen to me”. (written submission, medium sized interstate transport company).  
 
The company argued that the growth of e-commerce was, if anything, increasing the pressure 
on transport operators by providing businesses with greater ability to manage their stock flow 
over time and thereby reduce inventories. 
 
The trend now within the industry where fresh produce is concerned is to hold as minimal 
quantity of stock on hand as possible, This ensures the product is fresh and last the longest 
period of time thus maximising return on investment. This shift has created more “just in time 
delivery” with minimal operational error or even built in allowances. The fluctuation in 
demand for product makes it difficult to predict quantities, thus creating under or over supply, 
placing extra demands on drivers. 
 
Due to the decrease in stock levels this has also seen smaller amounts of freight being 
delivered to more customers. This in turn creates additional loading and unloading as well as 
extra driving requirements. Many freight forwarders use the services of interstate drivers to 
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collect freight from other areas to make up a particular load for the vehicle.(written 
submission, medium sized interstate transport company). 
 
In recent years the transport company has made significant efforts to improve safety (being 
accredited with TruckSafe and also being a participant in a pilot fatigue management 
scheme). In its efforts to address the problems just identified, the company has tried to come 
to arrangements on scheduling etc with its clients and other operators. The company got in a 
level of agreement although one national carrier refused to cooperate. The latter problem is a 
recurring limitation with voluntary schemes since even one dissenter has the capacity to 
unravel the agreement especially they gain a commercial advantage from this refusal or 
threaten the business of other firms – which is often the case. There is also a concern that such 
arrangements could be deemed to breach the Trade Practices Act. 
 
The firm has tried to educate its clients, by identifying “Duty of Care” legislative 
requirements and problems arising from a lack of planning by growers, to ensure the product 
is ready for transport when the truck arrives (leaving the driver waiting for extended periods 
or having to undertake loading). Other problems raised by the company include attempts to 
force overloading (since growers are paid by weight but transport is charged according to 
pallet space), extremely tight delivery times due to delays at farms, lack of sleep for drivers 
and possible infringements.  
 
Despite these and other efforts the company was concerned that the issue received insufficient 
attention in the media, customer newsletters and safety programs. 
 
It makes it increasingly difficult when the common catch cry is “If you don’t do it, I will find 
another company who will”, and so competition rears its ugly head’ (written submission from 
the company, a medium sized interstate transport operator). 
 
The claim that transport operators who refused to meet customer demands on scheduling or 
other matters were threatened with the customer taking their business elsewhere was made 
repeatedly by transport firms in the course of the Inquiry. It was a claim repeated by many 
drivers, the TWU, CFAT and others. In more than a few instances, a specific example was 
cited to support the claim and this was invariably the case when the Inquiry asked for more 
evidence that the practice was occurring. As discussed elsewhere, a number of transport 
operators had also tried to educate their customers about their operating costs (by opening 
their books etc) in order to get them to acceptable higher freight rates. Though not without a 
degree of success, virtually all these operators reported losing business as a result. 
 
In combination with other evidence (see below) the Inquiry came to the view that many 
customers show no understanding of the consequences of their demands in relation to 
delaying trucks when loading and tight delivery schedules. Given intense competition 
amongst transport operators, attempts by some companies to educate their clients or come to 
arrangements were at best only partially successful. Further, customer attitudes were clearly 
framed in a context where there was no recognition whatsoever that they might bear any legal 
consequences for such behaviour.  
 
At the same time, this case illustrates that in, some industries at least, there are strong 
commercial pressures on customers to behave in ways that make it very difficult if not 
impossible for transport operators to meet their demands safely. In other words, this is a 
structural problem where voluntary measures and goodwill alone are very unlikely to succeed. 
Rather, what it needed is a means of ensuring these commercial decisions are framed with 
safety standards firmly in mind.        
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3.2.4.3 Other Evidence Connecting Client Expectations and Safety  
 
A number of submissions drew an explicit connection between client expectations, tight 
deadlines, use of drugs and driver fears for losing pay or work if they failed to deliver. 
 
With the unreal deadlines that they are forced to meet drivers have to resort to drugs just to 
keep their job. It is a well-known fact that if you are late just because you were tired and went 
to bed you are penalised for it one way or another. A company driver will be sacked, and 
there are always drivers out there willing to take his place, and an owner/driver risks losing a 
load or a customer and it is money he cannot afford to lose. That’s what it comes down to 
money. Big companies just don’t care, they are more concerned with their profit margins than 
the health and safety of their drivers, and as I have already explained, owner/drivers just 
have to do it to stay afloat. I know of an instance of a driver being sacked because he was 15 
minutes late. The customer phoned the transport company and complained, and instead of 
reasoning with the customer and defending his employee they sacked him. 15 minutes, most 
people get longer than that for a coffee break. The customer was hardly going to go broke in 
the space of 15 minutes. God forbid the driver should put his safety, and the safety of other 
road users, before the customer (written submission, wife of owner/driver southern New 
South Wales). 
 
In both oral and written submissions another driver described an incident leading up to her 
dismissal. The driver started work at 5am and after doing local deliveries all day was told to 
take a load to Sydney, which she did after a two-hour delay while the truck was loaded. In 
Sydney the driver claimed to have got two hours sleep in a truck before returning to her home 
yard the next morning where upon arrival she was asked to do another delivery. Having been 
on the road for 30 of the last 34 hours, the driver’s initial response was to refuse, upon which 
she claimed to have been told in no uncertain terms to take the load ‘to keep the customer 
happy’. The driver further claimed that when her husband (also a truck driver) heard of this he 
complained to the management of the local office of the client. Shortly thereafter the driver 
was sacked by the transport company and told the reason for her dismissal was that the client 
no longer wanted her delivering their product. The driver later obtained employment with 
another transport company in the town but was subsequently dismissed, she claimed, when 
the manager discovered the events at her previous employer. 
 
In addition to verbal and written submissions the Inquiry was able to draw on some survey 
evidence. The already mentioned national survey of driver fatigue undertaken by Williamson 
et al (2000) highlighted the impact of an array of work-related pressures, together with a 
desire to get home or get to adequate rest facilities. The ‘return home’ factor cannot be 
presumed to be unrelated to work, given that the job entails long periods of separation 
between the driver and their family. The overlapping of reward, insecurity and work/family 
balance matters is indicated by multiple responses on the part of drivers. In giving reasons for 
breaking working hours regulations almost half the drivers surveyed by Williamson et al 
(2000) nominated a desire to return home and around a quarter the desire to get to adequate 
rest facilities.  Other reasons given are more directly relevant to issues being considered in 
this section. Amongst employee drivers around a third nominated tight schedules imposed on 
them or the need to do enough trips to earn a living (though the figure was only a quarter for 
large fleet drivers) while a quarter nominated ‘to keep your job’. Other reasons indicated 
greater pressure on small to medium fleet drivers in comparison to those in fleets of more than 
50 trucks, with over a third of the former nominating the need to do enough trips to earn a 
living (compared to a quarter of large fleet drivers). Similarly, around thirty percent of 
small/medium fleet drivers referred to the need to get in early to get the next load that was 
about double the figure for larger fleet drivers. Finally, while over 10% of drivers in fleets 
with fewer than 10 trucks gave rewards/penalties for delivery time as a reason, the response 
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for larger fleet drivers was 4.4%. By way of contrast, as might be expected owner/drivers felt 
more pressure to do trips to earn a living (well over 40% gave this reason) than employee 
drivers. About a quarter of owner/drivers referred to tight schedules or the need to get the next 
load (the figure was far higher for independent owners), less than 20% broke regulations to 
keep their job and between 4 and 9% reported the influence of delivery time penalty/rewards 
(Williamson et al, 2000:85). 
 
In terms of breaking road rules (like speeding) rest/return home factors did not figure, 
although lack of attention entered the arena (with about 17% response). The other main 
reasons given were tight schedules (a third of employee drivers and 30% of owner drivers), 
doing enough trips to earn a living (about 30% for both groups), to get in early for the next 
load (a quarter of all but less than 14% for larger fleet drivers). Overall, delivery time 
reward/penalties were mentioned by just under 10% of both employee and owner/drivers 
(with no substantial difference amongst employee drivers according to size). 
 
In sum, the Williamson et al (2000) study confirms a picture that, notwithstanding some 
variations between employee and owner/drivers and according to operator size, breaches of 
hours regulations and road rules by long distance truck drivers are strongly associated with 
tight scheduling, income insecurity and fear of losing their job/work. Direct bonus/penalties 
for delivery time are less an issue but contrary to the suggestions of some witnesses to this 
Inquiry they remain a not uncommon feature of the industry (even if rarer amongst large 
operators). Of course, while these findings are consistent with submissions made to the 
Inquiry, the study does not identify precisely which party in the transport chain is responsible 
for exerting these pressures. In particular no mention is made of the part played, if any, by 
consignors, load owners or clients (although the study does provide evidence of this 
connection in relation to other issues discussed elsewhere in this section of the Report). It 
might be suggested that these pressures emanate entirely from within the transport industry 
itself. However, available evidence does not make this a likely scenario. In those cases, 
generally rare, where a client took an interest in driver welfare and specified certain safeguard 
the evidence is that the transport operator readily adopted these. For example, a Victorian 
driver (oral submission) described a case where: 
 
One of the yards I work out of in central Victoria, very high profile operator does a lot of 
overnight express work, also has a couple of other contracts. But one of the customers he 
carts for requires on his Sydney/Adelaide run, which is overnight, that they must supply a 
changeover driver. So just for that contract he has two drivers employed at the twelve-hour 
mark of the changeover time - only for that contract. There's up to five [of this company's] 
trucks a night running that corridor, two changeover and the other three go straight through.  
 
3.2.4.4 The Views of Clients/Load Owners/Receivers 
 
Despite widespread advertising of the Inquiry in the print media inviting submissions and 
publicity received during the hearings, the Inquiry received few submissions from load 
owners, clients, or consignees/receivers a notable exception being the Australian Retailers 
Association (ARA). In the USA, the National Industrial Transportation League (NITL) 
represents shippers and retailers but there is no similar body representing the major clients of 
the road transport industry in Australia. The ARA made both written and oral submissions 
and the Inquiry would like to place on record its appreciation for this input and the 
cooperation received at all stages. In the course of the Inquiry, a number of allegations were 
made about the impact of specific retail companies on the road transport industry. Indeed, this 
was the category of clients most consistently named as placing pressure on companies and 
drivers. Having said this, it would be entirely wrong to draw from this an imputation that the 
problems raised in connection with retailers differed in degree or nature from those raised in 
relation to clients/customers in other areas (like manufacturers).  
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Representing Australian retailers, the ARA has over 11,000 members nationwide (4,600 in 
NSW) and its members account for 75% of retail sales and 70% of the retail workforce. As 
the ARA pointed out, around 95% of retailers (and over 90% of its members) are small with 
fewer than 20 staff and who would rarely have deliveries through dedicated long haul road 
transport (written submission, ARA). On the other hand, as the ARA also noted, there are a 
small number of very large retailers (such as David Jones, Coles Myer, Franklins, 
Woolworths). These large retailers do account for a disproportionate component of retail sales 
and total retail employment. In its submission, the ARA argued that the impact of retailers on 
freight rates or driver behaviour had been overstated because most retailers were small and, as 
a whole, retail industry only accounted for just over 10% of the total road freight task. Citing 
ABS figures for the September quarter 1995, the ARA noted that the retail industry accounted 
for around 11% of the 42 million tonnes moved by road transport (written submission ARA 
pp3-5). In preparing its submission, the ARA surveyed national retailers, noting they were:  
 
…surprised at suggestions that the retail industry has a significant degree of influence on the 
behaviour of long haul truck drivers (written submission ARA p2). 
 
Expanding on this point in its oral submission, Bill Healy from the ARA stated: 
 
In general, our industry believes we only have a limited degree of influence on some of the 
behaviour of owner/drivers in the long haul transport industry. We're aware that the Inquiry 
has been asked to look at the issue of clients, and the role of the client in the whole structure 
of the industry. Our investigations indicate that the industry as whole, while it may be a 
beneficiary of transport, isn't the actual client and in most cases it is the supplier, the 
manufacturer or the principal contractor. The second point is that we're obviously happy to 
work with any party that is nominated to review the recommendations…we'd rather be active 
than sitting outside the loop. However, we're still somewhat skeptical that our role is as 
significant as some other people have suggested to the Inquiry  
 
The ARA also expressed some confusion as to what constitutes long haul trucking. At a 
preliminary meeting with the ARA the Inquiry indicated the definition it was using was based 
on the current logbook requirement (ie a single delivery trip of more than 100 kilometers - 
also the definition used by the 1984 May Inquiry). In its written submission the ARA used a 
definition based on interstate trucking and in it oral submission Bill Healey stated: 
 
Another issue I think we wanted to raise at the outset is that we're still confused as to what 
long haul is and what the context of long haul is. And I think that is a major issue for us that 
we're not sure exactly the magnitude of the problem or the area we're dealing with.   
 
No other body raised this concern but it could indicate that those making use of the long haul 
road transport industry either as a direct customer or a consignee may need to made more 
aware of the parameters of the industry so they can make more informed judgements. 
In both its written submission and evidence to the hearings, the ARA emphasised that its 
members sought competitive contracts but always on the presumption that these would not 
entail a breach of regulatory requirements by the successful tenderer: 
 
…in entering these contracts retailers expect the transport company to ensure the drivers 
comply with all legal and regulatory obligations (written submission ARA p2). 
 
The ARA questioned submissions made by TWU to the Inquiry that retailer pressure was 
driving down freight rates and promoting unsafe practices, arguing they should be treated 
with scepticism unless concrete rather than anecdotal evidence could be provided.   It also 
argued that it had little control of inbound loads and took appropriate measures to control 
outbound freight. 
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Retailers generally utilise long haul transport in two discrete yet interrelated levels. First, 
long haul transport is used to deliver stock to distribution centres and warehouses. In the 
majority of cases transport arrangements are part of a supply agreement and are managed 
through the supplier/manufacturer delivering the product to the warehouse. The retailers has 
limited involvement with the contractor and the lead time for deliveries is a competent of the 
overall supply contract. 
 
This is particularly evident in large scale operations, such as supermarkets warehouses, 
where supply chain management systems will initiate a reorder when stock levels reach a 
certain point. This ordering process enables the manufacturer/supplier to produce, package 
and deliver the product to the warehouse in a reasonable time period. The lead time for 
deliveries is generally negotiated as part of the overall supply agreement. Transport 
companies contact the distribution centre and are allocated a delivery slot based on the lead 
time established in the supply agreement. 
 
The retailer therefore has nothing to do with the engagement of the transport contractor. 
Every effort is made to ensure that deliveries are received within the designated time slot to 
ensure the efficient processing of orders and to avoid unnecessary long delays for the driver. 
 
Retailers have more direct control over “outbound” transport arrangements from 
warehouses to individual stores. These stores are controlled by the company and this provides 
far greater capacity to determine delivery times and processes. They usually involves a 
standard delivery timetable. 
 
Representatives of Coles Myer recently appeared before the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and the Arts to discuss issues associated 
with Long Haul Transport. This appearance provides an interesting insight into the processes 
of Australia’s largest retailer. An extract from the proceedings is provided to the Inquiry 
(Attachment 1). 
 
The retail industry has been criticised for causing unnecessary long delays for truck drivers 
waiting to make deliveries into warehouses. In addition, some transport companies and 
owner-operators have suggested that retailers expect unrealistic delivery times. The ARA is 
unaware of any significant evidence to support these claims. 
 
Retailers admit that from time to time unforeseen circumstances may disrupt the normal flow 
through a warehouse, however, they maintain that this is the exception rather than the norm 
and generally deliveries are processed at distribution centres at the time indicated in the 
delivery advice (written submission ARA page 9). 
 
The ARA also made the point (oral submissions, Bill Healey) that the bulk of freight 
movements handled by major retailers were predictable (and therefore subject to long term 
planning). The smooth movement of freight was also assisted by the fact that these retailers 
owned many of the warehouses along with large distribution (note too that unlike other 
clients/consignees large retailers sometimes have staff permanently stationed at commercial 
warehouse). In sum, the ARA view was that, while problems might occur from time to time, it 
was doubtful that there were systemic problems involving the member organisations it 
surveyed. The ARA was also keen to put on the record that the delivery slots developed by 
retailers tended to include some leeway. 
 
The Inquiry put the question of more predictable transport arrangements to drivers making 
submissions to the Inquiry who delivered freight to the major retailers. This indicated some 
disparities in waiting time, with a more rapid turn around for larger operators doing regular 
tasks and with the equipment to facilitate rapid transfer of freight (two hours being cited as 
typical though longer periods of up to four hours were not unusual). Small independent and 
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predominantly regionally based subcontractors or owner/drivers, on the other hand, more 
typically complained of experiencing far longer delays (for examples see below). In other 
words, the response of some drivers appears not that inconsistent with the ARA's, though the 
overall picture is more complex, with different treatment of large regular shipments to those 
delivered by small subcontractors on a more irregular basis being hardly a cause for surprise. 
A detailed examination of scheduling and loading/unloading practices across a range of 
industries would be necessary to make more forceful statements about typical delays for 
different tasks and different clients, something well beyond the scope of this Inquiry. What 
the evidence available to the Inquiry does permit is the observation that delays vary according 
to a range of factors even within a particular firm or industry. At the same time, the survey 
evidence already cited and some more recent research presented below indicates that overall 
delays in loading/unloading are a substantial problem for the transport industry and not the 
figment of drivers' imaginations. 
 
In its written submission, the ARA also argued that the Inquiry should try to identify the true 
level of safety problems in the industry. The ARA referred to evidence of a 50% improvement 
in road safety performance involving trucks over the past decade (an improvement 
outstripping other vehicles) and that truck drivers were responsible for only 16% of fatal road 
crashes involving articulated vehicles.  
 
While clearly one fatality on the road due to inappropriate driving behaviour is too many, the 
figures provide an insight into the current situation in relation to road safety and the trucking 
industry (written submission ARA p7). 
 
The ARA noted the submission of the Insurance Council of Australia identifying the need to 
target poor performance, given that of 6,000 workers’ compensation policy holders (ANZIC 
Code 611 Road Freight Transport) 40 employers (around 1%) contributed 10% of premiums 
but accounted for nearly 25% of the cost of all claims. The ARA argued these 40 firms should 
clearly be targeted. The ARA does not draw direct conclusions from these observations in 
terms of the role of retailers. However, the clear implication is that safety performance has 
substantially improved, truck driver behaviour only accounts for a minority of fatalities, and 
further improvement should be sought be targeting the poor workers’ compensation record of 
a number of transport companies.  
 
Summarising its position, the ARA argued: 
 
…the ARA believes that retailers do not significantly influence current practices in the long 
haul trucking industry. Retailers who tender for transport contracts do so on the basis that 
services will be undertaken in accordance with all legal and regulatory obligations. Price is 
only one factor in determining the successful contractors. 
 
The competitive nature of the industry, however, may mean that transport contractors often 
are prepared to submit low cost tenders in order to get jobs. This means that any subsequent 
subcontracting to owner drivers is also at a low rate (written submission ARA p10). 
 
The Inquiry accepts the ARA’s argument that the impact of the retailers on road transport 
needs to be seen in context and that small retailers are unlikely to exert much direct influence 
either on freight rates or driver behaviour. The situation is relation to large retailers is 
qualitatively different, especially in the context of a growing concentration of ownership and 
control in the sector. According to the most recent data (1998-99) from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) retailers employing fewer than 20 persons accounted for 95% of total 
retail businesses but only 38% of retail income. Retailers with between 20 and 199 employees 
accounted for 4% of businesses and 21% of retail income. Finally, retailers with more than 
200 employees represented only 1% of retail businesses but accounted for 41% of total retail 
income. In other words, the largest five percent of firms accounted nearly two thirds of total 
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retail income and the largest one percent accounted for over 40% of retail income. The pattern 
of retail concentration is by no means confined to Australia (ABS, 2000). In the USA by 1993 
the five largest firms accounted for 48% of total sales (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 
1996:16).  
 
Breaking down the retail industry by sub sector reveals an even more pronounced pattern of 
concentration. The ABS (2000) found the large business share of total retail income in 
supermarkets and grocery stores was 85% and this represented a substantial increase over 
recent years (in 1991-92 the figure was 77%). 
 
In sum, the Australian retailing industry is bifurcated into a large number of small retailers 
who account for less than 40% of total retail income and a small number of large firms who 
account for over 40% of total retail income. Further, in particular sectors the concentration is 
much higher and increasing over time. While it is realistic to suggest small retailers exert little 
influence on transport operators it is stretching credulity to suggest that very large retailers, 
controlling a sizeable share of the total retail market, are unable to exert a significant 
influence on transport operators. The total size of the contracts they can offer operators 
provide a powerful incentive for the latter to accommodate to the needs of such clients. 
Moreover, their ability to provide ongoing work for smaller operators also provides a source 
of influence. The size of contracts they offer to suppliers (who provide for transport) means 
these companies will be keen to ensure their goods are delivered promptly, and with just-in-
time the delivery windows may be tight. Evidence of the influence large retailers can exert on 
their suppliers and service-providers are not confined to the road transport industry (see for 
example the introduction by Woolworths of its own cut-price milk and large retailer moves 
into selling petrol). The relative influences being exercised at various levels of the 
subcontracting chain needs to be recognised. 
 
Of course, the point just made does not only apply to large retailers. Patterns of concentration 
undoubtedly exist in other industries that use road transport, including some types of metal 
products (and cases involving companies in this area are referred to elsewhere in this Report). 
Given the vast number of load owners/clients and consignees that are served by road transport 
it was impossible within the time frame and resources of this Inquiry to investigate and report 
on details of this. Further, despite widespread advertisements of the Inquiry the ARA was the 
only representative organisation of load owners/clients to make formal submissions to the 
Inquiry  (and the Inquiry is extremely grateful for their contribution). Given allegations about 
specific retailers made to the Inquiry and given the ARA’s efforts to provide a detailed and 
thoughtful response to these issues its submission deserved careful attention. 
  
Turning to other points raised by the ARA, there can be no doubt that several indicators of 
safety performance show an improvement over the past decade, but as the Inquiry has already 
demonstrated, a more comprehensive assessment of OHS performance gives serious cause for 
concern. It is equally clear, as the ARA suggests, that the road transport industry, and 
particularly some elements of it, need to take more responsibility for its own safety 
performance. At face value neither observation appears consistent with the notion that 
pressure from retailers is leading to deteriorating safety performance, although the 
improvement in fatality rates is undoubtedly the result of a complex web of factors and 
masking effects should not be discounted. As the ARA observes, safety in the industry 
remains a significant issue.  
 
In keeping with the ARA’s suggestion of seeking a true picture of the industry’s safety record, 
the Inquiry drew on other evidence, including initiating a driver survey and drawing on the 
findings of a recent national survey on driver fatigue as well as other sources. Some of this 
evidence point to significant omissions in workers' compensation claims-based data 
(especially in relation to owner/drivers) and the need for caution in interpreting this data in 
the road transport industry. This view is reinforced by submissions to the Inquiry that some 
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companies, especially small to medium companies, discourage claims by employee drivers. 
The Inquiry agrees with the ARA that claims data indicate a strong case for targeting. Indeed, 
it could be argued that had WorkCover taken a more proactive prevention role in road 
transport this aspect may have been addressed already. It seems strange that one of the long 
mooted advantages of having compensation/rehabilitation and prevention activities within the 
orbit of single agency has failed to materialise in this case. The Inquiry finds this constitutes 
additional evidence for WorkCover taking a stronger prevention role in relation to road 
transport. Nonetheless, as has been detailed at some length in an earlier section, targeting is at 
best a partial solution given that workers' compensation data significantly understates the 
overall number of injuries experienced by long distance truck drivers (including those of a 
serious nature) and distorts patterns of incidence.  
 
Finally, at a number of points the ARA was at pains to point out that in many instances its 
members, including large retailers, were not the owner of loads being transported but rather 
only took control once the product had been delivered to their premises: 
 
Well the general position for us is who initiates the transport contract. Except for the 
outboud…generally our people do not initiate the trip. They don’t see that they're initiating 
the trip and that's the important issue for us…Most of the negotiations for supply are with 
delivery included… We'll accept our role where it is justified. The point is we don’t want to 
accept responsibility for things in actual fact aren't our responsibility and obviously if there 
are responsibilities there we'd have to review our total supply arrangements (oral submission, 
Bill Healey, ARA)  
 
The Inquiry accepts that for inbound transport of freight retailers are not the load owner and, 
as consignees, only take possession once the freight is unloaded except where goods are bring 
moved from a retailer's own warehouse or a commercial warehouse storing the goods on the 
owners behalf. At the same time, the Inquiry heard evidence that pressure on transport 
companies did not emanate solely from those dispatching/consigning or owning loads but also 
those receiving them (ie consignees). Even if a receiver does not own a load they will still 
have an interest in ensuring it is delivered at a time that suits them, and with just-in-time, 
these delivery windows are often very tight. The Inquiry received frequent submissions in 
relation to precisely this sort of pressure from customers receiving a load and it was also 
raised in the Driver Survey undertaken for this Inquiry. Nor are these suggestions especially 
new. For example, in 1997 NatRoad executive director, David Cribb (de Brito, 1997:55) 
declared: 
 
There is a definite influence on operators, for example, setting unreasonable delivery times 
and causing delays, and there is definitely need for an education program for customers… 
 
Consignees, those who receive freight, are the real problem, rather than those who despatch 
it, the consignors. 
 
Cribb provided a number of illustrations of this, including the case where a four hour delay in 
unloading a truck (from 7am to 11am) means the driver cannot get an adequate rest before 
going to pick up his next load (at 4pm). The Inquiry heard many submissions from drivers 
and operators making precisely the same point. 
 
It should be stressed that the points just made are not confined to the transport of freight for 
the retail industry. From what the Inquiry has been able to discover about the attitude of load 
owners or clients more generally the following observations can be made.  
 
First, clients have been inclined to argue that once the product has left their premises (if they 
are consignors) or until it is unloaded at their own premises (if they are consignees) its mode 
of delivery, including driver behaviour, is beyond their control. With regard to at least some 
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load owners there is disingenuous character to this argument. As transport operators are apt to 
be point out, where issues of security, quality and perishability are at stake, a number of the 
very same load owners want detailed information and a say on how goods are to be delivered 
and the transport progress at every stage. Detailed specifications, or even compulsory 
deductions by customers in relation to freight insurance are far from atypical. Further, as 
David Anderson, CEO of NatRoad (oral submission) observed a number of customers have 
sought to meet their due of care by passing on costly requirements to the trucking operator: 
 
You must have this, you must have that, have roll-over tarps before you get in the yard, you 
must have under-side protection or whatever. 
 
Second, in an analogous fashion it is argued that where realistic schedules are set then the 
client should not be held responsible for wayward practices on the part of the operator or the 
driver. The short answer to this argument is that where the customer takes such a precaution 
they absolve themselves from legal responsibility but on the other hand they cannot exclude 
loading delays etc for which they are responsible from the equation. Taking the point a step 
further, there are issues of genuine complexity in setting a realistic schedule will be 
determined by the driver's available hours and periods of rest the driver had prior to departure. 
It will also depend on the timing of trip (ie day/night) and whether the delivery is being made 
a subcontractor, a small fleet or a large truck (which may be able to change drivers at say 
Tarcutta). In practice, it appears that is usually the lowest common denominator that applies 
in the resulting schedules. It might be suggested that the answer to this problem is that as the 
principal contractor the client should take some reasonable measure to assure themselves on 
these matters by requiring the operator to provide this information, and that risk management 
might suggest some precautionary operator selection principles. At the same time, the Inquiry 
recognises there is a practical issue here and a recommendation in relation to a trip-based 
document system specifically addresses this issue. 
 
3.2.4.5 Conclusion 
 
The concerns of the ARA that retailers do not wish to be held legally responsible for aspects 
of the transport supply chain that they have no or very limited control over is understandable 
and almost certainly would be a view shared by other users of long haul road transport. As the 
ARA points out, correctly in the view of this Inquiry, there are a complex array of 
arrangements in the supply chain and to treat all users of road transport as load owners would 
be inequitable and unfair. The argument of the ARA is that problems besetting the industry 
arise from the practices of transport operators. Certainly, there are features of the industry 
(ease of entry, operator turnover and intense competition) that may be viewed as encouraging 
hazardous practices by some operators even in the absence of pressures from 
customers/clients. At the same time, there is also compelling evidence that customer/client 
pressures have contributed to hazardous practices. In practice, there is no simple divide 
between customer and transport operator responsibility, since pressures from customers 
undoubtedly encourage unrealistic scheduling by transport operators while the willingness of 
transport operators to meet these and other demands reinforces such expectations. Further, 
whether they are load owners/consignors or consignees, users or those relying on road 
transport do have a vested interest in its performance and, as would be expected, exercise 
influence accordingly to the extent they can.  
 
The overall impression gained by the Inquiry is that the balance of bargaining power between 
the road transport industry and its clients is unequal. The long haul transport industry is very 
much customer driven in terms of rates, scheduling, waiting and destination times. It would 
seem suppliers, clients, consignees, consigners, loaders, fleet owners, other transport 
companies, freight-forwarders and receivers are imposing unrealistic expectations on the 
industry.  Such unreal expectations encourage operators to cut corners to try to fulfil those 
expectations. This results in unsafe practices such as excessive hours, use of drugs, neglect of 
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machinery etc. The real issue here is not so much to apportion blame but to devise a 
regulatory system where all parties have an opportunity to act responsibly in that sphere 
where they do have influence. 
 
3.2.5 Trucks as Mobile Warehouses: Just-in-Time, Delays to Loading/Unloading and 
Demurrage  
 
There can be no doubt that the increased use of just-in-time inventory systems by retailers, 
wholesalers, manufacturers and other major clients over the past decade or more has placed 
increased pressure on the trucking industry. Delivery ‘windows’ have narrowed and transport 
companies are liable to receive less notice of a freight task and to get more calls for urgent 
deliveries because lower inventory levels (while saving storage costs for the customer) also 
leave less margin for error or to cover unexpected changes in demand. The Inquiry received 
numerous submissions attesting to this from transport operators and it was also something that 
regulatory agencies and others connected with the industry have become increasingly aware. 
Indeed, the Inquiry was rather surprised at the number of agencies and enforcement officers 
(such as police highway patrol officers) who raised the issue. Some evidence in relation to the 
impact of just-in-time (JIT) - and the exacerbating effect on this of e-commerce - was 
presented earlier in this section of the Report, and the potential for tight schedules to 
compromise safety also requires little additional elaboration. Therefore, this subsection will 
be concerned to identify some aspects of the just-in-time/scheduling issue not raised thus far 
as well as looking at the issue of loading/unloading delays. 
 
One point that needs to be made is that the rapid delivery pressures associated with just-in-
time result not simply from the direct effects of keeper lower inventory levels but also other 
decisions affecting the supply chain. This includes decisions on the number and location of 
warehouses storing produce for a client (which they already own or can draw on) and the 
ways in which these warehouses are administered. Further, where there are several available 
sources for the same product in competition with each other, then the commercial imperative 
of the more remotely located source may measurably affect time pressures on the transport 
operator brought in to do the freight task. As the manager of one large transport operator (oral 
submission) observed: 
 
It’s a cyclic thing that people go through, having warehouses in other states and then they 
close warehouses in other state. Half the people you talk to will say “we want to have one 
warehouse in a major city where we do a ‘just-in-time’ to the customer”. Other people will 
say “no we want to go from that and we want to have a warehouse in Brisbane, one in 
Melbourne, one in Adelaide, bulk transfers between the two and then just do local deliveries. 
It’s the one where you’ve got one main warehouse plus servicing direct to customers in every 
state that puts pressure on the times. Because they are competing with people in Brisbane 
who can arrive that day or the next morning and if you’ve got product coming from Sydney or 
from Melbourne then you’re a day away. 
 
The ARA (oral submission, Bill Healey) also saw shifts in the ownership of warehouses (by 
retailers or transport companies) in cyclic terms. 
 
The logic of just-in-time (JIT) might also suggest that once a truck has arrived it will be 
rapidly unloaded and sent on its way to the next task. While such rapid shifts do occur, it is by 
no means a universal or arguably even a dominant practice due to a number of complicating 
factors. First, the Inquiry learned of cases where a truck is delivering to a commercial 
warehouse to replace depleted stock to a space allocated to a particular client but cannot 
unload because the movement of existing stock from the warehouse to the stores or other final 
destinations has been delayed. Strict queuing procedures imposed by the customer (especially 
in the case of refrigerate or perishable stock) may mean there is also no option for directly 
transhipping the newly arrived product in favour of that stored in the warehouse. Delays may 
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also arise because the warehouse accords other loads a higher priority on the basis of meeting 
the timeframe of a range of customers, because the warehouse lacks space or due to 
mismanagement on the part of the client. Those managing the ordering or delivery of freight 
for a client are not always knowledgable about the transport process/demands on long haul 
drivers/operators and the Inquiry heard that some customers are simply more efficient in this 
task than others. For example, some large customers have their own personnel permanently 
stationed at commercial warehouses to ensure efficient maintenance of inventory and stock 
movements but more often those in charge of the process are remote from the process. 
Second, even in the case where a truck is delivering freight to a warehouse, factory or store 
owned by the client there is no guarantee of rapid unloading and indeed often no imperative to 
do so since the client now knows the load is available whenever it suits them. For example, 
the client might prefer to load and dispatch trucks doing local deliveries prior to unloading all 
or some long haul deliveries.  
 
The basic reason why just-in-time does not extend to the turn around of trucks by the 
customer or commercial warehouse is that there may be no commercial imperative to do so, 
indeed quite the reverse. Waiting time for long haul trucks is usually unpaid (ie without 
demurrage) while the drivers of trucks doing local deliveries, on the other hand, are paid by 
the hour. In other words, long haul trucks can become a useful and unpaid form of mobile 
storage, facilitating the just-in-time process but in no way benefiting from it – quite the 
reverse.  
 
The Inquiry also received many submissions that once a truck had arrived it was often 
delayed for long periods, waiting to load/unload. 
 
These are what we deem as the real abusers of the trucking industry. It is nothing for a truck 
to be kept waiting hours on end to be loaded or unloaded. It is the freight 
forwarders/suppliers/receivers who set the time limits the drivers have in which to deliver the 
freight. The grocery warehouses are the main offenders. The [named cold storage warehouse 
and location] treats the truck drivers appallingly. It is not uncommon for drivers to wait from 
10 to 14 hours and on a few occasions they have been made to wait up to four days, to be 
unloaded. There is no shade, no toilet amenities and no food or drink facilities close by. The 
closest shop is approx 1km away. While that may not seem far, the drivers can not leave their 
trucks in case they are called in to unload, so by the time a driver walked to the shop, got his 
order and walked back to the truck he could be away as long as 45 min [sic].  Just long 
enough for someone else to jump the queue. Most places do not let the truck drivers go to bed 
and sleep whilst they are waiting. They will constantly be told “twenty minutes, twenty 
minutes” until they will be unloaded/loaded to make sure they do not go to bed. Once they 
have been unloaded they then have to drive elsewhere to re-load and have it all happen 
again. Truck drivers are rarely loaded before late afternoon/early evening and this means the 
drivers are made to drive all night to meet the time slots they are given, especially with 
market freight. You only have to see the amount of trucks on the highways late at night to 
know this is true. My husband usually has time to stop for either a shower or dinner. He 
rarely has time to do both let alone sleep. My husband gets an average of between 5-8 hours 
sleep per week. No-one can survive on that amount of sleep and be expected to have full use 
of their senses. That is when they truly become dangerous, and need to rely on “awakeners” 
to get them safely to their destination and ultimately home to their families. No 
owner/operator is indispensable and unfortunately there are too many willing to take his 
place so he must carry on and get the freight through. (written submission, wife of NSW 
based interstate driver for nine years, the last five as an owner/driver). 
 
The Report has already noted that time spent waiting to load or unload was repeatedly raised 
as a pressing safety issue in the course of this Inquiry. Waiting time ranging from several 
hours to eight hours or more extend the working/non-rest hours of drivers (especially given 
the absence of rest facilities (preferably air-conditioned) and queuing practices that prevent 
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drivers from even getting rest in their trucks. Wherever it travelled to conduct hearings/take 
oral submissions, the Inquiry heard repeated complaints of loading/unloading delays and tight 
schedules with limited windows of opportunity/time slots. The same points came across in 
numerous written submissions. Drivers and others giving evidence to the Inquiry attributed 
these delays to a mixture of inefficiency, cost incentives favouring given priority to local 
driver deliveries over long haul drivers, and also the warehousing space/tight scheduling 
limits imposed by the just-in-time system. Criticism was directed at freight 
forwarders/warehouse operators, load owners and load receivers. The following quotes are 
typical of those made in the course of the Inquiry: 
 
I name trucks the mobile warehouse because I believe that’s how freight forwarders treat the 
transport industry because they don’t have the overheads of major warehouses to house all 
these products. So if somebody loading from Melbourne to Sydney and they go in the morning 
and they might keep them there for six hours before they even start to load them and they then 
have to wait another three to four hours for their paper work which is already ready… There 
is a reason for that…You actually …get to Sydney too soon before they had a chance to clear 
the warehouse for your product and that is basically what it comes down too. (oral 
submission, wife/business partner Victorian based owner/driver). 
 
We do delivery into a distribution center near Goulburn and had a load of toilet rolls and we 
were told to be there at one pm exactly. We were there at 12.30, proceeded to line up with 
everybody else… one o'clock came, two came, three o'clock and at 4.15 we were told to come 
in and they would unload it. Half the load got taken off and then they stop. I walked around 
until I found somebody 'well what's the story, not only were we here on time but we were here 
early, now some hours later why aren't you finished unloading the truck? Tea break mate, 
sorry'. If we had not been there by one o'clock who would have been penalised?  We would, 
not them (oral submission, wife/business partner owner/driver southern NSW). 
 
The retail sector and some of the manufacturing sector are dictating, and the window of 
opportunity or the window of delivery in some instances now is down to 10 minutes from the 
point of pick up to point of delivery. You could be talking over a legal travelling time of 
anything up to 40 hours and that is the time frame you got. So we have here…not so much in 
my view…the industry itself saying this is what's going to happen, it’s the clients of the 
industry (oral submission, owner/driver southern NSW). 
 
Complaints about loading delays did not simply emanate from owner/drivers and employee 
drivers. The TWU, CFAT, regulatory agencies and several industry associations also raised 
the issue. The complaints indicated that it was a general problem across the industry and not 
confined to just some clients.  
 
At the same time, this is not to say the problem affects all areas of road transport or that there 
are not some areas of road transport where efficiency gains have not included faster turn 
around of trucks. For example, in its oral submission (Bob Gunning), the Livestock 
Association of NSW stated that increased efficiency amongst for-hire livestock haulers over 
the past decade had secured freight task away from not-for-hire operators (such as farming 
operations owning their trucks). Over the past three to four years the Association stated there 
had also been a dramatic reduction in the practice of numbers of local carriers queued up for 
three or four hours at saleyards. In most instances, livestock trucks were also able to unload at 
most abattoirs on a 24-hour basis with minimal if any need for involvement by abattoir staff. 
Animal welfare considerations (and associated regulations) as well as the abattoir’s 
commercial incentive to get livestock (it now owns) in the best possible condition also play a 
role here in terms of minimising delivery and unloading times. Non-stressed and rested 
animals are less likely to result in ‘dark cutters’ (slaughtered animals with dark coloured meat 
not favoured by the market) and improvements in the shipping of animals has resulted in a 
very significant reduction in this problem. 
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However, the welfare/regulatory imperatives and commercial incentives that apply to 
livestock appear to be atypical. For an example of this it was necessary to turn to bulk carriers 
of grain and other farm-related freight, a category of transporters also covered by the 
Livestock Association. Here, the situation was quite different: 
  
Not in livestock but with bulk carters one of the things that has clearly happened…is they 
come down from Sydney to deliver feed, for example grain or maybe pick up superphosphate 
or something. Some of the places they come into give them the most horrendous times in terms 
of turning up. Be there at 10 or 11 and then get away by four in the afternoon…it costs them a 
lot of money and …it costs them anguish…and they have to be alert. There’s a psychological 
dimension to it too. One of the worst cases I heard about recently the drivers were told 
they’re not allowed to use the facilities, they’ve been banned from the lunch room, can’t use 
the toilet… (oral submission, Robert Gunning, Livestock Transport Association of NSW) 
 
In short, the livestock and bulk handling cases highlight how, where there are strong 
commercial and market incentives on the client do so, a loading/unloading delays are 
addressed whereas if this is not the case, as with bulk handlers, the problem remains. The 
Inquiry was made aware of other areas of transport (including one part of refrigerated 
haulage) where the commercial interests of load owners or the owners of storage facilities 
gave rise to quite inefficient and potential dangerous arrangements for the transport operator.  
 
As the research of Hensher and colleagues discussed earlier in the Report clearly showed, 
waiting times and efforts to evade them were a major source of potentially dangerous self-
scheduling on the part of drivers. It can be argued that waiting delays imposed on trucks 
constitute a health risk to drivers. It exacerbates fatigue problems by preventing drivers taking 
proper rest (often confining them to the truck irrespective of the temperature outside) and 
encourages a breach of driving-hours laws because time spent in a queue is essentially unpaid 
work time.  It is also a means whereby load owners/receivers effectively if indirectly 
encourage scheduling pressures on drivers as they try to beat queues, or after being delayed, 
try to make up time to meet another schedule or secure a further load. While load 
owners/receivers are unlikely to readily accept the latter interpretation, evidence of the link is 
clear and even if this was not the case it can be argued that commercial pressures from clients 
are the underlying problem.  
 
This is not to say owner/receivers are entirely responsible for the problem. As the ARA (oral 
submission Michael Davidson) has pointed out, it is also possible that some owner/drivers 
who cut the time margin too finely between jobs (in order to maximise their business) can 
hardly expect a major client/receiver to reschedule its unloading to facilitate this. The Inquiry 
has no doubt this problem occurs and should be addressed (as back to back loads within 
narrow time frames are conducive to a breach of driving hours). Most of the owner/drivers the 
Inquiry spoke to were sufficiently experienced to leave a gap and the times mentioned for 
moving between jobs were of an order (six hours was the narrowest ‘gap’ mentioned and 
most were far long than this) that would, without considerable delays, have been adequate. At 
the same time, the were repeated references to the eagerness of divers to secure a job so as to 
not leave them stranded ‘away from home’ on the weekend and this could be conducive to 
rushing between jobs (along with other hazardous practices). 
 
Bob Mitchell, President of the Livestock Transporters Association (oral submission) referred 
to the problem of drivers being tied to their truck while waiting to load/unload: 
 
…they dare not leave their vehicle. They’ve got to be there to move it up because it’s so 
competitive. 
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The wife of an owner/driver who accompanied her husband on trips delivering metal products 
to Melbourne made the following comments about queuing at the large manufacturer’s 
(named) depot: 
 
There is no time to sleep because…of the line. You sit there and wait your turn…You just 
can’t get any sleep because they [the factory staff] just keep banging on your door telling you 
to move up. 
 
And in response to being asked about the possibility of a ticketing system to organise queues 
and allow drivers to get rest: 
 
Too easy, too easy. They won’t do it. We have tried. We even asked them to put a number on 
the front of the truck, like just a card to say what truck number that is to call us in. Its far too 
easy for them. The problem is [named company] send out orders 24 hours a day…we want 20 
trucks today. Through the whole period of the day they set out orders when they want it…So 
you’re on call – in time freight (oral submission, wife of owner driver, Hunter Valley). 
 
Throughout hearings the Inquiry heard repeated claims of a similar nature, namely that drivers 
were kept waiting at the customer’s convenience, that truck drivers were treated without 
dignity and that their health and welfare was of no concern to customers. While it would be 
dangerous to presume that all customers treat long distance truck drivers in such a cavalier 
fashion the weight of evidence presented to the Inquiry is that such practices are not 
uncommon. 
 
The problems just alluded to were raised again and again in the course of the Inquiry by a 
wide range of other parties (including academics with knowledge of the industry, regulatory 
agencies and insurers) and not simply drivers. For example, in its written submission the RTA 
argued: 
 
Apart from directly putting pressure on drivers to break the duty and rest laws, players in the 
road freight chain can influence drivers’ behaviour in other ways that have implications for 
industry safety. One example is queuing practices at depots. Drivers often have to place 
vehicles in a queue at a depot to be loaded or unloaded. This can mean that they have to 
spend hours behind the wheel, moving it a few metres at a time toward the loading point. 
Research has shown that this is very frustrating for drivers and it means that they cannot 
relax away from the vehicle or take a nap. Under the duty and rest laws, time behind the 
wheel must be counted as work. 
 
The ability of drivers to effectively manage their fatigue would be greatly facilitated if 
companies had queuing systems that allowed drivers to take a nap or leave the truck while 
they wait for their turn. Unfortunately, many operators of the loading points are not prepared 
to take steps to facilitate drivers’ fatigue management. 
 
In addition to submissions made to it, the Inquiry received additional evidence indicating that 
delays to loading and unloading of long distance trucks was a serious issue not an aberrant 
occurrence. One such piece of evidence was the national survey of fatigue amongst long 
distance drivers by Williamson et al (2000) already mentioned at several points in this Report. 
This report found that of the 1007 drivers surveyed, around 30% had to wait to load or unload 
at the start or end of their last trip, with average wait being two to three hours. Loading 
queues were the common cause of these delays (Williamson et al 2000:xii). It should be noted 
that in addition to delays, over half the drivers surveyed reported having to spend an average 
of between 1.75 and 2.5 hours loading or unloading their truck on their last trip. While this 
loading/unloading does not always involve either the load owner or the receiver (where the 
load is being moved to or from transport operators/freight forwarders depots), situations 
where this is the case are not uncommon. These may occur where responsibility for 
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loading/unloading formally resides with the transport operator (whether an additional 
payment or allowance is made for this is a moot point). There are also situations where the 
driver undertakes these activities informally in order to expedite the turnaround (including 
cases where a mismatch with the working schedules of warehouse staff threatens to cause or 
exacerbate a delay).  
 
For its part, the Williamson et al (2000:109-110) study concluded: 
 
Pressures of loading and unloading were shown to be important in both the current and 
earlier survey in terms of being a potential contributor to fatigue and by reports from drivers 
that improving loading and unloading practices was a strategy that would reduce fatigue. The 
second survey asked about the specific issue of waiting to loading and unloading. The results 
showed clearly that waiting to load and unload was a major problem for drivers by 
contributing to their fatigue and by being a time pressure on them to arrive at their 
destination… 
 
There has been an increasing acknowledgment of the role of the freight forwarder and the 
customer in work scheduling for long distance drivers over the past few years (McCabe & 
Grant, 2000). This study adds weight from a driver point of view to the importance of these 
sections of the transportation relationship chain in exerting pressures on drivers that are not 
consistent with fatigue management. 
 
Existing arrangements provide absolutely no economic or regulatory incentive for clients to 
consider the health and inconvenience delays to long haul trucks, quite the reverse. There are 
two grounds for this assessment. 
 
First, long distance trucks deliver freight usually at a set rate rather than a time-based 
payment. While major transport companies may, indeed it was suggested, often include 
demurrage provisions in contracts (with payment to be made after an hour or an hour and a 
half) there is little evidence that these are enforced. As the representative of one transport 
operator (oral submission) observed: 
 
If you charge demurrage and you would find most contracts with customers would probably 
have a demurrage clause in it, nobody enforces it because nobody will pay it. 
 
Almost all the fleet operators (let alone owner/drivers) spoken to in the course of the Inquiry 
felt they were in no position to include a demurrage provision let alone impose a charge for to 
do so would risk losing further work from the client. As one small fleet operator observed in 
relation to a colleague (another small fleet operator): 
 
If [named operator] was to implement a demurrage program that said after two hours you 
pay…, they [the client] would just drop him like a hot brick and get somebody else. So the 
demurrage wont work, unless it was government legislated…(oral submission, small fleet 
operator, Southern NSW). 
 
The absence of demurrage provides a stark indication of the relative bargaining strength of 
transport companies and clients in the road transport industry, and the real power that is 
exercised by the former despite protestations to the contrary. Demurrage, or the imposition of 
a charge where a client delays a truck for a lengthy period (and due to reasons that reside with 
the client rather than the transport operator) would be regarded by most as a commercial 
practice which makes sense both in ethical and efficiency terms. Yet, the issues at stake are 
more than this, because the evidence on what delays do to driver rest and future driving 
behaviour, and the implications of this for safety, are clear and compelling (see Hensher, 
Williams and other studies cited in this Report). The failure to pay demurrage is not simply a 
'good commercial deal' on the part of the client. Rather, it also represents a practice that, by 
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discouraging rapid unloading of trucks, directly induce practices that put drivers and the 
community at risk. 
 
Even in those seemingly rare situations where demurrage payments are made and a 
subcontract arrangement is involved, a number of witnesses to the Inquiry claimed these 
payments never found their way to the owner/driver or small fleet that actually delivered the 
freight. As noted elsewhere, for many owner/drivers and small operators getting paid the 
basic freight charge is difficult enough - let alone demurrage. In sum, it appears that clients 
seldom have to consider paying demurrage and as such there is no incentive for them not to 
waste the time of the long distance truck driver if this suits their own interests. The fact that 
there are no regulatory requirements in relation to affording delayed drivers opportunities to 
shower, change and rest essentially means that any potential incentive is absent. 
 
Second, on the other side of the coin, in the absence of any regulatory requirements in relation 
to queuing there is no reason why clients/receivers cannot impose the most arbitrary process 
in terms of the allocation of trucks to loading/unloading bays. There may even be good 
reasons for putting long distance trucks at the end of the queue because not only is there no 
penalty to do this, since drivers of local deliveries are generally paid on an hourly basis any 
delay to these trucks does attract a cost. In other words, existing commercial arrangements 
make showing preference to local drivers over long distance trucks economically rational 
even though it imposes a series of economic and health-related costs on the long distance 
truck driver. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Weighing up the evidence in relation to waiting time/queues and demurrage the Inquiry has 
come to the view that this is a serious safety issue, especially when flow on affects to lost 
earning time and scheduling are considered. Current commercial practices in no way 
encourage a responsible approach on the part of those who essentially control the situation – 
quite the reverse. The just-in-time system operates for those using road transport but is not 
something that is accorded to the industry itself where in essence delayed trucks become 
mobile warehouses. There also needs to be a clearer recognition of the hazards inherent in 
tightly coupled logistical chains, epitomised by just-in-time. In their study of the development 
of transport systems and the implications of this for Dutch road safety, Stoop and Thissen  
(1997:112) observe: 
 
…tight couplings in logistic chains may lead to vulnerability in a number of ways. 
Operational pressure will tend to dominate safety concerns. For example, drivers or 
forwarders who see themselves behind planned schedule will be inclined to give highest 
priority to catching up with the desired time schedule, often at the expense of safety margins. 
Such operators should fulfil their tasks within the boundaries of the safe operating envelope 
defined for their vehicles… 
 
In other words, once we have a system built on tight couplings we should expect strong 
operational pressures to override safety. Where, as in road transport, the load owner and 
receiver often dictate the time slot but feel no responsibility to ensure the rapid 
loading/unloading of the truck other than the extent it suits their own interests, safety risks are 
exacerbated in a way that needs to be addressed. 
 
Finally, as in the previous subsection this subsection found strong evidence that customers, 
including those receiving a load they may not take ownership of until it has been unloaded, 
have a profound effect on the ability of long haul drivers to obtain sufficient rest. This, in 
turn, has significant implications for safety in the industry that can no longer be ignored. 
Submissions to this Inquiry on this point were overwhelming and not simply based on 
anecdotes but included evidence from two recent surveys of drivers, both substantial and 
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arguably representative. Further, this evidence was entirely consistent with other evidence 
from earlier reports, inquests and inquiries carried out in Australia that were identified and 
discussed earlier. Finally, precisely the same issues have been raised in recent overseas 
research into the trucking industry. In the United States, for example, a series of studies have 
pointed to both shipper/dispatcher pressures and an association between tight delivery 
schedules and hours of service violations and (to a lesser extent) speeding violations. A 
survey of truck drivers in Florida by Beilock (1995) found at least 26% would have break 
speed or hours of service rules to meet assigned schedules. A survey of 1249 drivers at 
inspection stations and truck stops in four states by Braver et al (1992) found 73% reported 
exceeding permitted hours and this was associated with tight delivery times and penalties for 
late delivery (for reference to a number of other studies reaching similar conclusions see 
Braver et al, 1999:194). Braver et al (1999:194) also point to evidence that shippers have been 
imposing increasingly precise delivery times because manufacturers are holding smaller 
inventories (as part of JIT strategies) which compounds the cost of late deliveries (including 
lost customers). 
 
Consistent with what this Inquiry was repeated told by drivers and industry representatives, a 
study by Neale et al (1998:26) based on focus groups of drivers held in eight cities covering 
seven states noted: 
 
One problem cited is arriving at the customer’s terminal at the scheduled time and being told 
that the driver must wait to be unloaded. While waiting, many drivers report that they cannot 
sleep because they will lose their turn in the queue, since the customer may not choose to 
wake the sleeping driver. Drivers reported waiting as long as 16 hours to be unloaded. Some 
drivers said that if a driver is delivering a load and is only a few minutes late, the customer 
can refuse the load. Drivers further alleged that if the truck driver arrives early, the customer 
can make the driver wait well beyond his scheduled time. Regardless, drivers stated that they 
are still expected to deliver the next load on time. Customers such as these were said to have 
a tremendous effect on the driver’s attitude and hence his/her level of fatigue. 
 
The study detailed other loading/unloading problems, including the need to supervise the 
process to ensure proper loading or prevent freight damage and instances where the shipper 
delays loading but tells their consignee the load is en route, leading to situations where the 
driver is blamed for missing their schedule. As in Australia, the problem of not being paid for 
periods of non-driving time was raised as well as the additional stress caused by transport 
companies siding with customers against drivers rather than risk losing business (Neale et al 
1998:27). Summarising their findings, the authors noted every focus group highlighted the 
need for drivers to able to unload as scheduled and, if delayed, to sleep while waiting to 
load/unload without fear of losing their place as well coercion of drivers by dispatchers to 
keep driving (Neale et al, 1998:30). 
 
By 1998 the United States Congress was sufficiently concerned that scheduling pressure from 
shippers was inducing hours of service breaches that it passed a law directing the Department 
of Transport (DOT) to investigate the issue and propose how it could bring civil actions 
against shippers, brokers, consignees and freight-forwarders (Braver et al 1999:194-195). A 
subsequent survey of both long haul drivers and 270 dispatchers by Braver et al (1999) found 
20% of drivers reported the trucking firm employing them had imposed penalties for late 
delivery while 40% of dispatchers reported shippers had imposed lateness penalties, but only 
rarely. Dispatchers identified revenue as the major factor determining whether they accepted 
or rejected a load (75% cited this) while just under a quarter (24%) referred to delivery 
deadlines. The study noted that revenue considerations were probably ‘...a strong influence on 
delivery schedules in the very competitive trucking industry’ (Braver et al, 1999:200). The 
study found trip mileage was the key determinant of schedules and dispatchers generally 
failed to factor non-driving tasks into their calculation of trip times. This may be seen as 
another manifestation of revenue pressure. Further, it may be difficult to counter pose revenue 
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and deadline pressures since it could be argued that the former makes it unnecessary in many 
instances for shippers to resort to the latter. In other words, the commercial power over price 
that intense competition bestows to shippers hardly places transport companies in a position 
to quibble over deadlines. This interpretation matches the evidence presented to this Inquiry. 
Also consistent with this interpretation, Braver et all (1999) conclude by noting that motor 
carriers may be reluctant to nominate shippers imposing pressures for fear of losing 
customers. Braver et al (1999) see this as making regulatory initiatives against shippers more 
difficult. The Inquiry examines this issue and potential remedies in a later section. At this 
stage it is enough to reiterate the point that the problems of scheduling pressures identified by 
the Inquiry are not unique to Australia but are also causing considerable concern in the United 
States and elsewhere. 
 
The issue of tight scheduling, loading/unloading delays and demurrage requires urgent 
attention, and has been addressed in the major recommendations of this Report. 
  
3.2.6 Commercial Practices, Operator standards and Entry into the Industry 
 
The intense competitive pressures to undercut rates or engage in unsustainable or hazardous 
operational practices in the long haul road transport sector are not simply the product of client 
pressure but are also shaped by factors which make entry of newcomers into the industry 
relatively easy. These factors include: 
• Relatively low capital start-up costs and a willingness of finance companies to lend 
money to potential entrants 
• The absence of formal entry requirements for operators (apart from a truck drivers’ 
license in the case of owner/drivers) 
• The way entry in road transport is viewed as a means of ‘buying a job’, especially for 
those in regional centres with high unemployment levels/few job prospects or workers 
who have been made redundant 
 
3.2.6.1 Easy finance/easy indebtedness 
 
Any Tom, Dick or Harry can go and buy a truck. Now I’ll give you an example. I’ve got a son 
in Tamworth…he can’t borrow money to buy a house but the bank will lend him money to buy 
a truck. Can you believe that? (oral submission, small fleet operator, mid north coast NSW). 
 
It's an easy industry to enter but it’s a hard industry to survive in (oral submission, small fleet 
operator for 25 years and truck repairer for other operators, Hunter Valley) 
 
One of the greatest shortcomings of the Australian Road Transport Industry since its 
beginnings…is the fact that entry to the industry does not necessitate any form of education or 
accreditation. Ultimately, we are left in many instances with average to good truck drivers 
who can neither run nor maintain a business successfully. Once pure survival becomes 
paramount, from a risk management perspective, we have established that the first corners to 
be cut are on safety, this in itself is a majority of the current problem with the industry. Just to 
survive, every last shred of the roughly formulated business plan is dependent on operating to 
dangerous limits (written submission, Owen Driscoll, NTI Ltd, page 24). 
 
Throughout its investigations the Inquiry was repeatedly told that it was all too easy for a 
person with driving experience but with no demonstrated business skills to borrow money to 
purchase a truck and so start their own operations. The result is a surplus of transport 
operators, many with limited business knowledge or acumen, chasing a limited pool of tasks 
and who, in an effort to survive, must underbid each other on contracts. Considering the 
overall importance of the long haul trucking industry to the economy, it is essential that it be 
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conducted in a sustainable way. Whether or not some sort of licensing system should be 
introduced to help achieve this was an important consideration of the Inquiry. 
 
These problems are not new to the industry. In the mid 1980s the National Road Freight 
Industry Inquiry (May et al 1984 especially pages 197 to 204) examined the issues of truck 
financing and entry into the industry. The report noted that it had received many complaints 
that finance companies were indiscriminately supporting new entrants to the industry, 
including the offering of low deposit/high repayment finance-packages to new owner/drivers 
that could not be sustained under normal market conditions. Criticism of the frequent use of 
homes as collateral was also noted. The Australia Finance Conference rejected this criticism 
by identifying its lending requirements, but as the Report observed: 
 
The state requirements outlined by the Australian Finance Conference for truck sales and 
financing appear to diverge from the practices actually in force in the industry, although the 
divergence appears to have been greater a few years ago. There is, however, considerable 
potential for this divergence to reappear in time (May et al, 1984:204). 
 
Driving Forward, a report on the public vehicles and carriers industrial legislation undertaken 
for the then NSW Minister of Industrial Relations in 1993, made the observation. 
 
The fact remains that lenders do compete to provide truck finance and possibly to finance 
trading in ‘goodwill’. They take financial but not social responsibility for the outcomes of 
their lending policies. There is an argument for further consideration of this matter in a 
broader context of small business borrowing and lending generally. It is supported by this 
Review (Driving Forward, 1993:22 cited in written submission by its author Hylda Rolfe). 
 
This and other criticism by the report of the lending practices of finance companies in relation 
to truck purchases drew a response from the Australian Finance Conference in December 
1993. In submission to this Inquiry, the author of the report, who has remained a keen 
observer of the road transport industry, did not resile from the position taken in 1993. Indeed 
she expressed the view that competition amongst financial institutions encouraged by ACCC 
may have made the interaction between truck safety and finance even more apparent. The 
Inquiry is unable to express any view on this. It can say, however, that the view that funds for 
financing the purchase of a truck are too readily available is widely held by many sections of 
the industry and other interested parties such as insurers. 
 
Representatives from several insurance companies expressed serious concern at the ease of 
getting finance to purchase a truck and called for changes to lending practices. For example 
MMI/Allianz argued  
 
Allianz believe that the finance industry should review current practices and impose minimum 
standards which require a new finance applicant to produce financial projections as part of a 
business plan. This should demonstrate how they intend to achieve a return on net assets 
(RONA) greater then their weighted average cost of capital (WACC refer section 1.5) and 
ultimately ensure their long-term profitability 
 
…Anecdotal evidence suggests that the more traditional forms of security of bricks and 
mortar is all that is required for new entrants to purchase a new vehicle. Allianz propose that 
irrespective of the form of security on offer and the mix of capital required (debt and equity), 
it is more important for the business applying for credit to demonstrate that their proposal is 
viable before the institution advances finance (written submission, Dean Croke/MMI/Allianz, 
page 19). 
 
Large companies use small operators as subcontractors and these small operators have a very 
high rate of insolvency. From 1996 to 1997 they experienced a 91% increase in bankruptcies. 
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Lone operators, the owner/drivers, experienced a 42% increase in insolvency in the same 
period. 
 
It may be argued that the problem applies to small business generally and the market provides 
a remedy because those borrowers who cannot operate in a sustainable fashion will simply 
disappear.  Even ignoring the consequences of bankruptcy or losing the family home on these 
drivers and their families, there are number of other risks and costs that the community may 
not choose to be exposed to. Most notably, in their efforts to make ends meet after entering 
into such arrangements, drivers may well engage in work practices (excessive hours, 
speeding, use of drugs etc) which breach the law, undercut drivers and firms operating 
legally, and expose themselves and other road users to an increased risk of death or injury.  In 
a competitive labour intensive industry such as road transport, this scenario is indeed a likely 
outcome. Indeed, concern with these very issues led to the introduction of unconscionable 
contract provisions in the NSW Industrial Relations Act many years ago. While of some 
value, this represents at best a post hoc remedy.  
 
3.3 Comparing the Australian Experience with the USA and Europe 
 
In 1977 a restructuring of the US trucking industry initiated by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission removed regulations limiting market entry, collective rate-making and allowing 
carriers to favour larger clients. Increased competition reduced rates, especially for larger 
manufacturers and shippers, but thousands of carriers went bankrupt and the wages of non-
supervisory trucking employees fell by 26.8% between 1978 and 1990 (Belzer, 1994:1). Non-
union drivers suffered the largest loss in wages plus a significant increase in unpaid hours (for 
waiting etc). This widening gap encouraged an increase in the non-union workforce and with 
it ever more pervasive patterns of low payments and evasion of work-rules (relating to driving 
hours, drug use etc). Like other neo-liberal ‘reforms’, measured economic gains mostly 
derived far less from efficiency improvements than a combination of crude work 
intensification and a massive transfer of wealth from workers and small business to large 
owners of capital. Further, while environment and safety laws were retained (and indeed 
strengthened in areas like the carriage of hazardous substances and drug testing of drivers), 
the economic de-regulation exacerbated risks to drivers and public road users more generally. 
Belzer (1994:20) argued it made compliance with rules more costly for carriers, also 
observing that: 
 
Since economic deregulation, hundreds of thousands of owner-operators and drivers working 
for small, unregulated carriers have become harder to locate, supervise, train and 
monitor…In addition, the highly competitive market fostered by regulatory restructuring 
provides a daily incentive to violate rules designed to encourage safe operations 
 
Updating his analysis Belzer (2000:150) has argued the collapse of wage rates in trucking, 
both at an absolute level and in relation to other industries (like manufacturing) may well 
account for the driver shortages perceived by the trucking industry. As in Australia, Belzer 
(2000:139) found that US truck drivers were overwhelmingly paid on a performance-related 
basis, most commonly on a mileage basis (equivalent to the per kilometre rate in Australia) 
which rewards driving but not other work activities. Belzer (2000:142) argues the popularity 
of these systems is because they enable trucking companies to shift some of the risks they 
encounter from market pressures and customer scheduling demands, loading delays etc onto 
the driver. Belzer (2000:100-102) also contends that the low margins trucking companies 
operate on following deregulation means that any miscalculation by a firm can prove 
disastrous, helping to explain an increasing level of bankruptcies. His analysis of the return on 
equity bears some striking parallels with that of Dean Croke discussed earlier showing a 
downward trend throughout the 1990s (with a sharp fall in 1995 following intrastate 
deregulation). Belzer (2000:87) also points to the combination of customer pressure and 
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intense competition as offsetting the benefits that might otherwise have followed industry 
concentration (through mergers etc).  
 
Even though the industry is more concentrated, competition remains very high because 
customers are cost driven and competitors can engage in "destructive" competitive 
practices…The carrier making the back haul sets the rate, in this case, and nobody makes a 
profit. In other words, variant capacity utilization may systematically justify very different 
rates, and since at equilibrium every carrier is hauling freight at the lowest possible rate, 
profits remain chronically low. Controlling for information asymmetry, each customer will 
purchase its preferred bundle of lowest rate and highest service, keeping competition intense. 
 
Belzer's analysis has found support by other studies of the US trucking industry. For example, 
Cynthia Engel, an economist with the US Bureau of Labor found that the intense competition 
that occurred in the wake of deregulation had a profound effect, with strong benefits to 
consumers but rather more dubious effects on the industry itself. Engel (1998:40) concluded: 
 
Competition has resulted in increasing capital intensity in the industry, as firms strive to 
reduce average variable cost per load… Increased competition also has led companies to 
change the character of compensation plans for their workers, replacing those based on time 
with plans based on output. Over the years, wage premiums for unionised truckers have been 
bid down, and union representation has fallen dramatically. Increasing workloads and less 
attractive pay have led to high labor turnover and persistant driver shortages. 
 
It is worth noting in passing that several transport company managers making submissions to 
this Inquiry who had visited the USA made observations about the impact of deregulation on 
truck driver wages, and the consequent effects on labour turnover and experienced driver 
shortages essentially consistent with Belzer et al’s analysis. One referred to his surprise that 
during a visit in 1997 major companies were experiencing turnover rates well in excess of 
100% and one apparently very good operator based in Oregan reported with pride that he had 
reduced driver turnover to 86%. At least two felt the drug and alcohol regime in operation in 
the USA had exacerbated the driver shortage. 
 
A detailed survey of 573 long haul truck drivers undertaken by Belman et al (no date, 1998?) 
in 1997 found that the majority of drivers were working at or above the 60 hour maximum 
specified by hours of service regulation. Further, the survey indicated that long hours were the 
result both of pressure of freight firms and shippers, and driver efforts to maintain their 
income. The survey found that although drivers had a strong commitment to their profession 
(the typical respondent having worked in the industry for 12 years) this did not translate into 
loyalty to an employer. The average driver had been with the current employer only 18 
months and one quarter of drivers had quit in the previous 12 months. This turnover was seen 
to a consequence of a labour shortage to firms was actually a result of high turnover amongst 
drivers who remain in the industry. In other words, drivers were dissatisfied with their 
employer and the study argued for measures to address this and improve driver retention.  
 
Again, at the risk of belabouring the point, this is yet another survey that found evidence 
pressure from customers was a factor in the long hours worked by drivers. In short, 
evidence pressure from customers/clients induces hazardous practices in the road 
transport industry is not confined to Australia and it is certainly more than anecdotal. 
  
Recent research in the USA also confirms the strong relationship between reward levels and 
safety that has been repeatedly raised in the course of this Inquiry. In 1995 JB Hunt, the 
second biggest trucking company in the USA, announced a substantial wage increase for its 
drivers that placed it well above the norm for the industry. Professor Belzer and colleagues 
(2000a) were able to access company records to assess the impact of this change on safety. 
Belzer et al found that the increase had a significant discernable effect in reducing both the 
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incidences of crashes and labour turnover. Higher pay enabled the company to select more 
desirable driver characteristics from a safety perspective, and crash likelihood also 
progressively decreased with additional tenure suggesting some policies leading to lower 
turnover also lower crash rates. The strong relationship between pay and safety was 
confirmed by a later cross-sectional study based on a national survey of driver wages and 
UMTIP survey of carriers (Belzer et al, 2001). 
 
In another study Belzer and colleagues (2000b) examined the hours of service issue (more 
than half US drivers exceed the 60 hour limit), and especially the impact of unpaid working 
time (ie time not spent driving but waiting for loads etc). This study was undertaken for the 
Office of Motor Carriers in conjunction with a new hours-of-service regulation. Belzer et al 
found that the more wasted (ie unpaid) time drivers have, the more likely they are to squeeze 
too many hours into a day, forcing schedule irregularity and excessive hours. Indeed, they 
found that the number of unpaid hours a driver worked was the best predictor of work in 
excess of 60 hours per week. At the same time, they calculated that if unpaid non-driving time 
could be reduced by 25% the efficiency gain would eliminate the cost of compliance. In terms 
of a policy response, Belzer et al (2000b) argued that the consequent safety risk could be 
reduced by charging shippers and consignors for delay time and paying drivers for this time 
so they log it on as duty (measures to reduce driver turnover were also advocated). These 
findings are not inconsistent with many submissions made to this Inquiry and earlier research 
undertaken by Hensher and colleagues. 
 
The promotion of competition by the European Commission is having a similar effect in the 
European Union. According to Hamelin (2000:5), subcontracting, business start-ups and 
failures spread at the height of the deregulation 'fever' from the mid 1980s. Competition 
between freight forwarders held freight rates down, with many transport firms, some barely 
viable, taking contracts at 'rock-bottom' prices just to stay in business and the turnover of 
firms enabling the embedded costs of the haulage system (including those associated with 
economic swings) to be farmed out. Hamelin (2000:5) argues that fierce competition between 
hauliers has been instrumental in making anti-social working hours the norm for drivers. This 
can be seen as one aspect of a broader question as to whether the social costs of road 
transport, including public safety, should be borne by the industry and passed on in haulage 
rates, or regarded as a cost to the community. 
 
By the mid 1990s, if not before, regulators (and others) were expressing serious concern at the 
safety implications of the simultaneous growth of the road freight task at the same time as 
freight rates and profit margins were being squeezed. In 1996 Derek Gibbons from the British 
Department of Transport (Bousfield, 1996:66) observed:  
 
As profit margins get smaller, we are worried about the 'cowboy' companies that aren't 
properly licensed and don’t train their drivers correctly. 
 
As in Australia, there have been recurring complaints from drivers that the pressure from 
customers and the just-in-time system is undermining safety (Bousfield, 1996:66). 
 
From 1998 onward the level of competitive pressure was intensified as a direct result of the 
European Commission's economic reform process. As in Australia, agencies, interest groups 
and academic economist and policy analysts supporting these regulatory reforms 
conspicuously ignored occupational health and safety effects or other externalities associated 
with the change (see for example, Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). The first (anti) cabotage 
regulation on road transport introduced in July 1998 effectively removed license requirements 
to drive in particular countries, enabling drivers to not only take loads into countries where 
they were not licensed but also to do domestic trips within these countries on an ‘occasional’ 
basis. Precisely what ‘occasional’ means is yet to be decided, with individual countries 
reluctant to make a move that might jeopardise the competitive position of their own transport 
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operators. Given significant disparities in licensing requirements and safety legislation, wage 
rates, working conditions and union density between countries (especially between southern 
and northern Europe), the cabotage regulation has intensified competition between transport 
operators in different regions in Europe. According to Hamelin (2000:25) this competition has 
led to a further cut in already low freight rates. This has occurred in a context where the only 
common law governing labour management amongst European hauliers is EEC Safety 
Regulation 3820/85 (passed in 1985) and there are serious disparities and omissions in the 
legal framework governing driving hours. In other words, there is a mismatch between direct 
competitive pressures and a patchwork quilt of regulatory protection to prevent anti-social 
outcomes. 
 
Even the largest operators in the Netherlands have sought ways to cut operating costs by 
changing their employment practices and manipulating legal categories. Analogous to the 
maritime industry, it has also led to emergence of companies using drivers from Eastern 
Europe at low 'flag of convenience' wages. This practice has already caused concern amongst 
representatives of British haulage industry. A recent inquiry into the industry by the House of 
Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee (2000:xxvii) heard 
evidence that drivers from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia were being between 16 and 23% 
of the pay of a driver from the United Kingdom. These low wages enabled companies to 
'double man' their lorries and so operate for much longer hours and more cheaply. 
  
The aforementioned issues have also caused concern in Sweden, which has around 35,000 
long and short haul truck drivers. In Sweden, with a highly unionised transport workforce 
(paid under a single collective agreement despite pressure for separate enterprise agreements 
from the Swedish Competition Authority), and, unlike other parts of Europe, relatively few 
self-employed drivers, the effects are liable to be most profound. Already, a number of 
Swedish transport firms have sought to relocate their operations. As elsewhere, researchers 
(see Frick, 2000) have pointed to the fragmented nature of the industry, a poor understanding 
of OHS, the inability of operators to resist customer demands, the impact of deregulation 
(especially the right of cabotage and leasing of Eastern European drivers) and lack of 
enforcement of minimum standards. It is argued that cost savings achieved through inferior 
working conditions and compromises on safety have emerged as major means of competition. 
There is also growing evidence of undercutting of working conditions by smaller operations 
and drivers accepting below agreement rates or individual (ie kilometre rate) contracts in an 
effort to safeguard their jobs, as well as an increase in hazardous work practices (Segerdahl, 
2000). The Swedish Transport Workers Union has countered the threat by pursuing a 
Scandinavia wide collective agreement (it is difficult to see how this response more than 
partly meets the challenge posed) and more effective EU Directives to govern the industry. 
 
As in the USA, there is growing debate in Europe as to how to retain a solid core of 
professionally trained and experienced truck drivers. Yet as in the USA, there are signs that 
intensified competition is leading to a more volatile, younger and inexperienced workforce, 
and there is clear evidence that new inexperienced entrants have a significantly higher rate of 
crashes and work-related injuries than their more experienced counterparts (Hamelin, 
2000:22).  In other words, the shift to a more volatile workforce will also mean a more 
hazardous workforce. 
 
3.4 Putting Clients/Consignors and Consignees in the Regulatory Loop 
 
A range of submissions argued that clients should be brought into the regulatory loop in a 
meaningful way. 
 
Also required is for manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers to order their goods and sales 
of products days and weeks ahead of time, not just in time as is the current practice (written 
submission, Western Australia).  
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Referring to reasonable expectations of clients and consignors and enforcement, WorkCover 
NSW stated: 
 
WorkCover considers that the underlying tenet of effective safety management is the 
proposition that all hazards must be identified and all risks must be assessed and controlled. 
It is essential that this process be applied during all phases of delivery of a project from 
conception to completion… 
 
WorkCover considers that clients and consignors have the power and the authority to 
influence driving practices and that they have responsibility for the management and 
enforcement of a range of safety related matters such as speeding, driving hours, drug use 
and loading arrangements. 
 
Accordingly, it is WorkCover's view that investigation of the causes of accidents or incidents 
should be broadened beyond considerations of physical aspects and driver behaviour so as to 
include investigation of consignment and transport arrangements and environmental factors 
affecting driver behaviour. This approach properly extends accountability to include the 
parties with the authority to effect change (written submission, WorkCover NSW, pages 14-
15). 
 
Ken Smith, a consultant with considerable knowledge of the industry offered the following 
observations: 
 
At the bottom the core issue is that road transport is a highly competitive service industry, 
with more operators and trucks than there is freight to shift…The competitive nature of the 
industry is such that the industry has responded to productivity improvements by cutting 
rates, rather than pocketing or re-investing the revenue benefits, which is something that 
really benefits nobody.  
 
I think it is agreed that rate fixing and operator licensing is unlikely to be politically 
acceptable, even if there were not economic reasons against them. But one viewpoint to 
consider is that all this is in the nature of keeping down the cost to the consumer, out of some 
fear the consumer won’t buy if prices go up. 
 
I don’t know what the transport component of a packet of cornflakes is, but I doubt if it is 
significant, and I doubt if the consumer would notice if it were as much as doubled. But the 
end result of the present regime is that a portion of the true cost of the transport component of 
commodities is being pushed down the chain to the only link who cannot pass it on – the 
driver. 
 
Evidence has been given that consignors are sometimes willing to strike a more reasonable 
rate if the truck operator is able to demonstrate his true costs and that he cannot do it for less 
than a certain amount. This should spread if the truck operators hold up their end and do not 
accept a lesser rate – especially if it is reinforced by judicious waving of the duty of care stick 
(written submission, Ken Smith, page 4). 
 
Others made the point that a clear regulatory message needed to be sent to both clients and 
transport operators: 
 
But its also got a lot to do with the people who are growing and picking and packing the 
produce, and those that are in the middle selling it. There's some middle people in there too 
who dictate the terms. The people who really determine how much the truck diver is paid and 
when its got to be there. See, there's a lot of people in the chain that need to be 
educated…and made an example of if they continue these dubious practices…What we need 
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in this country is we need a group of people, and unfortunately some truck operators, to be 
made an example of. People aren't going to going to take the government's regulation 
seriously while ever they have all these threats that just amount nothing. Truck operators 
have been very shrewd at working their way around regulation and laws for many, many 
years…. We've actually go to not only say here's the regulation folks but here's the penalties 
and then here's the examples. (oral submission, Dean Croke). 
 
It should be noted that the need for regulators or governments to consider the influence on 
safety of the practices of consignors and load owners is neither new nor novel in connection 
to freight transport. In its Review of Ship Standards and Safety the federal parliament’s House 
of Representative Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure 
(1994:31-32) identified charterers and cargo owners as one of four main players that needed 
to be targeted in terms of eradicating substandard shipping. The report argued that, given the 
amount of information available, charterers and cargo owners had no excuse for hiring 
substandard operators and those that did should be subject to public exposure. This Report 
can find no reason why an analogous argument cannot be made in relation to those that use 
road transport, especially since essentially similar requirements are commonly imposed on 
road transport operators in relation to quality (in terms of timeliness, stewardship of the 
product in transit etc).  
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Evidence given to this Inquiry and evidence of earlier inquiries/research indicates that, 
notwithstanding periodic fluctuations due to bouts of bankruptcy etc, oversupply of drivers is 
a long term and structural feature of long distance trucking. This creates competition for work 
that, in turn, represents a serious and ongoing inducement for operators to undercut freight 
rates, squeeze in additional trips, evade regulatory standards and engage in other practices that 
pose a direct threat to safety.  
 
Poor business practices on the part of transport operators, especially small operators, 
exacerbate pressures to cut costs and corners in relation to safety. This issue, highlighted in a 
number of submissions such as that of the ATA, needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency 
and a means of doing this is addressed in a later section of the Report. At the same time, it 
needs to be recognised that poor business practices are an exacerbating factor not a root cause 
of economic pressure on transport operators. The evidence collected by this Inquiry makes it 
clear that the transport industry is generally in a weak bargaining position in relation to its 
clients. The result of this, and lack of client recognition of responsibility for safety outcomes, 
has been tendering conventions, contract provisions and freight rates that are not infrequently 
incompatible with compliance with laws and levels of safety deemed acceptable by the 
community. 
 
Although it has long been recognised that trip-based payment systems are not conducive to 
safe driving practices they remain a common arrangement, almost certainly because they are 
means of transferring the economic pressures on transport operators from low freight rates 
and tight delivery schedules into work practices. 
 
Another issue worthy of serious consideration is the impact of e-commerce on client/operator 
relationships. At several points during the Inquiry it was suggested that electronic commerce 
had facilitated lower inventory levels, shorter 'transport windows' and an even tighter 
coupling of the supply chain. It was also claimed (see the next section) that electronic 
communication led to a reduction of the 'paper trail' that might be used to detect illegal 
practices. In the mid 1990s the federal Department of Industry Science and Technology 
sponsored a project on domestic transport electronic data interchange (DOMEDI) involving 
major road transport companies, two rail freight operators, major clients (such as BHP, 
Woolworths and ICI) and large no-for-hire truck operators like Australia Post. The aim of the 
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project was to streamline domestic transport by reducing the amount of paperwork and 
replacing it with a more standardised (numbering, labeling etc), comprehensive and 
coordinated electronic information exchange. The project dealt with consignment instructions 
(proof of pickup, billing information, receiver's copy, proof of delivery), billing and invoice 
statements, and the processing of transport documents. The final report was presented in 1998 
(Department of Industry Science and Technology, 1998).  
 
In 1999 the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, together 
with the National Office for the Information Economy (1999), issued the results of scoping 
study on the development of e-commerce in road transport. The report highlighted that 
Woolworths alone could save up to $1 billion per annum if all its dealings with the transport 
sector were done electronically. The key benefits were seen to lie in the area in terms of 
faster/reliable exchanges of information, freight tracking through the supply chain, 
communication with vehicles (including weather/traffic information), and meeting regulatory 
requirements. The report (1999:v) identified a number of impediments to the shift to e-
commerce including lack of understanding and training (and time for training) in the transport 
sector, lack of perceived customer demand, costs and diversity within the sector. 
Counterbalancing this were a series of incentives included competitive pressures, 
opportunities for better management and improved customer service. The report noted large 
companies, such as Toll Express, had installed computer screens on vehicles working on their 
Ford contract, while others were using global positioning systems (GPS). It also noted 
potential improvements in transport scheduling, including vehicle booking systems, to avoid 
truck queues and loading/unloading delays. At the same time, the report begs a number of 
serious questions, most obviously the capacity of smaller transport operators to embrace this 
technology. The cost of installing transponders in trucks is raised and the report does make 
references to the diversity of the industry but really fails to develop this point. At least as 
important, much of discussion of efficiency gains pertain to those accruing to customer/clients 
(indeed it is acknowledged that some changes will require greater discipline on the part of 
operators) and regulatory issues are confined to taxation. 
 
While not questioning the value of moving to electronic communication the Inquiry would 
note that there is no evidence in either report that serious consideration was given to safety, or 
whether indeed, safety-related issues (such electronic records of driving hours or trip details) 
could be incorporated into the new systems. There is a possibility to improve both efficiency 
and safety from new systems but this is unlikely to occur (and indeed the effects may be 
negative) unless some consideration is given to the safety dimension. At least one firm has 
tried to move into this niche by distributing freight task availability on the internet (for a flat 
fee), arguing this affords operators greater load selection, improved time management and the 
ability to comply with legal rest periods. However, this is hardly likely to address the issues 
just raised. What this Inquiry as found somewhat surprising was the failure of either report to 
address the substantial use of subcontractors in the industry and the problems this posed for 
more elaborate e-commerce systems. While some large customers may alter their use of 
transport operators if they see benefits in terms of e-commerce, many others may simply 
prefer the cost-savings they can achieve through subcontractors, resulting perhaps in an 
increasingly bifurcated transport system. 
 
As a final point it should be noted that additional evidence on the relationship between 
commercial practices and safety is to be found in other sections of this Report. For example, 
in Section 2 commercial considerations that may compromise the safety and wellbeing of 
drivers were raised in connection with truck configuration. More evidence on the connection, 
including how commercial inducements shape regulatory evasion, will be presented in 
succeeding sections. 
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SECTION 4  
 
 
EXTENT OF PROPER ENFORCEMENT OF DRIVING HOURS, SPEEDING 
& DRUG USE 
 
 
…if I'm being put in a situation where I have to break the limits to survive then I will break 
the law to survive…its alright to talk about enforcement but if you don’t fix the underlying 
problem first then forget the enforcement. I just want to point out to you that there's no way 
known that I'm going to abide by any enforcement regime unless I can make a dollar. If I'm 
viable then the enforcement becomes a secondary issue (oral submission, owner/driver 
southern NSW).  
 
Safety in the long haul road transport industry, as in the road transport industry more 
generally, is subject to a complex overlapping web of different laws administered by a 
number of regulatory agencies. At least four separate bodies of legislation directly impinge on 
trucking, namely road transport legislation, occupational health and safety (OHS) legislation, 
environmental protection/hazardous substance legislation, and industrial relations legislation. 
Up to the present time the overwhelming if not entire focus of enforcement activities has been 
under the auspices of safety provisions in road transport legislation.  Apart from driving hours 
regulations and some other specific RTA road safety measures (such as Culway, highway 
weighbridges and Safe-T-Cam) long haul trucking is subject to the same law as the road 
transport industry more generally, with the NSW Police Service and the RTA being the prime 
enforcement agencies. Given this, much of the initial discussion in this section will focus on 
enforcement activities under the umbrella of road transport legislation. At the same time, the 
role that could be played by other agencies is raised, as are suggestions as to how enforcement 
might be improved. 
 
Before turning to specific problem areas and enforcement instruments it is important to make 
a number of general observations. First, the information collected for this Inquiry indicated 
that there was a widespread view that, whatever its other faults, the current enforcement 
regime was inadequate in terms of the overall level of enforcement activity. This was the view 
expressed not only by the TWU and enforcement agencies but numerous other parties 
including major bodies representing trucking operators. Many suggested that relative to the 
growing number of trucks on the road the level of enforcement was actually declining. For 
example, in its written submission (at page 16) the NSW Road Transport Association stated: 
 
The current enforcement of existing Road rules is practically non existent. There appears to 
have been a gradual reduction of enforcement resources over the past few years particularly 
in the heavy vehicle end of the industry. Vehicle numbers are increasing making already 
struggling resources even thinner on the ground. 
 
In responding to this issue a number of submissions argued that a lack of co-ordination 
amongst regulatory agencies undermined effective enforcement. The Australian Retailers 
Association (ARA), for example, argued: 
 
There appears to be a problem in enforcing current regulatory obligations within the trucking 
industry. Enforcement responsibility is split between the Police and the relevant state 
transport authority. Police enforcement often only occurs after there been an accident or 
traffic infringement. 
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Effective regulation requires a high risk of detection and punishment for breaches of 
obligations. The current lack of co-ordination, across the States increases the risk that drivers 
will operate outside the law (written submission, ARA).  
 
The NSW Road Transport Association also endorsed the need for coordination although it 
placed more emphasis on achieving fair and consistent patterns of detection/prosecution 
within the state: 
 
Enforcement, once re-instigated must be fair, but most of all, consistent within the state and 
preferably within the whole country. One of the biggest gripes that operators have about 
enforcement is the lack of consistency across the state (written submission, NSW Road 
Transport Association, page 17). 
 
The issue of co-ordination will be examined in detail in a later section of the Report. 
 
4.1 Driving hours  
 
It’s a known fact that any of these drivers that are pushed to this extent will use two or more 
logbooks… Its very simple all you do is walk in and say “I left my logbook sitting on the fuel 
tank and I drove off, the kids scribbled in it while I was at home last weekend, I need a new 
logbook.” Its too easy, too simple to be able to get another logbook. I can relate a story about 
a driver who actually boasted he could do three and four trips to Brisbane/Sydney, plus all 
his running around, down in Sydney [in a week]. Sadly, he’s not with us any more…single 
vehicle incident (oral submission CFAT representative, Northern NSW who lost her husband 
in a truck crash) 
  
Effective enforcement of driving/working-hours regulations has long been a problematic 
exercise, not only in NSW but in other jurisdictions, with evidence pointing to widespread 
flouting of regulatory requirements. For example, a blitz conducted by the Victorian Police in 
February 1997 (Operation Austran) recorded 1,213 offences relating to falsified logbooks or 
47% of the total.  In August 2000 the Victorian Police Road Safety Task Force conducted 
another week-long blitz at Mildura, Swan Hill and the main Sydney and Adelaide highways 
in August 2000.  The Task Force intercepted 497 trucks and detected 93 offences of 
exceeding driving hours, 83 offences relating to incorrect logbook entries, 9 other logbook 
offences, 8 offences of exceeding dimensions, 8 exceeding weight offences. It also issued 89 
roadworthy defect notices. Police involved later expressed concern at the level of 
logbook/driving-hours offences and told a meeting of the Victorian Enforcement Liaison 
Group that they building profiles on companies to target with on-site audits (VRTA Member 
Alert No.14, September 2000).  
 
Likewise, driving hours offences are widespread in Queensland. For the Queensland 
component of the Austrans campaign out of 4225 heavy vehicle intercepts 77 trucks (1.8%) 
were grounded for excess driving-hours offences and 381 logbook offences (9%) were issued. 
In the first five months of 2000 the Traffic Support Branch of the Police Service (which 
focuses on vehicle safety and fatigue) issued 842 breaches, 622 of which (74%) were for 
logbook offences. Between March and May of 2000 Queensland Transport Inspectors (the 
equivalent of RTA inspectors) issued 349 breaches for logbook offences or almost 20% of all 
breaches for that period (written submission, Queensland Transport page 6). 
 
During the period 1994 to 1997 NSW Police recorded a 58% increase in offences where 
drivers recorded over 12 hours driving in a 24 hour period and a 50% increase in offences 
where drivers failed to have a 24 hour rest period in a seven day working week (Figure 4). 
Croke (1998:30) argued this evidence of widespread and possibly increasing flouting of 
driving hours requirements was a consequence of operators encouraging increased vehicle 
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utilisation in their efforts to maintain viability too offset the squeeze on margins identified 
earlier as well as inadequacy of the then existing hours regime. 
 
Since the late 1990s driving hours have been regulated in NSW in accordance with a 
nationally coordinated approach to the issue. In 1991 State, Territory and Federal Heads of 
Government signed the Heavy Vehicle Agreement, which set up the National Road Transport 
Commission (NRTC) to oversee the introduction of consistent and uniform regulation of 
heavy vehicles across Australia (the role of the NRTC is examined in a later section). A year 
later the Heads of Government signed the Light Vehicles Agreement to expand the NRTC’s 
regulatory responsibilities to all vehicles.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: NSW Driving Hours Infringements 1994-1997 
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Source: NSW Police Infringement Processing Bureau reproduced in Croke, 1998 as Table 12.  
 
 
In consultation with road freight and coach operators, unions and the road/traffic authorities 
of each jurisdiction, the NRTC developed uniform standards and regulatory frameworks to 
control fatigue amongst heavy vehicle drivers. While covering the overwhelming majority of 
long distance road freight haulage, two jurisdictions (Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory) were excluded from the arrangements. NSW implemented the national regulations 
in November 1998 with the relevant provisions being incorporated into the Road Transport 
(Safety and Traffic Management) (Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 under the Road Transport 
(Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999. The national hours/rest break regulatory 
framework provides three options or alternative regimens, namely: 
 
• A standard regime based on 12 hours ‘driving’ and 14 hours total work in 24 hours, and 
72 hours driving per week. This option was similar to driving hours/rest regulation in 
NSW prior to the new national standard. Like earlier regulations, it required the keeping 
of a logbook (issued by the RTA) recording driving and rest periods by the driver (and 
which must be carried on the truck); although some effort has been made to address flaws 
in previous logbook systems. As in the past, the baseline requirement is that a logbook 
must be kept when a truck travels more than 100 kilometers on a single delivery point 
trip. 
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• A Transitional Fatigue Management Scheme (TFMS) based on 14 hours of driving or 
other work in 24 hours and 144 hours per 14 days. Again, this is still subject to the 
keeping of a logbook on the part of the driver. The TFMS was designed to legitimise a 
specific trip (Brisbane/Sydney) that requires 14 hours previously available under an 
enforcement moratorium by relaxing some core regulatory requirements (Moore and 
Brooks, 2000:3). As the name implies TFMS was intended as an interim measure to be 
replaced by full fatigue management schemes such as the Fatigue Management Program; 
and 
• A Fatigue Management Program (FMP) that freed participating companies from 
compliance with prescriptive driving/work/rest limits and logbook requirements. In lieu 
of this participating operators must demonstrate both prior to entry and periodically 
thereafter that they have implemented a system that effectively manages driver fatigue. 
As yet FMP has only operated for several years as a very small pilot scheme in 
Queensland and other states. 
 
To promote understanding of the new requirements amongst operators and drivers the RTA 
produced and distributed an audiocassette in addition to brochures and information placed on 
its web site. Driving/work hours and rest period requirements, or as the RTA prefers to call 
them ‘duty and rest limits’, are predominantly enforced via roadside audits of truck drivers’ 
logbooks by RTA inspectors and the police. More recently the RTA has begun a trial of 
installing laptop computers in 10 inspection vehicles on the North Coast, enabling inspectors 
to access data from Safe-T-Cam (see below) so this information can be cross-checked against 
logbook entries. RTA inspectors also conduct office audits of operators where they have 
‘reasonable cause’ to believe the limits are being abused (written submission, RTA page 7). 
The RTA uses offence patterns and Safe-T-Cam (a digital camera system at fixed sites that 
can identify trucks reaching a particular point for driving hours regulations would permitted. 
Safe-T-Cam is discussed below) to identify cases where a reasonable cause exists. 
 
The Inquiry heard considerable evidence from a wide range of parties concerning 
inadequacies with logbooks as a method of monitoring driving hours. Inaccuracies and 
widespread flouting of the logbook system has been reported over many years (see for 
example Cairney, 1991:33). Criticism of the system presented to the Inquiry emanated from 
not unexpected sources such as drivers and transport companies where a degree of caution is 
warranted given a potential conflict of interests. Nevertheless, their arguments were often 
supported from other bodies. The NSW Branch of the TWU (written submission, page 12), 
for example, argued that their own experience indicated that driving hours regulations were 
poorly enforced and logbooks openly abused. In supporting this claim, the TWU referred to 
driver statements in the Hansard of the Australian Senate and Legislative Assembly of NSW, 
and Statutory Declarations of drivers and a WorkCover Inspector's report into Scotts 
Refrigerated Freightways Pty Ltd. The Inquiry was able to peruse copies of these documents 
and confirm their contents supported the union's contentions. For example, in his 1997 
inspection report on Scott’s Refrigerated Freightways WorkCover inspector Ron Keelty 
examined evidence from Safe-T-Cam, interviews with drivers, logbooks and manifests. Only 
after examining all these records (especially Safe-T-Cam) was he was able to determine that 
the logbooks had not been filled in correctly. Keelty concluded:   
 
The company did not have any systems in place for ensuring employees and contractors who 
drive the company vehicles took the required rest breaks (WorkCover Investigation, Scotts 
Refrigerated Freightways, summary). 
 
Keelty concluded that there was evidence of drivers working excessive hours contrary to RTA 
requirements. From the evidence compiled for the report he concluded that it appeared the 
company was not complying with s15 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act by failing to 
provide adequate supervision to ensure workers got adequate rest breaks. In his view, the 
evidence also suggested that the company was not complying with s16 by putting the 
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contractors it employed at risk by requiring them to work excessive hours (for a detailed 
discussion these general duty provisions, now section 8 and 9 of the amended Act, see 
Appendix 2). 
 
The other evidence submitted by the TWU indicated that the situation at Scott’s was by no 
means a rare occurrence in the industry. The TWU submission included copies of 
correspondence it had written to the federal Minister for Transport in September 1999 raising 
hours and other safety problems. The Canberra branch of the TWU provided driving time/trip 
detail summaries for individual drivers that indicated they were exceeding the required 
driving limits by a considerable margin and yet for which no logbook offence had been 
recorded. In general, the evidence provided by the TWU matched the thrust of many other 
submissions to the Inquiry from individual drivers, small operators and numerous others.  
 
Further, criticism of logbooks also came from other parties and even unexpected quarters such 
as the submission of the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police Service, which stated: 
 
For some considerable time one of the main areas of trying to monitor fatigue within the 
heavy vehicle industry has been the use of logbooks. The difficulties in this area have been 
well documented. A number of schemes have been developed and are being used in an attempt 
to overcome the problems that are associated with the use of logbooks. Each of these ‘new’ 
schemes presents their own problems to the enforcement officer. I have already alluded to the 
problems associated with FMP (see below). 
 
A number of owner/drivers, operators and at least one transport association claimed that the 
more conservative approach to driving-hours regimes in NSW was actually a source of the 
enforcement problem given strong commercial pressures. Robert Gunning from the Livestock 
Association of NSW (oral submission) criticised the rigidity and rule-based focus of the NSW 
approach. He gave, by way of example, a trip that could be completed in 13 hours – one hour 
beyond the legal limit but safely in their view – with an appropriate ‘catch up’ of rest the next 
day. Given powerful commercial imperatives, he felt such tasks were likely to be undertaken 
irrespective of the regulation and advocated a more flexible but managed approach. He argued 
that regulators in NSW needed to adopt a greater sense of engagement in terms of relating 
enforcement processes to objectives (and not simply outcomes measured in terms of the 
number of prosecutions).  
 
For its part, the submission of the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police Service raised 
concerns about the Fatigue Management Scheme as an alternative compliance measure. 
 
The basic notion of this scheme is to attempt to educate drivers and owners to better manage 
fatigue on the individual. There are a number of concerns which are impacting on the ability 
of Police to carry out road safety activities in this area. In some instances operational Police 
are being approached by heavy vehicle drivers stating they are being forced into fatigue 
management schemes merely so vehicle operators can work them longer. 
 
Each and every Fatigue Management Program differs from the next. The difficulty with this is 
that police do not know at what point the actual driver is within that daily, weekly, monthly 
program. Some drivers are permitted to work a number of seemingly long days. These may be 
up to 16 hours or longer. This is done on the pretext that other working days will be modified 
to accommodate these long days. 
 
If a driver works outside the parameters of the scheme it is possible that this may not be 
discovered for months later, and only then as a result of some form of audit. The more 
complex the program the greater the difficulty of police to take pro-active action rather than 
a reactive response. 
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There is a common misbelief within the industry that because operators are in a Particular 
Alternative Compliance Scheme that is (sic) some kind of natural immunity to being stopped 
and inspected by Police. This is clearly not the case. Police take notice of the particular 
scheme which the operator may be in and usually do not carry out as rigorous inspection as 
might usually be the case. Some of the Alternative compliance schemes seemed to have 
stalled, in particular the Roadworthiness Scheme sponsored by the NSW RTA. Very little 
information seems to be flowing out of the RTA with regard to this scheme. This information 
is vital to the Police in the field. This allows them to monitor any companies or operators who 
may be trying to fraudulently represent themselves as being in a scheme. 
 
The submission of a recently retired highway patrol police officer (with over 6 years 
experience working with the RTA on heavy vehicle enforcement programs) echoed these 
concerns. Pointing to the demonstrated effectiveness of well-planned and implemented 
enforcement programs in reducing road trauma, he expressed grave concern both at ‘the 
horrifying practices of drivers in the long distance road transport industry’ and at recent trends 
in compliance activity: 
 
…front line operations need the support of senior staff particularly in securing adequate 
resourcing to maintain programs. It has been my experience, in the three to four years 
leading up to my retirement that less importance was being placed on road enforcement and 
an increasing emphasis was being placed on alternative compliance programs. Such 
programs, I am led to believe, have never been adequately monitored or evaluated. 
 
My former RTA colleague continually expressed his concern over the lack of evaluation of 
alternative compliance programs and also his frustration at the lack of strategic direction in 
relation to effective enforcement programs (written submission recently retired NSW highway 
patrol officer). 
 
It should be noted in passing that the Traffic Services Branch’s concerns about information 
sharing and better coordination between various regulatory agencies generally was raised 
repeatedly by other parties in the course of this Inquiry and is examined in some depth in a 
later section of this Report. 
 
Returning to the issue of enforceability, several other dimensions of this problem were raised 
repeatedly in the course of the Inquiry. One recurring point made was that the way the system 
currently operates has, by default if not by design, resulted in a driver-orientated focus that 
makes systems-based enforcement difficult. It is the responsibility of drivers to fill-in 
logbooks, making them the ‘keepers’ of the key document for assessing duty and rest hours. 
A number of operational police spoken to by the Inquiry expressed reservations about the way 
the logbook system placed the onus on the driver to keep the record, which they felt had real 
limitations given pressures frequently put on them by operators and clients. In addition to the 
problem of multiple logbooks already mentioned, it is comparatively easy matter for the 
logbook to bear little relationship to the hours actually worked. The Inquiry heard claims that 
some companies kept separate time sheets to calculate hours actually worked (a second set of 
records that were not made available to RTA inspectors during company audits - which 
appear fairly infrequent in any case) for payment purposes. In other words, the logbook might 
tally with company records but bears no relationship to what actually occurred (of course 
additional cross checking via Safe-T-Cam might assist in detecting breaches but even here 
there is problem in proving who was driving the truck at the time).  
 
Further, if a driver is pressured to falsify their logbook either directly by the employer or 
indirectly by a customer-imposed schedule for enforcement to move beyond the driver 
requires either elaborate cross checking of multiple records (which has just been shown to be 
problematic) or the driver giving evidence. Yet as more than a few drivers told this Inquiry, 
they would be reluctant to give such evidence as they feared it would place their future 
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employment or work prospects in jeopardy. The Inquiry believes these fears are not 
unjustified. In addition to evidence already mentioned, the Inquiry received submissions from 
Queensland branch of TWU detailing cases (with names, dates etc) where drivers were 
threatened or dismissed for refusing to undertake trips that breached driving regulations and 
which they believed they were too tired to do safely. In another case, a NSW-based driver 
dismissed by a large transport operator because he complained it was requiring drivers to 
exceed their legal driving limits provided the Inquiry with an array of documents 
substantiating his claims. This driver claimed he has not been able to get work in the transport 
industry since this incident. Cases reported in the media (see for example Courier Mail 10 
December 1999) or brought before industrial tribunals where drivers claim they were 
dismissed for refusing to exceeding driving hours hardly allays such fears (such as a 
Queensland case reported in CCH Employment Law Update, 1998:3). Overall, there were 
simply too many complaints or feared or actual dismissal for making complaints over driving 
hours for the Inquiry to accept that these practices are aberrant. This means that agencies like 
the RTA will find it hard to get drivers to testify to the sort of system-offences which almost 
if not all parties to this Inquiry agreed should be targeted.  It should be noted in passing that 
the Inquiry heard evidence from an array of sources (including an insurance investigator) of 
similar intimidation where drivers complained about defective trucks, especially those 
working for small regional operators. The latter should not be taken to suggest that all or even 
most regional operators adopt this approach. 
 
The problem of drivers as witnesses in ‘up-the-chain’ prosecutions is well-recognised by the 
RTA itself and applies not simply to driving hours offences but a range of other serious 
breaches/dangerous practices such as speeding and drug use (where there is also an issue of 
self-incrimination/indemnity). As coronial inquests such as the 1996 Blanchetown tragedy 
and evidence presented to this Inquiry amply demonstrate, systematic pressure to exceed 
driving hours can be informal (relying on ‘understandings’ of what is required amongst 
drivers, the tone and demeanour of managers etc) and difficult for an outside agency to 
establish. It also clear that, especially with small to medium operators, ‘last minute jobs’ may 
leave little in the way of a ‘paper trail’ and the increasing use of electronic tending etc can 
exacerbate this. Finally, the penalties that would normally apply to a system-offence even if 
drivers were prepared to testify are not of an order likely to change practices within the 
industry. It is to this point that attention now turns. 
 
A recurring criticism of the logbook regime was the deterrent value of fines imposed for 
offences. This criticism had two components. First, it was suggested that the size of fines was 
insufficient to match either the gravity of the offence (given the potential consequences). 
Second, it was claimed that logbook offences of very different consequences might attract the 
same or similar level of fine, thereby sending both an ambiguous message to the industry and, 
worse perhaps, encouraging the committing of one kind of logbook offence over others. After 
considering the evidence presented to it, this Inquiry is of the view that both these criticisms 
have considerable substance. 
 
Again, at least the first of these problems was not confined to NSW. In its written submission 
(page 21) Queensland Transport noted that the fines applicable for logbook and driving hours 
offences ranged up to a maximum court fine of $1500 for individuals and $6,000 for 
corporations (not all offences carried these penalties) while a Penalty Infringement Notice 
(PIN) fine is $240. Queensland Transport conceded the deterrent value of this penalty regime 
could be questioned and indicated a solution being currently investigated: 
 
In many cases, the fines may offer little disincentive to recalcitrant operators and little 
incentive to enforcement officers to go beyond issuing a PIN (ie investigating the new 'chain 
of responsibility' provisions of the regulation). There are no demerit points attached to these 
offences in Queensland, however, plans are underway to investigate the feasibility of 
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introducing demerit points for fatigue related offences (written submission, Queensland 
Transport, page 21). 
 
Another criticism of the logbook system is that existing regulations only require a logbook to 
be kept where truck drivers undertake a single trip of 100 kilometers or more from their 
depot. The problem here, as mentioned in an earlier section of the report, is one of omission. 
Local 'drop-off' or other short journeys taken before or after (but especially before) a long trip 
are not recorded in the logbook, thereby giving an understated and misleading impression as 
to actual driving hours. The number of submissions to the Inquiry that raised this issue 
indicates that it is a significant problem and many of these suggested the omission was being 
systematically exploited by some consignors, freight forwarders and operators. The Inquiry 
was supplied with information on situations where the regular work arrangements involved 
long hours that clearly breached the driving hours legislation but for which no formal offence 
could be identified in logbook records. One case (from an independent source) involved a 
driver doing two return trips between a regional town and Sydney (under 100 kilometers 
apart) finishing late Monday and leaving early the next morning for a long trip to destinations 
in Victoria, Queensland or South Australia with a return on late Wednesday. On Thursday and 
Friday this cycle, or some variation of it was repeated. In this case the logbook would report 
around 48 hours of driving even though the actual hours spent driving that week were at least 
80 hours. This is a serious problem that the current enforcement regime fails to cover and 
highlights the need for a more effective recording of driving/working hours. 
 
Another issue raised in relation to the enforcement of driving-hours regulations was in 
connection to the stopping of trucks being driven by fatigued drivers. Several police giving 
evidence expressed the view that in the immediate interests of public safety the most 
appropriate remedy for instances where they detected an excessively fatigued driver was to 
order the truck to halt until driver either had adequate rest or a replacement was provided. The 
numerous submissions from a wide range of parties (including drivers themselves) of 
instances where trucks were being driven erratically (wandering over the road etc) by 
apparently fatigued drivers. The current Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) 
(Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 empowers authorised officers to stop or ground a vehicle. 
Clause 130 gives an authorised officer the power to stop a vehicle to complete inquiries about 
compliance with this Regulation. Clause 137 gives an authorised officer the power to direct a 
driver not to drive until sufficient time has elapsed to allow the person to drive without 
contravening the driving fatigue Regulation. While these regulations would appear to give 
police the power to address the situation of a fatigued driver, concern was expressed at the 
potential civil liability implications of ‘grounding’ a truck carrying a perishable load that 
might sustain considerable damage during the period of delay. It could be argued that a load 
owner or transport company that fails to provide a safe system of work has no right to expect 
special dispensation just because the load carried is perishable (rather this aspect should have 
been factored into arrangements for delivering the freight). It should also be noted that the 
powers to stop and temporarily ‘ground’ vehicles for reasons of driver fatigue or other safety 
issues (see the discussion of overloading and load restraint offences below) finds a ready 
parallel in the powers of WorkCover inspectors to issue prohibition and improvement notices.  
 
In the view of this Inquiry, the issue of civil liability should be clarified and if a problem 
exists it should be addressed. Police and RTA officers first priority is to safeguard road users 
not freight, and making this clear by ‘grounding’ unsafe drivers or trucks will provide an 
additional economic incentive to ensure delivery arrangements do amount to a safe system of 
work. At most, a workable system may require to authorised officer to notify the load owner 
or transport company so that alternative arrangements (such as supplying another driver) can 
be made. A method of achieving this is proposed later in the Report. 
 
Conclusion 
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There are serious problems with existing enforcement practices in relation to driving hours. 
The logbook system used in conjunction with regulated hours has long been abused and 
recent efforts to counter this (including the use of Safe-T-Cam surveillance) appear to have 
had limited success. The prescriptive regulated hours approach takes no account of circadian 
rhythms or the actual time when driving occurs, as well as a number of other factors that are 
relevant to fatigue management. It needs to be noted that problems of enforcing the logbook 
regime are due in no small part to the commercial practices described in the previous section 
of this Report. During the course of its investigation, the Inquiry was repeatedly told by 
drivers that delays in loading and unloading, for example, put them in position where they felt 
pressured to evade Safe-T-Cam surveillance points. They also complained that, because the 
prescriptive regime, took no account of their body clock, there were situations where they 
were entitled to drive but wanted to sleep and vice versa. The second of these criticisms need 
to be treated with some caution, as the logic of a system dependent on driver's perceptions of 
tiredness might be more dangerous than one where hours are prescribed, especially given the 
pressures drivers are under. 
 
The introduction of a more comprehensive and flexible approach to fatigue management such 
as the Fatigue Management Program (FMP) and the code-based schemes now operating in 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory (both examined in some detail in a later section) 
would seem to avoid some of these issues. However, both options are in their early stages (the 
FMP is only a pilot scheme) and require careful assessment. At least in the case of FMP, the 
scheme requires a deal of commitment and planning on the part of operators that is by no 
means a characteristic feature of the industry. Despite well-recognised problems with the 
prescriptive approach, there is reluctance on the part of regulators to move into alternative 
regimes. Reasons for this include a lack of confidence in or applicability of alternative 
approaches, widespread public concern at the operating practices of the long haul trucking 
industry, and the problem of using on-road enforcement in relation to alternative compliance 
schemes (Moore and Brooks, 2000:5-6). For example, although the Queensland pilot of FMP 
has been operating over five years the number of transport operators involved remain small. 
This Inquiry also pointed to evidence that the existence of multiple schemes was causing 
confusion amongst police engaged in highway enforcement. In the view of this Inquiry it is 
extremely unlikely that these concerns will be ameliorated until a number of underlying 
problems are addressed, particularly the strong commercial pressures to evade regulations, 
however these are constructed. 
 
Irrespective of what regime is in place for regulating hours/managing fatigue there is an 
urgent need for a more reliable recording system for working and rest hours in transport 
industry that can be used by regulators, operators, clients and others.  Very few defended the 
current logbook system and many individuals and organisations (such as WorkCover NSW, 
written submission at page 17) urged that a better replacement be considered. What is needed 
are records of hours worked and rest taken that are created by cross-matched between the 
major parties, establish a clear and easy to follow audit trail to both detect breaches and to 
form the basis for prosecution, especially in the case of systematic offences. There was 
significant support amongst a wide range of parties for a trip-based document to replace the 
logbook amongst both drivers and some of those involved in enforcement. It could form the 
basis for both on-road and off-road enforcement processes. A police coordinator (oral 
submission) expressed frustration at not being able to ask for information that would enable 
them to verify scheduling arrangements: 
 
Unfortunately, we can't say to a driver "can we see you planned schedule?" In other words, 
the company would say to the driver "here is your planned schedule, you start work at five in 
the morning…" Its very easy to do a time/distance study to say that… "your meal breaks at 12 
o'clock, you unload in Sydney at three o'clock in the afternoon, your down time is from here to 
here, and then you start the next day at this time." 
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The police officer (with over 20 years experience in highway enforcement) believed a trip-
based document that gave a more accurate picture of hours worked etc was and was filled in 
by the operator (thereby placing the onus on them) would be a superior option. The idea of 
trip-based safety documents was proposed in National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et 
al 1984). This Inquiry is of the firm view that a relatively simple trip-based document could 
provide the basis for more effectively regulating driving hours, scheduling and a range of 
other safety related matters. This matter is addressed in the recommendations. 
 
The recent federal Inquiry into fatigue in transport (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:34) recommended that driving-
hours regulations should be amended to incorporate time of day considerations and increasing 
minimum allowable rest periods. These recommendations are consistent with concerns raised 
in this Inquiry. This Report would suggest that these two issues could be readily 
accommodated in a trip-based document covering driving hours and other safety matters. 
 
4.2 Speeding 
 
As an especially hazardous practice, speeding by long distance trucks has been the subject of 
an array of enforcement measures. Most of the measures about to be described are used in all 
States and Territories of Australia (the rigor with which they are pursued varies between 
jurisdictions, however) although there are some exceptions in relation to the three strikes 
system and Safe-T-Cam (the latter is confined to NSW). 
 
At the proactive preventative level, since 1991 all vehicles over 12 tonnes GVM must be 
fitted with speed limiters and those below this weight may also be required to fit a speed 
limiter if detected speeding under the three strikes program (see below). While this technical 
intervention might seem to pre-empt the problem as noted elsewhere in this Report the 
incidence of speeding by heavy vehicles is not only high but it appears to be increasing in 
recent time. The Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW (RTA) has drawn the conclusion from 
this that tampering with speed limiters is widespread – something that may or may not be 
condoned by vehicle operators (written submission, RTA page 7). This view was shared by 
the NSW Road Transport Association, which represents trucking operators. 
 
The speed limiter program seems to have run its race. It is all too common now to see speed 
limited vehicles exceeding the designated limited speed by 15% to 20%. This is unacceptable, 
yet how is it to be enforced? A regular audit program would assist, but the real answer would 
be some exposure of the offender following a prosecution (written submission, NSW Road 
Transport Association, page 17). 
 
In the course of investigation oral and written submissions were received from drivers and 
those with a close knowledge of the industry that tampering was not uncommon and a series 
of methods were described as to how this could be achieved. Methods described included 
fitting the truck with smaller wheels when the limited was fitted or recalibrated and disabling 
switches disguised as radio buttons etc (so the limiter could be turned on and then off if the 
limiter was being tested) to name but a few. It needs to be noted that even when properly 
fitted, a speed limiter may not prevent a truck exceeding the speed limit down an incline or 
travelling a few kilometres per hour over the limit on the flat. However, allowances for this do 
not materially affect the evidence on excessive speeding by heavy vehicles including material 
supplied by the RTA and others presented to this Inquiry. 
 
It has also been alleged that some companies have sought to evade the speed limiter (and 
driving hours) regulations by using trucks 11.99 tonne GVM trucks which fall outside the 12 
tonne ‘kick-in’ point for these requirements (written submission, Victorian Road Transport 
Association). How widespread this practice has been is unknown but it may warrant some 
investigation by regulatory agencies. 
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Evaluating the available evidence, the Report concludes that manipulation of speed limiters is 
widespread but this does not indicate they should not continue to be employed. Rather, in 
conjunction with other measures proposed to deal with speeding offences, there needs to be 
both targeted and random auditing of vehicles (including blitzes on particular routes). 
Operators found to be committing offences in this area should be prosecuted and efforts made 
to publicise the identity of those convicted so the public shaming and the risk of losing 
contracts to customers becomes an additional deterrent.  
 
Beyond attempts to directly prevent speeding a range of more reactive measures are used to 
detect and impose an array of penalties on speeding trucks. Speeding offences are detected via 
a range of methods, including mobile police patrol along highways using radar and other 
detection devices, fixed and portable speed cameras and the Safe-T-Cam system. As in other 
Australian jurisdictions, primary responsibility for the detection of speeding by trucks rests 
with the Police Service although the RTA operates Safe-T-Cam and has recently taken 
responsibility for the installation and maintenance of fixed electronic (ie using digital 
technology) speed cameras. According to the RTA, fixed unattended cameras are currently 
installed at 21 locations including the Burringbar Range section of the Pacific Highway in far 
north NSW as well as urban locations such as the Sydney Harbour Tunnel and Eastern 
Distributor. The cameras are located at sites with a history of speeding and crashes. While 
some of the measures just described are part of the general strategy on road safety targeting 
all road users, two were developed by the RTA as a specific response to community concerns 
about speeding heavy trucks. Safe-T-Cam and the Three Strikes and You’re Out program 
specifically target the owners and operators of heavy vehicles. To this might be added the 
Culway scheme described earlier in this Report that although not directly used for 
enforcement, does assist enforcement strategies by identifying the extent of illegal practices 
on particular routes. 
 
The remainder of this subsection will examine the nature and effectiveness of the measures 
just mentioned in turn. 
 
4.2.1 General enforcement practices by the NSW Police Service 
 
Police activities to enforce traffic laws, including speeding by heavy vehicles, is coordinated 
by the Traffic Branch of the NSW Police Service. Across the State of NSW there is a network 
of regional police commanders in charge of highway patrol vehicles that are responsible for 
monitoring particular (and often very large) stretches of highways and other major roads used 
by heavy vehicles.  
 
In its submission, the Traffic Branch of the NSW Police Service pointed to a recent increase 
in the number of infringement notices but argued commercial pressures already discussed in 
this Report were increasing both the tendency to speed as well as efforts to evade existing 
enforcement measures. 
 
In 1998 there were some 6,767infringement notices issued to heavy vehicles for speeding 
offences. In 1999 that figure rose to 8,644, speeding is a symptom of the inability of some 
sections of the heavy vehicle industry to set realistic schedules. There is evidence provided 
from police in the field that the incidence of speeding is becoming more frequent. Sections of 
the industry deliberately schedule timetables to coincide when the least on road enforcement 
will be encountered. Additionally the ability of speed limiters to either be bypassed or not 
used at all is becoming more apparent. In one Police Region alone some 200 Radar detectors 
have been seized from the drivers of heavy vehicles in a 12 month period (written submission, 
Traffic Services Branch of NSW Police Service). 
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Police operations that might be effective against most road users confront particular problems 
in relation to long haul trucks. The use of radar detectors continues to be a problem in 
connection to the long distance trucking industry even though its use by car drivers largely 
disappeared when such devices were deemed illegal. Further, unlike cars each truck is 
equipped with a radio which drivers use in addition to other means (such as meeting at truck 
stops, rest areas etc) to maintain a highly developed network for exchanging information. As 
the NRMA observed: 
 
Speeding trucks are caught by normal police speeding operations although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the position of any police operation is quickly broadcast through radio 
so that other drivers are not caught (written submission, NRMA). 
 
In fact, evidence of such practices is not confined to NSW and is more than anecdotal. In its 
written submission (page 6), Queensland Transport stated that Queensland Transport and 
Queensland Police Service vehicles: 
 
…are equipped with UHF/VHF radios which are able to pick up vehicle to vehicle 
communications. Using this equipment, Government officers have established that elements of 
the transport industry use their in-vehicle communication systems to share information about 
the location, movement and activities of enforcement officers and often monitor the start and 
finish times of Transport Inspectors and Police in more remote areas. This gives those who 
are operating outside the legal requirements the ability to avoid detection. This is particularly 
critical in rural/remote areas where there are few enforcement officers covering a large work 
area. 
 
An experienced highway patrol officer from southern NSW (oral submission) pointed to a 
similar problem in relation to combined (NSW and Victorian) police blitzes on the Hume 
Highway, and in doing so highlighted how, in his view, scheduling pressures contributed to 
systematic evasion. 
 
We find that if there is concentrated enforcement within our region, the southern rivers 
region, or us and an adjoining region, you find you get quite a high level of compliance in 
that enforcement zone. But what happens is, because of schedules or whatever, we find that 
outside that, those drivers that have got a tight schedule or are behind … use the other areas 
where there isn't the enforcement level that is conducted elsewhere. They pick up time and 
speed in other areas to make up for the restriction in the enforced area. 
 
Some drivers interviewed by the Inquiry made an essentially similar point in relation to Safe-
T-Cam. For example, a Victorian based owner/driver (oral submission) stated: 
 
Safe-T-Cam because it is only in NSW, means that speeding trucks are more prevalent now in 
Victoria and Queensland, states without Safe-T-Cam, because that’s where they can make up 
the time.  
 
There were also suggestions from drivers that there was a margin of tacitly permitted 
speeding (ie over the 100 kph limit but below 110 kph) before a truck would be booked in 
some jurisdictions (Victoria was mentioned) but not NSW. The Inquiry is unable to assess the 
validity of this observation, although inconsistency in enforcement practices would present a 
problem. 
 
It should be added here that it was suggested to the Inquiry by a range of sources that at 
particular time there might only be one highway patrol vehicle operating on the Pacific 
Highway between Newcastle and close to the Queensland border (a distance well in excess of 
500 kilometers). If this is the case, then it would be comparatively easy for truck drivers to 
notify colleagues of the approximate location of the patrol car. Indeed, even if two, three or 
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perhaps even four patrol cars were operating on this stretch regular communication would still 
enable trucks to speed for considerable periods with some impunity. 
 
4.2.2 Safe-T-Cam 
 
Safe-T-Cam represents an attempt to bring sophisticated technological surveillance to the 
arena of enforcement in long haul road transport. It was developed under an agreement 
between Telstra, CSIRO and the RTA (at least one alternative system was examined but 
rejected), and is administered by the latter Safe-T-Cam is an automated monitoring system 
using digital camera technology located at 21 sites on the main transport routes in NSW. 
Employing a real time system, cameras take picture of heavy vehicles (over 4.5 tonnes 
GVM), locating and deciphering their number plates, and determining not only speed but also 
registration status and whether a heavy vehicle is travelling beyond prescribed hours. 
Speeding violations and travelling beyond prescribed hours (ignoring the possibility of a 
change of driver) can be determined by comparing sighting data from two or more Safe-T-
Cam sites that a particular vehicle has travelled through. Once an apparent violation is 
detected the vehicle operator is sent a letter requesting an explanation and statement of what 
actions will be taken to prevent a recurrence. If the response is deemed unsatisfactory or if 
further violations occur the RTA may undertake an office audit or review the operator’s right 
to operate vehicles in NSW (written submission, RTA, page 8). The latter sanction would 
seem to have real deterrent value given its direct and potentially significant impact on the 
operator’s business. 
 
In the period to early 1999 a total of 7658 operators (or 80% of the total issued notices) had 
been sent one speeding notice, 1320 operators (or 13%) had been sent two notices, 396 (or 
4%) three notices and 294 (or 3%) four or more notices (PrimEmoves, March 1999:1).  
Consistent with this, in its submission the RTA noted that 80% of those receiving a warning 
letter did not re-offend. In the past year 16 operators had been asked for reasons why they 
should continue to operate vehicles in NSW, with two NSW and 11 interstate operators being 
suspended. Another seven operators were currently under review with a view to possible 
suspension. At the same time, the RTA identified some problems in relation to Safe-T-Cam’s 
effectiveness as a tool of enforcement as well as efforts to remedy them. 
 
It should be noted that Safe-T-Cam sanctions can only be applied to vehicles registered in 
NSW or another State. Sanctions for Safe-T-Cam violations cannot be imposed on operators 
with vehicles registered under the Commonwealth Federal Interstate Registration Scheme 
because of deficiencies in the legislation…  
 
There is an element of the industry that deliberately attempts to avoid detection through a 
range of avoidance behaviours. These include tailgating at Safe-T-Cam sites, turning lights 
off, travelling in the breakdown lane and using bypass routes. Enforcement resources are 
deployed at Safe-T-Cam sites to detect avoidance behaviour. Any driver detected attempting 
to avoid the system has their right to drive in NSW reviewed by the RTA. Over the last 12 
months over 130 drivers have had their privileges reviewed for both excessive speed and 
avoidance behaviour. 34 NSW drivers and 85 interstate drivers have had their privileges 
suspended  (written submission, RTA page 9). 
 
The deficiency in relation to federally registered vehicles applies equally to the Three Strikes 
and You’re Out program and will be elaborated upon in the subsection dealing with it. At this 
point it is enough to observe that providing for effective enforcement across jurisdictional 
boundaries is a serious issue and one referred to by a number of large transport operators (see 
for example, written submission, R Angus, Boral Transport).  
 
There was a fairly wide base of support for Safe-T-Cam, though much of it was qualified. 
Amongst industry groups, the NSW Road Transport Association labelled Safe-T-Cam as an 
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excellent idea with wide industry acceptance but whose potential was yet to be fully realised 
because legal impediments had prevented decisive action being taken against all offenders 
(written submission, NSW Road Transport Association, page 17). A number of individual 
transport operators, especially medium to large firms, endorsed Safe-T-Cam, as did 
submissions from motoring organisations and other bodies. 
 
Speeding trucks are also identified by through the Safe-T-Cam system, which was expanded 
last year to cover most of the major highways in NSW. This is a highly effective system to 
measure speed and driving hours infringements and strategies to expand its use would be 
welcomed by NRMA (written submission, NRMA). 
 
Safe-T-Cam also had support from industry associations, companies and other parties outside 
of NSW, with the Victorian Road Transport Association (written submission) calling for it to 
be expanded into a national system covering all major routes to address both speeding and 
fatigue monitoring. Similarly, a Queensland based operator urged that the number and 
location of Safe-T-Cam sites be increased and cover the whole nation (written submission, 
Nolan’s Interstate Transport). A major reason for support for Safe-T-Cam amongst both 
industry associations and predominantly medium to large operators was their belief that it 
helped to establish a level playing field by capturing those who sought to gain advantage by 
evading safety regulations. At the same time, significantly increasing Safe-T-Cam coverage 
was seen as crucial to this. 
 
The submission (page 8) of the insurer NTI Ltd also endorsed Safe-T-Cam as a progressive 
step but queried whether its present mode of use assisted or hindered fatigue management: 
 
Frequently, operators have reported to us that the cameras make no allowance for loading 
and unloading inefficiencies and subsequent delays. Has the technology influenced the 
desperation? What price do we pay for an industry put under even more stress? 
 
Oral submissions from drivers and some small fleet operators made an essentially similar 
point, claiming that the need to catch up to pass through Safe-T-Cam site at the 'right time' 
actually encouraged hazardous practices. Of course, this begs the question as to whether it 
would be better to address the loading delays and other factors that are the original cause of 
this pressure. As already noted above, one response to Safe-T-Cam that may be seen to 
simultaneously illustrate its effectiveness but also its limited coverage, was the claim by 
drivers that they speeded up in Victoria and Queensland in order to make up the time lost due 
to Safe-T-Cam surveillance in NSW. At one level, these claims provide support for those 
calling for an extension of Safe-T-Cam to other jurisdictions. At the same time, the 
underlying scheduling pressures mentioned in connection with this behaviour makes it also 
likely that such an extension would induce new forms of evasion – something that the history 
of industry indicates some operators are all too adept at finding. Indeed, the Inquiry received a 
large number of oral and written submissions attesting to practices already in use to evade 
Safe-T-Cam (including tailgating and taking evasive routes). This evidence does not 
contradict the argument that Safe-T-Cam has encouraged speeding in areas beyond its reach – 
it simply highlights the diversity of evasive responses to the system. 
 
By no means all those making submissions to the Inquiry were convinced of the effectiveness 
of Safe-T-Cam, with frequent references to various measures used to evade the system. Those 
to point to these problems included the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police Service, 
whose written submission included the following observations: 
 
Safe-T-Cam has long been heralded as a tool, which will be used to combat certain practices 
within the heavy vehicle industry. Some of those practices have been that of driving extended 
hours as well as speeding. The location of Safe-T-Cam sites within NSW are well known. The 
incidence of avoidance of these sites based on information in the field is increasing. Practices 
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of driving through these sites with headlights turned off, crossing to the incorrect side of the 
road to carryout various avoidance manoeuvres, heavy vehicles tailgating each other as well 
as devices that can be activated to hide number plates of offending vehicles are just some of 
the practices being employed. A number of operators take alternative routes to go around 
Safe-T-Cam sites. 
 
As noted above, the RTA has taken counter measures to address a number of these problems. 
Though not without effect, the overall impact of these measures was challenged by some 
making submissions, including an ex RTA inspector, and warrants further investigation. 
 
Safe-T-Cam was also the subject of trenchant criticism from the TWU. The NSW Branch 
(written submission, page 19) argued that despite assurances its use in conjunction with the 
three strikes program (discussed below) would apply to the full transport chain including 
operators, consignors and clients it had become 'just another stick to beat the driver with'. 
There is substance in this criticism, although in fairness to the RTA it should be noted that it 
has encountered problems here not of its own making (see below). Further, WorkCover's use 
of Safe-T-Cam records to cross-check against logbooks and company records in the Scotts 
Refrigerated Freightways case described above illustrates the potential to use Safe-T-Cam in 
up the chain prosecutions. Unfortunately, this potential is yet to be realised. It provides 
evidence for a more co-ordinated approach by regulatory agencies using a mix of available 
remedies. This issue is taken up at greater length later in the Report and forms the basis for 
some important recommendations of the Inquiry.  
 
4.2.3 Three Strikes and You’re Out 
 
Another important enforcement initiative was the introduction of the ‘Three Strikes and 
You’re Out’ program (hereafter referred to simply as the three strikes system) in July 1998 
with the support of the road transport industry, to reduce speeding by heavy vehicles.  The 
system addresses operators as well as drivers and is targeted at operators of heavy vehicles 
detected by the Police Service travelling at over 115kph. It involves a graduated range of 
sanctions for both speed-limited and non-speed limited vehicles. A first offence of a speed-
limited vehicle results in a warning, a second offence the calibration of the speed limiter, a 
third offence leads to a 28 day suspension of the vehicle’s registration while fourth and 
subsequent offences each result in a three month suspension. For non-speed limited vehicles 
the first offence leads to a warning, a second offence to the fitting of a speed limiter, a third 
offence to calibration of the limiter, a fourth offence results in a 28 day suspension of vehicle 
registration and subsequent offences each cause a three month suspension. By addressing 
operators as well as drivers, and by suspending the registration of the offending vehicle and in 
so doing affecting the earning capacity of the operator the three strikes system would seem to 
provide a more effective deterrent than simply issuing speeding fines. This especially the case 
given suggestions that some companies routinely pay fines or that some drivers are prepared 
to forego fines when they balance this against bonus/penalties which may apply to delivery 
schedules or the risk of missing a load in the case of owner/drivers. 
 
The three strikes system has been adopted in a number of jurisdictions and has the strong 
support of bodies like Queensland Transport (written submission, page 10). It also commands 
strong support from a number of bodies, including industry associations. The ATA, for 
example, saw it as a method for dealing with unscrupulous operators and driving the 
‘cowboy’ element out of the industry, something which heavier penalties on drivers were 
unlikely to achieve: 
 
…the industry realised that drivers should not bear the full brunt of increased penalties when 
in some instances they may have been pressured by their employer or consignor to do so 
(written submission, ATA page 19). 
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As at 25 May 2000 1571 speeding offence ‘strikes’ had been recorded by the RTA in NSW, 
with 63% of detected vehicles travelling at 120 kph (exceeding the speed limit by at least 20 
kph) and about 12.5% travelling at 130kph or more (written submission, RTA). Of these 
(1571) offences 267 (or 16.9%) were recorded by NSW registered trucks. Of the remainder, 
740 (47.1%) by federally registered (FIRS) trucks, 355 (22.6%) by Victorian registered 
trucks, 87 (5.5%) for both Queensland and South Australian registered trucks, 18 (1.1%) for 
ACT registered trucks, 9 (0.6%) for Western Australian registered trucks and 4 (0.3%) for 
Tasmanian registered trucks.  Several things are apparent from these figures, including the 
relatively low detected offence rate for NSW registered trucks given the number of vehicles 
based in this state. However, most striking by far is the significant number of offences (almost 
half) incurred by federally registered trucks even though they comprise only about 2% of the 
national heavy vehicle fleet. Two FIRS trucks also held the dubious distinction of recording 
the highest speeds (152 kph or more than 50 kph over the speed limit on the Hume Highway 
at Mittagong). The Federal Interstate Registration Scheme (FIRS) provides for registration of 
vehicles involved in interstate trade (though by no means all), and is administered by the 
federal government, with each state acting as its agent. The Report will return to the issue of 
federally registered vehicles shortly. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Breakdown of the registration of vehicles that have recorded ‘strikes’ in NSW 
 NSW FIRS ACT QLD SA VIC WA       
TAS 
NT 
No. of offences 267 740 18 87 87 355 9 4 
% of total 16.9 47.1 1.1 5.5 5.5 22.6 0.6 0.3 
 
Source: written submission, RTA. 
 
 
In its own assessment the RTA finds the three strikes system hard to judge, noting that for one 
thing it depends on the effectiveness of detection (ie the probability of being caught) and in 
relation to this there were some worrying trends.  
 
An analysis of the ‘3 strikes’ data showed that the number of speeding incidents reported by 
Police for January to April 2000 was down 40% from the same period last year. Analysis of 
RTA speed data from Culway sites shows that there has been an increase in the incidence of 
speeding heavy vehicles.  
 
Increased Police activity does not guarantee reductions in the incidence of heavy vehicle 
speeding. Speed survey data (7 day, 24 hour/day surveys), from three sites on the section of 
the Hume Highway where there had been significant enforcement of the ‘3 strikes’ scheme by 
Police (Goulburn to Sydney), has been analysed. The analysis revealed that even on this 
section of the highway, the percentage of heavy vehicles speeding remain very high (50-70%) 
and had increased since the implementation of the ‘3 strikes’ scheme. The increase was, 
however, less than at the Culway sites. There was a slight decrease in the Goulburn area 
(written submission, RTA). 
 
There is need for caution in interpreting evidence in relation to one route (albeit the busiest 
and very competitive Sydney/Melbourne corridor) and trends over such a limited period of 
time. Nevertheless, the observations are consistent with other evidence presented to the 
Inquiry that the speeding problem is not improving and may well be getting worse, and that 
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some elements of the industry are becoming more adept at evading enforcement. Along with 
other measures, the three strikes scheme is failing to have a clearly demonstrable effect 
(which is not to say the situation may not have been even worse had it not been for the 
scheme). 
 
In addition to the probability of offences being detected, the certainty of punishment once an 
offence has been detected, and the imposition of penalty that actually influences offender 
behaviour in the desired direction are critical elements in an enforcement regime with genuine 
deterrence value. While the three strikes system would seem to meet these elements in 
principle, in practice there have been some major problems and again FIRS registered trucks 
figured heavily. In its written submission (at page 10) the RTA asserted: 
 
The key problem with FIRS is that the scheme restricts the action that can be taken against 
the operators of vehicles registered under it. Suspension of a vehicle registration must be 
undertaken by the State in which the vehicle is registered not the State in which the offence 
occurred. As the ‘3 Strikes’ system is not applied uniformly by all States, operators can avoid 
sanctions by registering in Jurisdictions where the system does not currently operate thus 
limiting the effectiveness of the scheme as a whole. 
 
Recognition of this problem extended beyond the RTA to other parties such as the ATA who 
observed: 
 
The speeding trucks legislation has been embraced especially by NSW however, in a 
nationally consistent approach, it appears not all other state authorities are taking this 
legislation to the full limit (written submission, ATA page 19). 
 
The RTA pointed to another evasion device that while not restricted to operators with FIRS 
trucks, was easier for them to avail.  
 
The sanction applied to operators under the ‘3 Strikes’ scheme is the suspension of their 
vehicle’s registration. To avoid this sanction heavy vehicle operators can transfer the 
registration of the vehicle to another entity such as their spouse or subsidiary company, prior 
to suspension action taking place. Under the current regulations the transfer cannot be 
prevented because there is no reason to suggest that the person/company to whom the vehicle 
is being transferred is ‘not a fit and proper person to be the holder of the registration of the 
vehicle’. It should be noted that for non-FIRS vehicles stamp duty is paid on the transfer. This 
would be $7,000 on a typical prime mover. Stamp duty is however not paid on FIRS 
registrations. So, as happened recently, a FIRS operator can transfer the registration of their 
vehicle to avoid sanction at virtually no cost.  
 
The NSW Minister for Roads has written to the Federal Minister for Transport and Regional 
Development on a number of occasions asking the Commonwealth Government to either 
honour its commitment to repeal FIRS legislation or make provision for States such as NSW 
to take direct action against offending operators. However, the Commonwealth has not taken 
the necessary action (written submission, RTA pages 10-11). 
 
A virtually identical concern was raised by the submission of the Traffic Services Branch of 
the NSW Police Service: 
 
There is a very large loophole in the legislation that allows Federal Interstate registered 
vehicles to thwart both Safe-T-Cam provisions as well as the 3 Strikes legislation. Information 
from operational police indicates that the 3 strikes legislation seems to have little affect on 
FIR’s vehicles at all. 
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The greater tendency to speeding amongst federally registered vehicles appears to be a long-
term problem. In their 1989 pilot survey Hensher and Battellino (1990:552) found that 
federally registered vehicles had average trip speed 11kph faster than the average for all other 
trucks and the gap was even greater when compared to trucks registered in NSW. The Inquiry 
heard some submissions claiming that the enforcement problems in relation to FIRS trucks 
did not simply relate to speeding but also included logbook/driving hours offences. The TWU 
(oral submission, Michael Kane), for example, claimed there was a problem in relation to 
both checking and falsification of logbooks carried by FIRS trucks. However, some drivers 
suggested that a general decline in the level of logbook inspection outweighed any differential 
treatment accorded to FIRS trucks. 
 
In summarising its position, the RTA was quite emphatic: 
 
There is a need to ensure all trucks operating in NSW are subject to its laws – there is an 
urgent need to dismantle the Federal Interstate Registration Scheme which is currently 
providing a shield for unscrupulous operators against NSW road transport law (written 
submission RTA executive summary). 
 
It is the view of this Report that federally registered vehicles constitute a problem far beyond 
their number both in the commission of speeding offences and their capacity to evade 
punishment which other transport operators, especially those with vehicles registered in 
NSW, must bear for behaving in a similar fashion. The Inquiry regarded this as an extremely 
critical issue that undermined the legitimacy of the enforcement regime, and was going to 
recommend that further urgent action be taken to address it. However, just prior to the 
completion of this Report the Inquiry learned from the RTA that the federal government is in 
the process of making the desired changes and has consulted with the RTA in developing 
these amendments.  
 
Notwithstanding this belated but welcome measure, the prolonged misuse of FIRS as a means 
of regulatory evasion is one of a number of issues that have cast a shadow over the push of a 
more coordinated nationally administered safety strategy in relation to long distance trucking. 
The Report will examine the question of national coordination in greater depth in a later 
section.  
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Speeding trucks are not an isolated problem, and as with regard to other hazardous practices 
such as excessive driving hours regulatory agencies have had to confront sometimes quite 
elaborate attempts to evade their enforcement measures. During the 1980s evidence of 
widespread speeding (one NSW study of articulated trucks found over 80% exceeded the then 
80kph limit and 15% of these were travelling in excess of 100kph. Cited in May et al, 
1984:184) was used to argue that a more ‘realistic’ speed limit was warranted. Even ignoring 
the short-term effects of the resulting changes, a more sober assessment of truck speeding is 
that speeding remains pervasive because the intense competition for work, scheduling 
pressures, unpaid loading/unloading time, and incentive/task-based payment systems 
encourage such behaviour. 
  
4.3 Drug use 
 
In its written submission (at page 11) the RTA pointed to an array of alerting/stimulant drugs 
being used by long distance truck drivers. These included slimming pills/appetite suppressants 
(such as Phentermine and Diethylpropion with the trade names Duromine and Tenuate 
respectively which were both available only on prescription). Another obvious set was 
caffeine (as found in coffee, cola drinks and NoDoz) and pseudoephidrine (used in many 
medications) that could be legally obtained. Finally, there are illicit drugs such as 
 199
Amphetamine, Methamphetamine and MDMA (‘ecstasy’). The RTA noted that, with the 
exception of caffeine and pseudoephedrine, it was an offence to drive a vehicle in NSW under 
the influence of any of these drugs (Road Transport [Safety and Traffic Management] Act 
1999 Division 2 and Schedule 2 of the 1999 Road Rules Regulation). Referring to the 
enforcement of these provisions, the RTA stated: 
 
Under Division 5 of the Act, police have the power to test a driver who appears to be under 
the influence of a drug at the roadside. If a test for alcohol is negative, the police officer can 
require the driver to undergo a drug assessment. If the police officer forms the opinion that 
the driver is under the influence of a drug, he or she has the power to arrest the driver and 
take him or her to a designated hospital where a blood or urine sample is taken by medical 
staff. Those samples are sent for analysis at the Health Department’s Division of Analytical 
Laboratories. The results of the analysis and the police officer’s report are considered by the 
Police Service pharmacologist who decides whether the driver should be prosecuted for 
driving under the influence of a drug. 
 
Provisions also exist under Division 4 of the Act to allow police to have a blood sample taken, 
in certain circumstances, from a crash-involved driver to be analysed for the presence of a 
drug. 
 
Police prosecute truck drivers for driving under the influence of stimulant drugs. It needs to 
be acknowledged, however, that it is much more difficult to detect a driver who is under the 
influence of a stimulant than one who is under the influence of a depressant, such as alcohol 
at the roadside. This is because stimulants do not usually produce overt signs of impairment 
when used in moderation. When RTA IVRs encounter a driver who appears to be under the 
influence of a drug, they call for police assistance (written submission RTA page 13). 
 
Operational police who gave evidence to hearings of this Inquiry echoed the caveat about the 
difficulty for police in enforcing this law. Further, in relation to post-crash investigations it 
should be noted that the Inquiry heard evidence that tow truck operators routinely offered to 
remove drugs or other potentially incriminating material (such as guns) for the driver from the 
truck cab at a crash site.  
 
A number of submissions highlighted the difficulties of implementing an effective 
enforcement regime in relation to drugs, especially where the underlying reasons for drug use 
in the industry were not addressed. For example, the NRMA observed: 
 
This is a difficult problem to deal with because roadside drug testing regimes are presently 
cumbersome and inaccurate, the specific impairing effects of drugs are difficult to identify 
and vary with different drugs, and the connection between detected drugs and the impairment 
level over time since the drug was taken is unclear. Again, the most effective form of 
‘enforcement’ of this issue may lie with companies. Those which schedule realistically do not 
pressure drivers to take risks, and are proactive with driver health issues are far less likely to 
have drivers infringing driving hours, speeding or taking drugs to stay awake. Another 
approach could be for the appropriate regulatory body to establish a taskforce including 
regulators, Police, the industry, unions and others to further investigate drug problems in the 
industry and suggest strategies to deal with the problem (written submission, NRMA). 
 
As noted in Section 1 the NSW Police Force has also targeted drug supply points, with the 
most recent success being the major raid on a drug manufacturing/supply center in Western 
NSW at Peak Hill. Such activity is by no means new. Police spoken to in the course of the 
Inquiry referred to raids on service stations near Gundigai supplying 'speed' in the early 
1980s. However, such activity appears sporadic. Notwithstanding the apparent success of the 
Peak Hill operation (which involved elaborate electronic surveillance that enabled the full 
chain within the organisation to be identified) and follow operations, it seems clear that these 
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worthwhile efforts have a limited impact on drug use in the industry. As was noted in an 
earlier section, there is evidence that some companies condone the use of drugs and a few, at 
least, actually supply the drugs themselves. The problem in the latter situation is that 
prosecution of such cases is likely to rely on drivers testifying against their employer. The 
Queensland branch of the TWU (written submission, page 8) complained that when it tried to 
refer these problems to the Police it was told to provide direct evidence (not hearsay). The 
union expressed concern that this was impossible to do without placing the driver/s in the 
invidious position of giving evidence on illegalities they had committed and also risking 
future employment prospects. The Inquiry heard sufficient evidence on this point to accept 
that, in most circumstances, it is highly unlikely that drivers will testify against their employer 
or even former employer. 
 
Further, there are questions as to whether present activities aimed at detecting drivers or 
targeting distribution/supply points can succeed without also addressing the underlying 
reasons for drug use. In its written submission the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police 
Service pointed to the need for an effective prevention strategy to address the underlying 
reasons for drug use and draws attention to a number of industry characteristics already 
highlighted in this report. 
 
The detection of drug-affected drivers is the final link in a long chain. Strategies need to be 
implemented prior to drivers resorting to drug taking. A long hard look at the number of 
operators servicing the industry needs to be undertaken. Are we over servicing the industry in 
general or in specific parts? How easy is it for me to obtain finance to buy a heavy vehicle 
and commence operating. What training do operators undergo prior to, and once entering the 
industry? Are they instructed on how to operate a successful business? Are they trained how 
to manage fatigue without resorting to the use of stimulants in order to keep their business 
viable and to make a reasonable living from the industry? 
 
The RTA also emphasised the need to address root causes and, like the Police, stressed the 
role of commercial pressures: 
 
The drug abuse problem is a symptom of the excessive pressures on drivers and the 
requirement for them to drive through the ‘circadian low’ from midnight to dawn. The 
problem is therefore best addressed through alleviating these pressures and educating drivers 
about sound fatigue management practices (written submission, RTA executive summary). 
 
Some submissions such as that of the Victorian Road Transport Association and several 
transport operators called for the introduction of compulsory random drug testing of drivers 
similar to the system currently in place in the USA. The general manager of one large 
transport operator argued this should be done as a matter of urgency. Indeed, he expressed 
some exasperation that, compared to the concerted efforts to make the Sydney Olympics 
‘drug-free’ there was no similar enthusiasm to do the same in road transport, despite evidence 
that it was a pervasive and long standing problem (written submission, Sydney based 
transport operator). One issue here is how to ensure drug testing doesn’t become solely driver 
focused. A heavy transport summit held in Brisbane in August 1999 tried to address this issue 
by proposing that in addition to the random testing of drivers, operators of drivers testing 
positive be heavily penalised, especially where it could be shown that unrealistic deadlines 
'forced' drivers to take drugs. The Queensland Minister for Transport was reported to be 
considering this proposal but the Inquiry is unaware of any further action on the issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus far, efforts by various government agencies to arrest the use of drugs in the long 
distance trucking industry appear to have had a very limited effect. While a tougher 
mandatory drug-testing regime such as that pursued by the Department of Transport in the 
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USA will have an effect it is not clear that this would be sufficient. The Inquiry heard 
evidence from persons with a knowledge of the industry who had visited the USA that due to 
privacy laws and the shortage of drivers, truck drivers dismissed following mandatory annual 
drug tests can readily join another transport company (and one located close to the initial 
employer). Further, to the extent that vigorous testing encourages labour turnover/instability 
then this will have its own adverse consequences for health and safety in the industry. The 
evidence of Professor Michael Belzer from the University of Michigan clearly showed that 
high levels of labour instability in the trucking industry were not conducive to safety. The last 
thing the Australian trucking industry needs is the high level of labour turnover that seem to 
characterise US operators (although it should be noted that the greater use of subcontract 
owner/drivers probably achieves a similar outcome). While suggestions about job shifting to 
escape the consequences of drug tests and other problems need to be tested further they do 
highlight the limitations of a driver-focused regime in such a competitive industry. Further, an 
Olympics-style approach to drug-use by the far-flung trucking industry of would be very 
expensive.   
 
A more effective approach would be to combine targeted enforcement activities with 
interventions designed to remove the root-causes of drug use in the industry. Thus, 
enforcement activities should target supply chains. Equally efforts should be made to combat 
the reasons that induce drivers to use drugs and in particular long hours and tight schedules. 
Selective use of random or systematic drug testing could be introduced to reinforce the 
eradication process once other changes are underway. 
 
4.4 Overloading, Load Restraint and Other Offences 
 
The Inquiry received a number of submissions in relation to enforcement measures designed 
to combat the overloading of vehicles. The RTA has a network of weighbridges on major 
routes to check heavy vehicles for overloading (and at which all trucks are obliged to stop) 
and inspectors also have the capacity to do on-road assessments. Several oral and written 
submissions, including those of drivers themselves, alleged that the closure or part-closure of 
several weighbridges had created major loopholes in the network that were being 
systematically exploited by some trucking operators. For example, on the Pacific Highway/F3 
motorway between Sydney and Newcastle there is a weighbridge for northbound trucks but 
no longer any weighbridge for southbound vehicles. It was suggested that operators took 
advantage of this to run overloaded trucks into Sydney. A similar argument was made in 
connection to a weighbridge on the New England Highway near Tamworth where the RTA 
closed down the south-bound side due to, it was suggested, a dangerous set of lane changes 
required by trucks entering and exiting the weigh station. A former RTA inspector criticised 
this change, arguing that the southbound station was the more important one because it had 
handled trucks bringing grain from the northwest of the state to the port of Newcastle. During 
hearings the Inquiry asked RTA about alleged exploitation of gaps in the weighbridge system 
and was told that the RTA was aware of the issue. 
 
As with fatigue, road transport legislation provides a series of powers to deal with the 
immediate risks posed by overloading, poor load restraint or defective vehicles. Under the 
Roads Act 1993 Section 230(2) provides an authorised officer with the power to direct a 
driver to stop the vehicle in relation to the vehicle’s load.  Section 231(1)(a) provides the 
power for an authorised officer to prohibit the person in charge of the vehicle from driving the 
vehicle until the vehicle’s weight no longer exceeds the maximum permitted. Section 
231A(1)(a) provides the power for an authorised officer to prohibit the person in charge of the 
vehicle from driving the vehicle until the vehicle’s load is properly secured.  This section 
applies to vehicles with a GVM over 4.5 tonnes, a vehicle combination with a GCM over 4.5 
tonnes or any other vehicle being used for business or commercial purposes.  Under the Road 
Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act 1997 Section 27B(4)(a) provides a police officer or the 
Authority (RTA) with the power to request or signal a driver of a heavy motor vehicle to stop 
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the vehicle in relation to the vehicle’s safety. Section 26(2)(c) provides a police officer or the 
Authority (RTA) with the power to prohibit the use of the vehicle in accordance with clause 
77 of the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1998.  This is prohibition is 
achieved by issuing a major defect notice under clause 77(1)(a). Section 42 provides an 
authorised officer with the power to stop a vehicle in connection with mass and other load 
requirement checks. 
 
The NSW Police submission drew attention to the enforceability of new regulations on load 
restraint. 
 
For many years Police relied on experience and training provided in developing a common 
sense approach to pro-active load restraining practices. The legislation governing load 
restraint was simple and easy to interpret. As part of the Road Transport legislative reform 
process a Load Restraint Guide was developed. This guide provides examples of the types of 
restraints that should be used on varying loads that should be used on varying loads. The 
guide then goes onto say that Alternative Load Restraints may be used in preference to those 
referred to in the guide as long as they meet the performance standards outlined in Section 
D1. When an officer turns to Section D1 in the guide they are presented with an engineering 
discourse that is impossible to decipher on the roadside. It is preferable that Police take 
action before the load falls off and causes death, injury or serious traffic congestion. I quote 
the following as an extract from Section D1 of the Load Restraint Guide, regarding 
alternative load restraining. 
 
‘To achieve the above, the load restraint system must be capable of withstanding the forces 
that would result if the laden vehicle was subjected to each of the following separately 
• 0.8g deceleration in forward direction 
• 0.5g deceleration in a rearward direction 
• 0.5g acceleration in a lateral direction 
• 0.2g acceleration relative to the load in a vertical direction’ 
 
How would Police be in a position to gather the required evidence to prove a case in a court 
of law, under the above performance measurement process. The Police Service has received a 
number of requests from the industry itself, asking if police could provide advice as to the 
contents of the Load Restraint Guide and how they (the industry) should interpret certain 
areas? (written submission, Traffic Services Branch of NSW Police Service). 
 
4.5 Enforcement of Offences Relating to the Transport of Dangerous Goods/Hazardous 
Waste 
 
As indicated earlier, in addition to the main body of road transport legislation there are also 
special regulatory controls on vehicle emission of noise and air pollutants as well as the 
transport of dangerous goods and hazardous wastes. The Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) is the prime agency responsible for enforcing this legislation, which makes no 
differentiation between short and long haul road transport. The NSW legislation for transport 
of dangerous goods is the Road and Rail Transport (Dangerous Goods) Act 1997 while the 
primary law governing hazardous waste is the Protection of Environment Operations Act 
1997. Each of these Acts implements relevant national requirements. National dangerous 
goods legislation was coordinated by the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) as 
part of the national road transport industry reform process. Hazardous wastes regulation was 
based on the National Environment Protection Measure for the Movement of Controlled 
Wastes between States and Territories under the National Environmental Protection Council 
Act, and equivalent State and Territory legislation.  
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In its submission the NSW EPA stated that the legislation placed specific responsibilities on 
all those in the management chain of the transport industry not just the driver (written 
submission, NSW EPA, page 2).  
 
With regard to dangerous goods the NRTC's coordination process ensured the responsibilities, 
procedures and operating requirements were identical between jurisdictions, with mutual 
recognition provisions to minimise bureaucracy (for example a license issued in one 
jurisdiction is valid in any other). The legislation entails substantial penalties of fines of 
$500,000 for a company and $100,000 and four years gaol for an individual. The legislation 
specifies the responsibilities of (and associated penalties pertaining to) consignors, transport 
companies, vehicle owners, tank and package manufacturers, vehicles loaders and those 
filling/emptying tank vehicles. The EPA stressed that most offences aimed at those in the 
management chain above the driver and that Penalty Infringement Notices (or PINs of up to 
$3,000) could be used for many of these offences. Since the inception of the legislation in 
April 1998 the EPA reported it had issued 90 PINs totalling $125,000, two court prosecutions 
had been finalised and investigations into another major incident was under way. The Inquiry 
understands that the EPA has a deliberate strategy of targeting enough serious prosecutions 
'high up the chain' (ie beyond transport companies) to send a deterrent message to those 
parties with considerable influence over the entire dangerous goods movement process and 
that this approach has met with some success. This approach would also appear to strengthen 
the position of transport companies in ensuring customers and clients follow due procedures 
(Borger, 2000:19-22). 
 
With regard to hazardous wastes the Protection of Environment Operations Act (and 
associated Waste Regulation) requires waste transporters to be licensed and details the 
responsibilities of those involved.  The Act provides for fines of up $250,000 for a 
corporation and $120,000 for an individual under the Act (or $20,000 and $10,000 
respectively under the Regulation). A far higher penalty of up to $1 million (for a corporation) 
or $250,000 or seven years gaol for an individual applies to the specific offence of wilfully or 
negligently causing a leak or spill that may cause environmental harm. There are additional 
controls apply to the transport of declared scheduled chemicals under the Environmentally 
Hazardous Chemicals Act. Informally, the Inquiry was led to believe this framework has 
enjoyed less success in terms of enforcement than is the case with dangerous goods. 
 
Overall, it can be noted that environmental legislation pertaining to the transport of dangerous 
goods and hazardous waste entails far more serious penalties than is the case with road 
transport legislation (apart from criminal charges laid against drivers in the case of an incident 
causing death or serious injury). Further, this legislation also has a stronger focus on the top 
of the chain of decision-making in terms of legislative form - an emphasis reinforced by 
associated compliance activities. In short, the legislation is far less driver-focused and has 
reached up beyond the transport company to those who own, control or receive dangerous 
goods or waste materials. Environment legislation is far more sensitive to the realities of 
commercial power and influence in the transport process than road transport legislation, and 
evidence would seem to suggest (as far as dangerous goods are concerned) more effective as a 
result. As such, it provides an instructive model for improving enforcement in the long haul 
trucking industry. While environmental legislation plays a confined role in terms of the areas 
of road transport it can address the same does not apply (at least in principle) to OHS 
legislation, which broadly resembles environmental legislation in terms of penalties and 
duties. It is to this body of law that attention now turns.  
 
4.6 The Role of the WorkCover Authority of NSW in Enforcement 
 
In addition to enforcement under road transport and associated dangerous goods/hazardous 
waste legislation the long distance road transport industry clearly falls within the ambit of 
occupational health and safety legislation, most notably the Occupational Health and Safety 
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Act 2000 and its administering agency, WorkCover NSW. WorkCover also administers the 
Timber Industry (Health and Safety) Regulation 1982 that covers transport because it includes 
provisions on the movement of logs between felling/logging sites and timber mills, but 
whether this would often include long haul (as defined by this Inquiry) is a moot point. 
 
In the view of this Inquiry, a truck engaged in a commercial or work-related task is a 
workplace, albeit a mobile one. Irrespective of its origins, ownership or the jurisdiction in 
which it is registered once a truck travels on a NSW road the truck becomes a workplace in 
NSW and its operator and driver are both subject to the full legal responsibilities enshrined 
under the Occupational Health and Safety Act. However, as far as this Inquiry could 
determine the WorkCover Authority of NSW has never really sought to exercise its powers in 
relation to the long distance road freight industry, notwithstanding repeated urging from the 
Transport Workers Union. For example, the NSW Branch of the TWU pressed for a 
prosecution in relation to Scott’s Refrigerated Freightways in 1997 (discussed above). In 
November 1999 branch officials met with the then General Manager, John Grayson to discuss 
its concerns over driving hours and as recently as January and February 2000 wrote to the 
General Manager asking WorkCover to investigate specific fatal/serious on-road incidents 
and to inform it of current investigations. In February the General Manager responded stating 
that the agency investigated work-related accidents in any industry, had always investigate 
traffic accidents on a road works site or where there were indications inadequate systems of 
work contributed to the accident. He then added: 
 
WorkCover recognises that for some workers in the road transport industry a truck or motor 
vehicle is a place of work. I have therefore issued a media release reminding employers in the 
transport industry of their obligations to report workplace incidents, which in their case may 
include road traffic accidents. 
 
WorkCover acknowledges however that the NSW Police Service, which provides the 
emergency response is the lead agency in regard to the investigation of road traffic accidents. 
WorkCover also acknowledges the role and responsibility of the Roads and Traffic Authority 
(RTA) in this regard. 
 
The RTA has primary responsibility for the regulation of the long distance trucking industry, 
including making provision for or with respect to the management and prevention of driver 
fatigue in connection with the driving of heavy trucks and coaches. WorkCover is advised that 
it is the practice of an RTA Officer to attend the majority (85%) of road traffic accidents 
involving heavy vehicles. 
 
Arrangements like these are accepted practice among government agencies where there is 
potential for more than one agency to be involved because of overlapping legislation and/or 
responsibilities. 
 
Investigation by WorkCover into accidents involving truck drivers have resulted in 
prosecution action being taken (Correspondence, John Grayson, General Manager of 
WorkCover to Tony Sheldon, Secretary of NSW Branch TWU, 24 February 2000). 
 
While in no way questioning the veracity of the last statement, the Inquiry could find no 
evidence of a prosecution in relation to an on road incident involving long haul truck drivers 
although several matters were investigated with a view to this. This absence of enforcement 
activity appears to be the result of a deliberate policy decision just identified by the then 
General Manager and essentially reiterated by the WorkCover Authority in its oral and 
written submissions to the Inquiry. It should be noted that at the time he wrote the letter just 
quoted, the General Manager was aware of an impending Inquiry (this Inquiry) and made 
specific reference to it, indicating that these issues would be considered as part of the 
Inquiry's terms of reference. In other words, while stating the WorkCover position, he was 
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aware this issue would be subject to an examination. This was also approach adopted by 
WorkCover in their submission to the Inquiry.  
 
In its submission WorkCover argued that safety problems in the long haul trucking industry 
formed part of the general imperative of road safety and it was therefore preferable for road 
safety legislation to remain as the central safety regime in this area. It argued that road safety 
legislation provided the most comprehensive and preferable tool to undertake this task 
(written submission, WorkCover, pages 7-10). WorkCover also made reference to notion of a 
lead agency arrangement whereby in areas where several agencies had overlapping 
responsibilities, one agency would take on the major compliance role with other agencies 
acting in a supporting capacity. In keeping with this and its arguments about the overarching 
road safety imperative, WorkCover viewed the RTA (together with the NSW Police) as the 
lead agency in road transport, including long haul road transport, and saw its own role as one 
of providing support. The agency noted that it had never seen the investigation of road traffic 
accidents as a primary role and road traffic fatalities were not recorded in its workplace 
fatalities surveillance system (written submission, WorkCover NSW, page 9). 
 
WorkCover also pointed to some regulatory restrictions on its coverage of road transport. 
While noting the emergence of the concept of a 'mobile' workplace and more liberal court 
interpretations of the geographic boundaries of a workplace, the agency (written submission, 
Appendix 3) noted several limits on this development under the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act. This included (s53 of the 1983 Act dealing with practicality considerations) and 
the inclusion of the words 'at the workplace' in both general duty provisions (sections 15 and 
16 of the 1983 Act and sections 8 and 9 of the new Act). WorkCover also expressed 
reservations about coverage of owner/drivers under the Act, doubted whether the intent of the 
Act was to cover road transport and pointed to the onerous responsibilities this would place 
on the agency. The Inquiry was a little perplexed by WorkCover's stance.  An expert on OHS 
and employment law, Associate Professor Richard Johnstone from the University of 
Queensland, was asked by the Inquiry to investigate a number of issues including to what 
extent the general duty provisions of the NSW OHS Act can be seen to extend to the road 
transport industry. A full copy of Associate Professor Johnstone's legal opinion is to be found 
in Appendix 2 of this Report. Summarising this opinion, it can be noted that Johnstone 
(Appendix 2, page 8) concluded that the NSW Act: 
 
…contains a range of general duty provisions which cover the major parties to long haul 
trucking arrangements. Of particular importance are the general duties in section 8(1) 
(employers to employees), 8(2) (employers to persons other than employees) and section 9 
(self-employed persons to persons other than employees). These latter two duties have the 
potential to impose important duties on trucking companies, clients and consignors in 
relation to owner drivers, but their operation in this area is severely is severely constrained 
by the provision in section 8(2) and 9 that the duties only extend to persons exposed to risks 
"while they are at the employer [or self-employed person's] place of work. 
 
In other words, the existing general duty provisions have wide coverage but for one serious 
flaw. Johnstone notes a similar proviso does not exist in corresponding general duty 
provisions of the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act and recommends the "while 
they are at the employer [or self-employed person's] place of work" be removed. The Inquiry 
believes the recommended amendment is fully warranted and urges it be undertaken as a 
matter of urgency. 
 
Leaving the last issue aside, the need to investigate the antecedent causes of serious incidents 
so responsible parties (operators and other) could be held attributable was recognised by 
WorkCover. WorkCover argued that the new chain of responsibility road transport legislation 
provided a mechanism for implement risk management principles that incorporated the 
obligations of consignors, transport companies and other parties. The agency recognised that 
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the penalty limits available under this legislation was in no comparable to that found under 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000 and urged that this situation be addressed. In its 
oral submission agency representatives also acknowledged WorkCover's greater experience in 
undertaking prosecutions based on performance standards or general duties and offered to 
provide assistance to road transport regulators in this regard. 
 
WorkCover has by no means entirely ignored the road transport industry. However, its 
activities have tended to focus on work locations (such as depots) and activities (such as 
manual handling) where it clearly has primary jurisdiction in terms of its responsibilities for 
OHS. For example, the agency produced a ‘Truckload’ web site (WorkCover NSW, 1999) 
providing practical guidance on equipment that could be used to prevent back injury 
connected to the loading and unloading of vehicles. Further, in its submission WorkCover 
argued that one way of encouraging most effective risk management by transport operators 
would be to follow the leverage model used by government departments when purchasing 
products or services from the private section. It pointed to the standard developed for all 
tendered construction work by the Department of Public Works and Services (written 
submission, WorkCover NSW, page 27). This required tendering contractors to have an 
appropriate OHS management system in place, a contract clause requiring an OHS 
management system to be prepared prior to the commencement of work, the auditing of these 
systems, and for all subcontractors to meet standards laid down for the principal contractor. 
WorkCover argued a similar model could be developed to apply to direct (ie moving 
government materials) and indirect (ie where goods are supplied) transport arrangements 
entered into by the NSW government as part of a strategy to encourage a risk management 
approach in the industry. The suggestion has merit. It would set a benchmark for other 
customers of the transport industry although, by itself, the leverage technique is highly 
unlikely to influence more than a minority of the industry. 
 
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that, overall, WorkCover NSW saw itself as playing a marginal 
role in terms of regulating safety in the long haul trucking industry. 
 
During the course of investigation the Inquiry found the overwhelming majority of parties 
making submissions saw safety in the long haul road transport industry as an OHS issue and 
not simply as a road/public safety issue (of course these components are not mutually 
exclusive). Most were of the firm view that OHS legislation should play a far stronger role in 
addressing the industry’s safety problems. This was the viewpoint of a wide array of different 
parties and interest groups. 
 
For example, the first point on enforcement raised by the Insurance Council of Australia in its 
written submission (page 7, Dallas Booth) was: 
 
Relevant Occupational Health and Safety obligations must be used to control and enforce 
safety standards relating to the issues of driving hours, rest periods and drug use. By setting 
strict standards and conducting frequent random audits with the power to impound vehicles 
and report offending companies/drivers to police…would change current practices. 
 
It is also important to note that the attitude of WorkCover NSW was not shared by several 
other jurisdictions. For example, in its written submission to the Inquiry WorkCover Victoria 
noted that the issues of driving hours, drug use and speeding were interrelated and it was 
currently undertaking research on fatigue in Victorian workplaces in order to develop a 
framework for prevention. The submission noted that in 1997 the Transport Industry Safety 
Group (TSIG) had produced a guide explaining the OHS duty of care (with a video version) 
in order to address a lack of knowledge within the transport industry. The TSIG has also 
produced a video guide on fatigue management entitled ‘How the hell can you take a break?’ 
More recently WorkCover funded the development of TransCare - a transport-specific 
performance-based management system designed to achieve a more comprehensive and due-
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diligence approach to OHS - by the Victorian Road Transport Association (discussed below). 
Further, a recent report prepared on falls from heights found truck drivers and other transport 
workers were at risk of falling from the top of a trailer or its load (while the industry is aware 
counter-measures such as overhead pulleys and gantries, by and large, these are not being 
utilised). In response WorkCover has funded research into falls from trucks and loads. 
 
The Victorian agency made it clear it believed it had a strong enforcement role to play in road 
transport, one made especially important by advantageous features of OHS legislation and 
corresponding problems with the existing road transport regulatory framework. It noted that 
road transport was an extremely competitive low margin industry with many small operators 
and subcontractors but the OHS legislation had regulatory requirements, especially those 
within the general duty provisions, to deal with this.  For example, it specifically noted 
section 21 (3) (a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 extended employer duties 
to independent contractors and their employees. Section 22 of the Act imposes a duty that 
other persons should not, as far as practical, be exposed to risks to their health or safety – a 
public safety provision that would clearly encompass other road users in the case of a road 
transport operator. Further, it noted that OHS responsibilities extended along the full vertical 
chain of responsibility from consignor/supplier through transporter to client. The Inquiry 
would note, that as Associate Professor Johnstone points out in his opinion (see Appendix 2), 
the deeming provision (section 21(3)) has been rendered somewhat redundant by the courts’ 
quite expansive interpretation of section 22 and its equivalents in the OHS Acts of other 
jurisdictions such as NSW. In other words, the fact that the NSW does not contain an 
equivalent to section 21(3) is not a problem, provided the suggested amendments to sections 8 
and 9 (see below) are implemented.  
 
Under section 22 of the Victorian Act chain of responsibility can be enforced, as suppliers and 
clients (where they are employers or self-employed persons) owe a duty of care to persons at 
their workplace (who are not their employees) to ensure they are not exposed to risks to their 
health and safety. While prosecutions of parties such as suppliers and manufacturers have 
been rare in the past a number of WorkCover agencies have signaled their intention to target 
these parties in future. A recent landmark decision by the Full Bench of the NSW Industrial 
Relations Commission (involving Arbor Products International, a supplier/manufacturer of 
wood chipping machinery. Reported in Occupational Health News Issue 495 26 July 2001) 
indicates these intentions are being implemented. As far as the road transport industry is 
concerned factors that might be considered could include fatigue, unrealistic scheduling or 
delivery requirements imposed by suppliers and clients and work environments at pick up and 
delivery that cause undue delays or exhausting manual labour to drivers. 
 
WorkCover notes a common view in the industry that whilst the legislation administered by 
the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) addresses significant issues in the industry, 
this has not been pursued vigorously enough and the prescribed fines are too low. 
 
The Victorian OHS legislation enables courts to impose jail sentences for directors 
responsible for failing to provide safe systems of work, and the industry is particularly keen to 
see a jail sentence enforced to send a clear message of the importance of health and safety. 
 
The Victorian agency noted that it actively pursued prosecutions, including those against 
employers for failing to provide a safe system of work. To illustrate this in connection with 
the road transport industry it pointed a prosecution of Don Watson Pty Ltd in 1999 for failing 
to provide a safe system of work for its truck drivers (Section 21 (1) & (2) of the Act), the 
company being fined $12,000. The company's operations manager was charged with failing to 
take care of employees under his direction (Section 25 of the Act) and fined $3,000 without 
conviction. The maximum penalties available under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 
1985 when the offences were committed in 1994 were $40,000 for the company and $10,000 
for the manager but by the time the sentences were handed down the maximum penalties had 
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increased to $250,000 and $50,000 respectively. In handing down his decision, the County 
Court Judge made it clear that a far heavier penalty would be imposed on anyone committing 
these offences now: 
 
Current offences would be more severely dealt with, not only because of that very marked 
increase in the maximum penalties, but also because of the increased awareness in the course 
of the last five years in the community about occupational health and safety issues and, in 
particular, the steps that can and must be taken to provide a safe working environment 
(Queen v Pierce Philip Gage and Don Watson Pty Ltd County Court of Victoria, 11 August 
1999). 
 
It hardly needs to be added that these maximum penalties (and the equivalent penalties under 
the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act) far exceed monetary penalties available under 
the road transport legislation, including chain of responsibility provisions. It should also be 
noted that the Victorian WorkCover submission essentially agrees with all the major 
components of the legal opinion on these questions prepared by Associate Professor Richard 
Johnstone for this Inquiry.  The Inquiry is aware of WorkCover prosecutions for on-road 
incidents going back as far as 1998 although not all these involve for-profit freight 
companies. For example, the agency successfully prosecuted Mabro Meats PL and its director 
for failure to maintain a truck in roadworthy condition under s21 of the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act after a company-owned prime mover ran off the road when a steering linkage 
failed (WorkCover Recent Prosecutions No.3/4 1998:10-11). In this case, the driver was 
injured although the magistrate stated it was lucky no one was killed. 
 
Prosecution by the Victorian WorkCover Authority received strong support from the local 
industry association (the Victorian Road Transport Association, written submission), 
especially where it was directed at serious on-road incidents: 
 
In Victoria, unlike other jurisdictions a moving truck is considered to be a workplace and 
successful prosecutions have resulted from on road crashes. These crashes have been more 
serious in nature involving death…Even prior to presenting offending companies to court 
there was an impact on the industry. The information/rumour network created an almost 
immediate response in the form of requests for assistance at this organisation. Companies 
will respond in a positive manner to safety if they perceive that enforcement authorities are 
serious about prosecution. 
 
It should be noted that Victoria is by no means the only jurisdiction where a truck would be 
considered a workplace. However, the real point being made by the Association – and one 
accepted by this Inquiry – is that in Victoria serious efforts have been made to follow this 
recognition with enforcement activity. 
 
The option of using OHS legislation in relation to the long distance trucking industry has been 
raised in other jurisdictions. For example, in his findings on the Inquest into the death of six 
motorists arising from the 1996 Blanchetown smash in South Australia (already mentioned in 
this Report) the Coroner addressed the culpability of two managers under the Occupational 
Health, Safety and Welfare Act, 1986. Specifically, the Coroner believed both men had 
abrogated their responsibility as employers and then referred to duties under Section 19 (1) (a) 
to provide a safe working environment and a safe system of work; and to provide adequate 
information, training and supervision (s19 (1) (c)). The Coroner also referred to s19 (3), 
which requires employers to monitor employee health and well-being, keep injury records and 
provide information at the workplace (Coroners Court of South Australia, 1999 page 23). It 
should be noted that very similar general duty provisions are found within the principal OHS 
Act of every jurisdiction in Australia, including NSW. The Coroner noted that the Act also 
provided for detailed regulation identifying how these objectives could be achieved in 
particular industries. In concluding his observations on this point the Coroner observed: 
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The time has long passed when employers can take the "hands off" approach described by Mr 
Bunker and Mr Cushnie. I do not seek to suggest that WRB or its managers are in breach of 
the Act - to do so may contravene Section 26(3) of the Coroners Act. I merely observe that the 
attitudes displayed by both these witnesses are not consistent with modern concepts of the 
duty of employers to their employees. 
 
In this regard, it seems to me that the Office of Workplace Services, part of the Department of 
Administrative and Information Services, has a substantial role to play in ensuring, by 
training, information and policing, that this legislation is complied with. I do not know what 
action has been taken by that department in relation to the heavy vehicle industry to date, but 
it seems to me that there is plenty of scope for them to play a more active role in relation to 
this industry, assuming they have the resources to do so (Coroners Court of South Australia, 
1999 page 24). 
 
In the same year the WorkCover Corporation of South Australia (WorkCover South Australia, 
1998) produced a detailed 25-page guide to meeting the OHS duty of care in the road freight 
transport industry. The guide identified the major responsibilities of employers, employees, 
self-employed persons, and having a system in place to safeguard subcontractors under 
general duty provisions in the South Australian Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act, 
1986. It also detailed the key elements in establishing an OHS management system (including 
management commitment and policies, hazard identification, risk assessment and control 
measures, fleet and depot inspection/auditing, training, dangerous goods, fatigue management 
and employee consultation). What is noteworthy about this document is that it presents these 
responsibilities in an integrated fashion while identify the relevant provisions under OHS, 
road transport and dangerous goods legislation (and agency contact points). What is equally 
noteworthy is that this document was produced in response to concern from industry 
operators and employees as to how they to comply with OHS legislation. In Queensland, the 
Division of Workplace Health and Safety (1994) issued a guide on health and safety in the 
road freight industry in 1994, which has since been updated. Even the 1994 version identified 
the relevant general duty provisions covering employers, employees, self-employed persons 
and others (sections 9,10,13 and 14) under the Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Act, 
1991. The guide contained a fairly detailed and (for the time) advanced section on fatigue, 
which amongst a number of others, was clearly directed at the long haul sector. 
 
The need to bring OHS legislation into play in the trucking industry has also been recognised 
in other countries. For example, the recent New Zealand inquiry into truck crashes 
recommended that: 
 
The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 should be applied immediately to truck 
operations by the Occupational Safety and Health Service, in conjunction with the Police, 
especially for serious offending where the full force of the Act is justifiable (Storey 1996:12). 
 
The New Zealand report noted that OHS legislation provided that employers, including 
company directors, who breached the Act could be fined up to $NZ 100,000 or gaoled for up 
to one year. In other words, the penalties available were fare more significant than those 
normally applying under road transport legislation and could also consider systematic 
offences (these are issues to which this Report will return). The New Zealand report also 
made recommendations in relation to the appointment of inspectors (both in the short and 
long term) to facilitate enforcement under the Health and Safety in Employment Act, 1992 
(Storey, 1996:84-85). A more recent inquiry health and safety problems in Tranz Rail (New 
Zealand, 2000:46) reinforced this point, arguing that rail employees should be afforded the 
protection of general duties in the principal OHS Act (the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act or HSE Act): 
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There is, in our view, no justification for rail employees having a lower level of occupational 
health and safety protection than the work force generally. We therefore recommend that the 
provisions of Part II of the HSE Act that set out the duties of employers relating to health and 
safety in employment should apply without restriction to all rail employees. 
 
This Inquiry can see no reason why an analogous argument should not apply to road freight. 
Indeed the Tranz Rail Inquiry made specific reference to road transport, and the 
recommendations of the 1996 inquiry into truck crashes, to support its argument with regard 
to rail freight. 
 
A Task Group established by the Health and Safety Commission in Britain found the 
longstanding reliance on transport legislation and enforcement authorities was no longer 
adequate, although it excluded heavy vehicles from this: 
 
It has been Government policy for many years that the health and safety enforcing authorities 
should not investigate at-work road traffic incidents, except where work vehicles or workers 
are engaged in specific work activities (eg refuse collection, street cleaning). However, one 
consequence has been that, other than for large vehicles, there has been little motivation for 
employers, or the enforcing authorities, to examine whether a failure in health and safety 
management systems might have contributed to an incident. 
 
The Task Group believes that this position is no longer sustainable. Our central position, 
therefore, is that employers should manage risks associated with at-work road journeys and 
other safety within their firms. This could mean approaches set out in existing health and 
safety law (principally the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSW Act) & the management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (the Management Regulations) would become 
relevant (Health and Safety Commission, 2001:2-3). 
 
The Task Group discussion paper does not specify why heavy vehicles are excluded from the 
problems identified. Somewhat perplexingly, heavy vehicles feature in at least one of three 
case studies referred to later in the paper on the benefits of health and safety management 
systems similar to those promoted under OHS legislation (Health and Safety Commission, 
2001:5). It is also difficult to reconcile this position with the findings of the House of 
Commons Committee of Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs released in July 2000 
that were discussed in the earlier section on commercial practices and safety (see above). It is 
possible the Task Group was influenced by the existence of operator licensing but of course 
no comparable scheme exists in Australia and the New Zealand evidence referred to earlier is 
that such a scheme would benefit from a closer integration with OHS legislation rather than 
being seen as a substitute for it. 
 
Leaving these issues to one side, the Task Group discussion paper went on to discuss the 
nature and benefits of a more integrated approach, including reliance on the broad duty 
provisions the Health and Safety at Work Act sets out for employers, the self-employed and 
employees as well as the risk assessment processes established under this legislation in 
conjunction with European Directives (including the Framework Directive 89/93/EEC). 
While the discussion paper is by no means a statement of final position (and indeed calls for 
comments on how to implement these changes) the general thrust of a shift from policy is 
clear. In an associated document (Health and Safety Commission, 2001:12) it is noted that ‘at-
work’ vehicles account for an estimated 30% of all miles driven on British roads and that of 
an average of 123 ‘at work’ persons killed in traffic accidents (4% of all traffic fatalities) 40% 
were in heavy or small commercial vehicles.  
 
Nor was the WorkCover NSW interpretation one that found support amongst industry, 
insurance company, the union, drivers, community organisations and others that the Inquiry 
interviewed in the course of its investigations. Virtually without exception they at the very 
 211
least accepted that safety in the long haul freight industry was an occupational health and 
safety and as such one where OHS legislation should play a role. Many went beyond this, 
advocating rigorous use of this legislation as critical to establishing a more effective 
enforcement regime (for example, the NSW Road Transport Association). 
 
What is perhaps most telling is that the RTA itself did not share WorkCover’s views. In its 
own submission (executive summary) the RTA stated: 
 
There would be advantages in WorkCover taking a stronger role in insuring safe working 
practices in the industry given that trucks are clearly workplaces of their drivers. 
 
Consistent with its recognition of the role of OHS law, the RTA recently adapted its Heavy 
Vehicle Drivers Handbook to include a section, approved by WorkCover, that makes the 
relevance of this legislation explicit: 
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (OH&S) places obligations upon employees to 
ensure the health, safety and welfare of their employees in the workplace. This duty of care 
requires everyone in the workplace to be aware of potential hazards and take steps to prevent 
workplace accidents, injuries and illnesses, and the Act provides for severe penalties where it 
is established the employer has failed to meet that duty. 
 
Any vehicles used by employees in the course of their employment is defined as their 
workplace, including heavy trucks or commercial buses. One aspect of provision of safe 
systems of work by employers would be compliance with the National Driving Hours 
Regulation, and this in turn would obligate the employee driver under that OH&S legislation 
to co-operate in compliance with the National Driving Hours Regulation. 
 
The National Driving Hours Regulation sets the limits for driving, other work and rest. These 
limits are a balance to fulfil the needs of efficient road transport, the management of driver 
fatigue and a workable system of compliance and enforcement. The limits do no guarantee 
that a driver will be free of fatigue in every circumstance. 
 
It is important that employers and drivers adopt principles and practices to manage driver 
fatigue within those limits to ensure that they fulfil their duty of care. 
 
The need for WorkCover to investigate serious on-road incidents involving freight trucks also 
found support within the ranks of operational police, being volunteered (without any 
prompting from the Inquiry) by a number of police officers. For example, a highway patrol 
officer with 19 years experience was perplexed by the failure of WorkCover to do this, 
wondering whether it was due to a legislative restriction or lack of manpower, because: 
 
…in my mind all heavy vehicle accidents, I am talking about all heavy vehicle accidents - they 
are industrial accidents (oral submission, police traffic coordinator based in southern NSW). 
 
The officer stressed that he was not advocating more enforcement per se, as the pattern of 
offences seemed to have changed littler over time, but rather more carefully targeted 
enforcement that would deal with those elements, such as freight forwarders, who were at the 
heart of the problem. 
 
Calls for trucks to be treated as workplaces, and for on-road crashes to be treated as industrial 
accidents, also came from owner/drivers, a number of whom were unaware of the current 
situation, even in Victoria. 
  
 212
The TWU was not the only body to raise the lack of WorkCover inspections in relation to the 
depots/workshops of transport companies. When asked whether he had seen a WorkCover 
inspector during his time with a transport company, a former maintenance manager replied: 
Thankfully no, being in charge of the workshop where there were a few bugs - that was a lot 
of the reason I left. Being in charge of the workshop I’m glad that I didn’t see one because 
there is probably a few practices in there – people driving forklifts without licenses and 
unsafe work practices, people not wearing …hearing protection when supplied and given to 
them. But I would have been the person in charge held responsible. No I did not see one (oral 
submission, former fleet maintenance manager). 
Other managers and transport operators, some quite large, indicated that they could not recall 
a WorkCover inspection of their workshops and depots. While such responses are anecdotal 
and subject to error they do indicate that whatever inspections have been carried out have 
remained largely invisible in the eyes of transport operators even that area of road transport 
operations where it might be expected WorkCover would be active under its own preferred 
approach. 
One apparent consequence of the failure of WorkCover to take a significant role in road 
transport more generally is that worker’s compensation claims data does not appear to have 
been used for targeting prevention activities. In its written submission (page 8), the Insurance 
Council of Australia referred to the claims rating experience of Road Freight Transport 
(ANZIC Code 611) in NSW included in a detailed analysis undertaken by the Premiums 
Rating Bureau. The analysis found smaller employers (workers compensation premiums up to 
$50,000) accounted for 97% of policies, 50% of the premium pool and about 50% of the cost 
of claims. A small number (ie less than 10) of very large employers (ie premiums in excess of 
$600,000) account for about 15% of the premium pool and a smaller proportion of the cost of 
claims. There are about 150 companies in the medium-size category (premiums over $50,000 
but less than $600,000) with about 110 of these contributing about 20% of premiums but 
accounting for less than 10% of claims. The remaining 40 employers (about 1% of policies) 
contribute 10% of premiums but account for nearly 25% of the cost of claims. Such patterns 
are not unique to NSW or even Australia. For example, in the USA in 1997 one in ten 
workers in the trucking and warehousing industry suffered an work-related injury or illness, 
almost 50% higher than the rate pertaining to the private sector as a whole. Further, in 1996 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) identified 56 trucking companies 
that had injury rates double the transport industry average (Jeffress, 1999). 
The Insurance Council argues companies with significantly worse claims experience were 
effectively being subsidised by their competitors and should be targeted (a similar argument is 
made in relation to property and CTP insurance). There is some merit in this argument. At the 
very least, information on companies with worse records should be available to those agencies 
responsible for prevention. While this might present difficulties for the RTA there is no 
reason why WorkCover’s own prevention arm could not target these firms. At the same time, 
some caution is required. Account needs to be taken of the distortions to workers’ 
compensation data that arise from the extensive use of self-employed owner/drivers in the 
industry and the fact that the good record of some companies may be an artefact of claims 
suppression/referral to Medicare discussed in Section 2. The better claims record of some 
medium to large operators may be heavily influenced by the extent to which they subcontract. 
While using subcontractors may effectively reduced the company’s exposure to workers’ 
compensation claims this is no way commensurate with an improvement in safety 
performance. Indeed, it is quite possible that safety may have actually deteriorated. These 
arguments do not justify a decision not to target companies with poor workers’ compensation 
claim records but does suggest such practices need to be used carefully, and in conjunction 
with an array of information. 
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Conclusion 
 
Up to the present time there has occupational health and safety legislation has played little if 
any role in the enforcement of safety in the long haul trucking industry in NSW. The evidence 
presented to the Inquiry clearly indicates that this represents a serious limitation in the current 
enforcement regime that should be addressed as a matter of urgency. A number of (if not 
most) OHS agencies in other Australian jurisdictions have already begun to move in this 
direction and there is support for this amongst most stakeholders and other interested parties. 
While the Inquiry understands the reluctance of WorkCover NSW to become involved in a 
jurisdictional battle with other enforcement agencies or to cause a more uncoordinated 
enforcement regime it has a clear and significant responsibility for safety in the trucking 
industry.  Further, experience in other jurisdictions, such as Victoria and Western Australia, 
indicates that agencies can work effectively together. The Inquiry believes it is time for NSW 
to follow their lead and specific recommendations to achieve this are made later in the report. 
 
4.7 Award Rates, Owner/Driver Rates and Minimum Labour Standards 
 
Unfortunately, the Australian Trucking Association is unable by its charter to involve itself in 
industrial matters, and… this is an impediment in solving many safety issues in the Long haul 
industry (written submission, NSW Road Transport Association, page 2). 
 
As this Report has already indicated payment methods/minimum payment rates for drivers, 
whether they receive formal entitlements in relation to pay (in the case of employee drivers), 
and delays to payment (especially in the case of owner/drivers) have significant safety 
implications. In addition to the evidence demonstrating this link it can be noted that the 
association is well recognised amongst many parties to the industry. For example, in its 
submission the NSW Road Transport Association, which represents truck operators in NSW, 
argued that failure to address these award and contractor rate enforcement was undermining 
attempts to improve safety in the industry. In doing so, the Association identified a number of 
significant issues and so it is worth quoting at some length. 
 
It has long been the understanding of the NSWRTA that compliance with safety regulations 
and Occupational Health and Safety legislation is not possible without award compliance. 
Put simply, an employee cannot be expected to work safely if that employee is not being paid 
the correct award entitlement. The impression of this Association is that compared to the size 
of the industry award compliance is minimal. We are not aware that any cases for breaches of 
award compliance in the transport industry have been run in the past five(5) years. 
 
This is exacerbated by the fact that in the transport industry there is serious confusion 
regarding award coverage between the Federal and State system. In order to be bound by a 
Federal Award a transport company must be named in the Schedule of “Parties Bound” 
attached to the award. The Industrial Relations Commission must order this to be the case, 
but only after being convinced in a hearing that the company should be so bound. This 
procedures is commonly known as a “Roping In” and follows the serving of a Log of Claims 
on the company by the Union, a dispute being found, and a decision to “rope in” being made. 
This process is not understood by a larger majority of transport employers in this country and 
this ignorance is in large part a reason for massive non-compliance to Federal Awards. Many 
transport employers just don’t know their obligations in this regard. 
 
In contrast to this, State transport awards are “common rule”. This means that if a company 
is based in eg New South Wales and is not party or “roped in” to a Federal Award by the 
processes previously described, and that company is in the business of transporting goods in 
New South Wales then that company is bound by the relevant State award, in this case the 
Transport Industry (State) Award. 
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Again, the Arbitration Inspectorate of the Department of Industrial Relations in New South 
Wales is severely understaffed, so monitoring State Award compliance in the industry is rare. 
The Department only relies on complaints from employees to act: however employees are 
reluctant to complain for fear of losing their job. Complaints from employees tend to be 
limited to disgruntled ex-employees. 
 
This is unsatisfactory as a means of ensuring that employees are not disadvantaged. 
Ultimately, a company who takes advantage of employees by award breach has an unfair 
advantage over a business competitor who complies with the Award. 
 
Over the years, employers have argued that the Transport Award in New South Wales has 
been far too restrictive, and this is one of the main reasons why they ignore its content. About 
five (5) years ago the NSWRTA and the TWU (NSW Branch) set about modernising the award 
to remove these perceived impediments to productivity. This process was not without some 
heartache on both sides. Eventually, wage rises for award variations were agreed and the 
consent document was approved by a Full Bench of the NSW Industrial Relations 
Commission in December 1996.  This process was repeated in April 2000, again resulting in 
wage rises for greater award flexibility. The Transport Industry (State) Award has thus been 
made more flexible in its conditions, eg to the extent that Saturday and Sunday can now be 
worked as part of ordinary time, and part-time provisions are now included. 
 
There have been many more changes, all to allow greater flexibility of operation of the 
award, such that no employer could now argue that his business is being disadvantaged by 
having to comply (written submission, NSW Road Transport Association, pages 8-9). 
 
In short, the Association argued the framework of federal and state awards was confusing to 
employers (especially ‘roping in’ under federal awards) and that non-compliance with awards 
was widespread and seldom pursued except in relation to complaints. The independent legal 
advice prepared for this Inquiry by Associate Professor Richard Johnstone concurs with this 
assessment (see Appendix 2). Clearly, in such a competitive industry as long haul road 
transport the disparities in coverage and level of award rates represents a serious problem 
(Professor Johnstone identifies a number of potential remedies). 
 
The Road Transport Association also argued that concerns inflexibility in the NSW Transport 
Industry Award encouraged non-complaince had been addressed.  Given that it is the major 
representative of the industry in NSW, and has been so for more than 100 years, the 
Association position that these problems have now been eliminated must be given strong 
weight.  That award evasion continues, in the Association’s view, to be widespread and that 
this has serious consequences for safety, are cause for concern, especially as it is supported by 
other evidence presented to the Inquiry by transport operators, individual drivers and the 
Transport Workers’ Union (TWU).  
 
During the course of the Inquiry’s investigation, it received submissions from operators 
(especially medium to large firms) attesting that award evasion was widespread, particularly 
amongst smaller firms. In its written submission (at page 10), the NSW Branch of the TWU 
argued that award compliance represented a far great problem in long distance sector of road 
transport (in comparison to short hall) and referred to its own experience of pursuing wage 
recoveries: 
 
As an indication of…the pressure on drivers to continually reduce their rates to remain 
competitive we would like to draw the attention of the inquiry to our experience of back wage 
claims in the long distance industry. In these cases the union has found it not uncommon for 
long distance drivers knowing they are entitled to higher rates to accept rates below their 
legal entitlements on the basis that they know if they asked for a higher rate they wouldn’t 
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have a job. Often this practice is also accepted on the basis of knowledge of their entitlement 
to a backwage claim once they leave a particular company. 
There was wide acceptance that serious award compliance problems in long haul road 
transport were essentially an outcome of competitive pressures on transport operators (low 
freight rates and lower labour costs charged by owner/drivers) and employee driver fears that 
demanding award entitlements would place their job at risk. Overseas evidence supporting the 
willingness of truck drivers to accept below their minimum legal entitlements to safeguard 
their job is presented below. The Inquiry also received numerous submissions arguing that 
award non-compliance was factored into work and scheduling arrangements, with drivers 
undertaking additional hours in order to make up what they lost in not receiving award 
entitlements. This claim finds support in evidence arising from specific incidents such as the 
Coronial Inquest into the Blamchetown smash in South Australia referred to elsewhere in this 
Report, which revealed a systemic pattern of such behaviour.  The Blanchetown case also 
reinforces the connection between award entitlements, driving hours and safety. With regard 
to the level of expectation that drivers will accept these arrangements, it is also worth 
recalling submissions from drivers, the TWU and CFAT about drivers who refused excessive 
hours being threatened with dismissal. The Inquiry heard enough detailed examples of such 
incidents to form the view that these were not aberrant or atypical, at least with regard to 
some operators. 
 
In his oral submission, NSW branch secretary Tony Sheldon claimed that by 'cooking the 
books' the payments to drivers employed by small regional companies in particular might be 
as little as half their full aware entitlements. Not surprisingly, other branches of the union 
echoed the views of the NSW branch. The Victorian/Tasmanian branch echoed the view that 
award evasion was worst outside the metropolitan area and in relation to casual drivers. It 
added that company turnover/closure exacerbated the problem and alleged some closures 
were a deliberate attempt to evade the legal entitlements of drivers. The branch (oral 
submission) referred to a claim for over $80,000 in unpaid wages it was pursuing from a 
Shepparton-based company relating to award breaches over a six year period. In its written 
submission, the Queensland branch of the TWU reproduced (supported by copies of letters 
and sworn statements) a number of instances of non-payment of award rates or illegal 
withholding of wages (including allowances) reported to it. In these cases (where the names 
of drivers and the company involved were identified) the Queensland branch repeated 
identified a connection between low wages (including below award payments) and drivers 
being forced or encouraged to work excessive hours outside the legal driving limits. The 
Inquiry also received written (some with appended documents) and oral submissions referring 
to the failure to pay due entitlements. Indeed, no one the Inquiry spoke to seemed to query 
this was an issue though large transport operators suggested it was mainly an issue with small 
to medium operators. 
 
The Inquiry was unable to precisely estimate the size (in terms of a proportion of total 
entitlements) or extent of award evasion. For reasons indicated below as well as others (such 
as the fact that in a number of industries it is unions not government inspectors who have 
historically done the bulk of enforcement) government records on enforcement must be 
treated as a very partial indicator of the extent of evasion. Nevertheless, there was widespread 
acceptance by a range of parties that award evasion is extensive in both scope and size (ie the 
level of underpayment in each pay packet). Indeed, the Inquiry is unaware of any individual 
or organisation making submissions who disputed this interpretation. The impression that 
award evasion is widespread finds support in the available evidence. This evidence also 
indicates this has been a serious problem for some time. Williamson et al’s (1992) study of 
960 long distance drivers found that about 50% of independent owner/drivers reported that 
they were paid below award rates.  But this proportion may well understate the extent of 
below award payments, especially owner/drivers, because twice as many owner/drivers 
responded that they were unaware of award rates. Similarly Arblaster et al (1995) found that 
amongst drivers employed by large companies only 54.5% received award rates, 36.4% 
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received below award rates, and 9.1% of drivers were unsure whether they were receiving 
award rates or not. For drivers employed by medium-sized firms the responses were 27.8% on 
award rates, 61.1% below award rates and 11.1% unsure while for drivers employed by small 
firms the responses were 25% (award rates), 62.5% (below award) and 12.5% (unsure). That 
is, the smaller the firm the greater the proportion that is paid below award rates.  Amongst 
owner/drivers the study found that only 11.1% claimed to be receiving award rates with 
66.7% receiving below award rates and a further 22.2% being unsure. Thus financial 
pressures are greatest on drivers in small business. 
 
Long distance trucks on NSW roads can belong to operators based in any Australian 
jurisdiction. Further, federal awards cover a number of operators. For both these reasons 
compliance and enforcement of award wages cannot be considered only within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant NSW agency, namely the Department of Industrial Relations. 
Therefore, in order to obtain more information on the extent of compliance and enforcement 
practices in relation to award wage rates, the Inquiry contacted the relevant Minister of every 
state, territory and federal jurisdiction asking for relevant information over the last five years.  
In most cases the responses were only able to provide information in relation to the road 
transport industry generally, rather than long distance drivers. Not all award breaches related 
to wages although they represent the bulk of enforcement activity. In the three years to July 
2000 the NSW Department of Industrial Relations initiated 193 prosecutions (about 5.8% of 
all department prosecutions) involving a total of 40 employers and resulting in the recovery of 
$190,000 in entitlements and the imposition of penalties totalling $180,000 (W. McDonald, 
Director General, correspondence 25 August 2000). These figures did not include complaints 
made to the Department through its contact centres and settled during the investigation phase. 
 
In Queensland, the Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations received 
1480 complaints in the last five years resulting in 83 prosecutions. Correspondence from the 
Minister (Paul Braddy correspondence 1 September 2000) noted that some complaints would 
involve more than one breach and added: 
 
The breaches are reported to be difficult to prosecute as driver logbooks are said to be 
incorrectly completed in many areas. In this regard, driving in excess of twelve hours per day, 
because it is illegal in Queensland, often results in drivers being paid for hours not recorded 
in logbooks at less than award rates. 
 
The observation provides an important award enforcement dimension to the problematic link 
between logbooks and paid time raised earlier in this Report. It is unlikely this problem is 
confined to Queensland. 
 
In South Australia in the five years to July 2000 the Department of Administrative and 
Information Services received 372 complaints in relation to transport award breaches, of 
which 284 were sustained (Robert Lawson, Minister for Workplace Relations, 
correspondence 13 October 2000). During the same period three prosecutions were initiated 
and eight infringement notices served for alleged breaches. Of the 372 complaints, 41 were 
made under the federal Transport Workers Award (all made between 30 September 1998 and 
31 July 2000) and 36 of these were sustained (no prosecutions were commenced or 
infringement notices issued in relation to these federal breaches). 
 
In Tasmania, four cases of underpayment (two under the Transport Workers General Award 
and two under the Carriers Award) were referred to the Tasmanian Industrial Commission 
and in each orders were issued against the employer. Since February 2000 Work Standards 
Tasmania has dealt with federal awards and by 5 September it had dealt with four cases of 
wage arrears (Deputy Premier Paul Lennon, correspondence 5 September 2000). Of these, 
one case under the Transport Workers Passenger Vehicles Award were settled by negotiation, 
of two cases under the Transport Workers Mixed Industry Award one was settled by 
 217
negotiation while the other is still under investigation, and one case under the Transport 
Industry Award is still under investigation.  
 
In Western Australia the Department of Productivity and Labour Relations dealt with 156 
formal inquiries (4.1% of all inquiries) under the Transport Workers General Award, most of 
which related to underpayment of wages and all resolved without prosecution (Cheryl 
Edwards, Minister for Labour Relations, correspondence, 17 August 2000). 
 
With regard to the federal jurisdiction, information was obtained on award breaches and wage 
recoveries for a number of transport awards. Again, as in the state jurisdictions it appears that 
since the mid 1980s the federal inspectorate has undertaken little proactive inspection 
(especially that of a random nature designed to maximise impact), relying mainly on 
complaints to detect breaches (Bennett, 1994:149-164). During the 1980s and 1990s most 
recorded breaches occurred under the Transport Workers (Passenger Vehicles), Transport 
Workers (Interstate Drivers), Transport Workers and Transport Workers (Mixed Industries) 
Awards. Information obtained from the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations 
and Small Business (Correspondence, Fisher 8 November 2000) indicated that the Office of 
Workplace Services investigated 118 claims of award breaches under the Transport Workers 
(Long Distance Drivers) Award 1993 between 1995/96 and 2000/2001(part). Of this total, 12 
occurred in 1995/1996, 30 in 1996/97, 58 in 1997/98, 6 in 1998/99, 9 in 1999/2000 and 3 in 
2000/2001. As in other states, the claims mainly related to underpayment of wages and trip 
money. Of the 118 claims, 60 or just over half were sustained following an investigation (to 
initiate a claim a signed claim form has to be lodged with the Office) and apart from two 
recent cases all these were finalised.  
 
In general responses from the jurisdictions indicate that award compliance complaints are 
common in road transport although the precise number pertaining to long haul trucking is 
unknown. The responses tend to confirm the claim of the NSW Road Transport Association 
that enforcement activities are largely in response to complaints rather than proactive 
auditing. It recognises this approach may be a consequence of limited resources. Given 
evidence presented by drivers to the Inquiry expressing fear of being victimised for making 
complaints, especially those in small to medium firms outside the major urban centres, the 
Report has a serious concern about the effectiveness of existing enforcement arrangements as 
they pertain to the long haul trucking industry.  
 
Awards, Determinations, Agreements and Owner/Drivers 
 
As has already pointed out, in the long haul road transport industry employee drivers directly 
compete with owner/drivers for work. Owner/drivers compete for business with companies 
using employee drivers and companies may also elect to use owner/drivers so competition 
may occur between companies using employee drivers and another using subcontracted 
owner/drivers or even varying combinations of both. Unlike employee drivers there is no 
minimum wage rate for most owner/drivers in Australia so this competition may occur on the 
basis of labour costs where the firm using an employee driver is placed at disadvantage. 
Owner/drivers become a tool to drive down tender costs and this may be especially attractive 
to larger operators who, to put it bluntly, may find it more difficult to cut costs by failing to 
meet award conditions to employer drivers than smaller firms. As was also noted earlier, there 
is evidence to suggest some larger companies have moved increasingly over to subcontracting 
to other transport firms (generally but not always small) and owner/drivers in recent years and 
that has placed even greater pressure on companies heavily relying on employee drivers. It 
could be argued that while ever there is pressure from owner/drivers prepared to accept 
freight rates that translate into below award wages in order to try and survive then the 
resulting competition with employee drivers will provide and ongoing inducement to award 
evasion. If award entitlements 'discounting' is as high as the TWU has claimed (pay rates 
amounting to 50% of legal entitlements) then the discounting of rates paid to owner/drivers 
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needs to be even more substantial for them to retain competitiveness. In the end, a spiral of 
undercutting could occur, in the worst cases bolstered by fraudulent taxation (at least until 
recently) and social security arrangements. Several submissions drew attention to these 
problems. Similar problems have been identified in other industries with elaborate 
subcontracting networks such as home-based clothing manufacture (in the late 1990s the 
Australian Taxation Office estimated an annual loss of revenue of around $80 million in this 
industry alone). To the extent these practices occur they can be seen to represent a hidden 
subsidy to freight rates but there was insufficient evidence to make any further observations 
on this issue. 
  
The threat to award rates posed by undercutting by owner/drivers has long been recognised 
and indeed attempts have been made to deal with it by industrial relations tribunals making 
determinations setting minimum rates for them in several jurisdictions. This approach has 
been rendered increasingly ineffective in recent years and again the NSW Road Transport 
Association believed this has had serious implications for safety. 
 
New South Wales is the only state that regulates the terms and conditions of engagement of 
owner-drivers (Contract Carriers) by Principal Contractors. These are known as 
Determinations and they can be considered as “Awards for Subcontractors”. There are quite 
a number of Contract Determinations in NSW applicable to varying types of transport eg: 
 
The General Carrier (Contract) Determination 
The Car Carrying (Contract) Determination 
The Courier and Taxi Truck (Contract) Determination 
 
There is, incidentally, an Interstate Carrying (Contracts) Determination also, however for 
some years now this Determination has not been updated in rates due mainly to its 
widespread breach and lack of practical use. The problem here is that it was only possible to 
regulate journeys that commenced in NSW, and that travelled over a state border. 
Compliance thus caused NSW based companies to be at a disadvantage to interstate based 
companies who could travel into NSW and backload back. 
 
There is no doubt that failure to adhere to Awards and Determinations in NSW does enable 
an unfair business advantage to be gained over those companies that do comply. The unfair 
advantage is then “balanced up” by unscrupulous companies by reducing safety 
considerations and breaking traffic laws eg driving hours, rest breaks, speeding etc (written 
submission, NSW Road Transport Association, page 9). 
 
As noted by the NSW Road Transport Association (written submission, pages 10-11), there 
have attempts to set up Australia-wide agreements on minimum rates, most notably the 
Interstate Owner-Driver agreement reached in the aftermath of the 1979 Razorback truck 
blockades. Based on a minimum 22 tonne load and updated every six months by a costing 
committee of both employer and union representatives, the agreement ultimately failed to 
have a serious effect. Crucial limitations were its status as a 'recommendation' rather than 
having legislative backing and the consequent lack of enforcement/compliance (the rates were 
only adhered to in 'union' yards), problems in costing (escalation provisions)/determining 
market rates and the failure to cover specialist trucks such as refrigerated trucks and tankers. 
Moreover, the agreement was seen to clash with the de-regulation/free market philosophy of 
the 1980s and received little if any endorsement from government. Indeed, several 
submissions argued that the targeting of anti-competitive (co-operation on pricing) 
arrangements amongst the major freight forwarding companies by the Trades Practices 
Commission in the early 1990s seriously weakened the agreement's already limited chance of 
success. The NSW branch of the TWU (oral submissions, Michael Kane and Tony Sheldon) 
supported this interpretation, arguing the union lost a considerable number of owner/driver 
members in the long haul sector as a result of the decision. These observations afford some 
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parallels with changes to regulatory arrangements in the USA discussed later in this section of 
the Report. 
 
The NSW Road Transport Association (written submission, page 11-12) argued disparities in 
freight movements between different centres made the setting of rates difficult. These 
imbalances are exacerbated where a large number of small operators are involved since larger 
companies are in a better position to organise offsets and equalise returns. The Association 
was of the view that owner/drivers should be remunerated fairly for all the costs associated 
with providing a service but argued, given market forces, this was beyond the control of the 
industry itself. 
 
The TWU has sought to demonstrate that a practical freight rate calculator could be devised 
for owner/drivers based on them drawing a wage at the same level as award rates while 
covering operating and fixed costs and return on invested capital. The union engaged a 
consultant, Tasman Asia Pacific to evaluate the rate calculator. 
 
Aside from the issue of calculating an acceptable rate, the central problem with previous 
attempts at contract determinations has been the issue of coverage/enforcement. Where these 
issues can be overcome there is some evidence that these determinations can have an effect. 
According to Bob Angus, the General Manager of Boral Transport in NSW (oral submission) 
a contract determination has been effectively implemented in relation to the local 
owner/drivers involved in moving quarry materials. Indeed, one effect of the determination of 
cartage rates (especially escalator provisions), according to Angus, was to give a financial 
advantage to fleet operators in tendering for work, resulting in greater use of employee 
drivers. While owner/drivers are unlikely to view this as an ideal outcome it does protect the 
earnings of those who do obtain work and, to the extent fleet operators have superior OHS 
performance, may result in improved OHS outcomes.   
 
In the past year there has been evidence of a growing national recognition of the threats to 
safety posed by very low payments to owner/drivers. In October 2000 the president of 
Natroad, Doug McMillan, called for sustainable freight rates. While not condoning recent 
blockades by owner/drivers, McMillan said these actions and associated debate over high fuel 
prices and GST-related costs were a catalyst for a long overdue assessment of rates. McMillan 
argued small operators were chronically underpaid, with the rates paid to some owner/drivers 
barely covering fuel costs, and urged users of trucking services to take responsibility for the 
ongoing viability of industry: 
 
Users of trucking services are turning a blind eye to this trend and are putting pressure on 
operators to provide services at even lower rates than previously, all in the interests of short 
term commercial gain (Natroad calls for sustainable rates, 2000). 
 
Two months earlier in August 2000 Senator Ron Boswell, Secretary to the federal Minister 
for Transport, stated: 
 
Maintenance and general safety issues become compromised if subcontractors are forced to 
work for unviable rates (Lewis, 2000:7) 
 
At the same time, chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Professor Allan Fels, announced that the Commission was investigating a number of instances 
of alleged unconscionable conduct in the transport industry. He warned major trucking 
companies that they could be committing breaches of the Trade Practices Act if they forced 
subcontractors to accept cut-price haulage rates (Lewis, 2000). While supporting these 
measures the Inquiry would note that the evidence presented to it indicated that cut-price 
haulage rates were the norm for owner/drivers not an aberration and the pressure to impose 
these rates came from consignors and customers, not simply large transport companies. The 
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Inquiry was also repeatedly told the increased use of subcontract arrangements by at least 
some major transport companies was a response to the intense competition for freight tasks 
and the not unconnected pressure for lower freight rates from clients. That is, as discussed 
elsewhere in this Report, large companies were resorting to subcontractors in order to secure a 
contract at a reduced rate and still make a return by 'squeezing' the rate paid to the 
subcontractor. It is not clear that targeting large transport companies will succeed in reversing 
this practice because it fails to address the underlying cause and may, at worst, simply lead to 
other companies filling the gap of those forced to withdraw from these practices by legal 
action. 
 
In recent times there have been a number of well-publicised protests by owner/drivers calling 
for a national code that included minimum freight rates. Thus far, the federal government has 
refused to entertain calls for minimum freight rates. Some submissions to this Inquiry also 
expressed reservations about minimum freight rates, seeing the solution more in terms of a 
national voluntary code of conduct, voluntary accreditation and improved business skills for 
owner/drivers: 
 
…work has been conducted by the ATA and the federal government in respect of their code of 
conduct and I certainly embrace and endorse the that work and believe that it can be a 
contributory factor to continuing improvement in on-road practices. I would make this 
statement that no one in this industry is owed a living and if we start to regulate to the lowest 
common denominator then we will be doing efficient businesses, honest businesses, a 
disservice. We have to ensure that people understand that they are running a business not just 
driving a truck and they adopt business principles that allow them to operate viably (oral 
submission, Peter Garske, Executive Director, Queensland Trucking Association). 
 
It has to be said that of the submissions made to this Inquiry, opposition to minimum freight 
rates for owner/drivers was, very much, a minority viewpoint. Ultimately, as far as this 
Inquiry is concerned the only relevant issue to be considered is whether there is a link 
between the rates paid to owner/drivers and safety and if so, how should any adverse effects 
be mitigated. The answer to these questions can be stated as follows. First, the evidence 
considered by the Inquiry, and far beyond just the views expressed in various submissions 
(including surveys), indicated that there is a significant connection. The problem extends to 
employee drivers because of they are, in many instances, in direct competition for 
work/freight tasks with owner/drivers. Second, without gainsaying the problem of 
inexperienced/inefficient operators, for reasons identified elsewhere in the Report, including 
the weak bargaining power of owner/drivers, it is entirely improbable that voluntary 
accreditation or enhanced business skills will remedy this situation. While the Inquiry heard 
reference to enhanced quality of services, the majority of submissions and other evidence 
indicated that, with some exceptions, customers were overwhelmingly concerned with 
obtaining the lowest cost for moving their freight. While ever there are owner/drivers with 
little bargaining power or under sufficient financial pressure to take a job at a lower price, 
other operators will have to compete. Enhanced business skills alone will not save operators 
from the pressure of competition and freight rates which research by Dean Croke and others 
indicates are so low as to threaten the viability of many operators. In sum, low freight rates 
are, in main, a cause not a symptom and to the extent this threatens safety must be directly 
addressed. 
 
In as much as evidence indicates that the failure to pay adequate returns to 
owner/drivers poses a threat to safety of drivers and the community, and entails 
regulatory evasion that punishes legitimate operators, there is an overwhelming case for 
intervention to the point where this risk is removed. That is, there is a need to establish a 
rate that ensures that safety is not endangered and competition can occur on a level 
playing field where minimum legal standards are met. This is not the same thing as 
guaranteeing a comfortable livelihood for owner/drivers or establishing minimum 
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freight rates for the entire industry. Rather, it merely sets a minimum rate for 
owner/drivers based on safety considerations alone. 
 
As a final point it is also essential to consider another aspect, namely the issue of enforcement 
of legal entitlements. As with employed drivers, the Inquiry heard evidence that at present 
owner/drivers sometimes face problems in getting paid their legal entitlements under the 
contract. A far more frequent problem is being paid promptly for work undertaken. Delays to 
payment exacerbate the financial pressure on owner/drivers and, as highlighted by the Driver 
Survey, were seen as a critical safety issue. At present, owner/drivers simply lack the 
bargaining power to pursue payment issues. Resort to the courts is an expensive and time-
consuming remedy that might also jeopardise future work. In short, delayed payment is a 
safety issue in its own right that needs to be addressed. Hence, it is important to ensure that 
any determination of a ‘safety rate’ also includes a mechanism that will secure prompt 
payment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Minimum payments made to both employed drivers and owner/drivers have a critical effect 
on safety but at present there are significant enforcement issues. At present the minimum 
award rates for drivers is established under a mixture of state, territory and federal industrial 
relations legislation, with some state determinations covering owner/drivers (not all of which 
appear to be effectively implemented). While a uniform minimum rate covering the entire 
industry would have advantages (so long as achieving consistency did not entail a lowest 
common denominator outcome) this would be difficult to achieve. As Associate Professor 
Johnstone notes in his report (Appendix 2) there are number of ways of addressing this issue. 
However, a resolution of the problem at the national level is unlikely due to political factors 
as much as institutional or regulatory difficulties. 
 
Leaving this issue aside, an arguably far more pressing concern is to ensure drivers are paid 
the rates they are entitled to. As far as this Inquiry can determine, that excluding major 
trucking firms evasion of award entitlements to employee drivers is widespread and a 
byproduct of intense competition, low freight rates, undercutting by owner/drivers and fear 
amongst employee drivers of losing their job. Existing state and federal compliance measures 
are overwhelmingly complaint-based, an approach which both industry associations and the 
union agree is seriously flawed, since drivers fear being victimised or losing future 
employment prospects if they make a complaint. Drivers making submissions to the Inquiry 
reinforced the veracity of this interpretation. Further, the move to enterprise agreements and 
Australian Workplace Agreements has exacerbated the situation, making it more difficult for 
drivers to determine compliance with the award baseline. Independent vetting by the union or 
other interested parties is also extremely difficult if not impossible since unlike awards (which 
are public documents) these agreements are often treated as private documents between the 
employer and employee/s concerned. Finally, like the recent federal fatigue inquiry, this 
Inquiry noted with great concern evidence it received on Australian Workplace Agreements 
which had been ratified that presumed average speeds that may well give rise to a breach of 
road transport legislation, occupational health and safety legislation or both.  
 
Minimum payments made to owner/drivers are also a serious issue, since these drivers 
directly compete for work with employers/employee drivers and financial pressures 
occasioned by inadequate returns lead fairly directly to compromises in terms of vehicle 
maintenance, driving hours, drug use and other critical safety issues. There is a serious 
imbalance in the present system which sets a minimum wage rate for one group of workers in 
an industry while another group undertaking precisely the same tasks and, indeed, competing 
with the former for work, is exempted. It creates a strong inducement to use subcontracting 
and shifts in employment status as a means of gaining a competitive advantage. This might be 
acceptable in some industries but not in the intensely competitive road transport industry 
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where efforts to remain viable by owner/drivers and transport firms often lead to 
compromises on safety that, in turn, pose a serious risk not only to drivers but other road 
users. There was almost universal agreement amongst the parties giving evidence to this 
Inquiry that minimum freight rates were a significant safety issue, though some debate as to 
practical methods of addressing this. The Inquiry believes a practical solution can be found 
and a procedure to achieve this is proposed in the final section of the Report. 
 
The problems just identified require urgent attention and a number of specific 
recommendations to achieve this are to be found in the final section of the report. 
 
4.8 A Broader Assessment of Existing Enforcement Practices 
 
Beyond any consideration of enforcement in relation to specific categories of offences such as 
speeding and drug use, there is a need to recognise a number of issues that affect enforcement 
more broadly or in connection to an array of offences. Several of these issues were touched on 
in the previous subsections. However, it is important that these issues be addressed in some 
depth, as the next subsection will attempt to do. In the course of its investigation the Inquiry 
uncovered considerable evidence pertaining to the effectiveness of existing enforcement 
practices. The risk of detection and prosecution, as well as the level and nature of the penalty 
imposed on offenders as well as which category of offenders are targeted (where the 
commission of offences involve multiple parties) influence the effectiveness of enforcement.  
 
4.8.1 Inadequate Resourcing and the Role of 'Smart' Compliance 
 
In addition to criticisms of specific activities in relation to enforcement of speeding offences 
and the like the Inquiry received submissions and other evidence raising more general 
criticisms of existing enforcement activities.  
 
The Inquiry received a number of submissions critical of the RTA and its overall strategy in 
relation to enforcement. Several submissions were critical of reorganisation within the RTA 
over the past decade in terms of its effects on on-road enforcement. After detailing 
reorganisation of the DMR/RTA compliance network, inspector rostering (and the secrecy of 
this) and several other changes an obviously frustrated ex RTA inspector made the following 
observations: 
 
The bureaucracy in the RTA is almost impossible to convince about an argument - you just 
cannot make them understand. I have worked with the RTA for many years as an inspector, I 
worked in Sydney to start with and then was sent to [names country town]. I then came back 
to Sydney and worked in the corporate area. It wasn't until I worked in the corporate area 
that I began to understand what we used to go through on the roads as an inspector, why we 
had these silly positions being made. Because you just cant make the corporate people listen, 
they have got no conception whatsoever about basic enforcement issues…When I was 
working up here on a secondment I took one of the directors of [names RTA section].  I took 
him on a trip one night, we left here and drove to [names town] to show him what actually 
went on the highway and I think he learnt more in those four or five hours than he probably 
learnt in 15 years before as a public servant (oral submission, former RTA inspector). 
 
Tensions between field-based inspectors and senior policy staff are by no means uncommon 
in enforcement agencies and so these comments should be treated with a degree of caution. 
What can be said is that the Inquiry received numerous submissions from drivers and 
operators urging that those involved in enforcement should spend some time in a truck so as 
to gain insights into the nature of the trucking industry. 
 
At least one transport association accused the RTA of being too bureaucratic/rigid as well as 
failing to coordinate the activities of its regional inspectors. This association made similar 
 223
criticism of the NSW Police Service.  It echoed criticism that enforcement agencies needed to 
understand the industry but argued this did not entail regulatory capture as a region where it 
felt it had one of the best relationships was one of the toughest. Like a number of others 
making submissions to the Inquiry the association referred to a recent decision regarding a 
ban on coloured bug-deflectors (based on the findings of a coronial inquiry) where it was 
claimed trucks were issued with defect notices without warning. Again, without doubting the 
veracity of some points made, these criticisms need to be interpreted cautiously. 
 
Another criticism was the overall level of resourcing of enforcement activities. This criticism 
was made not only by union representatives, insurance companies and those currently or 
formerly involved in enforcement (such as ex RTA inspectors or Police) but also by industry 
representatives. For example, the Australian Trucking Association (ATA) argued that 
enforcement was severely under-resourced and that the situation had been exacerbated by: 
 
the reduction in real numbers of enforcement officers dedicated towards the industry 
combined with an increase in vehicle numbers (written submission, ATA page 4). 
 
The solution proffered to this situation did not amount simply to an infusion of additional 
resources. Rather, a number of submissions called for more effective use to be made of 
existing enforcement resources with several (such as those of Queensland Transport, the 
ATA, QTA and NRTC) making specific reference to the need for ‘smart compliance’. Smart 
compliance received widespread support amongst industry, agency and regulatory body 
representatives that attended the National Enforcement, Viability and Safety Summit held in 
Albury in early 1999. In its written submission, the NRTC argued that smart compliance as a 
far broader approach to compliance than conventional compliance and enforcement 
provisions, one that enhanced compliance outcomes and complemented the command and 
control approach of new legislative provisions. The elements of ‘non-legislative’ compliance 
strategies identified by the NRTC included: 
 
• consistent, effective and well-targeted enforcement 
• privileges and incentives-based strategies 
• education and training of enforcement officers and industry 
• effective communication between enforcement officers, regulatory authorities and 
industry 
• well-targeted and nationally consistent enforcement practices; and 
• ongoing monitoring, researching and review of the effectiveness of enforcement 
outcomes 
 
The NRTC argued that these elements could be incorporated into a multi-faceted compliance 
program to improve compliance outcomes for road transport.  
 
For its part the ATA defined smart compliance as follows: 
 
Smart compliance is all about utilising minimal enforcement resources in the most effective 
and efficient way. That is, targeting the bad elements of the industry whilst at the same time 
recognising operators, such as TruckSafe operators, for being leaders in the culture reform of 
the industry. 
 
In short, as far as the ATA was concerned, smart compliance was achieving an optimal 
combination of external regulation and voluntary compliance programs.  
 
At the same time, the NSW Road Transport Association stressed self-accreditation and 'smart 
compliance' did not remove the need for rigorous external enforcement, and further, there was 
a need for rigorous external checks on self-accreditation programs: 
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This Association is of the view that conventional enforcement on the road, and conventional 
compliance procedures are essential as well as smart compliance and self-accreditation. 
There are, at present, too many loopholes in the self-accreditation and smart compliance 
process to permit a winding back of conventional enforcement. 
 
In fact, enforcement of chain of responsibility and Occupational Health & Safety legislation is 
essential if safety is to be improved. This will have to be done at some "third party" level by 
some separate organisation if it is to mean action is to be achieved and the general public 
appeased… The Association believes that self-accreditation must be backed by on road 
enforcement if we are ever to convince the public that the industry is cleaning up its act 
(written submission, NSW Road Transport Association, page 17). 
 
The argument that internal systems may help free up resources and enable a two track system 
is logical and has been promoted in both by policymakers and academic researchers in the 
field of regulatory strategy (see Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999, 2000). However, they also 
note that industry (such as the level of competition), firm (such as size) and employment 
characteristics need to be taken into account when deciding which of the two-track system is 
most appropriate. Further, in keeping with the NSW Road Transport Association's views, 
genuinely independent auditing of internal regulation systems is essential to ensure the system 
does not simply amount to a form of ‘paper compliance’ unmatched by actual practices (for a 
discussion of this and other system-requirements see Frick et al, 2000). The Report will return 
to these issues in a later section where the effectiveness external/mandatory and 
voluntary/self-regulatory models in achieving compliance in the long haul trucking industry 
are examined in some depth. 
 
As the NRTC’s written submission readily points out, smart compliance is in its 
developmental stages. A number of the components, such as more targeted enforcement, are 
likely to achieve widespread approval within the industry at least in principle (the specific 
determination of who is to be targeted and why may involve some healthy and hopefully 
constructive debate). As already implied in the last paragraph, other issues such as the degree 
of reliance to be placed on incentive-based schemes as a substitute for external regulation are 
likely to prove more controversial. There has already been a shift to voluntary accreditation 
and alternative compliance regimes in road transport and the role and effectiveness of some of 
these is examined in some detail below. The recent adoption of smart compliance – itself 
rather intriguing since many of its key components have been the standard fare of regulatory 
strategy elsewhere over a number of years – means that the Inquiry is unable to make any 
judgement on its effectiveness. While a number of the principles underpinning it appear 
sound, there are simply too many as yet unanswered questions. What is a little concerning, 
however, is that some elements of the package such as voluntary accreditation/alternative 
compliance regimes that have been around for a number of years have not, as far as this 
Inquiry could determine, been subject to rigorous independent assessment.  It might have 
been considered logical for the NRTC to have already sponsored such assessments as part of 
this shift (especially given the controversy surrounding a number). The last element of smart 
compliance identified by the NRTC (see dot points above) is ongoing monitoring, researching 
and review of the effectiveness of enforcement outcomes. This appears to be a recent 
discovery. As highlighted below, the NRTC has been far more active in drawing up new 
regulatory regimes and compliance models than assessing their effectiveness. 
 
4.8.2 The Preoccupation with Driver Offences and Inadequate Investigation  
 
Penalties are manifestly inadequate and do not properly target the prime offenders. The 
possibility of being detected versus the additional revenue dollars achieved by cheating the 
system outweighs any real concerns about current penalties applied. Too often the driver is 
 225
the easy target to bear the burden of penalty (written submission, Victorian Road Transport 
Association). 
 
When there is evidence that the driver of a heavy vehicle may have caused the death or 
serious injury to road users or other parties there is almost certain that charges will be laid by 
regulatory agencies. In the case of death a charge of manslaughter is common. This response 
is entirely appropriate but there are two basic imbalances in the existing equation.  
 
First, recent court cases and coronial inquiries have pointed to at least contributory negligence 
on the part of transport companies or other parties (such as pressuring the driver to work 
excessive hours or supplying drugs). However, this has hardly ever led to the laying of serious 
charges (under the OHS Act, for example) against those parties. In other words, the focus of 
enforcement remains largely confined to the driver. This problem appears to apply to all 
jurisdictions as some recent cases illustrate. 
 
One Victorian case involved the death of a 22 year-old driver in February 1996 when his 
small cattle truck was rear-ended by a semi-trailer in February 1996. It was later revealed that 
at the time of the incident the semi-driver had been working up to 14 hours a day for 18 
consecutive days. In sentencing the driver to three years gaol (with a minimum two-year non-
parole period) the County Court Judge observed: 
 
Caught up in a very competitive, aggressive industry whose habits all too frequently spill over 
onto roadway behaviour, Mr Braun (the driver’s employer) was, in my belief, negligent in his 
supervision, clearly had little interest in the log book and left too much to driver discretion 
(Age, 1998 cited in Perrone, 2000:160). 
 
Despite these comments, no charges were laid against the employer. 
 
The focus on culpability on drivers and failure to pursue the legal responsibility of employers 
and other parties even where there is evidence to suggest such action is warranted sends very 
poor signals to the industry and its clients about appropriate modes of behaviour on their part. 
Although some moves are being made to address this they are at present too insubstantial to 
have any real likelihood of affecting a significant change. 
 
Second, and at least equally important, when a truck driver dies in an highway/on-road 
incident there is very seldom an investigation of possible corporate responsibility, let alone 
the launching of a prosecution. In New South Wales we were unable to discover any 
investigation or prosecution by WorkCover on the basis of the on-road death of a long 
distance truck driver although at least one counterpart agency namely WorkCover in Victoria 
has begun to address this issue.  
 
Particularly in relation to fatigue-related single vehicle incidents a preliminary investigation is 
at least warranted. Without some level of investigation, serious breaches of OHS and other 
legislation are likely to go undetected. The problem is not confined to road transport but it 
appears to be particularly serious in this industry. In this regard the Inquiry is especially 
indebted to recent research by Santina Perrone on the circumstances surrounding and 
regulatory response to all work-related fatalities that occurred in a four-year period in 
Victoria. This research, which was based on the careful identification and sifting of a vast 
array of diverse materials, is extremely rare. It offers potentially unique insights into the 
regulatory response to workplace fatalities, including those occurring in road transport. In her 
attempt to identify instances of negligence connected to work-related fatalities in Victoria in 
the years 1987 to 1990 Perrone (2000) carefully sifted WorkCover, coronial inquests, court 
proceedings and other records of investigation. She found that of 258 deaths occurring in a 
corporate context, in 55 cases there was insufficient information to determine the negligent 
contribution of the employer and transport fatalities comprised almost three quarters of these 
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(74.5%). Perrone (2000:45) examination of the reasons for this and its implications are 
particularly pertinent. She noted that the relevant OHS agency (then known as the HSO) did: 
 
…not investigate traffic fatalities as a matter of course, particularly those involving trucking 
collisions occurring en route during the course of transporting livestock and other freight. 
This is despite the fact that as previously stated, transport fatalities constituted the largest 
single category of overall fatalities in the sample. 
 
This lack of attention to trucking fatalities is particularly concerning in the light of findings 
relating to the involvement of alcohol and other drugs in such incidents. Whilst in total, only 
nine cases were identified whereby it was ascertained through the course of toxicological 
examination that prescription stimulants and/or illicit drugs (amphetamines, cannabanoids, 
morphine etc) were present in the body of the deceased worker at the time of the fatality, six 
of those cases (66.7 per cent) involved the trucking industry. Similarly, of the twenty two 
cases where alcohol consumption was an issue, nine of those (41 per cent) were situated in 
the trucking industry. 
 
A report released by NOHSC (1992) confirms that drug consumption is a significant feature 
of the long distance road transport landscape with 33 per cent of those truck drivers 
interviewed admitting to having taken drugs on the job. A four-year drugs and driving study 
conducted by the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine, produced similar findings. Of the 
1054 Victorian, New South Wales and Western Australian driver fatalities examined in that 
study, 40 per cent were found to have involved drugs, including alcohol (cited in Carson, 
1997). Further evidence is to be found in the outcome of a South Australian police 
investigation of illicit drug use in the trucking industry. During the official period of 
“Operation Nightrider” (July – October 1992), 90 per cent of drivers stopped by police were 
found to be using drugs or in possession of them (cited in Cant, 1998b). 
 
Perrone argues these problems are mirrored in terms of police and coronial investigations. 
 
Compounding such regulatory disregard is the observation that police investigations 
conducted into such fatalities almost invariably fail to delve into the deceased’s routines and 
responsibilities, working conditions and employer demands. Although witnesses at the scene 
of a collision are routinely questioned, police investigations are invariably concerned 
predominantly with peripheral issues such as road measurements and configurations, the 
visibility of road safety/speed sign, weather conditions, the mechanical soundness of the 
vehicle and the like. This technical focus on immediate cause basically serves to 
decontextualise the incident, so that it simply becomes another road “accident” rather than a 
work-related harm; a purely unplanned and unintentional occurrence. Only on rare 
occasions were depositions sought from employers, and when interviews did transpire, the 
line of questioning adopted proved inadequate, with relevant organisational issues not 
ordinarily canvassed (for similar arguments regarding the short-sightedness of investigations 
in the United States, see for example Knestaut, 1997). 
 
…The dissimilarities in investigative rigour further extend in the coronial arena. Unlike the 
mandatory requirements to conduct an inquest into the circumstances surrounding a 
suspected homicide...coroners have a considerable degree of discretionary latitude where 
work death is concerned and that discretion is regularly exercised. During the period under 
review, coroners chose to dispense with a formal inquiry in 32% of work-related fatalities 
(N=112 cases). 
 
Of those cases which underwent a review short of formal inquest, the transport industry once 
again featured prominently, surpassed only by the farming industry. Unfortunately, those 
transport cases that were the subject of coronial review often failed to yield vital information 
that would have shed light on systemic shortcomings. Pertinent organisational questions often 
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remained unexplored: for example, were unscrupulous employers subjecting workers to 
unrealistic work schedules that discouraged sufficient rest periods and perhaps encouraged 
substance abuse? Were regulations mandating the possession and maintenance of logbooks 
enforced? Were logbooks doctored and/or speed-limiting devices circumvented? Were correct 
loading procedures observed? Was the employee provided with a roadworthy vehicle, 
adequate training, instruction and supervision? (Perrone, 2000:46-47). 
  
Perrone examined her sample of work-related fatalities to identify instances where the 
available evidence indicated prosecutable corporate negligence and categorised this according 
to whether the negligence was of a minor, intermediate or extreme nature. With regard to the 
transport industry cases where evidence was sufficient to make an assessment Perrone 
determined that 23 of the 24 fatalities involved intermediate company negligence. In 
construction and manufacturing, by way of contrast, 50% and 40% of cases respectively were 
determined to involve extreme negligence (Perrone, 2000:69-70). However, Perrone added an 
important rider to this that is consistent with observations above about the number of transport 
cases where evidence was too poor to make any determination whatsoever as to negligence. 
 
It is imperative here that we recapitulate the poor state of investigative scrutiny extended to 
the transport industry and stress the urgent need for ameliorative measures. The failure to 
thoroughly consider the circumstances surrounding trucking has meant that in most cases not 
even a minimum degree of corporate responsibility could be ascribed, despite the fact that 
information suggested differently. For example, in a number of instances, long distance truck 
drivers appear to have suffered fatigue and consequently fallen asleep at the wheel. The 
circumstances are suggestive of objectionable time schedules blindly followed in the impetus 
to undercut competitors, but investigations almost invariably failed to explicitly address this 
issue. Had such issues been considered, then perhaps more of these fatalities would have been 
categorised as extreme negligence cases (Perrone, 2000:70). 
 
The next step is, of course, to examine the number of cases where a prosecution occurred and 
here, again, Perrone found that the transport sector constituted a problem area. Perrone 
(2000:193) identifed 89 fatalities containing a degree of negligence warranting prosecution, 
24 of which were in transport. Only 14 or around 60% of these transport cases were known to 
the OHS agency (comparable to services but far below the 90-100% figure for all other 
industries) and prosecution occurred in only six cases. The latter represented only 42% of 
known transport cases or 25% of all relevant transport cases and, again, both figures were 
well below the comparable figure for all other industries aside from Services. In sum, while 
transport and service sectors contributed a greater volume to Perrone’s sample of work-related 
fatalities than manufacturing or construction the latter two – both a traditional jurisdictional 
focus OHS agency activities – attracted far more investigation and prosecutorial activity. In 
other words, Perrone found a substantial inadequacy in OHS agency responses to work-
related fatalities in the transport industry.   
 
No comparable research has been undertaken in New South Wales, and it would also be 
useful to consider fatalities in recent years to see if the response had changed. Nevertheless, 
Perrone’s analysis is consistent with what material is available such as Hopkins' study of 
transport fatalities in NSW. Hopkins (1992) found that incidents involving trucks (most of 
which were travelling long distances) accounted for more than a quarter of work-related 
fatalities in NSW in 1984. He argued this was caused by drivers spending what should have 
been rest periods loading and unloading, itself a partial product of economic pressures 
generated by freight forwarding businesses which necessitated long hours of work. Hopkins 
argued while these circumstances could constitute a breach of the general duty for employers 
to provide a safe system of work under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1983 
none of the incidents had been investigated by the responsible agency (now known as 
WorkCover). He argued (1992:243) a few precedent-setting court cases might encourage the 
industry to provide safer systems of work. It hardly needs to be added that this approach, used 
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with some success by the EPA and WorkCover itself in relation to the labour-hire industry, 
has yet to be tried in road transport. 
 
Perrone's analysis also found support in submissions made to this Inquiry. For example, a 
number of operational (NSW) police could not understand why WorkCover did not 
investigate serious on-road incidents involving heavy vehicles with a view to laying charges. 
One also expressed surprise that the families of drivers who were killed did not take civil 
action against companies, arguing there would be enough evidence in the majority of cases to 
suggest the work practices imposed on them were responsible for the incident: 
 
I'm really surprised that family members of drivers who are killed on the road, haven' t under 
civil law, sued the pants off companies. I believe that families of drivers would have so much 
evidence to offer…to say that work practices by their husbands [were to blame] (oral 
submission, police officer southern NSW).  
 
Concerns about WorkCover investigation into fatalities were raised in submissions from 
TWU and CFAT representatives. 
 
…I’ve got a major concern with WorkCover and its role in investigating accidents – fatal 
accidents… recently having to sit on the advisory group for WorkCover for transport and 
storage, I asked the question ‘what’s the process for WorkCover to liaise with other 
departments and how they call in etc?’ There were a lot of blank looks and some half-hearted 
undertakings given to produce documents (oral submission, TWU official, Newcastle). 
 
There is some evidence of a growing interest in prosecuting on-road transport incidents at 
least in Victoria (though not NSW). However, this trend is insufficient to invalidate Perrone’s 
overall assessment. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, and given the 
available evidence it is the firm view of this Inquiry that there have been manifest failings in 
the attempt to detect and prosecute corporate negligence in relation to death of long distance 
truck drivers. 
 
4.8.3 Recent moves to shift the focus of enforcement: Chain of Responsibility 
 
Who are the responsible [parties]? The cowboys are also in the boardroom and the 
government. People will try to succeed, when the odds go against them the first thing to suffer 
is safety (oral submission, partner of owner/driver, Queensland). 
 
We make reference to chain of responsibility and we acknowledge there is a move and there's 
a lot of support for the introduction of that. I think what we are trying to say is if you going to 
introduce that just make sure that when you plug us into the chain that you have an accurate 
view of where we fit (oral submission, Bill Healey, ARA). 
 
The introduction of chain of responsibility provisions into road transport legislation has been 
heralded as the most significant regulatory revision to affect the trucking industry in at least a 
decade. Amongst those making submissions to the Inquiry there was virtually unanimous 
agreement that the pre-existing regulatory framework and enforcement regime had been too 
driver-focused and there was a need to hold other responsible parties accountable. Virtually 
all parties making submissions to the Inquiry supported chain of responsibility legislation in 
principle, although there was some debate as to its practical effects. Further, as the above 
quote from Bill Healey of the ARA indicates, there is concern amongst parties using road 
transport that new regulations using this approach should noted misunderstand the nature of 
contractual arrangements (for example, who is the load owner?). Nor should it impute to load 
owners, consignors and consignees degrees of influence over road transport operators they 
don’t actually possess (for a more detailed consideration of this issue see Section 3). The 
ARA emphasised that major retailers relied on road transport in a variety of capacities but for 
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much inbound transport they were not the load owner.  These deliveries were largely made to 
warehouses owned by the major retailers (though some large transport companies also 
maintain warehouses as part of a fully integrated service). At the same time, the ARA 
recognised that deliveries between stores were a different matter (although the ARA’s written 
submission had focused on interstate trucking, hence the note of explanation in the following 
quote): 
 
The issue for us is where do we fit into that [chain of responsibility] and who owns the load. 
And for us we’ve tried to distinguish between the whole concept of the inbound load and the 
outbound load.  Perhaps the variation of the 100 kilometres and the odd internal delivery 
from one store to another, from Sydney to Newcastle, may change the situation. Perhaps we 
do have more internal deliveries in that context. …We were focusing on the heavy loads. We 
were focusing on the big long haul drives into warehouses in the majority of cases. And all 
the indications we have is that that load is overwhelmingly the responsibility of the 
manufacturer or supplier. We have quite sophisticated replenishment systems. Part of the 
replenishment process is a lead-time for production and delivery and the issue we would 
challenge is that there is insufficient lead-time. Because if there’s insufficient lead time, from 
the advice we’ve received its probably because the supplier stuffed up in the manufacturing or 
their relationship with the transport company (oral submission, Bill Healey, ARA)  
 
This concern is understandable, especially as there is no court case against a customer that 
might indicate how these new provisions will work (of course the very absence of these cases 
may be seen as indicating an entirely more sanguine scenario). Indeed, it is an issue that the 
Inquiry has given very careful consideration to in framing its recommendations viz a viz a 
code of practice 
 
The issues raised by the ARA also almost certainly reflect a wider concern amongst those 
using road transport as to how they should comply with their obligations under chain of 
responsibility. Indeed, if anything the ARA probably has a greater awareness of the chain of 
responsibility than many other bodies covering long haul transport users. As noted in Section 
3 (see also below) some transport users are looking towards special contract provisions or 
protocols to govern their use of long haul trucking and the option of model clauses has also 
been raised. It seems clear to the Inquiry that users of road transport require some education 
as to what their responsibilities are under chain of responsibility but that, as yet, there have 
been few efforts in this area. Such an education/awareness raising exercise may include 
proactive campaigns/publicity followed by some targeted prosecution (along the same lines as 
those used very effectively by various OHS agencies on occasion). It struck the Inquiry that 
insufficient attention had been given to this aspect although it appears the NRTC has now 
recognised the deficiency.  
 
At the same time, it is arguable that the disbelief amongst some customers, consignees etc that 
they have obligations simply indicates just how backward those involved in the transport 
chain have been when it comes to recognising their responsibilities. Similar, indeed arguably 
more encompassing obligations have long existed under OHS legislation but, until recently, 
have simply not been enforced. Further, the overwhelming majority of submissions to the 
Inquiry, including those from agencies such as WorkCover NSW (written submission, pages 
16-17), were in no doubt as to their ability of consignors, clients etc to exert a critical 
influence on transport activities. Indeed, this was seen as a critical rationale for chain of 
responsibility legislation. Most regulatory agencies and many other parties (such as the ATA) 
making submissions to the Inquiry expressed at the very least in-principle support for the 
introduction of Chain of Responsibility provisions. This was true not only of NSW-based 
bodies but also national bodies and those located in other states that made submissions to the 
Inquiry (including government agencies such as Queensland Transport).  
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A number of those supporting 'chain of responsibility' raised practical concerns about the 
enforceability and therefore effectiveness of these initiatives. In its written submission the 
RTA stated: 
 
NSW recently implemented laws that are ultimately expected to counteract, to an extent, the 
commercial forces that lead to drivers being placed under pressure to break speed and duty 
and rest limits. In November 1998, new laws for the management of fatigue in long haul truck 
drivers commenced in NSW. This law was based on model law nationally developed and 
agreed through the NRTCs National Reform processes. A key feature of the Road Transport 
(Safety and Traffic Management) (Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 is the provision of ‘chain 
of responsibility’ offences. These offences impose legal responsibilities on all participants in 
the road freight task who have the ability to pressure the driver to speed or flout the maximum 
work and minimum rest provisions. 
 
Although these ‘chain of responsibility’ provisions have been in place in NSW since late 
1998, the RTA is not aware of these provisions being used against a client or consignor in this 
State. It is difficult to bring a case against an offender under these provisions because hard 
evidence of the client or consignor having knowingly pressured a driver to violate the speed 
or duty and rest laws is difficult to obtain. Further, although disaffected drivers occasionally 
come forward with information, they are often reluctant to give evidence in court, particularly 
if in so doing so they implicate themselves in offences. 
 
The Queensland Trucking Association (oral submission, Peter Garske) also pointed to the 
reluctance of drivers to give evidence. 
 
I think for many [drivers] perhaps they see it as an end to a livelihood but I’m not sure what 
sort of livelihood they’ve got if they’re succumbing to those sorts of pressures…certainly they 
can’t possibly have any quality of life and neither can their families. 
 
In its submission, WorkCover NSW (written submission, page 17) argued that in order for 
chain of responsibility to be effectively implemented there would need to be more detailed 
investigation of the antecedents of on-road incidents: 
 
WorkCover submits: 
 
• That in the investigation of roadway accidents or incidents involving LHT drivers, 
strategies should be developed to facilitate an examination of the possible antecedent 
causes of such accidents and incidents so as to ascertain what might be the true cause(s); 
and 
 
• That if such causes, where they are detected, are attributable to management or 
contractual decisions made by transport industry participants such as trucking companies 
or consignors, they should be held accountable and liable to prosecution under road 
safety legislation as intended. 
 
It should be noted in passing that while WorkCover was referring to the implementation of 
chain of responsibility under road transport legislation (in keeping with the thrust of its 
submission. See above), the chain of responsibility can be used in relation to general duty 
provisions under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000. Indeed, as noted by 
Associate Professor Johnstone (Appendix 2) these provisions entail a fuller, more all-
embracing and more flexible notion of chain of responsibility. The Act, like its counterparts in 
other jurisdictions, has both chain of responsibility provisions and due diligence notions in the 
general duties and explicitly in the provisions dealing with director’s duties (section 50 of the 
1983 Act and section 26 of the 2000 Act). Another issue is the extensive powers granted to 
WorkCover inspectors to visit workplaces, inspect records and seize evidence. A number of 
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bodies making submissions to the Inquiry, most notably the Victorian Road Transport 
Association (which included Roger Sanders, a former police prosecutor) argued that these 
powers were more extensive than those currently available to the police or RTA inspectors, 
even under the new chain of responsibility legislation. This is also the view formed by the 
Inquiry. 
 
Several of the points just raised were reinforced by the submission of the Victorian 
WorkCover Authority. As noted earlier, in its submission WorkCover Victoria expressed the 
view that while the NRTC’s chain of responsibility framework addressed significant issues it 
had not been vigorously enforced and the fines were too low. It also pointed to other penalties 
under Victorian OHS legislation, most notably the capacity to gaol directors found guilty of 
serious offences under the Act. While this option is likely to be imposed only on rare 
occasions its presence sends a message about the criminality of these offences and has 
deterrent effects beyond any form of financial penalty. WorkCover noted that the industry 
itself is keen to see this option pursued for serious offences. Thus far, the gaol option has been 
little used. However, there is a discernible move towards pursuing this in a number of 
jurisdictions (including NSW) and addressing past impediments to successful actions (the 
Inquiry is also aware of instances where the threat of such an action has caused a major re-
organisation of OHS management by an employer).  Reinforcing this point, in October 2000 
the Victorian Attorney General recently released a draft bill amend the Crimes Act to create a 
new offence of industrial manslaughter. The draft bill also amends the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act, 1985 to substantially increase penalties, including a maximum fine of $5 
million for industrial manslaughter and $2 million for the offence of negligently causing 
serious injury (Workplace Intelligence, November 2000:1,5-6). The Queensland government 
has mooted a similar move, issuing a discussion paper detailing a proposed amendment of the 
Criminal Code to include a new offence of dangerous industrial misconduct carrying a 
maximum penalty of $502,500 or seven years imprisonment. Nor are these moves confined to 
Australia. In 1999 two company directors in Britain received a suspended sentence for 
manslaughter after being found responsible for a fatal road crash because of the excessive 
working hours that imposed on the truck driver involved (R v Roy Bowles Transport, 1999).  
 
There are strong procedural equity grounds for imposing the gaol penalty in road 
transport on parties other than drivers because truck drivers who commit negligent acts 
resulting in death are regularly subjected to gaol penalties (a scenario which is 
extremely rare in other industries). This issue has been addressed under OHS and 
associated legislation but remains conspicuously absent from the chain of responsibility 
model of road transport legislation 
 
The NSW Road Transport Association (written submission, page 16) supported 'chain of 
responsibility' but also identified a problem: 
 
The legislation has a limit to its effectiveness, as enforcement will be a problem. It is not good 
enough to wait until an accident occurs to proceed with investigations to find out who is the 
cause before action can be taken. A roving inspectorate is necessary provided some basis for 
an investigation can be programmed. 
 
There is evidence from other jurisdictions that some of the problems identified can be 
overcome and successful chain of responsibility prosecutions launched. In August 1999 
Queensland Parliament made changes via the Road Transport Reform Act to facilitate 
prosecution of third parties. According to Queensland Transport (written submission, page 3) 
section 57B of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 'was clarified to 
more accurately define an extended liability offence and an influencing person'. The 
effectiveness of these changes was demonstrated in May 2000 when a heavy haulage 
company based on Stradbroke Island became the first company to be convicted under chain of 
responsibility legislation. The company pleaded guilty to a number of mass offence breaches 
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(with extended liability being based on a series of driver prosecutions in the previous year) 
and suffered fines and damages exceeding $35,000. The submission of Queensland Transport 
noted it was currently investigating a number of other possible breaches by third parties, 
including consignors, producers, wholesalers and operators, in relation to mass, fatigue and 
vehicle safety. 
 
The Stradbroke prosecution was referred to by a number of parties to the inquiry as evidence 
that chain of responsibility can work. The prosecution is certainly significant in the sense that 
a conviction was achieved (even if the operator pleaded guilty), the publicity it achieved in 
the industry, and the fact that the fine imposed was of a far higher order than those normally 
pertaining under road transport legislation. That Queensland Transport is actively pursuing 
possible prosecutions against parties further up the chain than operators (such as consignors 
and producers) is also especially noteworthy. In short, these are positive signs. 
 
At the same time, these developments need to be placed in perspective. The evidence is still 
too limited (in terms of the number of successful prosecutions) to announce a sea change in 
enforcement has yet occurred. Given the findings of this Inquiry in terms of the role of 
commercial practices, successful prosecution of parties beyond operators is essential if a 
deterrent message is to be transmitted. For its part, the Victorian Road Transport Association 
(written submission) pointed out that while unrealistic time slots were a pressing safety issue 
no direct action had been taken to address this under chain of responsibility legislation. It 
seems that no jurisdiction has systematic procedures for investigating the antecedent causes of 
on-road incidents (raised by WorkCover NSW) or systems enforcement (raised by the NSW 
Road Transport Association) or even that existing chain provisions would cover more than a 
fraction of the offences that might be discovered.  The evidentiary problems raised by the 
RTA are serious ones that are yet to be demonstrably overcome (this relates back to the need 
for more effective documentation discussed elsewhere in this Report). 
  
It is worth noting in passing that this legislation has been long overdue and still lags behind 
OHS and environmental protection law where Stradbroke-type convictions would be regarded 
as unexceptional and where available and actually imposed penalties are far higher (much 
higher fines and the possibility of gaol). Under these laws there is already a long-established 
record of higher chain prosecutions. The shift away from a pure reliance on prescriptive 
regulations to those entailing general duties covering a wide range of parties took some time 
to achieve (perhaps a decade) as it involved re-educating inspectors, prosecutors and others. 
In its written and oral submissions WorkCover NSW highlighted the need for education, both 
within the agency, but also the behaviour of parties to the supply chain by a combination of 
prosecutions and education/promotion programs (written submission, pages 18 and 32). It 
pointed to its considerable experience in investigating 'up-the-chain' offences, which could be 
of substantial benefit in terms of implementing the new chain or responsibility provisions in 
road transport legislation.   
 
In the course of this Inquiry many operators demonstrated at best a very limited understanding 
of chain of responsibility. This didn’t simply apply to small operators, although it is true to 
say that as a general rule large operators were far more aware of the legislation and small 
operators, on the other hand, usually had little understanding. The Inquiry heard evidence that 
even where large companies ran programs to inform managers and others of chain of 
responsibility requirements this did not extend to their subcontractors (one manager simply 
stated it was ‘not a priority’). This can be contrasted with the Western Australian experience 
with fatigue management requirements based in OHS legislation where the extension to 
subcontractors was a major benefit (see below). Given the widespread use of subcontractors 
and the fact that small fleets directly compete with large fleets it is not reassuring that a 
process of legislative enactment begun over two years ago appears to have had such a limited 
recognition. While large fleets may have logistical advantages in tendering they may also find 
that additional costs of complying with chain of responsibility are not borne by all operators. 
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On the positive side, most operators that did have knowledge of chain of responsibility 
endorsed the concept and its use not only in relation to freight forwarders, clients and 
consignors but also against operators who flouted the rules.  A number made mention of the 
role of the ATA and state industry associations in promoting the concept. Not surprisingly, 
outside of Queensland most operators were unaware of any recent prosecutions and some 
mentioned the importance of this in spreading the message. The overall impression of 
operator knowledge and attitudes gained by the Inquiry was a mixture limited of 
understanding, cautious support for the principle and 'wait and see' as to what would occur in 
practice. Given the absence of high profile prosecutions, especially up the chain, such views 
are hardly surprising, especially in an industry which has been promised more than its share 
of magic regulatory bullets. Further, some experienced managers of companies who well 
understood the concept felt the rhetoric was yet to be matched by any serious efforts to 
address those higher up the chain, with one (oral submission, manager of a large transport 
company) observing:  
 
The chain of responsibility, recent changes to rope in managers and freight forwarders in 
setting times for deliveries and the like is a welcome step but its not enough in my 
observation. If you look at the chain of responsibility from consignor to consignee for very 
many years now the operators, whether they be company drivers or owner operators working 
as subcontractors, they’ve really carried that responsibility in terms of delivery times with 
very little assistance from the customer, regularly thwarted by delays on arrival despite some 
so-called clever systems of booking delivery times and the like. All those delays still occur and 
the only person that has up to now carried responsibility has been the forwarder, that being 
the transport company, and their driver or subcontractor. I’m sure there have been some 
welcome steps but they really don’t go far enough at this stage to make a difference… I am 
not sure how you put regulation in place but there needs to be an understanding that a 
realistic passage of time be allowed for a movement of freight from point A to point B and 
that by a form of enforcement you can sheet home the responsibility for non compliance to all 
the parties involved not simply the transport operator. 
 
It might be argued that chain of responsibility has already addressed this. However, the simple 
fact is – as this manager well knew (and it remained the case at the time of writing this 
Report) - there was not one successful prosecution against any party beyond the operator, let 
alone a pattern of prosecutions that might achieve a shift in customer behaviour.  
 
It seems safe to presume that, with some exceptions like the ARA and BHP Logistics, there is 
even less awareness of chain of responsibility amongst transport customers. Certainly this is 
the view of operators, the TWU and CFAT, who indicated that, with rare exceptions, they had 
not detected any change of attitude amongst the customers. Barry Moore from the NRTC 
(oral submission) argued that customer recognition of their responsibilities was still 
exceptional and confined to a few large companies. At the same time, companies including a 
national grain receiver were contacting the Commission asking for information on chain of 
responsibility because they were re-negotiating contracts with transport operators and wanted 
to build the provisions into new contracts. He suggested that, even if successful, this would 
entail far less than 1% of the industry but the direction of change was important. 
 
At the same time, the success of chain of responsibility depends to some degree on its 
capacity encourage more organised relationships in the transport supply chain. Yet as this 
Inquiry has already noted, despite some measures to the contrary the overall trend revealed in 
both submissions and survey evidence available to the NRTC indicate a growing use of 
subcontracting. This entails an inherently more disorganised situation that increases the 
number of players and steps in the chain. The argument of the NRTC (oral submission, Kirsty 
McIntyre, NRTC) is that the chain of responsibility model used does not rely on identifying 
particular parties performing specific roles but this has been taken into account. Instead, the 
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chain model used focuses on elements in the transport chain, such as freight loading, and any 
party that participates in those activities resulting in a road transport breach can be held 
absolutely liable, irrespective of their formal title and responsibility. Accepting this, the 
question of precisely who will be targeted (and like OHS legislation this is not limited to one 
party to any given breach) and the resulting outcomes including deterrence effects remain 
unclear. At the time of writing this Report, there were simply insufficient prosecutions (one 
conviction and that a case against an operator who pleaded guilty) to judge whether the 
NRTC approach can actually overcome these problems. Further, as with other road transport 
legislation aiming to move up the chain, there are evidentiary issues that the NRTC is seeking 
to address (in terms of intrusive powers requiring the production of documents identifying 
consignors etc). The NRTC observed that significant powers to secure documents etc that 
were taken for granted under OHS and tax legislation represented a major change for 
transport legislation. The Inquiry accepts this point though is compelled to wonder why this 
situation was not addressed years ago. Further it yet it to be seen whether the new methods 
will work as intended. For example, there is the issue of whether the documentary evidence 
available will lead to action against the appropriate party. More than once the Inquiry was told 
of instances where clients verbally instructed transport companies to remove documentary 
evidence of offences (as in the case where a transport company was told to tell its drivers not 
to fill in the actual hours worked in their time sheets/logbooks). In these cases the remaining 
evidence will tend to implicate the operator and drivers, neither of who may be prepared to 
give evidence for fear of losing future work or because they believe chance of conviction is 
simply too small.   It might be noted in passing that a trip-based safety document prepared by 
the key parties rather than the driver (as is the case with logbooks) discussed elsewhere in this 
Report would almost certainly enhance the evidentiary base for prosecutions under chain of 
responsibility. 
 
By way of contrast with the issues just raised in relation to chain of responsibility, there is a 
well-established pattern of successful prosecutions of offences involving subcontract and 
labour leasing arrangements under OHS legislation. In Australia, as in a number of other 
jurisdictions, while OHS agencies have sometimes prosecuted several parties to the offence 
their prime target is usually the principal contractor. This approach reflects not only the clear 
intent duty provisions in the legislation but also has strategic value because it targets the party 
with most control over work arrangements and thereby maximises the deterrent effect. 
Whether a similar approach will or even can be taken under chain of responsibility legislation 
is yet to be demonstrated. What can be said is that the re-orientation of road transport 
legislation would, in the view of this Inquiry, have been accelerated had the NRTC more 
directly drawn from the experience of and models provided by OHS and environmental 
legislation. A review of court cases involving subcontracting/leasing arrangements would, in 
the view of this Inquiry, have proved highly instructive.  
 
The penalties available under chain of responsibility represent a substantial increase over 
those previously available under road transport legislation, with a progressive ‘ratcheting up’ 
as new elements of the chain package are introduced (such as those relating to mass offences). 
They also include cumulative penalties for systematic or persistent offences (another 
innovation in this area). Nonetheless, existing chain of responsibility penalty levels (ie fines) 
are still well below those found under OHS and environmental protection legislation, despite 
efforts to bridge the gap. The NRTC highlighted a new package of penalties being developed, 
including restitution penalties (available to any party suffering loss as a result of the offence) 
and commercial benefit penalties (up to three times the profit that could have been made from 
the offence). Another proposed remedy is a supervisory intervention order, which could place 
onerous performance requirements on the offender. These remedies all look promising but 
again their use against consignors or load owners as well as their impact or deterrent effect 
remains a matter of speculation at this stage. 
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The staged introduction of the chain in relation to specific categories of offences has proved 
to be a lengthy process that still covers a narrower range of hazardous practices than those 
that could be addressed under the general duty provisions of OHS legislation.  
 
At the time of writing this Report, chain of responsibility provisions still compare 
unfavourably to OHS legislation. This view is confirmed by analysis undertaken by Associate 
Professor Richard Johnstone for the Inquiry. Comparing existing OHS legislation and chain 
of responsibility provisions in NSW, Johnstone concludes: 
 
The road transport “chain of responsibility” provisions are to be found in the Road Transport 
(Safety and Traffic Management)(Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 (NSW). Inter alia, they 
impose maximum driving and work hours, and minimum rest times, upon drivers; and provide 
for offences where “persons”, “consignors” and employers engage in specified activities 
where the person, consignor or employer “knows, or ought to know” that because of the 
activity a driver would be likely to commit specified offences. These provisions establish 
narrower duties than those to be found in the general duty provisions in the OHSA (NSW), 
discussed above... The flexibility and reach of its general duty provisions, and the larger 
sanctions, of OHSA (NSW) make it, on balance, the best regime to regulate long haul trucking 
in New South Wales.(Johnstone, in Appendix 2). 
 
Johnstone notes that these advantages would be enhanced if sections 8 and 9 of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000 were amended as suggested above. As already 
noted, the coverage and penalty regime associated with chain of responsibility is being 
enhanced over time but at the present rate of development it will take some years to cover all 
the issues/offences identified in this Report. Even then, the general duty provisions arguably 
afford more scope and flexibility in dealing with complex and dynamic sets of practices that 
pose a risk to drivers and the community (OHS legislation incorporates a specific public 
safety element). 
 
In sum, the development of chain of responsibility legislation in road transport is to be 
welcomed but, even on the most optimistic interpretation, a lot of catching up remains to be 
done. Indeed, a minimum realistic time frame for this legislation to have any serious effect is 
probably not less than five years (even assuming a high rate of successful prosecutions and a 
substantial escalation of penalties). 
 
Finally, there is a real question as to whether 'chain of responsibility' will, of its own, be 
sufficient to affect a significant change without other measures to address the problems 
identified in Section 3. In concluding its submission (page 9) the insurer NTI Ltd was 
emphatic on this point. 
 
Load owners, freight forwarders, retailers and fleet owners must be brought into the loop and 
must be held accountable. We must strive to rid the industry of the predicament that many 
owner operators and employed drivers find themselves in where they lie to insurers and road 
authorities, after an event, under the threat of losing future employment. There must be some 
form of minimum freight rate, minimum entry-level standard, tougher Chain of Responsibility 
law and specifics on loading and unloading issues to protect the 'good' operators. Fork-lift 
truck drivers and freight consignors, for example should not be able to dictate to drivers and 
then have no liability for their incompetent actions. 
 
Other bodies supporting the chain or responsibility, and due diligence concept implicit in this, 
nevertheless advocated that the option of placing greater reliance on OHS legislation be 
pursued as a means for achieving the same outcome. For example, the NSW Branch of the 
TWU (written submission, page 21) argued codes of practice and safe work plans based on 
OHS legislation presented a means of not only imposed far more serious penalties but also of 
holding clients liable for their actions that compromised safe systems of work. 
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4.8.4 Technological devices as an aid to enforcement 
 
Effective enforcement in the long distance road transport industry presents regulators with a 
major challenge. Unlike a factory, warehouse or office trucks constitute a mobile workplace. 
Given the sheer number of vehicles moving on a wide geographic terrain, and the capacity of 
drivers to communicate warnings to each other, monitoring and detection of offences is by no 
means simple. 
 
In terms of improving enforcement a number of parties raised the role that might be played by 
new technological devices. Some, like the RTA, simply stated that the option of new 
technologies being used to monitor speed, fatigue etc should be continuously explored while 
others advocated specific technological devices. Various proposals were made in relation to 
how technology could be used to increase the chance of detecting and verifying offences as 
well as creating an audit-trail or method of cross-referencing. This include discussions of the 
use of global positioning systems to track vehicles, the downloading of information from 
engine management systems and driver-specific monitoring devices such as smart cards. Most 
recently there has been discussion of technology for assessing or predicting driver fatigue. 
This option was not raised by those making submissions to this Inquiry but the use a computer 
game to enable roadside testing of driver fatigue was recommended by the recent federal 
Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts (2000) inquiry into fatigue in 
transportation. The inquiry drew on a NRTC commissioned a report on fatigue detection and 
prediction technologies (Hartley et al 2000) that have mainly been pioneered in the USA. The 
Report concluded that these technologies showed promise but given ongoing questions about 
their validity and use it was inappropriate to mandate them at this time or to see them as a 
substitute for setting standards in relation to the capabilities of operators. This Inquiry did 
receive some negative driver feedback in relation to the federal Committee recommendations 
(a number along the lines that "I'm no bloody good at computer games"), raising questions 
about the reliability of the measure. It also appears that such a device is entirely driver-
focused and, given evidence already presented, the Inquiry has severe reservations about this. 
 
The Queensland Trucking Association urged that more vigorous use be made of technology 
like Safe-T-Cam and downloading historical information from onboard computers in terms of 
prosecutions and that any technical/legal problems (such as conformity with the National 
Measurement Act) be urgently addressed (written submission, Peter Garske, pages 4-5). For 
its part, NRMA urged a more effective and integrated use of Safe-T-Cam to detect driving 
hours breaches: 
 
The Safe-T-Cam network has been recently extended and NRMA understands new initiatives 
are being planned to more effectively use the data from this system in the field. One initiative 
being trialed is for field staff doing random checks to be able to remotely access current Safe-
T-Cam data to cross check against details in a driver’s log book. NRMA believes that this 
would greatly enhance the effectiveness of random field checks and should be brought on line 
as soon as possible (written submission NRMA).  
 
As noted elsewhere not all those giving evidence to the Inquiry were as convinced of the 
benefits of Safe-T-Cam.  A number of submissions to the Inquiry argued that a limitation with 
Safe-T-Cam was that the current system identified vehicles not drivers, which made 
enforcement difficult in some circumstances, and several suggested this could be overcome 
with the use a driver specific e-tag. Similar suggestions were also made to the recent federal 
inquiry into managing fatigue in transport (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:79). The use of driver-specific e-tags needs to be 
approached cautiously lest it simply reinforce the current over-emphasis on enforcement on 
drivers. Again, such systems are not 'tamper-proof' and there may be superior remedies to the 
problem of ambiguous driver identity being used by operators to deny responsibility. 
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The Inquiry has also noted evidence that indicate the capacity and willingness of some 
operators to disable or ‘modify’ speed limiters fitted to vehicles. The written submission of 
the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police Service expressed the view that new 
technology had to be carefully evaluated in terms of its impact on enforcement effects. It also 
urged that assessment should be done with a degree of scepticism, given the capacity of 
operators to evade these devices in the past and the use of some forms of technology such as 
mobile phones and CB radios to avoid interception by police. Queensland Transport made a 
similar point in relation to driver specific monitoring devices, arguing that they made 
excellent fleet and driver management tools but would not prove effective as policing 
instruments because 'there is too much of an incentive to tamper with the equipment and 
recordings' (written submission, page 13). 
 
The point that technology is hardly an unequivocal benefit needs to be recognized. Some 
drivers and operators use technology to avoid detection. There are other technological 
developments that may adversely effect enforcement. A number of submissions to the Inquiry 
suggested that the growing use of mobile phones (virtually every driver has one) and of 
electronic communications, including e-commerce, is reducing the amount of paper evidence 
of a transport contract that may be used in auditing to detect offences. 
 
At present NSW is the only Australian jurisdiction to mandate vehicle-monitoring devices 
(VMD. Part 9 of the Road Transport (Road Safety and Traffic Management)(Road Rules) 
Regulation 1999) and has done so for over decade. Vehicles required to be fitted with VMDs 
scheme include prime movers and articulated vehicles with a gross mass of more than 13.9 
tonnes; all trucks with a gross mass of more than 13.9 tonnes carrying dangerous goods in 
sufficient quantity to require the display of dangerous goods signs; and coaches. Exemptions 
to these requirements were provided to allow for situations where the use of VMDs was not 
considered necessary for control of driver fatigue and excessive speed.  These include 
vehicles being used within a radius of 80 km from their usual depot (unless carrying 
dangerous goods); NSW primary producers' vehicles; and vehicles registered under the 
Federal Interstate Registration Scheme or in other States and Territories. In addition to the 
above requirements all B-Doubles operating in NSW (ie. including those registered 
interstate), with the exception of FIRS-registered B-Doubles, are required to have vehicle 
monitors as a condition of the B-Double notice. Police are empowered to check VMD records 
at the roadside. RTA Inspectors do not have this power, but they may check them when office 
audits are undertaken (supplementary information provided by the RTA). 
 
As noted by the RTA, a shortcoming of tachographs is their susceptibility to tampering.   
 
Electronic monitors show promise as a replacement for the mechanical tachographs, but to 
be of use as an enforcement tool the standard must require them to be as tamper-proof as 
possible.  There is a danger that the more sophisticated technology will only lead to more 
sophisticated – and more difficult to detect – tampering. GPS tracking systems also have 
potential to give real-time monitoring of vehicle operations, covering speed, travel time and 
route compliance (supplementary information supplied by the RTA). 
 
The use of electronic monitors is under consideration in the UK. In the USA too, the use of 
electronic monitoring devices is under consideration and there has been at least one trial of 
GPS-based truck movement monitoring. Under the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1999 
(referred to the Senate) section 220 deals with recording devices with a Congressional 
findings that: 
 
…the use of electronic control modules in commercial motor vehicles may prove useful to law 
enforcement officials investigating crashes on the Nation's highways and roads and may 
prevent the future loss of life. 
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The history of the introduction of VMDs in NSW and its failure to be adopted Australia-wide 
is worth recounting. Recommendations to introduce tachographs can be traced back as far as 
1980 (if not before) when the NSW Road Freight Industry Inquiry (McDonnell, 1980) urged 
that they be considered. Four years later the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et 
al, 1984) recommended tachographs for most articulated trucks. However, neither proposal 
was acted on although in 1986 the European Economic Community (now EU) required the 
installation of equipment recording distance travelled, speed and time on heavy commercial 
freight trucks. In July 1989 the then NSW Minister for Transport, Bruce Baird, sought 
Cabinet approval for tough measures, including 'likely mandatory installation of tachographs' 
to deal with the escalating road toll involving heavy vehicles (Sydney Morning Herald 8 July 
1989 cited in written submission, Philip Laird). This was strongly opposed by the road 
transport industry, which urged that only limiters be used (a move supported by the then 
federal Minister for Transport, Bob Brown according). Cabinet subsequently deferred the 
decision on tachographs despite it having support of the Minister for Transport, RTA, NSW 
Police, NRMA and the NSW Parliamentary Road Safety Committee, STAYSAFE). The role 
of industry in lobbying to achieve this outcome was widely reported in the media (Illawarra 
Mercury 26 September 1989, Sydney Morning Herald 27 September 1989 and Daily 
Telegraph 30 September 1989 cited in written submission, Philip Laird). The disastrous crash 
at Cowper (where 20 died and described elsewhere) less than a month later altered the 
situation. Mandatory fitting of VMDs was introduced as part of a heavy vehicle safety 
regulatory package the government introduced in response to the incident and the public 
outcry that surrounded it. The Government’s objective was to strongly encourage industry to 
self-enforce through operators monitoring their own tachograph records.  
 
According to the RTA, other jurisdictions have expressed opposition to the mandatory fitting 
of VMDs in NRTC-led discussions on national consistency (ie, they voted against VMDs as 
part of national standards for heavy vehicles). The RTA has been assisting the NRTC to 
develop a national standard for driver-specific monitoring devices (DSMDs) and an NRTC-
sponsored trial of this technology is under-way in South Australia.  The national ‘driving 
hours’ law (and hence the NSW law) provides for the use of approved DSMDs as alternatives 
to log books. 
 
A less controversial use of technology to aid compliance has been the development of web 
sites, such as that operated by Western Australian Main Roads where transport operators to 
access information (on road conditions etc) and apply for permits for vehicle combinations to 
operate on the road network. Consideration is being given to extending this to compliance 
information (in the USA employers can access statistical information on infringements by 
industry sector and sub-sector from the OSHA web page), providing weight advice and using 
GPS and mobile phone technology for route and mass compliance instead of paper permits. 
While this approach may present problems for smaller operators (though most have a mobile 
phone if not computer internet-access), the provision of information via the internet has 
considerable potential with regard to providing accessible and traceable set of documents. 
 
4.9 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In assessing the efficacy of existing enforcement measures a number of points stand out.  
 
• Existing enforcement practices have failed to stem a serious level of flouting of regulatory 
standards in relation to driving hours, speeding, drug use and a range of other areas. The 
problem of systemic breaches of road safety and other laws is not confined to NSW nor to 
Australia. It has been identified as a serious problem be recent inquiries in New Zealand 
(1996) and the United Kingdom (2000) if not elsewhere. Although inadequate resourcing 
and co-ordination of enforcement agencies (discussed in a later section) play a part in this 
it is also clear, from both the Australian and overseas evidence) that a primary factor here 
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is the commercial advantage that can be derived from evading regulatory requirements. 
The structure of the industry (easy entry, many small/marginal operators etc), commercial 
factors (poor tendering practices and the market power of some clients) and the removal 
of regulatory/institutional constraints on competition have created an intensely industry 
where advantage or survival can be enhanced by breaking the law. 
 
• With several partial exceptions, existing enforcement practices are not informed by an 
understanding of the underlying reasons for breaches. A point connected to this is that the 
evidence on enforcement practices presented in this section and in earlier sections of the 
report repeatedly highlighted the sheer array of both simple and ingenious practice by 
which some operators sought to evade or defeat compliance tools. It is not unfair to depict 
some elements of the industry as having engaged in a virtual war with regulators over 
many years and to have enjoyed a measure of ‘success’ in this. In all the other industries 
that the Chair of this Inquiry is familiar with in well over 20 years of involvement in OHS 
he has never seen such a consistent and widespread pattern of calculated evasion. Such a 
pattern is not consistent with the notion of a few ‘cowboys’ or aberrant driver behaviour. 
The only logical explanation for this is that characteristics of the industry and pressures 
on it that provide an ongoing powerful incentive for such practices amongst, at the very 
least, a substantial minority of operators. Submissions from a number of key parties such 
as the ATA, NRTC and Queensland Transport repeatedly emphasised the need for a 
'culture shift' in the industry. In its submission (page 24), Queensland Transport argued 
that even with increased government and industry attention to fatigue, 'cultural change' 
would only occur when consignors showed preference to fatigue management accredited 
transporters, firms investing resources in flexibility got more work, and failure to manage 
fatigue had the same social stigma as drink driving.  
 
• The Inquiry identified a number of deficiencies in relation to enforcement practices 
directed at driving hours, speeding and drug use. At one level the Inquiry pointed to 
specific problems such as the less than effective nature of logbooks and serious gaps with 
regard to federally registered (FIRS) trucks with regard to the three strikes program. In 
both the cases just mentioned, solutions were suggested by a number of those giving 
evidence, and the latter case the Inquiry understands the situation is being addressed at the 
time of writing. With regard to logbooks, the suggestion that it be replaced with a simple 
trip-based document has considerable merit, especially as it can cover a range of safety 
issues, including underpayment of drivers, and specific recommendations based on this 
are made later in the Report. The Inquiry was also repeatedly told by both operators and 
others (including ex RTA inspectors and trainers) that in order to be effective, inspectors 
needed to understand the industry, the challenges truck drivers face negotiating some 
roads (and seeing signage) and the practices (and even tricks) that some drivers/operators 
are engaged in. Again, the Inquiry sees considerable merit in ensuring inspectors have a 
working knowledge of the industry. 
 
• At another level the Inquiry was repeatedly told that dealing with driving hours, speeding 
and drugs in isolation would invariably fail, as these were symptoms of more deep-seated 
problems - problems identified in the previous Section of this Report. In other words, 
enforcement regimes needed to directly confront the commercial practices and intense 
competition that induced dangerous driving regimes etc. To do this it is essential that all 
responsible parties become a potential target of enforcement. Again, the Inquiry believes 
a trip-based document created and signed by the responsible parties is a potential solution 
and one that might mesh with the shift to fatigue management (see next section). Another 
crucial issue is the question of accrediting operators in order to ensure they meet 
minimum safety standards. Various means of achieving this are considered in the next 
section of the Report. 
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• Another critical point to emerge is that, despite some recent initiatives, the overriding 
focus of enforcement has been on drivers and, to a far lesser degree, operators. System 
offences and parties higher up the supply chain remain almost if not entirely exempt from 
any responsibility for the consequences of their decisions on driver or public safety. 
Given that power tends to reside at the top of both organisational and inter-organisational 
supply chains the existing approach makes little sense. Bodies such as the Environmental 
Protection Authority are only too well aware of the cascading impact on behaviour caused 
by even a small number of prosecutions targeting decision-makers at the top of the chain. 
 
• This section also identified some critical limitations in enforcement practices arising from 
a lack of inter-jurisdictional co-ordination and also a failure to get co-ordinated use of an 
appropriate mix of enforcement measures within NSW itself, including the failure to use 
OHS legislation. These problems are not unique to NSW or Australia as whole. Writing 
on the USA (Belzer, 2000:70) observed '…truckdriver safety seems to have fallen 
between the cracks as critics charge that neither DOT nor OSHA has taken clear 
responsibility for truckdriver safety and health.' At the same time, as indicated there are 
clear signs of a concerted effort to resolve this problem in other Australian jurisdictions 
(most notably in Victoria, Western Australia and the Northern Territory), entailing an 
increased reliance on OHS legislation. As yet NSW has failed to follow this direction, 
although the great majority of parties giving evidence to the Inquiry saw this as a positive 
step. In explaining its position, WorkCover NSW argued it believed the RTA should take 
the lead role. The Inquiry can appreciate the agency's reluctance not to intrude on another 
agency's role. However, in its oral and written submissions the RTA made it clear it saw 
considerable value in a greater input from WorkCover/OHS legislation. Further, the 
situation here is one of shared responsibilities that neither agency can walk away from. 
Even if this doesn’t mean equal input it does mean joint input and some efforts to co-
ordinate this. As this section of the report has made clear, existing enforcement practices 
using road transport legislation (and including chain of responsibility) are, of themselves, 
inadequate for the task of achieving a fundamental and significant shift in 'industry 
culture'. The evidence on this is overwhelming and it is a key reason why OHS agencies 
in other jurisdictions have begun to take a stronger role.  
 
• WorkCover pointed to a number of problems with regard to specific provisions of the 
NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000 that, in its view, made it more difficult 
for the agency to take on a stronger enforcement role in long haul trucking. The legal 
advice commissioned for the Inquiry and undertaken by arguably Australia's leading 
authority on OHS law (author on the standard text on the field) indicates these difficulties 
are by no means insurmountable. Indeed, he identified only one problem that required 
amendment of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000 - a simple amendment of 
two general duty sections that would bring them into line with similar provisions in 
Victoria and elsewhere. The Inquiry has recommended that these amendments be made as 
a matter of urgency. Though outside the terms of reference of the Inquiry, it can be noted 
in passing that this change would assist WorkCover to address a number of work 
arrangements outside long haul trucking that have become increasingly problematic. 
 
• If stronger use is to be made of OHS legislation in long haul trucking then there are issues 
of co-ordination and resourcing. The evidence of other jurisdictions indicates that a good 
working relationship between the Police, OHS and Road Transport Agencies can be 
achieved. The issue of resourcing a stronger input with regard to OHS legislation needs to 
be given serious consideration. The Inquiry makes specific recommendations aimed to 
address both issues.  
 
• The Inquiry heard repeated claims that drivers were not only reluctant to give evidence of 
illegal practices to enforcement authorities for fear of risking their future employment 
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prospects but the same fear made drivers reluctant to make complaints about excessive 
driving hours, defective trucks and a range of other issues. This evidence was not only 
repeated it came from a range of parties not simply drivers themselves and union officials. 
The Inquiry feels this evidence is sufficient to indicate there is a serious problem of 
drivers not being able to report safety issues which should be addressed.  
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SECTION 5  
 
CURRENT FORMS OF REGULATION IN THE LONG DISTANCE ROAD 
TRANSPORT INDUSTRY AND WHICH MODEL IS MOST APPROPRIATE 
 
 
Another key term of reference for the Inquiry was to examine current forms of regulation in 
the industry, to assess whether a self-regulation or external regulation model is most 
appropriate for the road transport industry and what forms this should take. 
 
In the last section the main features of road transport and OHS legislation used to regulate the 
long haul trucking industry were identified and discussed as part of the examination of 
enforcement practices. As such, it would serve no purpose to repeat this discussion here and 
attention will focus on alternative methods of regulation that have been proposed or 
implemented in recent years. The debate about how best to regulate the long distance road 
transport industry has been a long running one, including the issue of the degree of reliance 
that should be placed on self-regulation. Self-regulation has always subject to ambiguity in 
terms of its precise meaning. For example, some have interpreted the move from specification 
standards to performance standards and general duties in OHS legislation as a move to self-
regulation. This view was vehemently disputed by WorkCover in it submission on the sound 
basis that the change in regulatory instruments does not affect the mandatory nature of the 
standards that need to be met. Equally, the introduction of internal regulatory systems by 
employers in order to meet these standards does not amount to self-regulation (though some 
transport operators interpreted it in this fashion). Disturbing occurrences such as the Longford 
incident in Victoria (see Hopkins, 1999), highlight the critical need for vigorous external 
vetting of such systems.  
 
Amidst all this confusion what can be said is that self-regulation became something of a 
popular catch-cry amongst policy-makers in the 1980s but by the late 1990s evidence 
attesting to its effectiveness was hard to find, causing a re-think in some policy circles, as well 
as criticism in recent inquiries. For example, a critical finding of the report of the Queensland 
Building and Construction Industry Taskforce released in August 2000 was that self-
regulation had ‘gone too far and at times been used to provide employers with unnecessary 
and confusing discretion’ (SafetyZone, November/December 2000:5). The report called for a 
clearer definition of the rights and obligations of employers and workers, mandatory 
induction of industry participants and requiring principal contractors and employers to 
prepare work plans and method statements. These findings are worth noting given a number 
of similarities that building and construction shares with road transport, including a small 
number of large operators and a very large number of small operators, extensive use of 
subcontracting and intense competition for work. The extent to which self-regulation, or more 
restricted notions of voluntary compliance, could play a significant role in any particular 
industry is likely to be influenced by industry structure, including firm size (as a general rule, 
smaller firms have less ability to introduce internal responsibility systems). We will return to 
these issues shortly. 
 
In the long haul road transport industry self-regulation in the sense of the industry being made 
entirely responsible for regulating itself, was not considered a serious option by any other 
parties interviewed in the course of the Inquiry. Rather, self-regulation was conceived as 
individual operators and the industry taking on more responsibility through voluntary OHS 
management/accreditation schemes, voluntary alternative compliance programs (especially in 
the area of truck maintenance and fatigue management) or the use of voluntary codes of 
practice or conduct. The first two categories overlap because the voluntary OHS 
management/accreditation schemes can involve altered compliance arrangements by 
regulators and, on the other hand, industry has played a strong role in alternative compliance 
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regimes. Their advocates see the use of these schemes as a critical adjunct to external 
regulation, one that helps free up resources to target more recalcitrant elements in the 
industry. 
 
 
 
5.1 Current Examples of Internal/Self-Regulation 
 
At the present time a number of schemes operate in the road transport industry whereby 
individual operators can gain recognition or exemption from some compliance requirements 
by demonstrate they have achieved performance standards to the regulatory authority or an 
industry-based accreditation body. Those schemes directly administered by government 
agencies include what are termed Alternative Compliance Programs such as the Fatigue 
Management Program, discussed earlier, which permits a more flexible fatigue management 
regime than would be allowed under prescriptive hours regulations. Industry-based schemes 
include the national scheme, TruckSafe, and a more recent Victorian-based scheme 
TransCare. These industry systems will be described and assessed in turn. 
 
5.1.1 Industry-based Initiatives 
 
There are a number of existing accreditation schemes in place in the industry. Indeed, there is 
no shortage of accreditation and certification schemes, with one industry analyst (Hassle, 
1997:25) referring to a proliferation of schemes in 1997 - and the number has increased 
further since this time. Apart from various codes of practice the following schemes are 
presently of offer include: 
 
1.  Trucksafe (Proprietal Scheme) 
2.  TruckCare (Public Domain Scheme) 
3.  TransCare (Public Domain Scheme) 
4.  HACCP (Public Domain Scheme) 
5.  PACIA (Proprietal Scheme) 
6.  National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme (or NHVAS, Public Domain Scheme) 
7.  Transitional Fatigue Management (Public Domain Scheme) 
8.  ISO 9002 Standards Australia Transport Guidelines (Public Domain Scheme) 
It is beyond the scope of this Inquiry to examine all these schemes in detail. Rather, attention 
will focus on TruckSafe, which is arguably the most important and received considerable 
attention from submissions made to the Inquiry. Some attention will also be given TransCare, 
a recent scheme developed in Victoria, to provide some basis for comparison and to indicate 
the broader sweep of developments in the voluntary accreditation area. 
 
5.1.1.1 TruckSafe 
 
TruckSafe was an industry-based accreditation scheme developed by the ATA in the 1990s 
with the avowed purpose of changing the dominant safety culture in the industry and 
responding disastrous incidents in the late 1980s. During the early 1990s a set of modules 
were developed addressing four elements namely, driver health and safety (a new focus for 
the industry), vehicle maintenance, driver training and management. The modules were 
developed on the basis of driver research by the ATA research/courses on fatigue undertaken 
by Dr Anne Marie Feyer and Dr Ann Williamson from NOHSC and the NRTC working 
group on fatigue management). The modules formed the basis for an industry-accreditation 
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scheme that was piloted amongst a group of 29 operators selected to represent a cross-section 
of the industry in terms of size, location, type of freight etc. Following some modification, 
200 operators from across the country were approached to become the first accredited 
operators. Each prospective accredited operator was audited by an independent and external 
third party auditor and then reviewed by an Accreditation Council by Professor Michael 
Coper, Dean of Law at the Australian National University and a member of the National 
Driving Hours Group established by the Australian Road Transport Advocacy Committee.  
 
The Team 200 model became the basis for TruckSafe, with additional standards on OHS, 
driving hours and fatigue management being recently added and further developments on the 
Environment, Workshop Suppliers, Fatigue and Load Restraint currently underway (written 
submission, ATA page 22). As at December 1999 there were four core accreditation standards 
in TruckSafe, namely maintenance management, workplace and driver health, management 
and training. In its submission the ATA stated that 350 companies had achieved TruckSafe 
accreditation with another 380 currently in the process of accreditation. According to the 
ATA owner/drivers account for 69% of the ‘make-up’ of TruckSafe (reflecting the overall 
character of the industry) though evidence presented to the Inquiry gave the clear impression 
that fleet members accounted for the bulk of the trucks. Thus far, TruckSafe has conducted 
medicals and training on more than 13,000 drivers and those companies participating 
(accredited or seeking accreditation) represent about 10% of the long distance trucking fleet 
(oral submission, Mile Edmonds, ATA). According to ATA: 
 
These operators have been proven through statistics…to be actually a better risk and yet they 
still continue to fight for recognition with the regulatory authorities and customers (oral 
submission, Mike Edmonds, ATA). 
 
TruckSafe represents the first major effort by the industry to lift safety performance through 
its own initiative. As such, the ATA strongly argued that TruckSafe represented a way 
forward for the industry, pointing to its close involvement in Fatigue Management Program 
pilot in Queensland as well as an entire supply chain fatigue management program with a 
large company (see below). The ATA also emphasised the value of its memorandum of 
understanding with the RTA – a measure it would like to extend to other jurisdictions – which 
entailed the exchange of information (including regulatory performance of TruckSafe 
accredited operators to, amongst other things, assist TruckSafe’s independent review panel) 
 
Jan Pattison, the wife/partner of an owner/driver based in southern Queensland, strongly 
endorsed the positive role that TruckSafe had played in improving the efficiency and safety of 
their operation. Mrs Pattison was an impressive witness, who provided the Inquiry with 
detailed records to substantiate the points she raised. She noted (oral submission) that 
enhancing safety performance required a commitment in terms of time and cost. In addition to 
the joining cost, Mrs Pattison gave the example of the requirement for at least 16 hours of 
training each year. As part of this, she and her husband had agreed that he should undergo 
driver training every two years. Completing a three day multi-combination skills  course at 
the Mount Cotton driver training centre in Queensland had cost $1,000 and resulted in six 
days of lost earning time for their only truck. Further, a TruckSafe audit would cost an 
owner/operator $600. Mrs Pattison regarded these costs as more than justified (some of these 
costs are claimable as a business expenses but the cash flow burden on small operators should 
not be under-estimated). She believed that, given the economic pressures on owner/drivers, 
the entry cost alone helped to explain why more owner/drivers had not joined TruckSafe: 
 
A question that often gets asked to me is why aren’t there more owner/drivers doing 
TruckSafe? Why aren’t there more owner/drivers doing fatigue management? I sort of say to 
them, well its going to cost them $2,500 to do TruckSafe and they look at that thinking well 
that’s a long term thing but I need two new steer tyres…Going back .to rates its very, very 
hard at the moment. 
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The ATA (oral submission, Mike Edmonds) supported the idea of a government subsidy to 
assist owner/drivers enter accreditation schemes like TruckSafe. Such an approach, which 
avoids many of the problems of incentive schemes discussed below, and is consistent with 
strong case made by the ATA for more training expenditure in the industry, warrants further 
investigation. 
  
A number of those endorsing TruckSafe did so with some qualification. For example, Dean 
Croke from the insurer MMI/Allianz Australia argued that was best initiative the industry had 
come up with and despite its small membership level had helped many operators to improve 
their business practices and long-term viability. At the same time, he observed: 
 
However, TruckSafe operators still have truck crashes as the TruckSafe audit process does 
not audit many aspects of road transport law including driving hours, driver schedules speed 
and vehicle compliance. It simply asks operator to agree to implement a set of industry 
standards and be audited against them. 
 
As TruckSafe does not specifically address the major causal factors of heavy vehicle 
accidents, it will not have the desired impact on driver fatigue levels until the standards are 
widened to include those included in the Queensland Transport Fatigue Management 
Program (FMP) (written submission, Dean Croke/MMI page 15). 
 
The Insurance Council of Australia (written submission, Dallas Booth, page 11) made similar 
points. The Council argued that while TruckSafe was a step in the right direction it had 
achieved only a low market penetration; it failed to address key areas like unrealistic trip 
schedules, speeding, fatigue and drug use; and it needed more rigorous independent 
evaluation to achieve credibility. Consistent with this, the Inquiry received more than a few 
submissions from drivers and operators questioning whether TruckSafe accredited operators 
were more safety compliant in relation to issues such as speeding: 
 
I was travelling at 102 kilometres per hour…I got passed by, and I’ll say it, a TruckSafe 
accredited company… You can buy a program for $800 to put on your computer and as long 
as you keep up the paperwork and the entries in the computer system, when the auditors come 
in to audit you for TruckSafe, as long as every thing is right on the computer you’re right. 
However this squeaky clean TruckSafe accredited person runs overnight express [describes 
colour and logo of company trucks] but I tell you tonight, 130 kilometres an hour he passed 
me…I wondered with Safe-T-Cam. I thought how’s he going to do it…When you come round 
to Bell’s Road and …you’re coming into Albury I noticed a big line of trucks… tailgating 
[running tail to nose to avoid the hide the number plate from the Safe-T-Cam]… That’s okay 
for Sesame St (truck driver expression for Hume Highway, oral submission, Victorian 
owner/driver). 
 
While this driver’s reference to a large number of trucks tailgating was exceptional, 
references to the involvement of TruckSafe accredited vehicles in speeding and other offences 
was not. TruckSafe has undoubtedly aroused a certain amount of resentment amongst non-
TruckSafe operators and drivers so these criticisms need to be treated with some caution. 
Claims that TruckSafe operators were no more compliant with on-road laws than other 
operators also emanated from a number of enforcement officers (police and RTA inspectors) 
making submissions to the Inquiry. For its part, the RTA (oral submission) expressed some 
confidence in TruckSafe, pointing to a regular exchange of information (such as RTA data on 
offences relating to speeding, defects etc) and the actions of a TruckSafe independent review 
panel that followed up these complaints.  The RTA pointed to the recent suspension of one 
operator’s accreditation and also moves to introduce more independent auditing following 
criticism of this (see below). The RTA was unaware of a number of the criticisms of 
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TruckSafe (such as manipulation of audit practices) but noted it retained the right to withdraw 
the benefits of any TruckSafe operator they were not satisfied with. 
 
The Inquiry is unaware of any exhaustive independent audit of TruckSafe compliance with 
road transport laws by regulatory agencies. It may be that, like any voluntary scheme, a small 
but conspicuous number of operators have flouted the spirit of the scheme (if not the letter 
given that TruckSafe does not address scheduling, speeding etc). It is unknown whether 
operators have been stripped of their accreditation on this basis. The Inquiry has no 
information on the number of operators stripped of accreditation and the basis for this. At the 
same time, publicised stripping of accreditation might well serve to strengthen the 
legitimacy/credibility of the scheme in the eyes of other operators. 
 
Qualitative research of trucking operators by another insurance company made available to 
this Inquiry indicated that TruckSafe had widespread recognition and was seen as being able 
to improve the industry’s image. At the same time, operators perceived that TruckSafe 
membership was too expensive, provided few of the expected benefits (in terms of discounted 
insurance premiums, access to work and fewer RTA inspections) and gaining accreditation 
was too easy. 
 
A number of submissions were critical of TruckSafe. The NSW Branch of the Transport 
Workers’ Union (written submission, at page 18), for example, argued that TruckSafe had 
similar limitations to previous efforts to improve standards in the industry, namely the 
problems of ownership/credibility and enforcement: 
 
First, it is run, regulated, audited and initiated from within the industry…  Secondly, the 
program is unenforceable. There is no penalty for non-compliance or failure to meet the audit 
process other than, perhaps, the withdrawal of accreditation. This, however, is unlikely as 
anecdotal evidence provided to the union suggest the majority if not all of the current 
TruckSafe members are responsible for regular breaches of existing driving hours and 
minimum safety standards. 
 
Other individuals and organisations making submissions to the Inquiry echoed a number of 
these criticisms though often in a less strident fashion. One recurring area of criticism related 
to the auditing system. Suggestions were made that the audit was largely 'paper-based' rather 
than involving actual inspection of vehicles etc to check the veracity of paper-records. The 
danger of 'paper compliance' has been identified as a potentially significant problem with any 
OHS management system and, as such, requires special measures including independent 
vetting (by unions or other independent bodies). The paper 'compliance' criticism was not 
confined to TruckSafe but was made in relation to a number of the voluntary 
schemes/alternative compliance programs. In relation to TruckSafe there were allegations that 
at least some auditors lacked the technical knowledge to inspect trucks and trailers, that 
inspection of heavy vehicles in the yard was rare, and attempts to see if defective vehicles had 
been parked around the corner even rarer. There were even suggestions that the auditing 
process had been manipulated. A former fleet maintenance manager for a large road transport 
company told the Inquiry that the company had been able to delay an audit at what would 
have proved an inauspicious time by contacting TruckSafe to say it was unhappy with the 
designated auditor (company's have this right). RTA stressed it saw the need for a combined 
package of compliance measures, including alternative compliance, rather than reliance on 
one or two measures. 
 
Another criticism levelled by some insurers was that TruckSafe accredited operators had 
claim records no better than other operators. However, this claim was disputed by the largest 
insurer of TruckSafe firms which argued that loss ratios for TruckSafe firms was consistently 
8 to 10% better than other operators in the period 1998 to 2000 (written submission, heavy 
vehicle insurer). This firm argued TruckSafe might be used as the benchmark for a minimum 
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standard of entry into the industry or the basis for industry licensing criteria.  For their part, a 
number of TruckSafe operators spoken to by the Inquiry complained that they were 
disappointed that there wasn’t a reward, in terms of lower insurance premiums, for the efforts 
they were putting in.  Some indicated accreditation, had for them, largely entailed 
documenting and producing manuals on things they were already doing but believed it had 
undoubtedly led significant benefits for others. A number of TruckSafe operators were 
perplexed by the lack of publicity or information given with regard to operators stripped of 
their TruckSafe accreditation. 
 
An important limitation with TruckSafe, and one it shares with almost all other voluntary 
schemes, is that it is largely concerned with dealing with the symptoms of safety problems in 
the long haul trucking industry not the underlying causes. While the ATA has commendably 
sought to address poor business skills amongst operators it remains the fact that membership 
of TruckSafe is too small and largely confined to larger companies (not small operators most 
need of this help). More importantly, like other voluntary schemes TruckSafe does not 
address the commercial practices including the role of customers that this Inquiry has found to 
be a critical cause of unsafe practices in the industry. This problem has been recognised by 
some companies, with one (a TruckSafe member) recommending, as part of its written 
submission, that TruckSafe be expanded to include all customers in the supply chain and 
thereby serve as a 'best practice' model for the industry. This suggestion has some merit 
although it still does not address the membership coverage problem. Nor does it provide a 
proactive solution to the easy entry into the industry of under-prepared, highly indebted and 
accordingly vulnerable new operators, recycling problems that longer-term operators have 
overcome (with others having already succumbed) and exacerbating the competitive pressures 
within the industry. The ATA is aware of business skills/ease of entry issue and has 
undertaken some efforts to promote better knowledge on these areas. At the same time, it 
would appear that it is small operators, especially owner/drivers, who have most problems in 
this area that are least likely to join TruckSafe (even though, according to the ATA, current 
membership is representative of the industry as a whole). It also needs to be remembered that 
the current TruckSafe membership (around 350) is a tiny fraction of the over 30,000 for-hire 
freight operators in Australia and while the scheme has tended to attract larger companies 
there are major operators outside the system. In other words, TruckSafe retains only a small 
fraction of transport operators and long haul distance trucks. 
 
In sum, the Inquiry received a wide range of viewpoints on TruckSafe. On the one hand, 
TruckSafe has by far the highest recognition of all the voluntary accreditation schemes 
currently on offer and is seen as having value, or potential value, by a number of 
knowledgeable parties outside the industry. On the other hand, membership remains small 
despite nearly a decade of operation, its effectiveness is questioned by at least some insurers 
(if the not the largest with presumably the best data set), and the scheme needs to achieve 
greater credibility in terms of its ownership and auditing processes. 
 
5.1.1.2 TransCare 
 
TransCare is an OHS management self-audit, performance-based OHS management and 
(potential) accreditation scheme recently developed by the Victorian Road Transport 
Association. Victorian Workcover has funded a pilot of the scheme including about 20 
companies. Its originators told the Inquiry that the scheme has support of the Transport 
Workers Union. TransCare entails a detailed assessment checklist covering areas such as 
communication/information and consultation, accountability, training, site safety, 
equipment/maintenance, hazards, dangerous goods, accident investigation, purchasing, human 
resource management and driver policies, legal responsibilities, injury management and 
rehabilitation and internal review. Key issues such as drug use and shifts are addressed though 
not in great detail. Unlike the present version of TruckSafe, TransCare includes a detailed 
section of subcontractor management and, commendably, the issue is also integrated into 
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other sections (with for example, questions on subcontractor training in the section on 
training). At the same time, TransCare benchmarks draw on TruckSafe, ISO 9000 and 
InjuryMAP as well as OHS and other legislation requirements. 
 
Overall, TransCare covers a relatively wide range of issues and is in many respects 
comparable to OHS management/self-audit systems that are now common in other industries 
but up until recently have been comparatively rare in road transport. The system is based on a 
computer software package (using CD-ROM) that enables a degree of flexibility not found in 
paper systems (but avoiding many of the narrow presumptions that mar many computer-based 
OHS programs marketed in the USA and to a lesser extent here). The package is designed for 
the specific needs of transport operators and has an array of back-up information so it can be 
adapted focus on a particular segment of the industry (eg livestock transport). In sum, 
TransCare appears to be useful package and early responses have been promising though as 
with other voluntary schemes proving effectiveness over a long period and with a large 
member base will be critical. It needs to be remembered that given its recent development 
TransCare has not attracted the critical scrutiny that is the case with TruckSafe.  
 
Like TruckSafe and other voluntary schemes a key question is how to induce a large number 
of transport companies to ‘join up’. Unlike TruckSafe, TransCare is not a proprietal scheme 
that must be purchased but will be available to the industry at not cost. While this removes a 
barrier to take-up there is still the question of how to induce many operators to take up the 
scheme. The developers of TransCare hope that this may be achieved through the incentive of 
reduced workers’ compensation premiums and insurance for asset liability for TransCare 
members. The same suggestion has been made with regard to Trucksafe but as noted below, 
some insurers at least are not keen about this approach and there are also likely to be practical 
limits to the degree such incentives can attract operators to enter the scheme. This is not to say 
that developments like TransCare are not a positive sign – they are.  
 
The Inquiry was impressed by the broad scope of TransCare. In its structure and format, 
TransCare appears much closer to the better and comprehensive OHS management systems 
being developed in other industries and as such can be seen as an attempt to bring the trucking 
industry more into line with the sorts of standards in OHS management expected elsewhere. 
Practical and relatively comprehensive voluntary schemes have a role to play in the road 
freight industry but the evidence presented to this Inquiry indicates that while they improve 
the performance of some operators they are unlikely to lift operator standards generally. In 
any case it is by no means clear that, unlike TruckSafe, TransCare is being proposed as an 
alternative to operator licensing since the Victorian Road Transport Association, unlike the 
ATA, supports operator licensing (and more stringent driver licensing – see below). Rather, it 
may be seen as a useful voluntary overlay to the mandatory standards under operator 
licensing, helping operators to move to a superior level of safety performance. If such 
schemes are seen to build on the standards laid down in operator licensing this Inquiry 
believes they are likely prove more attractive to trucking operators than the current situation 
where all accreditation is voluntary.  This is because operator licensing will send a clear 
message to all operators that they will need to ‘lift their game’ and if consignors and others 
are included in licensing the message will be reinforced, with the latter seeking ways of 
demonstrating they are meeting their legal obligations.  
 
5.1.1.3 Using Incentives to Extend Voluntary Accreditation Schemes 
 
As already implied, a key problem confronting voluntary accreditation/certification schemes 
is their limited coverage of operators in the industry. According to Hassall, Simpson and 
Barnesby (2001:6), there has been accelerated growth of road transport accreditation since 
1997 largely driven by newer schemes such as Trucksafe, HACCP and NHVS. They have 
projected an average annual growth of 17.7% to 2002. However, even if such projections are 
achieved and sustained into the future the overall number of operators covered by voluntary 
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schemes will still remain small (though it is likely to include almost all large operators). It is 
also worth noting that Hassall, Simpson and Barnesby (2001:7) make the point that the peak 
of fatal accidents in the late 1980s and subsequent regulation (including the establishment of 
the NRTC) was the most significant driver behind the development and growth of 
accreditation schemes. Of course, a moot point here is not only the critical role of regulation 
(and threats of more stringent intervention) in sponsoring interest in accreditation but also 
whether, while accreditation remains voluntary, it will capture the operators most in need of 
lifting their performance and thereby changing overall behaviour in the industry. Consistent 
with observations made in the first section of this Report, Hassall, Simpson and Barnesby 
(2001:7-8) note that the growth of accreditation schemes has had no appreciable effect on the 
level of fatal and serious truck crashes, which have remained consistent since 1991. In other 
words, there is no compelling evidence these schemes are contributing to a decline in the level 
of serious incidents – the very incidents that are of critical concern to this Inquiry. Hassall, 
Simpson and Barnesby (2001:8-14) go on to discuss the confusing array of voluntary schemes 
now available, the special needs of owner/drivers (partly addressed by Trucksafe and 
TransCare) and the role regulators could play in influencing the adoption of these schemes by 
mandating minimum certification modules and standards. 
 
Unless, the coverage problem can be resolved the various schemes identified will remain at 
the margins of changing industry practice, which is not to gainsay the benefits of at least some 
to individual operators. When this issue was raised in connection to these schemes, the most 
common response of their advocates was to suggest that incentives could be used to boost 
membership. The first point that needs to be made here is that, as recognised by it advocates, 
for this to work the commercial advantages accruing to accredited operators must exceed the 
commercial advantage derived from regulatory evasion.  In many respects this appears to be a 
'tall ask'. The incentive of increased business at the expense of lower quality operators has, 
with some exceptions, generally failed to materialise as it appears customers are largely 
driven by concerns of price. Another option more commonly canvassed was discounts on 
insurance cover. Responding to the recent escalation in CTP (ie compulsory third party) 
insurance claims and premiums the ATA suggested that the introduction of performance 
based-premiums could represent a powerful commercial pressure to lift standards and make 
accreditation more popular (oral submission, Mike Edmonds, ATA). The Inquiry accepts the 
point that performance-based CTP premiums could be a powerful tool that might effectively 
force some operators to improve their performance or leave the industry. At the same time, 
insurance schemes need to balance incentive and coverage objectives and it is likely in the 
area of CTP that the relevant government agencies would resist any move that might detract 
from anything but complete cover of the industry. The ‘churning’ of operators that marks the 
industry may also mute such market signals since there are always ready replacements for 
those operators who fail, with many of the new entrants (on the basis of past history) being 
under-capitalised and desperate to survive. 
 
The most commonly referred to incentive was providing premium discounts to accredited 
operators in the areas of comprehensive insurance and workers' compensation insurance. 
Here, it has to be noted that, by and large, insurers were not enthusiastic to the idea. Even 
some insurers who endorsed accreditation schemes such as TruckSafe expressed reservations. 
 
The committee has heard calls from the ACTU for insurance companies to offer lower 
premiums as an incentive to transport operators to better manage fatigue. This approach has 
been tried before without success involving the TruckSafe Program. When it was introduced 
some insurers believed accredited operators would be better risks and offered immediate 
reductions without evidence that a change in on-road behaviour had been effected. Allianz 
have found that TruckSafe operators are no better risk than any other group of operators, 
some are in fact the highest risk operators in the industry with the worst accident records to 
date. 
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Lowering premiums will not work as it just allows operators to get away with high risk 
behaviour knowing that the insurance company will always be there to pick up the pieces. 
Unless operators get a clear message that high-risk transport operations where high levels of 
fatigue are involved attract higher premiums, then the trucking industry will continue 
believing that high-risk behaviour is acceptable (written submission, Dean Croke, Allianz 
Australia page 20). 
 
Offering incentives (such as discounts to insurance premiums) could be used to expand the 
coverage of TruckSafe (or other schemes like TransCare for that matter). However, this 
seemingly attractive means of using market pressure to lift standards does not, in the view of 
this Inquiry, represent a solution to the coverage problem for a number of reasons. First, the 
offering of such incentives was opposed by a number of insurers (including at least one 
supporter of TruckSafe) as not being justified on the basis performance by TruckSafe 
accredited firms (the largest insurer disagreed on this score). Second, such incentive schemes 
are known to be susceptible to manipulation of claims incidence (without any comparable 
changes in the incidence of claimable incidents). Third, insurance incentives will not 
influence the large number of predominantly small operators and owner/drivers who are 
under-insured (even non-insured) or who push the regulatory envelope even though these are 
precisely the ones who most need to meet accreditation requirements. Fourth, the incentive 
approach is liable to be defeated in practice by the elaborate subcontracting networks that 
already exist (by enabling firms to disguise risks/claims through outsourcing). The most direct 
and arguably effective way to achieve comprehensive and higher levels of performance 
through accreditation is to make it mandatory. 
 
For a number of quite similar reasons the Inquiry is also doubtful as to whether discounts on 
workers' compensation premiums will have the desired effect. The Inquiry has already 
presented evidence on the evasion and manipulation of workers' compensation premiums by 
some operators, indicate that for them discounts hardly provide a significant incentive. 
Similarly, the incentive hardly applies to owner/drivers or to firms who use them as 
subcontractors. 
 
Other incentives raised in the course of the Inquiry included discounts on government charges 
such as truck registration fees or requirements that freight forwarders should use accredited 
operators in preference to non-accredited operators. With regard to the former it is by no 
means clear that the incentive would be sufficient to offset the additional costs entailed in 
accreditation let alone the commercial advantage of regulatory evasion (although exclusion 
from the federal diesel grant might prove a more powerful incentive). The latter suggestion 
may have merit but its effectiveness will depend on just how stringent the efforts to secure an 
accredited operator have to be in order to satisfy those overseeing the scheme (and it is liable 
to prove a complex process). In an industry like road transport the bar may well need to be set 
at the point which nearly excludes unaccredited operators, raising the obvious point as to 
whether simply mandating this requirement through an operator licensing system might not 
prove a more direct and effective route. Further, licensing as a proactive form of regulation 
places the compliance burden far more on the regulated that reactive forms of regulation (to 
which alternative compliance measures are normally compared). 
 
5.1.2 Initiatives by Individual Companies 
 
During the course of its investigation the Inquiry became aware of a number of generally 
medium to large operators who had made strenuous efforts to improve safety performance by 
accepting internal responsibility and adopting measures to implement this. A number of these 
companies made written or oral submissions to the Inquiry (in some cases both) and the 
Inquiry also visited a number of transport company premises to examine their fatigue 
management and other safety management regimes (including the use of global positioning 
technology). Several of the companies freely acknowledged that prior to recent improvements 
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the company had a very poor record. The evidence on measures to manage fatigue and safety 
presented was usually impressive and, in most cases, could be corroborated with other 
evidence available to the Inquiry. Some of the companies concerned belong to TruckSafe or 
equivalent schemes while others did not. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the 
management of a number of transport companies have been keen to accept internal 
responsibility, with some using voluntary accreditation schemes to assist with this while 
others have relied on their own resources. 
 
While the long haul road freight industry usually attracts a very adverse image in media 
reporting, and this Inquiry has identified many serious problems requiring urgent attention, 
there are 'good news' stories that also need due recognition. Individual operators, often at 
considerable cost in terms of time and energy, have made strenuous efforts to improve both 
the quality of the services they deliver and the safety of their drivers (and other road users). 
Such operators indicate that an efficient and safe road transport industry is achievable 
although in the present climate this often comes at a cost of lost customers and competing 
with less scrupulous operators. Instituting an annual 'best practice' award scheme (with 
suitable categories based on size and sector) to recognise and reinforce this achievement in 
the eyes of other operators, as recommended by one operator, has merit. 
 
The Inquiry visited a Sydney-based large transport company (a TruckSafe member) and was 
able to inspect air-conditioned sleeping quarters and other facilities provided for drivers. As in 
other cases, the management emphasised that the company had moved from having a poor 
record some years before, by instituting a number of measures to manage driver fatigue 
(including changing drivers at Newcastle, trying to ensure drivers got a minimum number of 
night sleeps at home, and arranging for separate drivers to do local deliveries once a truck 
reached its destination). The company recognised the importance of work/non-work balances 
(especially family life) to the health and wellbeing of its drivers. The company also used a 
sophisticated vehicle tracking/global positioning system (called C-Track) to map fleet 
movements and reduce pressure on drivers to meet unrealistic/unsafe schedules. 
 
Another large company was the first to employ a full-time Driver Training Officer in NSW (it 
now had two officers), a practice that has now been followed by most other large operators 
(though some use outsource this the Mount Cotton Driver Training School in Queensland or 
DECCA). The company had integrated OHS into its ISO 9002 quality assurance accreditation 
(and there it is externally audited) – this remains atypical even for larger companies - and was 
able to achieve lost time injury and labour turnover rates (between 3 and 5% per annum) well 
below the industry average. The company also engages in very careful pre-employment 
assessment of potential drivers (including psychological testing to identify risk aversion and 
compliance behaviour as well as medical testing and ongoing regular assessment after 
employment [but not drug testing]). This is matched with a extremely rigorous vehicle 
maintenance regime. The company had spent $2 million dollars putting its program in place 
and has not joined TruckSafe because it believes it has achieved a standard of performance 
that goes beyond the current version of TruckSafe. The company has adapted its vehicles 
(such as the location of mirrors) and training methods in response to evidence from incidents 
(it also benchmarks its safety performance against other operators). With assistance from the 
MAA, it has enforced the wearing of seat belts by drivers long before this was mandated by 
regulation. 
 
The company has a rigid rule in relation to scheduling that it will not schedule a driver where 
that driver would exceed their available working hours. The General Manager has made it 
clear that breach of this rule will result in dismissal of the responsible manager prior to 
dismissal of the driver. Drivers who slightly infringe on schedules have been reprimanded or 
sent for retraining. Like virtually every other transport company spoken to by the Inquiry, 
delays in loading and unloading, constituted one of the most serious and uncontrollable 
threats to its scheduling regime. Unlike many other large companies, this company continues 
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to make very little use of subcontracted small fleets or owner/drivers. It is worth noting that 
the one area where the scheduling rule has been breached has been where a subcontractor has 
worked for the company on day shift and then sought work with another company on night 
shift. A number of subcontractors were stood down (removed from the company list) or 
suspended (where the subcontractor could show the practice had undertaken independently of 
their knowledge) when the company discovered this practice. 
 
These examples provide by no means all the positive cases that were identified in the course 
of the Inquiry but are indicative of the more progressive approach that marks some elements 
in the industry. 
 
5.1.3 Alternate Compliance Programs 
 
Alternative Compliance grew out of NRTC led discussions on operator licensing options and 
self-regulation in 1993. While the NRTC (1993) discussion paper had canvassed operator 
licensing Hassall (1997:26) reports that regulators (or at least some of them) preferred a move 
away from conventional enforcement measures such as weighbridges to internal auditing of 
companies that could assure them of meeting regulatory requirements. This shift also had the 
support of industry representatives. As the name implies, alternative compliance provided 
new options in terms of meeting regulatory standards and in at least some cases a reshaping of 
those standards into a more flexible format (especially those relating to driving hours/fatigue 
management discussed below). Development of these schemes began in 1994. Examples of 
alternative compliance schemes include the Fatigue Management Program (examined below) 
piloted in Queensland and the Mass Management (Loading) controlled by Vicroads.  
 
Another example is the Maintenance Management Scheme (MMS), which forms part of the 
National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation (NHVAS) coordinated by the NRTC. The RTA and its 
interstate counterparts (such as Queensland Transport) exempt operators accredited under 
MMS from having to undergo an annual vehicle inspection. In relation to this scheme, the 
Inquiry did not obtain sufficient information to make an assessment. It can simply be noted 
that the scheme, like a number of others, was the subject of widely diverging opinions. Some 
of those making submissions, including former RTA inspectors and some drivers, suggested it 
had become a means of evading appropriate checks while others, mostly operators, believed it 
was working well. The ATA (oral submission, Mike Edmonds) endorsed the scheme and was 
especially positive about the recognition given to TruckSafe accredited operators in terms of 
annual inspections, which it believed provided an incentive/endorsement to the latter. The 
RTA was also supportive of the scheme although one transport association argued that over-
vigorous checking during the assessment stage by RTA inspectors who were unhappy with 
the measure had ‘burned’ a number of operators and their drivers, adversely affecting the 
scheme’s ability to extend its membership. The Inquiry is no position to evaluate these 
opinions but believes they should be noted. The remainder of this subsection will deal with a 
number of alternative compliance schemes that are arguably important in their own right and 
where the Inquiry was able to obtain sufficient evidence to make an assessment of their role 
and impact. 
 
5.1.3.1 Fatigue Management Program (FMP) 
 
The Fatigue Management Program is a performance-based approach that places the onus on 
the operator to take responsibility for and manage fatigue of their drivers by identifying all the 
factors contributing to fatigue not simply driving hours. The main components of FMP are an 
accreditation agreement, standards and performance management model. This covers driver 
selection and induction (including medical tests), a 3 month probationary period and the 
issuing of a driver FMP manual to be carried at all times. Amongst other things, the manual 
explains fatigue and health (with tips on improving sleep) and a work diary to be filled out for 
each trip and checked by management (a driver must fill in an interception report if checked 
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by a enforcement officer and management must investigate this). The FMP model entails a set 
of working and rest parameters or operating limits covering both a 24 hour (maximum hours 
worked) and 7, 14 or 28 day cycle (including minimum number of night sleeps, home sleeps 
and maximum aggregate work hours). For each of these parameters the operator needs to 
nominate a 'normal' and 'outer or risk' limit (reaching this point signifies the need for 
corrective measures). Ideally, the FMP enables an operator to specifically match their 
business needs with work scheduling in a way that does not compromise safety and results in 
better fatigue outcomes for drivers. As an alternative compliance and quality assurance based-
model, operator performance under FMP is primarily monitored by an audit process 
(conducted prior to accreditation and on a regular basis thereafter), with some back up from 
on-road enforcement. Accredited independent auditors conduct audits.  
 
The FMP Pilot scheme began in Queensland in 1995 with the accreditation of Nolan’s 
Interstate Transport into FMP Phase 1, quickly followed by McIver’s Transport and Rocky’s 
Own Transport. In January 1998 TL Brown Transport became the first owner/driver to be 
accredited. A large operator Finemores was also accredited in this year and by March 2000 it 
was reported that a number of other medium and large-sized operators were preparing for the 
FMP entry audits. The NSW Transport Minister Carl Scully endorsing continuation of the 
project and establishing specific NSW operating conditions for FMP Phase 2 no doubt 
assisted this growth. Conditions included monthly FMP operator reports to the RTA, no 
logbook requirements but vehicles must be fitted with monitoring devices and records stored, 
no entry to FMP pilot of passenger vehicles and FMP drivers using the Pacific Highway 
between Hexham and Queensland must meet Transitional Fatigue Management Scheme 
criteria.  However, it was also noted that there had been delays in Phase 2 of FMP designed to 
give a more precise indication of the impact of the scheme on driver fatigue and business 
operations (Queensland Transport, Fatigue Management Pilot Program Newsletter Issue 3 
March 2000).   
 
FMP received support from a number of parties making submissions to the Inquiry. Further, 
the Land Transport Safety Authority has undertaken a similar pilot program for the scheme in 
New Zealand. 
 
An excellent program and a viable alternative to log books as a means to measure and 
manage driver fatigue levels. This is because it addresses the critical areas of driver and 
vehicle scheduling, employee rosters and the balance between work, rest and driving hours. 
 
The unnecessary delay in widening the availability of this program may bring about its 
ultimate failure as regulators procrastinate over its value and impact. As logbooks are proven 
to be totally ineffective in measuring fatigue levels and in the absence of an alternative, the 
FMP must be fast tracked if we are to seriously address driver fatigue (written submission, 
Dean Croke). 
 
In the course of its investigations the Inquiry received detailed written submissions from a 
number of Queensland-based operators involved in FMP that it was able to follow up at 
hearings held in Brisbane and number of other exchanges. Two medium-sized firms had 
entered into the Fatigue Management Pilot Program being sponsored by the Queensland 
Department of Transport. One, a TruckSafe member, undertook a range of integrated 
activities designed to enhance safety in addition to the Fatigue Management Pilot Program, 
including a regular newsletter (with considerable safety content). In terms of its commitment 
to fatigue management, on a number of occasions the company had responded to customer-
imposed scheduling problems by transporting a relief driver over considerable distances. 
From what the Inquiry could discover this was a highly atypical response. At a number of 
stages the Inquiry received independent verification that company was a leader in its efforts to 
maintain a safe operation.  
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The other firm, had in its own words been operating along similar lines to many others - 
'totally illegally' until entering the Fatigue Management Pilot Program. This necessitated them 
to recalculate the freight rates, an action that resulted in the loss of their largest customer and 
30% of their business (according to an independent witness to a TruckSafe accredited 
operator). The company was eventually able to reposition its business to the niche market of 
refrigerated food, where customers saw a benefit in the reliability/quality of the company's 
fatigue management regime given experience with existing carriers. Senior management of 
the firm developed linkages with Trucking Associations in north America (including 
reciprocal visits and training), enabling the company to introduce driver and vehicle specific 
smart card technology and black box on-board computers. 
 
The Inquiry was also able to obtain information on a southern Queensland owner/operator 
(largely engaged in hauling fruit and produce between Queensland, NSW and Victoria) that 
had entered the FMP pilot with a personal regime. This included night sleeps (avoiding 
overnight runs), afternoon rests, healthy eating and lifestyle activities, calculating driving 
hours to allow sufficient rest time, avoiding peak traffic times, resting when tired and re-
negotiating unloading times. In both written and oral submissions, the wife and business 
partner of the driver (an owner/driver representative in TruckSafe) stated that although these 
FMP measures were costly (and were in no way reflected in freight rates) it enabled them to 
operate viably (though doing it tough), safely and legally. The operator had resisted pressure 
to take loads at non-viable rates or to meet unrealistic schedules, in once case telling a freight 
forwarder to take the load off the truck (and losing a day’s work in the process). The 
combination of FMP and better business planning (including knowing when to refuse job 
prices or deadlines) enabled the operator to run a successful business with an annual kilometer 
travelled (less than 200,000) that was low by the standards of other owner/drivers. 
 
At the same time, a number of drivers and operators making submissions to the Inquiry 
expressed skepticism about FMP, suggesting practice did not always match the model and 
some operators were using it to extend hours of work. In some cases the criticism indicated a 
degree of confusion between the different alternative fatigue management regimes (both 
understandable and therefore a problem in its own right) but this was not always the case. 
There was also probably justifiable concern that what work for a few operators was unlikely 
to be embraced with similar dedication by all operators. As noted earlier, operational police 
were also critical of the confusion/on-road enforcement problems created by schemes like 
FMP. In its submission to the recent federal fatigue in transport inquiry the RTA expressed 
concern that some operators wanted extremely long and onerous hours as a condition of entry. 
The Inquiry was unable to fully reconcile these divergent viewpoints. At this stage, evidence 
indicates FMP has some promise but it needs a thorough going assessment and in its ultimate 
success almost certainly depends on complementary measures designed to address the 
underlying causes of unsafe driving practices that have been identified by this Inquiry.  
 
In particular, there needs to be some way of inducing or binding clients into the scheme. As 
yet, with a few exceptions, most customers show no interest in ‘buying’ into the issue through 
contract specifications.  One notable exception is the Coles Myer Logistics Code of Conduct 
that requires all its contractors to have a ‘comprehensive and effective Fatigue Management 
Program which must comply with all relevant State and Federal laws, regulations and codes 
of practice’ (provisions provided courtesy of the Australian Retailers Association). Assuming 
Coles Myer takes adequate steps to enforce this provision (including scrutiny of its own 
scheduling requirements) this is a very valuable step, although once again there is a question 
of how to generalise individual examples of ‘best practice’. 
 
To put the FMP pilot scheme into some perspective a final point needs to be made. There can 
be little doubt that suitably audited (and this remains an issue of some debate), it is an 
advance over previous schemes. However, FMP arguably still lags behind the fatigue 
management regimes currently being implemented (and continuously reviewed) by rail freight 
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operators such as FreightCorp and National Rail. In their submissions to this Inquiry, these 
bodies went to some lengths to detail these regimes. National Rail, for instance, has 
developed a scheme using a fatigue index developed by Professor Drew Dawson at the 
University of South Australia Sleep Research Centre. It is worth adding that these schemes 
now cover a significant proportion of train crew unlike the FMP pilot scheme.  
 
To repeat the point, FMP appears to represent a positive trend which requires further 
assessment, and if confirmed, methods for extending it and providing more effective 
regulatory support. 
 
 
 
5.1.3.2 The Western Australian Duty of Care Approach to Managing Fatigue 
 
In Western Australia, unlike other jurisdictions apart from the Northern Territory, there are no 
specific regulations governing driving hours. In 1997 meetings with representatives of the 
Department of Transport, industry associations, owner/drivers, the TWU and several 
experts/management consultants resolved to adopt a ‘duty of care’ approach to fatigue 
management. The ‘duty of care’ approach was based around a voluntary code of practice 
developed with the assistance of the Worksafe Western Australia (or WWA, the 
government’s OHS agency) and approved under section 57 of the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act, 1984 in October 1998. After an initial awareness phase Worksafe Western 
Australian notified the around 1460 transport operators identified within the state that it had 
an enforcement role. According to the Minister for the Environment and Labour Relations, 
Cheryl Edwards (correspondence with the Inquiry, 17 August 2000) 313 of these companies 
submitted a fatigue management plan and 184 of these had been audited. Audits were 
undertaken by independent auditors (both ex WWA inspectors) who provided feedback to 
WWA inspectors on compliance with operating standards and components of the code of 
practice. In the period since WWA took responsibility for fatigue management and August 
2000 a total of 452 improvement notices and 17 prohibition notices relating to fatigue 
management were issued but there have been no fatigue management-related prosecutions 
since the code was developed. The written submission from Lance Poore from the Regional 
Policy Section of WA Transport emphasised that despite their best efforts to get operators to 
voluntarily implement fatigue management it was only when enforcement was introduced that 
‘things started to happen.’ 
 
The Minister (correspondence 17 August 2000) stated that one positive effect of the 
development was that larger and more prominent transport operators were imposing their own 
fatigue management regimes on their subcontractors, thus broadening the compliance effect. 
Again, this point was reinforced by the submission from Lance Poore from the Regional 
Policy Section of WA Transport. He added that basing the new code under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act had been critical to this outcome because of the overarching duty it 
places on the principle contractor for subcontractors (and the same applies in most if not all 
other jurisdictions): 
 
The nature of the OS&H Act made this a particularly effective process as large operators 
were also made responsible for the activities of their subcontractors. In one instance a single 
prime contractor/operator had over 300 sub-contractors that they used. The prime contractor 
had to ensure that these sub-contractors had systems in place as part of their system. In effect 
by targeting the large operators initially the majority of owner operators will have been 
drawn into the net (written submission, Lance Poore WA Transport).  
 
The capacity of OHS legislation to tie in subcontractors through the duty owed to them (and 
the duty of the prime contractor to have a safe system of work, including any subcontracted 
component) has been well understood and enforced by OHS agencies for some years. While it 
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may too optimistic to presume that this process ties in all subcontractors, or that it is always 
effectively enforced, the superiority of this approach to conventional regulatory arrangements 
governing fatigue is clear. Moreover, this regulatory coverage of contractor/subcontractor 
relationships applies to all safety-related issues not simply fatigue. This observation is 
particularly important given suggestions about increasingly elaborate chains of subcontractors 
being used in the road transport industry.  
 
Thus, a noteworthy feature of the Western Australian initiative is its legislative base under 
OHS rather than road transport legislation. Although there were specific reasons for adopting 
this approach in Western Australia (including the absence of existing driving hour provisions 
under WA road transport legislation) it does highlight the practicality of basing road transport 
regulation and compliance strategies on OHS legislation (and especially the general duty 
provisions contained within). According to the Minister (correspondence, 17 August 2000), 
the various regulatory agencies were working well together under this arrangement. The 
Northern Territory, too, has implemented a code of practice for regulating driver fatigue 
under the territory's OHS legislation (Moore and Brooks, 2000:2).  The NSW Branch of the 
TWU (written submission, page 21) expressed support for the Western Australian Code of 
Practice approach based on OHS legislation because of the message it sent to the parties and 
especially if liability could be extended to clients. 
 
In sum, the Western Australian Code for managing fatigue appears to have significant 
potential. One important observation to be drawn from recent Western Australian 
experience is that it provides further evidence to support OHS legislation taking a more 
prominent role in regulating safety in the road transport industry. Another important 
observation to be drawn is that enforcement processes played a critical role in 
implementing the voluntary code. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
 
One major problem with existing voluntary schemes now in place is that they address the 
symptoms of safety problems in the long distance trucking industry (such as fatigue, poor 
maintenance etc) rather than the underlying causes of these problems. It is true that a number, 
such as TruckSafe, either explicitly or implicitly assist member operators to improve their 
planning and business management skills, and in so doing address one underlying problem. 
However, even here there are limits because, by and large, the companies attracted to 
TruckSafe are larger operators where this is less likely to be as important a problem as it is for 
smaller operators. More importantly, what these schemes do not address is the commercial 
and industrial practices that this Inquiry has found to be an absolutely critical factor 
contributing to unsafe practice. Nor are they able to address the issue of the minimal standards 
set for those entering the industry. 
 
In trying to address the lack of awareness on the part of customers of the implications of cost, 
scheduling pressures and other pressures (such as unpaid waiting time) for safety, one 
Queensland-based transport company urged a number of measures to get the 'message' out. 
This included a government advertising campaign in the electronic and print media, trade 
magazines as well as government assistance to hold meetings with chain stores, market 
authorities, farmers and others. The Inquiry would agree that such a publicity campaign could 
play valuable role but doubts whether this would have more than a minimal impact when used 
in combination with voluntary schemes. Rather publicity, and the distribution of advice and 
support materials etc to relevant parties, would work best in conjunction with selective high-
level prosecutions. These reinforce the message and generate their own publicity/awareness 
amongst key decision-makers, something high profile prosecutions by the EPA and 
WorkCover NSW (such as those in relation to labour leasing) clearly demonstrate. In short, 
publicity is an important adjunct to but not a substitute for a compliance policy that includes a 
mixture of inducement ('carrots') and deterrent ('sticks') measures. 
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Apart from questions of compliance and their failure to address root causes, the major 
limitation of existing voluntary schemes is that they simply do not demonstrate the capacity to 
attract a membership level sufficient to change industry practices more generally. It needs to 
be remembered that these schemes were, at least in part, proposed as an alternative to external 
measures such as operator licensing. The schemes are still advocated on these grounds but a 
basic observation needs to be made. The number of accreditation schemes has expanded but, 
in the absence of industry benchmarks, this diversity creates confusion (this and other issues 
were recognised at an accreditation workshop held in Melbourne in 1998. See Barnesby and 
Hassall, 1998 and Hassall, 1998). The most widely praised flagships of this approach, namely 
TruckSafe and FMP have now been around for almost a decade and over five years 
respectively. Overall, membership of these schemes remains very small. While some other 
schemes are in their early stages no compelling evidence was presented to the Inquiry as to 
why the newer schemes would prove any more attractive than their predecessors. The 
structural characteristics and competitiveness of the industry are such that a significant 
number of operators outside the schemes (not just a few 'cowboys') are not simply agnostic 
but will be induced/pressured by financial circumstances to secure work/get a commercial 
advantage by evading the law/undercutting legitimate operators. A sober assessment of the 
long history of sustained and widespread regulatory evasion in long haul road transport amply 
demonstrates that voluntary schemes can encourage some operators to adopt better processes 
of internal responsibility but relying on them to alter the character of the industry would be 
naïve.  
 
At the risk of belabouring the point, voluntary schemes should be supported where they 
provide demonstrable evidence of improving OHS performance amongst trucking operators. 
However, given concerns raised these schemes should be subjected to regular external 
assessment and the overall value of the schemes should be evaluated. In its investigations the 
Inquiry was surprised to learn that evaluative measures had not been taken in many cases (and 
the results made public). Further, there is no evidence that these schemes, taken individually 
or as a whole, have either the membership reach or address the underlying causes of unsafe 
practices in such a way as to alter safety across the industry generally. Incentives to boost 
membership, such as discounts on insurance, have their own problems (eg inducing claim 
suppression) and will not, in any case, attract those operators who most need to lift their 
game. Crucially, cut-price operators will continue to thrive so long as clients are 
predominantly cost-conscious and feel they have little if any obligation to the safety of truck 
drivers or other road users. Some customers impose stringent conditions on quality (in terms 
of safeguarding the freight), demonstrating that, despite claims to the contrary made to the 
Inquiry, similar requirements could be extended to safety.   
 
Not all clients fit this mould, and indeed some like BHP have gone to some effort to 
restructure transport arrangements on safety grounds. BHP is a major user of the road 
transport industry, moving over 6 million tonnes of product over a total distance in excess of 
80 million kilometers by road each year. BHP Transport and Logistics has developed a 
fatigue management program, which it is encouraging all transport suppliers to adopt (as well 
as bring all subcontractors into line with its safety objectives). This was developed in 
partnership with transport companies and some of BHP’s customers. The fatigue management 
addresses a number of the risk factors identified by this Inquiry including delivery 
arrangements and scheduling, loading/unloading facilities, reducing queues and delays. 
Indeed, the initiative was very much a response to the recognition that only about 40% of 
fatigue issues could be managed by the transport company with the remainder residing with 
customers, notably queuing at both ends. BHP has the market muscle to exert a significant 
and positive influence on the safety performance of the transport operators it engages. 
However, the evidence available to the Inquiry indicated developments like those at BHP 
were exceptional.  
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There have been some other attempts to address this issue, and this is discussed in the next 
subsection. 
 
5.2 Voluntary Codes Dealing with Transport Operator Relations with Consignors, 
Clients/Customers? 
 
As already noted, many of the attempts at improving compliance/raising safety standards in 
road transport through collaborative/self-regulatory compliance regimes or voluntary codes 
fail to address the underlying source of these problems (unless the problem is construed only 
as a result of poor management practices by transport operators). A critical issue that needs to 
be addressed is the relationship between transport operators and consignors, clients and load 
receivers. As yet there have been few if any serious attempts to do this. 
 
The Inquiry understands that late in the year 2000 the ATA held discussions with the ARA on 
mutually agreed principles (and reflecting the ARA’s expressed willingness [oral submission] 
to enter into a consultative process with regard to problems). There have been efforts to 
implement similar measures in other countries such as the USA. In the USA the Truckload 
Carriers Association has sought to revise an older code of ethics prepared by the National 
Industrial Transportation League (or NITL, an association of shippers and retailers) in a more 
comprehensive Shipper/Receiver/Carrier/Driver Guide to Good Business Relations.  This 
move followed concerns at waiting time at loading docks and the adverse effects this was 
having on driver alertness and reducing driving time to make the next scheduled delivery – in 
other words, the same issues raised repeatedly in the course of this Inquiry.  The Guide, yet to 
be adopted by the NITL as at May 2000, covers a wide range of issues couched in terms of 
non-legally binding obligations of the respective parties to each other. Section 1 D refers to 
the shippers/receivers expediting the movement of equipment.  Amongst other things, this 
includes bearing responsibility for loading/unloading and providing prompt loading/unloading 
when trucks arrive at the scheduled time (not unreasonably refusing to reschedule if 
circumstances change or if trucks arrive early/late). The section also urges making 
arrangements to contact drivers (so they can leave the site) if dock space is unavailable 
(information provided to the Inquiry by Barry Moore, NRTC). The guide clearly states it is 
not seeking to establish legal obligations or an industry standard.  
 
The spirit of the Guide, assuming it is adopted, is commendable. However, the ‘obligations’ 
are phrased in ambiguous terms and what is actually required to meet the guide could easily 
prove to be the subject of considerable differences of opinion. The question needs to be asked, 
if the guide sets no legal obligations or no benchmark standard, and there are no measures for 
assessing compliance/non compliance, then what effect is it likely to have? In other 
industries, such as clothing manufacture (OHS and labour standards) there have been attempts 
at voluntary codes, including labelling systems, in Europe, Australia and the USA over a 
number of years. Invariably, however, there have been serious problems getting parties to 
‘sign up’, to back this with meaningful attempts to ensure compliance or for agreements to 
survive in anything but name for more than a short period. The experience is that, even where 
adopted, some companies treat the code seriously but others who do not gain a competitive 
advantage (in terms of lower costs). In a fragmented and intensely competitive industry like 
road transport it is difficult to envisage anything but a similar outcome. In Australia, there is 
the added disadvantage of having no broadly representative body of major transport clients 
(like the NITL in the USA), although the ARA is clearly a pivotal body. 
 
Some individual customers of road transport have been far more decisive in incorporating 
legally binding requirements in relation safety, and in a more comprehensive way than the 
Coles Code of Conduct on fatigue mentioned above. For example, in its written submission 
FreightCorp referred to the intermodal PortLink strategy on the movement of containers – the 
highest growth area of rail freight – which involves contracts with road transporters (so as to 
offer a door to door service) as well as road alliances in relation to transporting grain. In both 
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areas FreightCorp’s road alliance contracts include safety clauses requiring road operators to 
comply with legal limits on gross weight, safe loading/unloading and load restraint 
procedures, speed and other traffic rules, road transport driving hours regulations, and 
designated routes set by local councils. Failure to comply with these clauses can lead to 
termination of the contract (written submission at page 2). Backed up by suitable auditing and 
contractor selection procedures, this provides a model for both load owners/receivers but also 
for subcontract arrangements within road transport since FreightCorp is both a client of road 
transport in this area as well as another link within the transport chain. 
 
In addition to the measures just described, the TWU has sought to address the issue by 
negotiating a code of practice with both transport companies and major customers of road 
transport. The codes set out reciprocal obligations, including the notification and sharing of 
information on illegal (such as award and OHS law breaches) or exploitative practices and a 
dispute resolution procedure. With regard to the customer code (which the TWU is seeking to 
negotiate with major retailers) it requires customers to keep records of all transport contracts 
of the previous six months (including specific information such as payment, route used etc). 
Information on transport providers, including owner/drivers and subcontractors, is to be 
forwarded to the TWU on a regular basis and there are procedures for addressing situations of 
exploitation. The Inquiry is unaware as to whether any customers have signed onto this code. 
Such negotiations are likely to prove difficult in a context where regulators have failed to 
demonstrate the obligations (under both chain of responsibility and OHS legislation) of both 
transport operators (including those who subcontract) and their clients. A related difficulty 
would be client fears that signing such an agreement would entail losing a competitive 
advantage to their rivals. In a sense, this highlights a more general point, namely that 
voluntary agreements may prove easier to negotiate once regulators establish mandatory 
standards and demonstrate the risk of flouting these. In other words, far from being a 
substitute to mandatory regulation, voluntary agreements may act more as a complement. 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Will self-regulation work in the long distance trucking industry? 
 
The fact is that self-regulation is no regulation at all when competition, as in the trucking 
industry, is the driving motive (comment by County Court Judge Paul Gebhardt sentencing 
truck driver for negligently causing the death of another road user. Cited in Transport and 
Distribution Newsletter, 25 March 1998). 
 
Even at the height of the popularity of self-regulation policies in the 1980s its applicability to 
the road transport industry was seriously questioned within the industry itself and specifically 
with regard to Codes of Practice being proposed at the time. In its 1989 report Concerning 
Alert Drivers and Safe Speeds for Heavy Vehicles, STAYSAFE noted: 
 
…a Code of Conduct was proposed to STAYSAFE by the representatives of the Long Distance 
Road Transport Federation, but representatives agreed that the industry needed Government 
help in holding all parties to the behaviour prescribed in the code (STAYSAFE, 1989:23). 
 
In a report published by STAYSAFE the following year Mr H Close, Executive Director of 
Energy Resources for TNT Ltd and Chairman of the Australian Road Transport Federation’s 
Technical Advisory Group was asked whether he thought the industry had done enough by 
self-regulation, to make motorists feel safer. Close’s response was: 
  
No. Self regulation is a joke…I don’t think it started from us, however, I think it started from 
probably the Federal Government when there was concern, however expressed from different 
quarters about truck safety and nobody knew what to do so they said pass the ball, let’s go 
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into self-regulation. What does that mean?…If you find out tell me. I drew up a code of safety 
conduct for ARTF which wasn’t accepted because it was too short, it said “obey the law.”  
(cited in STAYSAFE 16, 1990:26-27). 
  
Drawing this and other evidence together the STAYSAFE report concluded: 
 
STAYSAFE agrees that self regulation, alone, is often not enough to secure appropriate 
behaviour. There is an obvious need for surveillance, incentives or penalties, and government 
administered audit, whenever there are large commercial pressures encouraging transport 
operators to illegally compromise the safety of the public. The operators may be required to 
gather records (such as tachograph reports), but ultimately there has to Government audit to 
ensure the surveillance are remedial action are undertaken properly (STAYSAFE 16, 
1990:27). 
 
Some bodies saw a role both for self-regulation or voluntary accreditation/alternative forms of 
compliance and external regulation, though even here there were differences of opinion about 
the balance struck between to the two. The RTA, for example, argued it was appropriate to 
maintain a mix of regulations on safety issues with some industry-based accreditation 
initiatives such as TruckSafe (written submission RTA, executive summary). As was noted in 
the discussion of enforcement (Section 4 of this Report), to bodies like the ATA and NRTC 
the use alternative compliance regimes and other voluntary or incentive-based measures was 
seen as a key element in ‘smart compliance’. The ATA strongly argued that a combination of 
carefully targeted enforcement along with alternative compliance programs and voluntary 
accreditation bolstered by suitable commercial incentives could and would yield a significant 
improvement in safety performance over time. The same view was expressed by the QTA, 
Livestock Transport Association of NSW and a number of large transport operators although 
some referred to the dilemma that while they believed self-regulation had made progress in 
recent years operators embracing this had not recouped their costs in the face of competition. 
As one operator observed: 
 
The benefits gained by operators who have embraced the new learning of self-regulation has 
fallen short of the competitive needs when measured against those operators who wilfully 
break the law (written submission, large NSW based national transport operator). 
 
Even those (few) organisations that were most critical of the existing regulatory framework, 
and favoured a more voluntarist approach, making fuller use incentives and alternative 
compliance regimes, saw both limits to self-regulation and the need for external regulation. 
For example, Robert Gunning, executive officer with the Livestock Transport Association of 
NSW (oral submission) stated: 
 
We’re certainly strong advocates of maximising self-regulation but we don’t actually believe 
that an industry can successfully self regulate. There’s got to be a public interest role in 
surveying what’s happening in the self-regulatory environment and thinking out strategically 
the problems and making a fix them from a purely public interest point of view. Systems that 
industries recommend for themselves in our view just end up being rorts.   
 
Amongst other industry associations the NSW and Victorian Road Transport Association's 
expressed even less confidence in self-regulation. For its part the Victorian Road Transport 
Association (oral submission) argued that the industry was simply to diverse for self-
regulation to succeed and advocated both operator and enhanced driver licensing: 
 
We've had a look at the British system [of operator licensing] because we don’t believe self-
regulation will work, given the nature of the industry…. Its so diverse, there are so many 
different sectors. Self-regulation just can't touch it. Where do the farmers go? Where does 
landscape gardening fit in…They'd just ignore it. 
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In the course of investigations, a range of parties expressed outright skepticism as to the 
efficacy of voluntary codes of conduct or other forms of self-regulation, especially in the case 
of the transport industry. 
 
I think the evidence is out there that self-regulation is a very big ask in such a competitive 
industry…I would support government regulation with minimum standards (oral submission, 
Associate Professor Phillip Laird, University of Wollongong).  
 
The Transport Workers’ Union expressed no confidence in self-regulation, with the NSW 
Branch (written submission, page 18) stating: 
 
Self-regulation has not and will not work in the transport industry because the economic 
imperative to ignore regulation is too great. 
 
The TWU’s stance may be regarded as not unexpected but what was less predictable was the 
equally strident criticism of a number of other organisations. For example, the Insurance 
Council of Australia (written submission, Dallas Booth, page 2) was emphatic in its view: 
 
We seriously question whether voluntary codes will work in the transport industry. To have 
the best chance of success there needs to be a set of laws/rules/procedures put in place and 
these need to be backed up by a truly effective enforcement regime together with penalties for 
those who break the law which act as a real and measurable deterrent to undesirable 
behaviour on the roads. 
 
An ex-driver, with 25 years experience of driving in Europe, the USA, South Africa, New 
Zealand and Australia before completing university degrees in Commerce (specialising in 
Industry Economics) and Economic Geography, also expressed severe reservations about the 
effectiveness of self regulation in such a competitive industry: 
 
Self-regulation is simply a joke, as the road transport industry is very competitive (too many 
trucks chasing too few goods), so almost every operator ‘cuts the corners’ in order to save a 
‘few bucks’. In relation to the trucking industry the ordinary ‘laws’ of economics do not 
apply: when demand for services drop, supply of those services actually increase, instead of 
decreasing, as the desparate truck owner-drivers have to carry more and more goods in order 
to earn the same amount of money on the depressed market (they need minimal amount of 
money to pay fixed costs, such as taxes, registration fees, scheduled maintenance etc). The 
truck owner-drivers have simply to work (ie travel) more, in order to earn the same amount of 
money on the depressed market where prices for their services drop. Thus this market is 
virtually never in equilibrium, so the ‘orthodox’ economic theory is simply useless, and all 
models based on the assumption that the market eventually reaches equilibrium are simply 
misleading ….   The long haul trucking industry should be highly regulated…regulation 
should include shorter working hours for all drivers and mandatory two drivers per every 
long-distance truck (written submission, Victorian-based ex driver). 
 
Widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of self-regulation was matched by calls for 
more interventionist external regulation. 
 
I do not believe that the industry is able to regulate itself, as it has many cultural barriers 
which would not support the concept of self-regulation. I believe the industry needs 
enforcement from an external body. This enforcement must be effective in that it must be 
applied uniformly and have penalties which are real and ultimately result in repeat offenders 
being removed from the industry (written submission, person involved in interstate bulk 
haulage of agricultural product between Queensland and Victoria). 
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Industry self control will not work so there needs to be the controlling hand of law 
enforcement (written submission, woman who had worked in roadhouses and had later 
undertaken research on the trucking industry in Western Australia). 
 
What was interesting to the Inquiry was the number of owner/drivers advocating regulatory 
intervention. Notoriously hostile to regulation of any form in the past, a number stated that 
they had been driven to revise their views by the dire straits they now faced and the abject 
failure of earlier attempts at collective action (such as the Razorback blockades of 1979) and 
voluntary agreements.  Not one owner/driver the Inquiry spoke to believed a voluntary code, 
such as that recently discussed federally, had any chance of working (and this included 
owner/drivers engaged in negotiations with the federal Minister for Transport). Most were 
scathing of the whole concept of a voluntary code given the fractured and competitive nature 
of the industry. One owner/driver (oral submission, owner/driver, NSW) explained why 
previous efforts had failed and his belief that a regulatory solution was essential: 
 
The other biggest problem is with so many individuals [owner/drivers], that with so many 
different ideas, they won't stick together. We believe if we can get a legislated minimum rate 
standard that you can still operate your vehicles safely, working legal hours, and meeting all 
that criteria, we can't see that its such a great problem for the government. What is safety 
worth to them? 
 
The partner of an owner/driver who represented owner/drivers on the ATA and had no 
involvement in the owner/driver protests/code push made (oral submission) an essentially 
similar point.  
 
…I really don’t think [it] will work in the industry because even if you get the major players 
in the supply chain to sign up to this, part of the problem in the industry is the minor players 
that will never ever play to the game if it’s a voluntary code of conduct 
 
The choice between self-regulation and external regulation does not devolve to simply which 
is more popular amongst the various stakeholders. Nor is the choice necessarily as simple as 
sometimes portrayed. In this industry, there is a diversity of views as to what constitutes self-
regulation, though virtually every party making submissions to the Inquiry saw external 
regulation as continuing to play a significant role. Many also expressed some measure of 
support for some level of more voluntary measures, though here opinion was far more 
divided. What can be said is that, amongst a very wide range of parties there are serious 
misgivings about whether modes of compliance that depend heavily on a voluntary 
commitment on the part of the responsible parties, is feasible in this industry, given its 
structure, competitiveness and other characteristics. After weighing up the evidence the 
Inquiry shares these concerns. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Proposals for the introduction of Codes of Practice to address safety issues in the long 
distance road transport (including the respective responsibilities of employers/principal 
contractors, drivers and subcontractors) have been around for well over a decade in New 
South Wales (see for example STAYSAFE 1989:29). Even at that time, persons with 
considerable knowledge of the industry expressed severe doubts as to whether these Codes 
could be effective without regulatory intervention by Government to ensure compliance. 
While a number of submissions to this Inquiry argued for a voluntary or collaborative 
approach this was a minority viewpoint. A collaborative/high trust approach might work in an 
industry with relatively few and large operators and where there is the ability to restrict access 
to new players unless they demonstrate they can meet the new standards. This is arguably the 
situation in the rail freight sector but it is certainly not the situation with regard to road freight 
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where there are numerous operators, virtually no formal barriers (apart from a truck license or 
licensed driver) to new entrants, and a high turnover of businesses. The Inquiry repeatedly 
asked both those advocating the use of voluntary codes and others for suggestions as to 
methods for ensuring this approach would achieve sufficient coverage to have a meaningful 
impact on industry practices. A number of incentive schemes were suggested, but has been 
noted these have limitations. It needs to be noted that attempts at self-regulation in the 
industry now stretch back well over ten years and a dispassionate assessment would have to 
be that, while some measures may have influenced some operators, they have not wrought the 
fundamental shift in industry performance that is required. Overall, it is the strongly held view 
of this Inquiry that neither self-regulation nor voluntary Codes, however defined, are likely to 
have more than marginal effects in such a competitive and atomistic industry. As previous 
history more than amply demonstrates – for a substantial number of operators the 
incentive/pressures to evade them is simply too great.  
 
5.4 Accreditation or Licensing of Operators and Drivers in Long Distance Trucking 
 
One issue that highlighted the debate over the most appropriate form of regulation was the 
accreditation or licensing of both operators and drivers. At present, drivers require an 
appropriate truck license, obtained either after a test conducted by the RTA or after 
undertaking a competency-based course. The Inquiry heard evidence that this license alone 
was not sufficient to operate safely and further driver education and progressive accreditation 
would enhance safety and would also attract higher quality drivers to the industry. For their 
part, transport operators at present require no license to operate (apart from a driver’s license 
if they are an owner/driver). Again, a wide range of parties presenting evidence to the Inquiry 
either proposed or favoured/endorsed some form of operator accreditation. In both areas, but 
especially in relation to operators, there was debate as to whether this accreditation should be 
mandatory (effectively amounting to a form of licensing) or whether it should be voluntary 
with various forms of inducement to encourage a ‘take up’. 
 
It should be noted that (with the exception of buses and taxis) the road transport industry is in 
a unique position of being the only mode of mass transport in Australia that is exempt from 
any form of operator licensing even in the long distance category. Those operators whose 
business involves moving either people or goods by air, by water/sea or by rail all require an 
operating license that includes stringent safety provisions. It is hard to see a logical reason for 
this exemption in terms of size or safety record. Indeed logic suggests the reverse should 
apply since road moves far more freight than rail or air and entails a far greater level of risks 
to its own workers (truck drivers) and members of the public (pedestrians, bystanders and 
other road users). Nor is the notion of operator licensing unknown in road transport overseas. 
Indeed, two countries with which Australia policy makers often draw comparisons (New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom) both have mandatory operator licensing in the road 
transport industry. 
 
Not surprisingly, rail freight operators and their representatives were emphatic in their view 
on this issue, arguing in the strongest terms that is was unacceptable that road freight 
operators should gain a competitive advantage via having to meet far lower safety standards. 
All operators must be certified to nationally recognised standards (refer to AS 4292) and are 
subject to re-certification every two years, including refresher training (written submission, 
National Rail Corporation, page 5). In its submission FreightCorp noted that the NSW rail 
industry was regulated by the Rail Safety Act 1993, with the Department of Transport setting 
objectives that operators had to meet through internal safety management systems, including 
implementation, auditing and policing of safety programs (including incident reporting). The 
safety regime also included re-certification and re-accreditation of field operators, including 
train crews, every two years. It noted that unlike truck drivers, train drivers underwent 
periodic re-testing and extensive medical check-ups, must learn the characteristics of each 
track before they were authorised to drive on it, and the checking and response to speeding 
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(using running times and data loggers) was far more rigorous. The same can be said in 
relation to drug use, where rail freight operators maintain detailed and comprehensive 
monitoring/testing, counselling and remedial schemes – in stark contrast to the dominant 
practices found in road transport. Further, as was noted earlier, both FreightCorp and National 
Rail utilise shiftwork and workload regimes beyond what is required by government 
regulations and arguably far more advanced and stringent than the most progressive elements 
in the road transport industry. This included transport/return to depot arrangements (including 
crew exchanges) and where this was not possible the provision of quality accommodation. It 
should be stressed that rail freight bodies were not seeking a diminution of the safety 
standards they were required to meet. Rather, they strongly urged that road freight should be 
regulated in a similar way and to a similar level as they were. 
  
The present absence of any form of operator licensing or accreditation was linked to specific 
problems in the industry. For example, as was noted in an earlier section, the submission of 
the Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police Service argued that an effective prevention 
strategy on drug use required addressing issues such as ease of entry into the industry without 
any form of training or business skills. 
 
Some bodies making submissions to the Inquiry believed the objectives of operator licensing 
could be better achieved by other methods. For its part, the NRTC argued that its chain of 
responsibility regulatory approach was designed to achieve the same ends as operator 
licensing and would cover more parties, although readily conceding without prompting that 
this was still to be tested (oral submission, Barry Moore). The Inquiry would also observe in 
passing that chain of responsibility would represent at best a reactive approach to the problem 
of those entering the industry without business skills and indebted. The NRTC pointed out 
that in order to recommend a mandatory system such as operator licensing they would have to 
convince the Office of Regulation Review:  
 
…through a fairly hard-edged cost/benefit analysis that you could have reasonable 
expectations of safety benefits which would justify the costs imposed by those sorts of 
measures. We’ve never even tried to do those numbers and I don’t know how you’d go…(oral 
submission, Barry Moore, NRTC). 
 
This observation is an interesting one in several respects. 
  
Others, such as number of medium to large operators, argued for a continued emphasis on 
voluntary forms of accreditation bolstered by insurance premium discounts and other 
incentives. 
 
The notion of mandatory operator licensing has been vigorously opposed by some 
organisations, including the Australian Trucking Association (ATA).  
 
The ATA is strongly against any form of prescriptive licensing, believing that a performance 
based approach will be much more effective (written submission ATA, page 6). 
 
Robert Gunning, Executive Officer with the Livestock Transport Association of NSW (oral 
submission) also expressed opposition to operator licensing, pointing to the economic 
inefficiency of the US trucking industry when it was highly regulated according to 
region/distance and type of freight. The association was also very conscious of its role as part 
of an export industry. 
 
Some other industry associations did not share this view, with the Victorian Road Transport 
Association (written submission) endorsing entry standards for both operators and drivers, 
and highlighting the example of the UK that has an operator-licensing scheme: 
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It is interesting to compare with the UK where a company must establish its bonafides at a 
specific level prior to entry into the industry. Likewise drivers must establish competency in 
all areas relating to the freight task prior to be [sic] licensed and be subject to annual audits. 
 
The notion of operator licensing, perhaps surprisingly, found support amongst some 
owner/drivers and small fleet operators although a number stressed the number of licenses 
should not be limited as is the case with the taxi industry. 
 
If I want to go from an electricians license, which is like a truck driver license, to a 
contractor’s licence now, I have to actually have to go and do business management skills, 
then I have put insurance in place to cover people for work and what I do. So its licensing the 
industry but its not restrictive licensing which a lot of people in the industry are afraid of 
(oral submission, small fleet operator (10 trucks), Northern NSW).  
 
Not enough owner/drivers or fleet operators responded to this issue for the Inquiry to suggest 
that the majority would favour licensing. However, the Inquiry was surprised at the number of 
even small operators and owner/drivers who believed the parlous situation in the industry now 
required some form of entry standard so long as it was not used to limit the number that could 
achieve this standard. At the very least, it cannot be presumed that operators would 
vehemently oppose a licensing system. Further, without a quota on the number of licenses it is 
reasonable to presume the industry would remain highly competitive (as the experience in 
other countries amply demonstrates, see below). 
 
The Transport Workers Union also favoured the introduction of operator licensing. It 
somewhat surprisingly received support from a number of owner/drivers making submissions 
to the Inquiry even though it would directly impact on them most. 
 
As noted in an earlier section of this Report, the need to enforce some minimum standards for 
operators has been accepted and indeed recommended by a number of previous inquiries into 
the industry. Indeed, it was a central recommendation of two inquiries into the road freight 
industry. In 1980 an inquiry into the NSW road freight industry (McDonnell, 1980) 
recommended the introduction of operator licensing administered by a body to be known as 
the NSW Hauliers Licensing Tribunal. This recommendation flowed from McDonnell’s 
observations of problems faced by owner/drivers culminating in the Razorback blockades of 
1979. In 1984 the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et al, 1984) also proposed an 
operator licensing system to make transport operators more accountable for the ways their 
trucks were driven. The federal legislation to achieve this was passed but never implemented 
(it would have only covered interstate operators not all long haul operators so required 
complementary state legislation). The reasons for this are unclear though according to one 
source (oral submission, Robert Hogan, federal Department of Transport and Regional 
Services) it appears there was 'no great enthusiasm' for the scheme amongst the States or 
industry. The November 1987 ATAC, forerunner to the Australian Transportation Council of 
all transport ministers, decided to look at some form of self-regulation or voluntary 
accreditation in preference to operator licensing. Whether industry should have had a say, 
given the findings of the McDonnell and May reports and subsequent the serious deterioration 
in trucking safety that followed in late the 1980s, is a moot point. However, in the wake of 
Cowper and Clybucca smashes of 1989, NSW did respond by introducing a 
licensing/accreditation system covering buses (along with tachographs on trucks – a move 
resisted federally in favour of the option of speed limiters). 
  
Bodies currently opposed to operator licensing generally gave the reason that it did not work, 
voluntary performance-based measures were superior or that licensing would become a means 
of raising revenue. The argument that licensing did not work was not shared by others 
including the Victorian Road Transport Association which had examined the British system 
and noted: 
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In England if you want to open a transport company you have to make application to a 
committee. You have to prove that your financially able, that you've got the management 
skills, that you've got appropriate maintenance standards… Now we are now talking to waste 
industry in Victoria for exactly that reason…they are concerned about rogues getting into the 
industry. Now the English system the carters' license as it is called is a very high profile 
…document, they are audited every year, they have stickers on their trucks and if they speed, 
if they overload or if they go outside the driving hours they get demerit points, and they can 
actually lose their carters' license (oral submission, Peter Robinson).  
 
One of the association's representatives to the Inquiry had worked for a major transport 
operator with strong links to the UK and said his association with UK-based managers 
confirmed that the system did work. The Association also pointed to the dramatic turnaround 
in the Victorian taxi industry, which followed the decision of the Kennett Liberal government 
(perhaps ironic given its reputation for deregulation) to reject moves to deregulate the 
industry proposed under the previous Kirner Labor government and adopt a far more 
regulatory approach.  
 
Nor was the view that licensing didn’t work shared by operational police the Inquiry spoke to. 
One experienced police officer (oral submission) saw the experience with bus licensing in 
NSW as both successful and instructive when compared to long haul freight trucks. 
 
I look at the tourist coach accreditation. When it came in it was a bit a big stick. It was 
enforced on the industry after those horrific crashes up the north coast… The company had to 
be accredited, drivers had to be accredited…Quite strict guidelines were introduced and that 
was enforced by the NSW Department of Transport who had quite substantial legislative 
powers to conduct audits and whatever. We supplied them with information for tourist 
coaches we detected speeding… It's made a hell of a difference. I look at the amount of tourist 
coaches we stop and check their logbooks as much as everyone else and check them for 
speeding…and the amount of non compliance is minimal. The difference - I saw what it was 
was like years ago, it was open slather, the same category as trucks doing 120, 130, obviously 
substance abuse but now its just a complete turn around. The amount of tourist coaches you 
detect speeding on the open highway is virtually nil. I thought the thing there was that there 
was accreditation system brought in and audited by a government external body and that 
body had quite substantial powers. I believe a lot of companies went under but I sort of look 
at what's happening now. 
 
When asked about the UK operator licensing system opponents of suggested that the UK 
transport industry was very different to Australia and the scheme had not worked. While there 
are some obvious differences in terms of distances travelled (though note these trucks travel 
all over the European Union), road type etc there are also some important similarities. For 
example, in terms of industry structure, like its Australian counterpart the British industry 
includes a large number of small companies and self-employed drivers (90% of fleets have 
fewer than five trucks and 50% have one truck) and a very small number of large operators. 
Like Australia, the standard workhorse of the industry is a 38-40 tonne articulated lorry. Like 
Australia, heavy vehicles make a disproportionate contribution to the overall road toll 
(although the toll is low by Australian standards), accounting for 7% vehicle kilometers 
travelled but 15% of all road fatalities. As in Australia, there has been debate about the 
sustainability of freight rates and serious concern that ease of entry into the industry and a 
consequent over-supply of operators has compromised safety. As the National Road Freight 
Industry Inquiry (May et al, 1984) argued for Australia, operator licensing was introduced in 
an effort to address these issues. As a recent inquiry conducted by the Environment, Transport 
and Regional Affairs Committee (2000:xiv) of the House of Commons observed: 
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The Traffic Commissioner issue operator licences ('O-licences') to individuals and companies 
who wish to operate goods licences which weigh over 3.5 tonnes. Their objective is to ensure 
the safe use of goods vehicles and fair competition between operators, and before issuing a 
licence a Commissioner must be satisfied that the applicant is fit to hold it, has a suitable 
depot with proper maintenance facilities and sufficient finance to keep their vehicles 
roadworthy. The decisions of the Traffic Commissioners are in part based on European 
Union legislation relating to the good repute of operators, their financial standing and their 
professional competence, which requires, for example, that operators or their transport 
managers must pass a Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC). The Government has 
also aligned regulations governing the construction and use of lorries with relevant European 
Directorates, and thus the brakes, suspension, dimensions, and so on are controlled.  
 
Unlike submissions opposing operator licensing made to this Inquiry, the Environment, 
Transport and Regional Affairs Committee did not find operator licensing had proved 
ineffective. Indeed, the tenor of debate was that the licensing system should be made more 
stringent. The Committee (2000:xvi-xvii) accepted evidence from industry and other 
witnesses that deregulation had made the industry too easy to join, creating an oversupply of 
operators that depressed haulage rates and compromised safety. It found that the profitability 
and viability of road haulage companies had been undermined by the longstanding problem of 
very low haulage rates. Rates had been kept low by a combination of entry into the industry 
being too easy, competition from other European operators, and some companies within the 
industry routinely ignoring regulations in order to gain a competitive advantage. The 
Committee believed it was essential for hauliers to be able to pass on their true costs to their 
customers, and ultimately to the consumer. The Committee (2000:xxii) resolved to make 
licensing entry conditions more stringent: 
 
We therefore recommend that the financial conditions which we must before hauliers are 
granted an O-licence be increased substantially to ensure that new entrants to the industry 
are not financially unviable companies able consistently to undercut existing operators. It 
is important nonetheless that barriers to entry to the industry should not unduly deter small 
operators in favour of larger companies. The road haulage industry must remain a fully 
open and competitive one. 
 
At the time, a person seeking an O-licence needed to show they had access to approximately 
3,600 pounds (or 80% of the amount deemed necessary under EU Directive 98/76/EC to 
obtain an International Licence) whereas the Committee heard evidence that an amount of 
20,000 pounds was more appropriate.  
 
Operator licensing is by no means confined to the United Kingdom but has been long adopted 
by a number of other countries. Operator licensing was also implemented in New Zealand 
under the Transport Services Licensing Act, 1989. The New Zealand scheme requires good 
service holders to have a certificate of knowledge of law and practice of how to run a safe and 
proper operation. The legislation provides a mechanism to remove (from road operations or 
freight forwarding) operators who put safety at risk. A written submission from Associate 
Professor Philip Laird of Wollongong University argued that the New Zealand system was a 
good one in principle but had not been effective due to a lack of enforcement as highlighted in 
the 1996 House of Representatives inquiry into truck smashes (Storey, 1996). One outcome of 
the report was an investigation of the ‘fit proper person test’ undertaken by the New Zealand 
Office of the Controller and Auditor General (1996). The Office found that with the exception 
of one region (Hamilton) little action had been taken to review the ‘fit and proper’ status of 
operators. It was noted that one region had recently adopted an approach of based on 
discussions with police to identify problem operators, examining their conviction history, 
establishing the number of trucks they used and distances travelled, and obtaining information 
from truck testing stations. However, in another region there was little contact between Land 
Transport Safety Authority (LTSA) compliance staff and police, with one small operator (six 
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trucks) having accumulated 139 offences since 1985. While the LTSA had considered the 
level of offending by this operator in 1992 no action had been taken subsequently to review 
whether the operator was still ‘fit and proper’ in terms of the Act (New Zealand Office of the 
Controller and Auditor General 1996:23). The report also identified an emerging problem of 
unlicensed operators, openly flouting the system. One such operator had incurred literally 
dozens of traffic and truck safety offences as well as fines from the LTSA for carrying out an 
unlicensed service (the operator defied a court order to surrender their trucks. New Zealand 
Office of the Controller and Auditor General 1996:23-24).   The report urged that the LTSA 
should revise measures with regard to the determination of ‘fit and proper’ operator and 
propose an amendment of the Transport Services Licensing Act to enable it to compel the 
surrender of vehicles by unlicensed operators. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1996 parliamentary report there was crackdown of sorts on truck 
operators with 21 having their licenses cancelled over the next three years for offences such 
as faulty brakes, damaged steering and overweight loads (Pickmere, 2000). However, whether 
such a small number of cancellations would have a serious deterrent effect is debatable. The 
LTSA is also responsible for operator licensing in relation to rail freight, and a recent inquiry 
into Tranz Rail following a number of serious incidents, again identified problems in relation 
to enforcement (New Zealand, 2000). Like Associate Professor Laird, this Inquiry formed the 
view that the New Zealand scheme had failed largely due to a lack of effective enforcement 
(at least partly due to under-resourcing of the LTSA).  Lack of enforcement, including the 
failure to exclude unfit operators, is a serious problem.  However, it does not indicate that the 
licensing system itself is flawed so long as it is vigorously enforced and the sanctions for non-
compliance are sufficient to act as a real deterrent to flouting the system. 
 
The exclusion of ‘unfit’ operators for failing to meet certain standards is a more reactive and 
often resource-costly process than excluding operators from a license at the application stage, 
both are essential and there are clear signs that the need for these processes is being 
increasingly recognised in other countries. 
 
In the USA the Department of Transport recently introduced a major change to fitness 
procedures under Federal Motor Carrier Safety regulations will require all “unfit” motor 
carriers to improve or cease operating their trucks and buses in interstate commerce. The new 
rule promulgated under the Transportation Equity Act and taking effect on 20 November 
2000 significantly expanded the coverage of shutdown procedures to all motor carriers  (the 
previous rule only covered passenger and hazardous material [HAZMAT] carriers with 
unsatisfactory ratings). Under the rule, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FCMSA) will deem an unsatisfactory safety rating as a determination that a carrier is unfit. 
Investigators assign safety ratings as a result of compliance and on-the-road performance 
reviews. Following a FMCSA determination of unfitness, motor carriers have 60 days to 
improve safety or cease operations apart from passenger and HAZMAT carriers where the 
pre-existing 45-day time limit applies. The FMCSA may extend the compliance period by 60 
days but only if the carrier is making a ‘good faith’ effort to improve its safety fitness. 
 
It is the view of this Inquiry that voluntary systems of accreditation have failed to 
deliver the promise of raising the safety performance level of a substantial number of 
operators in the long haul road transport industry. At present, the operators in the road 
freight industry can, unlike operators in rail freight and other modes, undertake their 
business without a operating license and without a formal review of whether they meet 
minimum standards. Like the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May, 1984) this 
Inquiry believes a licensing system for the industry is essential if safety issues are to be 
effectively addressed. This would set minimum standards and the administering body 
should have sufficient resources and powers to ensure the system is vigorously enforced. 
As noted elsewhere in this Report, the RTA has already exercised a power for 
suspending the operating privileges of both NSW and interstate-based transport 
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companies on NSW roads.  Thus far, this power has only been used against the most 
recalcitrant operators. The Inquiry believes a licensing system with appropriate 
measures for suspending or cancelling licenses would provide an effective mechanism 
for ensuring all operators reach a base level of safety performance. Such a system places 
a strong commercial pressure for compliance (as recognised by May et al) and as such 
would address the cause of unsafe practices – a key weakness in many existing 
regulatory devices. This system should apply to freight forwarders, consignors and other 
key players in the transport chain as well as operators.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
It is essential that the form of regulation used should, as far as possible, be informed by an 
understanding of the root causes of safety breaches/hazardous practices. Regulatory remedies 
that fail to recognise or directly address the root causes of hazardous practices are likely to 
prove largely ineffective if not a complete failure. As the previous two sections (4 and 5) of 
this Report have shown, there are serious limitations with existing regulatory arrangements 
and their enforcement in terms of addressing the commercial practices and industry structure 
that are a major underlying cause of excessive hours, speeding, drug use and other safety 
problems. Many submissions stressed this point, and a number of submissions suggested 
specific solutions. 
 
For example, the Insurance Council of Australia stressed the need for regulations to ensure 
load owners/clients, consignors, freight forwarders and transport companies took 
responsibility for their actions when they set or demanded (in the case of customers) 
unrealistic deadlines or consignment arrangements that clearly breached speed limits etc. The 
Council argued that liability should not only extend through the entire supply chain but that 
individual parties, such as Directors, managers and consigning agents be held personally 
liable for their decisions. In order to achieve this it suggested that the consignment form 
should have a section dedicated to the trip time allowed, the distance to be travelled, the 
average speed expected and rest periods allowed. The Council also urged that fines and 
penalties must be set at a level that would have real deterrence value, with a similar level and 
array of penalties applying to clients/customers as those imposed on consigning and transport 
companies (written submission, Dallas Booth, page 5). The Council also believed that, 
irrespective of practical and philosophical objections, the issue of low freight rates must be 
confronted directly because it was a major reason for excessive hours at the wheel and 
speeding as owner/drivers strove to make a living: 
 
We realise that a minimum freight rate is contrary to competition principles, but mechanisms 
must be found to ensure the commercial viability of the transport industry if the safety and 
other standards are to be achieved and road safety is to be improved. Because it is a national 
industry the setting of freight rates has to become a national issue otherwise it will not work 
(written submission, Dallas Booth, page 6). 
 
The Inquiry finds considerable merit in a number of these recommendations, including the 
notion of a trip-based document specifying basic safety-related issues that are related to the 
commercial practices identified as dangerous in Section 3.  
 
Many submissions stressed the need for increasing the awareness of safety issues for all those 
parties involved in the freight task (see for example the Victorian Road Transport 
Association). Again, the Inquiry finds considerable merit in this suggestion, although it would 
note that, some ignorance on the part of customers appears to be calculated, and clear 
regulatory requirements backed by even a relatively small number of serious prosecutions will 
also have a valuable educative effect. Efforts aimed to improve safety in the industry must 
recognise the influence load owners, consignors and receivers exert in relation to freight rates, 
scheduling and waiting periods spent waiting to load or unload. Thus far, none of the 
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collaborative/self-regulatory compliance regimes or voluntary codes address this dimension 
although, as noted above, the Inquiry understands the ATA has recently held discussions with 
the ARA on mutually agreed principles. While by no means opposed to these measures, the 
Inquiry is yet to be convinced that these will achieve a substantial change in industry practice. 
 
Another possibility worthy of consideration was the suggestion by NatRoad CEO David 
Anderson (oral submission) that the combined effect of the shakeout of trucking operators 
caused by the introduction of the GST, the need to apply for fuel grants and increasing 
commercial 'bite' of accreditation would reshape the industry. In particular, he believed it 
would make entry to the industry more difficult and thereby reduce the funnel effect that 
depressed freight rates and punished legitimate operators. The Inquiry gave this argument 
careful thought. It concluded that, on balance, while an industry shakeout was probable, the 
projected outcome was unlikely (at least at the level suggested) for several reasons. First, 
while the introduction of the GST into New Zealand caused a major shakeout in the trucking 
industry, recent evidence indicates it has not eliminated the sorts of practices that compromise 
safety. Second, the Inquiry received numerous submissions that finance companies were still 
readily lending money to potential operators to purchase trucks, placing more reliance on 
'bricks and mortar' security than business plans. Third, the industry has been through periodic 
shakeouts before without this leading to any fundamental or long-term solution. The GST and 
fuel rebate may be new but it is not clear they are of sufficient influence to reshape the 
industry as suggested. Fourth, no matter how business 'savvy' a small operator is, they 
generally have little real bargaining power in relation to their clients and occupy a very 
dependent position if they are part of a subcontracting network, involving a large transport 
company. 
 
Overall, there is overwhelming agreement that there is an urgent need to set a higher 
performance standard for both operators and drivers than present regulations require, although 
there is disagreement over whether this should be achieved by voluntarily accreditation 
programs (perhaps with incentives) or should be mandated. After carefully weighing the 
evidence this Inquiry has come to the firm view that only a mandatory system will have the 
desired effect of setting a baseline of acceptable competencies. 
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SECTION 6  
 
CO-ORDINATION AND RESOURCING OF REGULATORY BODIES 
 
Another key brief for the inquiry was to investigate whether current regulatory bodies with 
responsibility for the industry are properly coordinated with each other and sufficiently 
resourced. 
 
6.1 Coordination 
 
The coordination of regulation affecting safety in the long distance road transport industry can 
be seen to operate at two distinct though overlapping levels.  
 
First, there is the coordination that occurs between regulators in New South Wales and other 
jurisdictions. The federal government can and has played an increasingly prominent role in 
terms of facilitating interstate co-ordination of the long distance trucking industry (through 
things such as national licensing and registration systems). However, there are other avenues 
of co-ordination between New South Wales and other jurisdictions on an agency specific 
basis such as contact between the various WorkCover agencies and also links between senior 
management of the Motor Accidents Authority and its equivalent body in Victoria and 
Queensland for instance. 
 
Second, there is the issue of the coordination that occurs amongst different agencies within 
New South Wales who have a direct responsibility for trucking safety (most obviously the 
RTA, the NSW Police, WorkCover) or whose responsibilities impinge on this such as the 
EPA.  
 
6.1.1 National Coordination 
 
Given the growing national framework for regulating road transport, it is impossible to 
consider the coordination and effectiveness of state agencies without some reference to 
national coordination. At the national level the federal government has undertaken a series of 
initiatives to promote a coordinated approach to the long distance trucking industry since the 
1980s. A number of submissions to this Inquiry stressed the benefits of a national approach to 
regulation given the interstate nature of the industry. The ARA, for example, urged that 
initiatives arising from this Inquiry should be consistent with and complement developments 
at the national level (written submission ARA p8). Others pointed to ongoing problems and 
the need to accelerate national consistency: 
 
There are communication problems that exist in the various states in relation to rules and 
regulations, as there is no National approach. There is currently confusion in regard to the 
Transitional Fatigue Management Scheme and other fatigue management programs, like the 
pilot operating Queensland (written submission, Queensland-based transport operator). 
 
It is fair to say that some of the federal initiatives since the 1980s have been welcomed across 
the board. However, it is also true that there has been a degree of controversy as to whether 
other reforms have really advanced the cause of safety or have weakened the situation in 
NSW which historically has maintained a more rigorously enforced road safety regime. In a 
number of instances it has even been suggested that reforms were driven more by a concern to 
favour the economic interests of the industry rather than safety. 
 
For example, the Coroner’s report on the Cowper incident severely questioned federal moves 
that resulted in the lifting NSW speed limit on heavy vehicles from 80 kph to 90kph in 1987 
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and to 100 kph in 1988. The Coroner argued the latter increase was done by the Australian 
Transport Advisory Council (ATAC) acting on a 1985 report of the Federal Office of Road 
Safety (FORS) without an accompanying road safety program and with the justification that 
higher combined speeds in collisions would not alter survival outcomes. The Coroner also 
queried FORS use of a 1974 USA report that argued a differential speed between cars and 
trucks encouraged overtaking and head-on collisions. He argued this failed to consider very 
different US roads (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:12). An experienced police witness 
proposed an entirely antithetical view that overtaking was actually easier for cars when trucks 
were kept to the lower speed although this argument assumes car drivers are not encouraged 
to overtake in dangerous places by having to slow behind a truck. The Coroner described the 
outcome of the increased limit as disastrous, with a 31% increase in heavy vehicle-related 
fatalities on NSW roads in the first 18 months after its introduction in July 1988, and pointing 
to a similar trend in Western Australia if not elsewhere (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:8).  
The Coroner then pointed to a corresponding drop in the fatality rate involving articulated 
vehicles when the speed limit was dropped following the Clybucca coach smash (where 35 
died). 
 
The Coroner openly questioned the need or desirability of uniform traffic laws pointing to 
evidence that NSW was not only the most populous state with the busiest roads but had a 
disproportionately high number road accidents (including fatalities) which warranted a more 
vigorous regime to discipline drivers. He also pointed to RTA evidence that between 1987 
and 1988 the proportion of heavy vehicles exceeding 110kph increased from 14% to 22% in 
NSW compared to an increase from 6% to 9% across the rest of Australia (Coroners Court of 
NSW, 1990:13). Finally, in addressing claims that inconsistent speed laws were inconvenient 
the Coroner asserted: 
 
As an unabashed Federalist, I do not agree with the slogans. If the road and traffic conditions 
vary substantially from one State to another, I can see nothing wrong with the State passing 
its own laws to meet those varying conditions. As I pointed out during the hearing, it was 
NSW which had the huge increases in fatalities when the speed limit went to 100 k/h, and it 
was NSW which in 1989 experienced the two greatest road catastrophes in Australian history. 
The fact that NSW imposes its own and different laws to regulate traffic and reduce the road 
slaughter seems to me to be a most proper and appropriate approach to those NSW problems 
(Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:12). 
 
The Coroner also raised some concerns as to the role of the Australian Transport Advisory 
Council in relation to driving hours and several other issues, which he believed smacked of 
being too ready to serve the economic interests of the trucking industry: 
 
A matter of some consternation in myself as an ordinary car driver was the revelation that the 
ATAC had actually recommended that the daily time permitted for semi trailer drivers be 
increased to 15 hours. With the greatest of respect, this decision seemed consonant with other 
determinations of this august body, and which seem aimed at pleasing the trucking industry 
(others being increases in truck sizes and speeds) rather than concentrating on road safety. 
One can imagine that if any employer demanded of his workforce that they work 15 hours per 
day, in any field, the result would be uproar (Coroners Court of NSW, 1990:31). 
 
At the same time, it should be noted that the Coroner still believed a collaborative 
federal/state approach was vital in relation to other areas such as roadways and licensing 
(Coroners Court of NSW 1990:59). He reported that amongst parties giving evidence to the 
inquiry there was near unanimous support for a national licensing system with medical 
checkups and driver training. This was in response to, amongst other things, the practice of 
drivers holding multiple licenses from different jurisdictions and using this to evade loss of 
license under the cumulative penalty points system pertaining to traffic offences. A national 
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driver licensing system was introduced but without the regular medical checkups required by 
the Department of Transport in the USA. 
 
6.1.1.1 The Role/Impact of the National Road Transport Commission 
 
In 1991 an Intergovernmental Agreement on Heavy Vehicles involving the federal 
government and all states and territories led to the creation of the National Road Transport 
Commission (NRTC) to develop nationally uniform regulation of road transport. In terms of 
this uniform approach the NRTC’s goals were to improve transport efficiency/reduce 
administrative costs and to enhance both environmental and road safety in relation to heavy 
vehicles (ie greater than 4.5 tonnes gross vehicle mass or GVM). Under the Heavy Vehicles 
Agreement, the NRTC is responsible for heavy vehicle charges; regulations relating to the 
design, manufacture and operation of heavy vehicles; vehicle registration and driver licensing 
(written submission, NRTC). As part of this, the NRTC consults with industry associations, 
community groups and regulatory agencies on national reform proposals. The NRTC reports 
to the Australian Transport Council, representing all federal, state and territory Transport 
Ministers who have the power to approve proposed reforms. Once approved, reforms are 
implemented by individual regulatory agencies with the NRTC undertaking a monitoring role. 
At the time of the Inquiry the NRTC (which is based in Melbourne) had a staff of 23 and 
budget of $3.5 million funded by federal, state and territory governments.  
 
There can be no doubt that the NRTC has achieved a historically unparalleled level of 
national co-ordination of regulation in the long haul road freight industry. Prior to this there 
had been a series of attempts at national co-ordination since the 1940s, with the most 
substantial body being the Interstate Commission established in the 1970s (before being 
ultimately absorbed into the Industry Commission -later re-badged as the Productivity 
Commission). The achievements of these earlier efforts (though note the Interstate 
Commission’s recommendations on operator licensing) have been over-shadowed by the 
NRTC. With regard to some areas at least, such as the movement of dangerous goods, 
implementation has been largely achieved and the beneficial results are widely accepted by 
state regulators, operators and others. In other areas, such as road rules, there has been 
substantial implementation of a national framework by the jurisdictions, with considerable 
agreement mixed with some misgivings on the part of individual regulatory agencies. In yet 
other areas, most notably mass limit increases, have been subject to more debate amongst 
jurisdictions due to the infrastructure implications of ensuring bridges can meet the new loads 
etc (oral submission, Barry Moore, NRTC). Overall, prior to the NRTC, national co-
ordination of road freight regulation was a vexed issue to say the least and the difficult task 
the Commission has faced should not be under-estimated. 
 
A number of submissions referred positively to the role of the NRTC in furthering co-
ordination of safety developments in the road transport industry, citing examples including 
the FMP which has brought greater involvement of OHS experts in the industry (oral 
submission, Robert Hogan, federal Department of Transport and Regional Services). The 
ATA also strongly endorsed the NRTC's success in working towards a more consistent 
national regulatory framework (oral submission, Mike Edmonds, ATA). The ATA argued that 
this national approach would have achieved even more had there been greater contact and 
collaboration between the regulatory agencies of various states: 
 
Regulation is a big issue and getting a nationally consistent regulatory environment is a real 
problem the industry's faced for a long time. We have gone a way forward with the NRTC but 
there are still walls in the road between the states. We need that flow a lot better. Some of the 
other legislation, areas like the three strikes and your out and the speeding legislation, it's 
there and it just doesn’t focus on the driver, it focuses on the owner and the operator as well, 
which we believe is the key. But unfortunately we also believe that the states don’t talk to each 
other in a regulatory sense and therefore this whole legislation is actually falling down in 
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some ways… Chain of responsibility legislation is another regulation that has been put in, 
enacted through the states…Now this is the clincher, this is the one that can help solve a lot of 
problems but it’s a toothless tiger at this stage. It actually brings accountability right through 
the supply chain, through the driver, operator, middle manager, customer, consignor of 
freight…we believe it is an answer but unfortunately its not being used and really these things 
need to be recognised and pushed (oral submission, Mike Edmonds ATA).  
 
From its own investigation, this Inquiry would endorse the ATA's assessment about problems 
of regulatory contact between the jurisdictions although this is not the only impediment to a 
more effective national regulatory framework (see below). 
 
Strong though sometime implicit support for the NRTC and the critical role it has played in 
moving towards a more consistent regulatory framework came from other parties. For 
example, in both its written and oral submission (Bill Healey), the ARA stressed the need for 
a consistent national reform agenda and identified the NRTC as the logical focal point for 
this. The ARA urged that this Inquiry should try to ensure its own recommendations were 
compatible with the national framework, including the national code currently under 
consideration. The ARA expressed the understandable concerns of body representing, 
amongst others, retailers whose operations extended across a number of jurisdictions if not 
nationally that they should not have different sets of rules relating to road transport.  
 
We acknowledge that there is an issue of driver safety that's being addressed at both state and 
national level. We would think that given the role of the National [Road] Transport 
Commission that whatever comes out of this Inquiry clearly has to be integrated with the 
national approach and we're involved on the periphery…at moves at Commonwealth level to 
address this situation (oral submission, Bill Healey, ARA). 
 
At the same time, during its investigation the Inquiry heard a number of organisations and 
individuals express misgivings about the extent to which safety had been given sufficient 
weight in terms of national road transport developments in the 1990s, including the role of the 
National Road Transport Commission. A number of submissions strongly supported the role 
the NRTC was trying to perform, lauded a number of its achievements, but expressed some 
concerns about the information used to make key decisions.  
 
I think the NRTC has done a great job in getting some of the issues on the agenda but, once 
again, I think they have been poorly advised on certain areas… There are a lot of interested 
parties that have lobbied for politically acceptable regulation…associations, there's a lot 
people who lobby the NRTC, even truck operators direct…I don't think they've had a cohesive 
argument put to them about how the industry should be regulated… I think they've got some 
good people but they're only as good as the advice they get and the NRTC will openly admit 
that (oral submission, Dean Croke). 
 
Other criticism was more pointed. Associate Professor Philip Laird from the University of 
Wollongong, who had spent the last 17 years researching land transport issues in Australia 
and overseas, (oral submission) believed the NRTC reforms had continued a longer term trend 
of compromising safety to commercial considerations and argued: 
 
My overall impression is that there has been a contest between increasing productivity on the 
one hand and to assist international competitiveness and exporters, particularly rural 
exporters, to compete on world markets and safety and competitive neutrality on the other 
hand. And I think the safety and the competitive neutrality have come off far behind the push 
to increase the productivity through the move in the 1980s to increase legal speed limits and 
to increase mass limits and to increase dimension limits. And the push for productivity and 
competitiveness within the industry I think has been at the expense of long term safety 
issues… In the 1980s the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry produced a report in 1984 
 275
with a package of 98 recommendations which were a balance between safety, an improved 
operating environment and a better deal for the trucking industry which was then showing 
signs of over-capacity, particularly in the areas of owner/drivers.  The federal government 
drove the reform agenda. At the end of the day we saw the mass limits for trucks increased.  
At the start of that process the legal gross vehicle mass for a six axle articulated truck was 38 
tonnes …and the GVM for a six-axle semi was lifted in two stages to 42.5 tonnes. The legal 
speed limit was lifted in two tranches from 80 to 90 to 100 kph but the compensatory safety 
measures of operator licensing, which had also been recommended by McDonnell in the NSW 
inquiry of 1980, and tachographs, which had also been noted by McDonnell, were not 
implemented… These productivity imperatives, this competitiveness pushes safety and 
competitive neutrality down and we really need a better balance between road freight 
productivity, truck safety and competitive neutrality … Its (the 1990s) a replay of the 1980s… 
I think they (the NRTC) have, let me choose my words carefully, been all but hijacked by the 
industry…its a classic case of industry capture at a very early stage and at the highest level. 
 
It is important to observe that this opinion was by no means typical of those enunciated in 
relation to the role of the NRTC. At the same time, claims that the NRTC had failed to 
balance commercial/productivity and safety issues were made on more than a few occasions. 
 
Another to raise some concerns was the NRMA. As a motorist organisation, the NRMA has 
taken a keen interest in the long haul trucking safety, and the regulations governing this, over 
many years. It was involved in the process developing regulations, which now constitute the 
Road Transport Reform (Truck Driving Hours) Regulations. In relation to the latter, the 
NRMA commented on each set of draft regulations and regulatory impact statements prepared 
from 1996 until the implementation of the regulations in 1999. However, while supporting the 
development and implementation of a national approach the NRMA did raise some concerns;  
 
In 1996, NRMA lobbied the NSW and Federal governments regarding the number of hours 
drivers were allowed to drive and work each day. At the time work being done by the National 
Road Transport Commission (NRTC) was suggesting 18 hours of driving per working day as 
the maximum for drivers. NRMA strongly opposed these hours and called for a significant 
reduction in the time allowed to be worked in any 24 hour period. This stance was supported 
by surveys which showed that the community regarded 9 hours a day driving and working as 
being an acceptable maximum. More than 70% of the respondents to NRMA’s survey either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposed 18 hours per day regime being suggested 
at the time. The eventual outcome of 12 hours under the regulated hours regime to 14 hours 
under the Transitional Fatigue Management Scheme was an acceptable compromise given 
the emphasis on fatigue management involved (written submission NRMA). 
 
What disturbed the NRMA, and this point was reinforced in evidence given to the hearings, 
was not the final outcome but the initial proposal – a proposal it viewed with alarm, especially 
as it emanated from a body, one of whose central objects was to promote safety in the 
industry. There is another side to this issue that perhaps reinforces the subsidiary nature of 
safety concerns in terms of national regulatory developments. At no point, as far as this 
Report can determine, was the issue of whether a substantial reduction in the maximum 
working hours of long distance truck drivers would substantially improve safety performance 
in the industry ever seriously considered. Yet, evidence presented in this Report as well as 
other research provides ample ground for raising this question. That the question was never 
seriously raised says something about the framework in which the reform agenda has been 
operating. 
  
The question of driving hours was by no means the only issue where concerns were raised in 
connection with national regulatory developments affecting the long distance trucking 
industry. As noted in an earlier section, both the RTA and the Traffic Services Branch of the 
NSW Police Service raised concerns about the difficulty of implementing sanctions in relation 
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to speeding and other breaches by federally registered vehicles. Reference was also made in 
an earlier section of the Report to problems the NSW Police Service had identified in 
connection with the enforcement of the new National Load Restraint Guide. 
 
In the course of its investigation, the Inquiry gained the clear impression that, left to its own 
devices, NSW is likely to have adopted a tougher and more restrictive regulatory regime than 
that agreed to at national level.  Of the spectrum of regulatory approaches found in Australia, 
NSW has a long established reputation as being the most punitive/regularity orientated. New 
South Wales is the only jurisdiction to go down the high technology enforcement path (with 
Safe-T-Cam) and according to Barry Moore from the NRTC (oral submission) account for 
about half the national heavy vehicle enforcement budget. Some of those favouring a more 
collaborative approach argued that NSW was out of step while others commenting on this 
issue, suggested there were reasons beyond history for the NSW approach (including its 
greater population/vehicle density, topography and place as a hub of most interstate 
transport). Whatever its origins, it does appear that the national framework has entailed 
concessions from NSW (whether these are comparatively greater than those of other 
jurisdictions is a moot point) which some regulators had misgivings about. 
 
The Traffic Services Branch of the NSW Police Service raised a number of further issues 
about national developments in its submission relating to ease of enforcement, vehicle 
configuration and load restraint. 
 
…over the past several years NSW has been involved in the implementation of new Road 
Transport Legislation, with the culmination of that process being the introduction of  the 
Australian Road Rules on the 1st December 1999. As with any new system that replaces a 
system that has been in place for some 90 years there is a certain amount of confusion. One 
difficulty with the current legislation is that a police officer may be dealing with an offence 
that resides in two, three or four volumes of separate legislation. The ability of police to be 
able to go to one reference point and glean the required information has gone. 
 
The Police Service is concerned that there seems to be a certain amount of legislative creep 
starting to emerge. One area where this seems to be occurring is in the area of heavy vehicle 
dimensions. An example of this is the lengths of B Double configured vehicles. We have seen 
the length of these increase from 19 metres to 23 metres then to 25 metres and now certain 
areas of the industry are looking to extend this to 27 metres. The basis of these requests are 
made upon in the main economic reasons. Police consider these issues from two perspectives 
one being road safety the other traffic management. 
 
Police concerns resolve around the notion that the longer you make a vehicle, the longer that 
it will take you to overtake that particular vehicle. This can start to impact on the safety of the 
vehicle overtaking and other road safety areas. Additionally the manoeuvrability of the 
vehicle themselves can create difficulties for police. If the [vehicle] is involved in a crash 
Police have the difficulty of obtaining specialised recovery vehicles. If a break down occurs, 
site safety of the vehicle can emerge as [an] issue both from road safety as well as traffic 
management. This issue is particularly relevant in urban areas. Our road network is 
operating in many areas at maximum capacity. 
 
Some organisations both within and outside the industry argue that by increasing vehicle 
dimensions size you can actually reduce the number of vehicles on the road. That may well be 
the case, however the decrease in volume appears to be minuscule. The problems that the 
sheer size of these vehicles create from a road safety and traffic management perspective 
outweighs any perceived decrease in volumes. 
 
It should be noted that the latter observation on the gains in relation to larger vehicles echoes 
observations made by the 1996 New Zealand Inquiry into truck crashes discussed earlier in 
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this Report as well as concerns and research examined in the discussion of vehicle 
configuration in Section 2. 
 
For its part, the NRTC is not unaware that the national framework has involved compromises 
for NSW but argues these need weighed up against the extension of regulatory reach that the 
national framework has provided (oral submission, Barry Moore, NRTC). This is, in the view 
of the Inquiry, a very valid point – though one that needs to be assessed in terms of specific 
(including the FIRS problem, which is hardly an endorsement of extended reach) as well as 
overall outcomes. The NRTC (oral submission, Barry Moore) stressed the very supportive 
and co-operative approach of NSW to adopting and enforcing regulation in keeping with the 
national framework. The NRTC also recognised the need to consider differences in 
topography/road conditions in relation to some standards. However, the Commission argued 
these issues (such as length and mass) were a very small subset of the total regulatory package 
and tailored solutions (perhaps, given intra-state variations, better based on zones or 
designated routes than state boundaries) could be worked through with the jurisdictions. 
Again, the Inquiry accepts that the move to national framework involves difficult judgements 
and the NRTC at least provides a basis for investigating/negotiating these issues. 
 
During the course of its own investigations the Inquiry obtained evidence which is at least 
perplexing. The NRTC was able to cite productivity improvements associated with the 
introduction of B-Doubles and extra mass on vehicles, arguing this had been fairly well 
researched. However, when asked whether it had undertaken any bench-marking or detailed 
assessment of the reasons for the apparent improvement in heavy vehicle safety since the late 
1980s NRTC representatives indicated that ‘the whole compliance area had been dreadfully 
under-researched and we really don’t know very much about it.’ (oral submission, Barry 
Moore, NRTC). When asked if they had safety experts able to undertake such research the 
NRTC response was they had the staff but not the budget to do it but relied on the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) who had done a fair bit. As shown in Section Two of this 
Report, the Inquiry undertook its own research on safety performance in long haul road 
transport, drawing on the RTA, ATSB and other sources (including a driver survey). After 
doing this, it became apparent that the picture was far less ‘rosy’ than the one often suggested 
to it by some parties in the course of the Inquiry. Much of the purported improvement in 
indicators derived from official data sets had stalled by the early 1990s (or with regard to 
some by the mid 1990s at the latest), and comparisons with the safety performance of ‘other 
vehicles’ or heavy trucks in other countries remained unfavourable. The driver survey and 
other sources revealed a series of problems, including high-range GHQ scores on the Hume 
highway and for those drivers paid under an incentive system (a result confirmed by other 
survey evidence). Questions about the precise origins of those improvements that have 
occurred remain to be answered. The effort put in to obtaining accurate measures of 
productivity outcomes from the national reform process has simply not been matched by a 
similar emphasis on investigating changes in safety performance and the reasons for this, 
including the impact on safety outcomes of NRTC-sponsored changes. 
 
The NRTC stated it was getting some work done on compliance trends (using Culway data) at 
the moment with funding from both ATSB and AustRoads but that at present compliance 
information was not collated nationally although they were trying to get it done. The NRTC 
conceded that this activity should have been undertaken years before. The NRTC also 
conceded there was no national enforcement picture but that they were getting that work done 
by a an economics consultant funded by ATSB to identify the available data and how it can 
be brought together (oral submission, Barry Moore).  The Inquiry was a little disturbed, to say 
the least, that the NRTC had not used OHS or safety enforcement experts in this exercise, 
given the need to make informed judgements about reliability of the data (reporting problems 
etc) and what it will show in terms of enforcement issues.  Such judgements are a necessary 
precursor to any decision about usable data sets and, with all due respect to the consultant 
employed, require background knowledge and expertise on safety and enforcement issues as 
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much as data identification abilities (though these too can depend on background knowledge) 
and statistical techniques. For example, as this Report has already shown, workers’ 
compensation data sets are readily available but there are serious limitations in terms of using 
them to measure the incidence of work-related death and injury in the road transport industry. 
As a second example, when the federal Department of Health and Aged Care recently 
prepared a report on available data sets on occupational disease, it used a panel of experts to 
assist the consultants (who had expertise in any case) identify both potential data sets and 
their strengths and weaknesses. In responding to this, the NRTC noted they had held 
discussion with the Australian Institute of Criminology and Professor Neil Gunningham from 
the Australian National University (an expert on OHS enforcement) and suggested they saw 
the inputs just identified as the second stage of the process. The Inquiry accepts the first part 
of this response but disagrees with the latter, since it believes knowledge of the field affects 
the capacity to identify relevant data sources. As the Inquiry has not viewed the discussion 
paper arising from the project it will make no further comment. 
 
The Inquiry was disturbed by the seemingly sporadic contact between the NRTC and the 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC). The NOHSC has been 
carrying out research on long haul road transport for around a decade and it would also have 
been a useful contact point in terms of identifying persons with expertise to on regulatory 
enforcement who could have acted as consultants. The NRTC has supported (managing with 
ATSB support) the research of Dr Ann Williamson (ex NOHSC now with the University of 
New South Wales) and colleagues to update a large survey of fatigue amongst long haul truck 
drivers. This is a welcome measure, given Williamson’s demonstrable OHS expertise and the 
way this research links to the NRTC’s interest in fatigue management (and push for 
regulatory reform in this area). The Williamson et al survey has a number of valuable findings 
that are included in this Report. A follow-up operator survey has also been undertaken. The 
Inquiry has not viewed the operator survey but can appreciate the NRTC’s hope that the 
results of this may prove to be especially important. 
 
Notwithstanding these recent welcome initiatives by the NRTC, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that safety concerns have not attracted the same degree of attention as economic 
and productivity improvements. At the very least, the research on safety performance that 
should have formed an essential part of assessing the reform process is conspicuously absent. 
Since its creation, the NRTC has produced a series of papers on safety-related reforms but 
closely examining several of these did not allay this Inquiry’s concerns. 
 
In 1993 the NRTC issued a discussion paper on options for improving driver performance. An 
appendix attached to this paper reviewed the evidence of five surveys of drivers carried out 
between 1984 and 1992, a number of which (like that of Hensher) have already been referred 
to in this Report. With due acknowledgement about treating their findings cautiously, the 
review concluded: 
 
The surveys indicate that there are occurrences of potentially unsafe practices or poor 
performance in the long-distance component of the road freight industry…The practices 
appear to be caused, in part, by the market power exerted by freight forwarders, agents, 
consignors of freight and some (smaller) transport companies. This market power can be 
exerted because the low barriers to entry and the structure of the industry make long distance 
trucking highly competitive. 
 
Without changes to the structure of the industry, it may not be possible to improve on-road 
performance to a great extent. The Hensher survey and subsequent analysis suggested that 
economic rewards were the major cause of poor on-road performance in the long-distance 
road freight industry. Moves to change the structure of the industry would be outside the 
current responsibilities of the National Road Transport Commission if they amount to 
Economic Regulation. Further, the recent Bureau of Industry Economics international 
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benchmarking study reported favourably on the efficiency of the Australian road freight 
industry. 
 
The survey results on speeding behaviour lend some support to setting realistic regulations as 
a means of improving on-road behaviour. Such regulations would also require adequate 
enforcement practices which appear to lack much effectiveness at the current time (NRTC, 
1993, Appendix page 10).  
 
The first five sentences of this quote affirm points made repeatedly during the course of this 
Inquiry although they do beg the question as to why these issues were not pursued at that 
time. The discussion paper itself canvasses a number of options including operator licensing 
and self-regulated accreditation. It notes that evidence on the effectiveness of operator 
licensing is limited and that self-regulation schemes may have the capacity to alter customer 
relationships due to more favourable customer perceptions of firms that have received 
accreditation and the effective sanction that exclusion from accreditation implies. This Inquiry 
is unaware of attempts to test either option in a detailed fashion (and evidence presented to it 
certainly casts doubt on presumptions central to the latter). It is, however, the tone of the last 
few sentences which are rather disturbing since they imply that the NRTC's brief does not 
extend to those regulations that might be required to improve safety, especially as the present 
structure of the industry is efficient. The reference to more realistic (ie higher) speed limits is 
offset with suitable references to the need for appropriate regulation. Nonetheless, the overall 
balance of the last part of the quote is not indicative of a view that economic efficiency and 
safety have equal priority. 
 
This concern was not allayed by other documents reviewed by the Inquiry. A year later, the 
Chairman of the NRTC, John Hurlstone addressed the 17th ARRB Conference on the subject 
of reform in road cost recovery, charging regimes and operational compliance. Out of a 12 
page paper just under two pages are devoted to compliance and most of this to promoting the 
idea of voluntary alternative compliance regimes. In the discussion Hurlstone (1994:71) notes 
that operator compliance and safety performance appears to be poor, especially in the long 
haul sector and then adds: 
 
Improving compliance is not costless. The benefits of an improvement in on-road 
performance must outweigh any increase in compliance costs to both operators and 
regulators. 
 
Hurlstone then argues compliance will be better if standards are set at a ‘realistic’ level, the 
level of enforcement is so high that chances of avoidance are low, the penalties are high and 
strategies are directed at those who bear the responsibility rather than those who are easiest to 
detect. He further argues for an array of sanctions and a mix of sanctions and incentives, 
before proceeding to discuss the key role alternative compliance will play in the future 
national regulatory framework. While the Inquiry would accept many of the points made, the 
analysis begs some critical questions. How are the costs and benefits of compliance measures 
to be calculated? As far as the Inquiry can determine no measures were undertaken by the 
NRTC in what was a central point. It might be expected that the NRTC would have at least 
sought to collate information on the full costs of poor OHS performance in the trucking 
industry as well as commissioning or encouraging research assessing the value of various 
compliance measures, including alternative compliance schemes.  How else do you judge 
whether the shift to alternative compliance is justified? As far as the Inquiry is aware no such 
research has been undertaken or if it was it was never made available to the Inquiry which 
would be surprising as it was central to its terms of reference. As noted earlier a number of 
former RTA and Police officers, amongst others, expressed concern that there had been no 
evaluation of the shift to alternative compliance measures.  
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Perhaps the single most important recent initiative of the NRTC, and one where the 
overarching importance of the safety objective cannot be questioned, has been the 
development of Chain of Responsibility. This is an important development which, as several 
submissions noted, had the potential to address some of the commercial pressures 
contributing to unsafe driving practices by targeting those responsible for initiating these 
pressures without due regard to their safety implications. Yet as indicated in the section on 
Enforcement, along with a number of other NRTC initiatives, inadequate attention appears to 
have been given to the practical steps needed to make these remedies workable or 
enforceable, at least to the extent that they might exact a significant change in behaviour. It 
could be claimed, with some justification, that it takes time to move from an entirely 
prescriptive approach to regulation to one that introduces the concept of performance 
standards and does so to a wider array of parties than was the case in the past. It should be 
noted in passing that the third heavy vehicle reform package picks up this issue, with a section 
devoted to the training of enforcement staff to affect a 'cultural' shift.  It again struck the 
Inquiry that this long overdue measure was at an early stage of development.  It could also be 
claimed that the full scope of Chain of Responsibility measures are still being introduced and 
will take time for the momentum of prosecutions and publicity to reach a point where change 
can be seen to occur.  
 
What these arguments fail to explain is why it took the road transport industry, and the agency 
with a key responsibility for safety, so long to develop and implement regulatory concepts 
that had wide currency in the areas of occupational health and safety and environmental laws 
for around 20 years. It also fails to explain why, in comparison to OHS legislation not to 
mention community expectations, the Chain of Responsibility provisions still lag well behind 
in terms of the scope/coverage of performance standards established and the penalties that 
apply for offences.  
 
When these observations combined with the limited number of prosecutions, there is an 
inescapable conclusion that, even factoring in increases in fines and the number of 
prosecutions, Chain of Responsibility provisions are unlikely to have a very significant 
impact within the foreseeable future (say five years).  Without a substantial upgrading of fines 
and more than few serious prosecutions the prospects are even less positive. Indeed, there is a 
real risk Chain of Responsibility could become yet another ineffective and largely symbolic 
attempt at improving safety in the industry. Even under the most optimistic scenario this 
Report is forced to conclude that while Chain of Responsibility represents a step in the right 
direction but is too belated and partial to meet the urgent safety problems being experienced 
by the road transport industry. 
 
It appears the NRTC is itself partly aware of this problem, recently arranging a focus group of 
key stakeholders to consider a national agreement on a code of practice for the health and 
safety of heavy vehicle drivers. WorkCover Victoria, which attended the focus group, 
indicated that it supported this approach but added important riders that the code would 
require endorsement under legislative provisions for both road transport and OHS, the code 
should highlight responsibility, be linked to penalties and create a level playing field (written 
submission). In other words, this code was not a voluntary one but was to link into both road 
transport and OHS legislation (the Inquiry has already indicated its strong support for a 
regulatory regime in long haul trucking based on both road transport and OHS legislation). 
Victorian WorkCover believed the involvement of industry would build ownership of the 
code and, for the same reason, argued that suppliers and customers also be involved in its 
development. Overall, WorkCover believed there was potential for a significant improvement 
in the co-ordination of jurisdictions in terms of information sharing and better integration of 
initiatives. At the same time, WorkCover expressed a desire to contribute to the development 
and implementation of any national strategy that might result from this Inquiry. 
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The involvement of agencies like Victorian WorkCover in discussions of national strategies 
on improving safety in the long haul trucking industry is a welcome development. It is the 
view of this Inquiry that had such collaboration with OHS agencies, including the National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, occurred at an earlier stage then the 
development of a more effective regulatory approach would have been accelerated. The last 
observation raises a perplexing point. Since the early 1990s NOHSC had funded or sponsored 
a series of major research projects in the long distance trucking industry and in 1997 it 
evaluated a number of prevention initiatives in various federal, state and state jurisdictions 
(including the NRTC's FMP pilot). This work was continued for another year under the title 
of OHS in Road Transport (NOHSC, 1999:6). As part of the latter, NOHSC ran a national 
workshop that brought together nearly all state and territory OHS agencies with a number of 
road industry players. A major outcome of this workshop was the recommendation for the 
development of a national framework for OHS in the road freight industry be '…developed by 
the industry, facilitated by a national body and with the involvement of the OHS agencies' 
(NOHSC, 1999:8). A prime reason underpinning this was the recognition of the problems 
posed by 'workplaces' that could move across jurisdiction boundaries and the need for a more 
coordinated regulatory approach. The obvious question to arise from this is why the NRTC 
and NOHSC did not collaborate more and at an earlier time.  At a number of points, the 
Inquiry was struck by a degree of insularity in terms of the road safety debate, which denied 
access to useful lessons from not simply an adjacent area but one that directly overlapped. A 
number of state and federal agencies, not simply the NRTC, undoubtedly helped to perpetuate 
this until recent times. At the same time, Victoria and Western Australia, if not other 
jurisdictions, have provided a lead in relation to a new approach involving collaboration 
between OHS and road transport agencies. All the evidence available to the Inquiry suggests 
this is a general approach that should be pursued more vigorously in the future.  
 
How the latter is to be best achieved at the national level is a serious question, but one beyond 
the terms of reference of this Inquiry. All the Inquiry will do is observe that a number of 
submissions, such as that WorkCover NSW and the ATA expressed the view that the NRTC 
was the logical coordinating agency for future developments in terms of a national approach 
for safety in the road transport industry. One the other hand, others including the TWU, 
academics and (and some agencies cited above) expressed reservations about the NRTC's past 
performance if not openly questioning its credibility to drive a new agenda that might include 
a code of practice on safety. Divided opinion is to be expected, but equally broadly based 
credibility will be essential to effectively introducing such a code. 
 
6.1.1.2 Other Mechanisms for Achieving Consistency/Cooperation between Jurisdictions 
 
It should be noted that the NRTC is by no means the only conduit for coordinating the 
regulation of long haul road transport across jurisdictions. Aside from regular informal 
contact between agency chiefs there are periodic coordinated enforcement campaigns such as 
the recent Aust-Trans operation involving South Australia, Victorian, Queensland and New 
South Wales. Further, at a recent meeting of road transport regulatory bodies from a number 
of jurisdictions held in Sydney, Queensland proposed the establishment of a new coordinating 
body, the Interstate Compliance Consultative Groups (ICCG). In its submission, Queensland 
Transport (written submission, page 23) stated that a meeting of the ICCG proposed for 
November 2000 would seek to achieve '…integration, co-ordination and co-operation 
between State Transport Authorities, State Police and relevant statutory authorities.' The 
proposed objectives include: 
 
• optimising economies and efficiencies in enforcement of heavy vehicle operations; 
• enhancing information exchange to standardise operations in each state 
• provide specialist input into legislative processes relating to the management and 
enforcement of interstate heavy vehicle operations; 
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• identifying and planning for the introduction of new heavy vehicle interstate operations; 
• fostering a 'whole of government' approach to heavy vehicle enforcement operations; 
• encouraging industry debate and participation in interstate heavy vehicle enforcement; 
and 
• developing a proactive strategic approach to the introduction of new heavy vehicle 
technology 
(written submission, Queensland Transport, pages 23-24). 
 
While it is to early to make a definitive judgement, the formation of the ICCG appears to be a 
very worthwhile venture especially if the 'whole of government' approach includes bringing 
OHS agencies into the loop. Quite apart from the remedies available under OHS legislation, 
these agencies have considerable experience in implementing and enforcing 'general duty' 
provisions and performance standards - measures that road transport authorities have begun to 
implement after a long period of relying on prescriptive legislation. The input of OHS 
agencies is likely to accelerate the development of the new enforcement regime as well as 
providing a new set of remedies, especially suited to the most serious cases of systematic 
breaches by a range of parties.  
 
6.1.1.3 Areas for future Improvements in Co-ordination 
 
The Inquiry heard evidence on a number of areas where co-ordination would lead to more 
effective enforcement. One example raised earlier were inter-jurisdictional disparities in the 
level of stamp duty payable for transferring truck registration and especially the absence of 
this payment from the FIRS scheme, creating a loophole that could be exploited by an 
unscrupulous operator.  
 
The Insurance Council of Australia (written submission, Dallas Booth, page 9) suggested that 
jurisdictional differences in relation to CTP coverage on large trailers (ie more than 4 tonnes) 
also created a problem. In NSW the Prime Mover bears the full cost of CTP and trailers are 
not required to have CTP insurance. The Council argued this meant that freight forwarders or 
transport companies who owned their own trailers and used subcontractors with prime movers 
do not incur any CTP cost ‘despite being a potential contributing factor to the accident rate.’ 
It was noted that the Heads of CTP Schemes were discussing uniformity for all 
circumstances/combinations (eg a Victorian prime mover towing a NSW trailer) – a move 
supported by the Council. Council suggested a potential solution was to charge CTP on 
commercially used trailers (carefully defined by type and experience rated) which it argued 
would have the effect of involving consignors and transport companies in the CTP scheme 
and thereby strengthening the link between safety performance and insurance costs. The 
Council stressed this would have to been done in a uniform manner nationally to prevent 
trailers being registered in jurisdictions with lower requirements. The Inquiry was unable to 
evaluate the full merits of this proposal but it probably warrants closer investigation. 
Certainly, present arrangements provide a financial incentive to use subcontracting 
arrangements to evade adverse safety outcomes and this should be addressed. 
 
6.1.1.4 Conclusion 
 
A note of caution needs to be sounded with regard to the purported advantaged accruing to 
national coordination. There is an argument to be made that, thus far, the benefits of national 
coordination have largely been economic gains to users of long haul road transport and the 
safety gains to the transport industry and other road users have been at best mixed and far 
from unambiguous. The move to federally registered vehicles is a case in point. As noted 
earlier in this Report evidence from the RTA using Culway indicates a far higher incidence of 
speeding amongst federally registered trucks compared to those registered in NSW. There is 
also evidence to suggest this is not a recent phenomenon (see Hensher and Battellino, 
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1990:552). The Inquiry has also referred to other coordination problems that, at best, have not 
been resolved by the national framework. For example, the push towards alternative 
compliance regimes, such as those in the area of driving hours/fatigue management has 
resulted in some confusion amongst regulatory agencies. As one operator observed: 
 
There are communication problems that exist in the various states in relation to rules and 
regulations, as there is no National approach. There is currently confusion in regard to the 
(Transitional Fatigue management scheme) and other fatigue management programs, like the 
Pilot operating in Queensland (written submission, Queensland operator). 
 
6.1.2 Coordination amongst regulatory agencies in New South Wales 
 
Other sections of this Report have provided considerable evidence on an array of co-
ordination problems that presently exist in relation to the regulation of the long distance 
trucking industry. Virtually all parties making submissions agreed this was a critical problem 
requiring urgent attention. Therefore, it is not intended to repeat these problems in detail. A 
few examples are worth mentioning simply to reiterate the point. For instance, the Inquiry 
spent considerable space on the ambiguous and often informal relationship between the NSW 
Police, the RTA and WorkCover. This results in crucial issues being unresolved such as how 
does WorkCover and the RTA allocate responsibility for inspection of long haul operator 
workshops and depots? How should information be shared amongst the three agencies (and 
note here the case of Victoria where the coroner has been drawn into the loop)? When should 
a serious on-road incident be reported to WorkCover and how should this process occur? 
Precisely when should action be pursued under OHS legislation rather than road transport 
legislation? One consequence of the failure to explicitly address these questions have been 
what appear to be significant gaps in regulatory coverage in areas like workshop/depot 
inspection and serious on-road incidents. In other sections of this Report, reference has been 
to specific incidents, one involving the dismissal of a driver (allegedly at the behest of the 
client) for refusing to work illegal hours where despite pressure from the TWU an 
investigation was not carried out by either WorkCover or the RTA. Quite apart from all the 
parties already mentioned who supported WorkCover investigating serious on-road incidents, 
a number of transport operators, both small and large, expressed concern at what they saw as 
the ambiguous situation in relation to investigating these incidents. Indeed, the views on this 
issue were overwhelming, with unanimity amongst industry associations and the union. As 
one ATA council member (oral submission) observed: 
 
There’s one question that gets asked in the industry is that if an incident, an accident, occurs 
on a building site then OH&S is there. We are out on the road. That is our worksite so 
therefore if there’s an incident …why doesn’t OH&S investigate. 
 
Similarly, David Anderson, CEO of NatRoad (oral submission) pointed to the inconsistency 
whereby WorkCover would rapidly attend a serious incident at the depot of a transport 
company but not an on-road incident even though that a driver was in their workplace, namely 
a truck.  
 
What may appear surprising is the number of times the Inquiry was told by operators and 
industry associations that there was strong support for taking prosecutions against operators 
and others who flouted safety and that use of the OHS legislation had support precisely 
because of the more serious penalties available. The Inquiry noted a deep sense of frustration 
amongst those within the industry committed to improving safety performance that more was 
not being done to target those who besmirched the industry’s reputation.  
 
One result of the lack of co-ordination is that while deaths of long distance truck drivers 
in highway crashes represents a significant proportion of total work-related fatalities in 
NSW, the Inquiry is unaware of a single case where there has been an investigation to 
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determine whether the transport operator, client or other party could be held criminally 
liable.  In this regard, truck drivers have not been afforded the protection that other 
workers receive and they are entitled to under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety 
Act. As numerous submissions to this Inquiry have made clear, this is a situation that 
many within the industry, the union and at least some of those involved in enforcement 
(including highway police) cannot understand or accept. It is a situation this Inquiry 
also finds to be unacceptable and needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 
 
The Inquiry was made aware of at least one attempt at formalising co-operation between 
different regulatory agencies in NSW but when it sought further information on this activity 
(ie records of meetings held) these attempts appeared largely dormant. 
 
The Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) has wide ranging responsibilities for managing 
vehicles and their use on NSW roads. The management of heavy vehicle traffic constitutes 
just one element of these broad responsibilities. Even in connection to heavy vehicles the 
RTA undertakes an array of tasks, by no means all of which relate directly to safety (although 
all at least impinge on it). In its submission the RTA identified these activities as: 
 
• Enhancing the safe operation of heavy vehicles while ensuring ‘industry productivity is 
not unduly constrained’; 
• Assisting the industry improve productivity by approving more productive vehicle 
configurations and managing route access of these vehicles so safety is not compromised; 
• Protecting the road network from excessive damage due to overloaded vehicles; 
• Manage access of heavy vehicles to the road system in consultation with stakeholders; 
• Provide new roads and maintain existing roads and ‘manage the efficient and safe 
movement of heavy vehicles through the use of leading edge traffic management practice 
and technology.’ This includes the provision of rest stops; 
• Protect the environment from heavy vehicle noise and emissions; 
• Charge operators for the use of the road; 
• Participate in the National Road Reform process led by the NRTC (written submission 
RTA page 2). 
 
In early 2000 the RTA undertook a restructure of its corporate road safety and road user 
policy functions, with the Road Safety Branch being merged with the Driver and Vehicle 
Policy and Regulation Directorate to form the Road Safety and Road User Management 
Directorate.  A Heavy Vehicle Section was established within the new Directorate to provide 
greater accountability by bringing all aspects of heavy vehicle safety together. The Heavy 
Vehicle Section is responsible for policies relating to heavy vehicle speed and fatigue, 
standards for truck and rest stops, heavy vehicle fleet safety, load restraints, drug use by 
drivers, driver health, driver licensing and vehicle design/construction, service and inspection. 
Beyond these specific areas, the Section has an overarching responsibility to direct safety 
strategy, including the implementation of specific initiatives and representing/acting as a 
contact point for the RTA in terms of heavy vehicle strategy, policy and standards (written 
submission, RTA page 3).  
 
In addition to these changes the section responsible for developing compliance strategy, 
primarily for heavy vehicles and drivers, has been elevated to a branch, now known as the 
Compliance Strategy Branch, within the Road Safety and Road User Directorate. In its 
submission, the RTA stated that the branch would work with the Heavy Vehicle Section to 
ensure RTA compliance activity has a strong safety focus. 
 
It is too early to judge the impact of this restructuring although it appears to be a move in the 
right direction and the Inquiry was impressed with the knowledge of members of this Section 
who gave evidence to the Inquiry and also provided detailed information on request. Indeed, 
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given the breadth of the RTA's responsibilities and the well-publicised problems of long 
distance over the past decade or more the Inquiry was a little surprised this measure had not 
been introduced some years before. There is also the obvious question as to why, if heavy 
vehicle safety is so important, the Heavy Vehicle Section did not warrant full branch status 
(including direct control of relevant compliance strategies)? The Inquiry was also surprised by 
the Transport Workers’ Union’s claim that it had not been notified of the establishment of the 
Heavy Vehicle Section (oral submission, Tony Sheldon, secretary NSW Branch of the TWU). 
As the Inquiry did not put these questions to the RTA it cannot pursue the issue further. 
However, the more general points just made remain valid in the context of the issues being 
addressed in this section. 
 
The key coordination point for the RTA at present is the NSW Police Service that undertakes 
a critical role in terms of on-road enforcement. This is a critical relationship both at both the 
level of determining compliance strategies as well as at the operational level of particular 
regions (and especially those covering major transport routes). Evidence obtained by the 
Inquiry indicated that, as might be hoped, there is a level of cooperation and shared vision 
between the RTA and the Police at both levels. This included coordinated campaigns with 
other jurisdictions such as the recent Aust-Trans operation involving Queensland, New South 
Wales, South Australia and Victoria. 
 
Nevertheless, during the course of the Inquiry a widespread view emerged that the existing 
level of coordination amongst the various agencies responsible for trucking safety was 
inadequate and needed to be improved.  
 
In its submission NRMA argued:  
 
Currently, the bodies with the main responsibility for regulation are the Roads and Traffic 
Authority (RTA) and the NSW Police, with the RTA having the lead role. It is understood that 
these organisations do not have any formal arrangement or agreement regarding their 
respective roles in enforcing truck driving regulations. This would seem to be a necessary 
component for effective cooperation (written submission NRMA, p5). 
 
A number of operational police also expressed the view that the relationship between the 
Police Service, the RTA and WorkCover should be strengthened, perhaps through a dual 
body. A traffic coordinator (oral submission) expressed the view that had investigation of 
heavy vehicle smashes been treated as more than traffic accidents the information derived: 
 
would have really highlighted a lot of the problems with the industry and we could have had 
the solutions in place by now. Unfortunately in this area we have had a number of heavy 
vehicle accidents where we believe WorkCover should have involved themselves in it… Even 
two weeks a go we had a motor vehicle accident where a truck turned over on the highway 
and we had a driver injured. We haven't got the final results of the blood urine tests on 
that…However, no one has investigated what the driver was doing prior to the accident. 
Nobody has investigated the time schedule for that driver. Nobody will…approach the 
company to find out why the driver was at that location at that particular time and…nobody 
will probably look at the pressures that were on that driver. 
 
Other submissions pointed to what they believed to be unnecessary duplication of procedures 
due to regulatory overlap. The ATA, for example, pointed to duplication in the area of 
medical testing of drivers, with drivers having to:  
 
undergo  up to three medicals (TruckSafe/Dangerous Goods/Heavy Vehicle) when one would 
suffice is but one example of bureaucracy not required in the system (written submission, 
ATA page 5). 
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One critical aspect of co-ordination is the sharing of information amongst agencies with 
responsibility for safety in the long distance trucking industry, notably the police, RTA and 
WorkCover NSW. 
 
A highway patrol officer identified this as a major issue: 
  
Exchange of information between WorkCover, the Police and the RTA would go a long 
way…we identify things but there are no formal avenues for us to say "look we found this 
problem and what do you know about it"… Some police have contacts with WorkCover and 
our own contacts with the RTA where, informally, they do find out information in relation to 
certain companies and operators which helps to target them.  But it's not a formal process 
and there is some reluctance because given legislation there is only certain information you 
can provide… We get a lot of information from Safe-T-Cam and what companies breach 
driving hours and speed limits…we use to target those trucks because they are avoiding Safe-
T-Cam or warning letters they get… But there's only so much they can tell us and its only 
because I know somebody that I can gain access to that. 
 
The issue of sharing information also has resonance in the broader domain. Community and 
relevant group access to non-sensitive information on safety issues can facilitate a more 
informed debate and a constructive input from interested parties can reinforce the 
effectiveness of compliance activities. Several submissions specifically addressed this issue.  
A written submission from Transformation Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) pointed to 
the problem of ‘diffuse disasters’ defined by a 1993 Victorian Law Reform Commission 
paper as: 
 
…a disaster in which individual incidents lead to a small number of deaths or injuries 
separated from each other by space or time. If all the calamities occurred at one time, they 
would be treated as a full-scale disaster. As they are, they are all too often treated as 
‘incidents’ 
 
Pointing to specific examples (like the Mistral fan case) the Law Reform Commission argued 
the phenomenon was exacerbated by an absence of information to assist preventative action 
and where the interests of particular parties militated against making such information 
available. For its part, the submission by Transformation Management Services (2000) noted 
successful efforts to break this nexus in relation complaints by bank customers and the 
rehabilitation industry in Victoria. The submission argued road users should have knowledge 
of the OHS performance of transport operators. Clients using particular operators should 
understand this choice and its implications (including safety) is open to scrutiny and that 
drivers and owners should be able to point to industry standards and the consequences of 
breaches of this in terms of hazardous practices. The submission recommended a free internet 
site be established to provide details of the OHS performance of trucking companies 
including workers’ compensation claim rates, driver turnover, average trip times against a 
standard set by the NRMA, number of incidents, and mapping the frequency of use of 
trucking company by name and size of clients. The submission argued that licensing 
requirements or incentive be used to induce trucking companies and retailers to provide such 
information. In other words, the centralisation of information would allow for more informed 
decisions by consumers and other groups. 
 
During the course of the Inquiry the NRMA and the NSW STAYSAFE Committee raised 
concerns about their access to sufficiently detailed and up-to-date information about the safety 
performance of the long distance trucking industry. They were by no means the only parties to 
raise this issue and have been identified to highlight organisations left of the loop who most 
would assume would, given their role, be given priority access to such information. 
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Concerns about the availability of information on safety performance in the trucking industry 
were not confined to NSW. Associate Professor Phillip Laird from the University of 
Wollongong (oral submission) stated: 
 
We could get a lot better data. I can got to the web page of Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau and download quite detailed statistics state by state on fatalities, hospitalisation in 
road crash victims but if I want to get from them information relating to trucks it’s a special 
inquiry. We could have more of this data out in the open.  
 
In the view of the Inquiry these are entirely legitimate concerns. Indeed, given evidence 
presented throughout the Report it is reasonable to suggest that the absence of ready 
access to such information has hampered the development of a more co-ordinated and 
strategic approach to improving performance in the industry and ensuring key 
stakeholders are informed and able to contribute. When the Inquiry came to prepare 
information on OHS performance in the industry it was surprised at the amount of 
information that was either not published in a summary form or even available at all. 
While attributing blame to no particular organisation for this state of affairs (indeed a 
number like the RTA, WorkCover and FORS readily co-operated to provide this 
information), it is a situation in urgent need of change. Transport operators, clients, the 
TWU and CFAT (amongst others) also should be able to access information on safety 
performance in the trucking industry so as to, in the case of a transport operator, 
benchmark its own performance. Equally, a client should have some basis for 
identifying where the safety performance of operators tendering for a contract stands in 
relation to industry standards. The Inquiry has made a specific recommendation to 
address this issue. 
 
Another aspect of the problem that has already been raised at various stages of this report, 
was getting a better degree of coordination amongst those engaged in on-road enforcement as 
well as the enforcement activities of the various agencies more generally. In other words, 
highway police must understand enough about the role of RTA and WorkCover inspectors to 
work harmoniously and effectively, to identify incidents worthy of further investigation. It 
will be especially important that RTA and WorkCover inspectors understand each other's role. 
If WorkCover inspectors are to operate effectively involved it is essential that they know 
something about the long haul road transport industry so it would seem advisable therefore for 
this activity be undertaken by inspectors specially trained for the task. Enforcement personnel 
in all three agencies should receive some exposure to the risk factors underpinning 
enforcement problems underlined in this Report and the regulatory devices in place that 
designed to address this. The ATA (oral submission, Mike Edmonds) has recommended that 
police and other enforcement officers receive competency-based training in FMP and 
management systems such as TruckSafe. While the Inquiry did not investigate those training 
programs currently in place submissions to the Inquiry indicate a degree of confusion that 
suggests this is warranted. Some shared short course training or interactive workshops would 
seem a very worthwhile measure (perhaps both a regional and metropolitan level) to increase 
understanding and overall effectiveness.  
 
In sum, this Report recommends that appropriate retraining of regulatory officers be 
undertaken to improve understanding of new regulations, the specific role of each 
agency, overlapping responsibilities and collaborative enforcement. 
 
6.1.2.1 A coordinating body or lead agency? 
 
Beyond information sharing and other specific problems already mentioned, there was a 
recognised need for some overall coordination in terms of a more strategic approach to 
regulation and enforcement. In other words, there was a perceived need, which this Inquiry 
endorses, for some mechanism to not only deal with the problems just identified by to provide 
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for a more cohesive approach to the entire industry. This raised the question of how this could 
be best achieved and in terms of such a structure which agency should take the lead role. Here 
views were mixed although almost all submissions saw the need for a stronger input from 
OHS law which presumably meant a larger role for WorkCover – something contrary to 
WorkCover’s own submission. The stronger input from OHS law might be seen to add to, 
rather than rectifying, co-ordination problems. Apart from WorkCover, very few parties 
raised this as an issue and evidence so far suggests that lines of demarcation, areas of 
collaboration and questions as to the most appropriate legal remedies for particular types of 
offences have been accommodated amicably thus far. The issue is not unique to Australia, 
being explicitly addressed by a recent inquiry into Tranz Rail in New Zealand. The final 
report of this inquiry (New Zealand, 2000:49) recommended that OHS legislation should play 
a much stronger protective role, to be used in conjunction with the existing licensing system 
administered by the Land Transport Safety Authority. The report argued that OHS legislation 
should be administered by HSE inspectors (the OHS agency) not the LTSA because of their 
greater experience in undertaking investigations and prosecutions using general duty 
provisions and would avoid demarcation problems. A further if implicit reason for this 
approach seems to have been a lack of confidence in the LTSA (evidence in support of which 
is found elsewhere in this Report). Of course, another solution would have been to create a 
new agency with exclusive OHS jurisdiction in this area. 
 
Some organisations expressed no strong views about which bodies should be regulating the 
industry. Rather their prime concern was that whatever regulation was used should achieve 
tangible outcomes in terms of encouraging improvements in business practices, scheduling, 
fatigue and other factors pertaining to safety (see for example written submission NRMA). 
 
A suggestion from WorkCover NSW (written submission, page 32) was to establish an inter-
agency body to coordinate a 'whole of government' approach to the regulation of the industry. 
 
With these considerations in mind, WorkCover is inclined to the view that the interests of the 
transport industry, including the LHT industry, might be well served by the operation of a 
special joint-agency body which would be acknowledged as the principal advisory body for 
the management of the regulation of safety in the industry in NSW.  
 
WorkCover suggested this body could be modeled on the Major Hazards Inter-agency 
Committee, with representatives from the MAA, EPA, RTA, Police and WorkCover, with 
NRTC interaction. 
 
Another solution to these coordination problems, which could incorporate elements of the last 
point, would be to establish an agency with a primary responsibility for trucking safety that 
could coordinate the input of other agencies. This need has been recognised and addressed 
elsewhere. For example, as already noted in this report in the USA the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration undertakes a number of these tasks.  Another possible model can be 
found in the Tow Truck Authority of New South Wales. This body was established in an 
attempt to deal with an industry that was widely regarded as out of control, with widespread 
corruption (pay-offs between tow truck operators and panel beaters/car repairers) and a 
history of violence ranging from common assault up to an including murder. The Inquiry 
originally spoke to the General Manager of the Authority, Frances Marshall, and its Chair, 
Peter Anderson, following oral submissions to the Inquiry that two truck operators were 
offering to remove drugs and other prohibited objects for drivers from trucks after smashes. 
At the same time, the Inquiry became interested in the actions of the Authority in cleaning up 
the industry, helping tow truck operators to achieve an improved level of professionalism (and 
ethics), financial performance and self-esteem. It was also interested in the Authority's efforts 
to reduce costs/improve efficiency and coordination in the attendance of tow truck operators, 
emergency services and other groups at highway truck smashes (for an indication of the scale 
of these costs see Section 2 of this Report). Put bluntly, the Inquiry was impressed by the 
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success of the new Authority to address such an entrenched culture of illegality and dubious 
practice within a relatively short period. It did this with a judicious mixture of carrots 
(including business training for operators) and sticks (potentially loss of the license essential 
to operate in the industry). Although it may be too early to proclaim the Authority a complete 
success, available evidence clearly indicates it has achieved a decisive shift in the culture of 
the industry, something previous government efforts had conspicuously failed to do. From 
independent sources the Inquiry was able to verify the respect that tow truck operators held 
the Authority and its General Manager.  
 
There are obvious and significant contextual and jurisdictional/regulatory differences between 
the tow truck industry and the long haul trucking industry. At the same time there are also 
some disturbing parallels in terms of widespread illegality and where, as far much of the 
community is concerned, there is a lack of controls. The more the Inquiry looked at some of 
the deep-seated problems identified in this Report the more essential it became for an 
intervention that would achieve a decisive break, that lead to a measurable improvement in 
safety. By enabling the industry to fulfil its tasks in a professional manner, it would also, in 
the longer term, allow the industry build a deserved self-esteem for making a vital social and 
economic contribution to the Australian community. In New South Wales there are 
approximately 7,000 tow trucks registered with the Tow Truck Authority whereas, by way of 
comparison, time there are at least 30,000 registered for-hire long haul trucks operating in this 
state. If the government considers it appropriate to set up the Tow Truck Authority to govern 
that industry it seems that it would be appropriate for it to set up this recommended Authority 
for the long haul trucking industry. Not only are the number of people involved much greater 
but the industry itself is more vital to the overall economic well being of the community. As 
set out in this Report, the considerations sufficient to justify establishment of such an 
authority are extensive and serious and require that firm and positive methods be adopted to 
rectify the situation. 
 
6.1.2.2 Dealing with regulatory agency co-ordination in other jurisdictions 
 
The Inquiry obtained information pertaining to coordination in other jurisdictions, which 
provide some basis for comparing the situation in NSW. In the past, as in NSW, the key 
coordination point in other jurisdictions has been between the principle road transport agency 
(the equivalent of the RTA like Queensland Transport) and the Police service. The 
relationship between these bodies and the OHS agency (like WorkCover) was far less 
important although this will change given the growing involvement of the latter in road 
transport (at least in jurisdictions like Victoria and Western Australia). 
 
A number of the co-ordination problems identified by this Inquiry are not unique to NSW. 
Indeed, Perrone (see above) identified very similar problems in Victoria with regard to the 
investigation and prosecution of corporate criminality in relation to truck driver deaths. At the 
same time, during the course of its investigation the Inquiry became aware of several very 
positive developments. In Victoria a Transport Industry Safety Group was established in 1996 
following a coronial inquiry into the death of a young boy hit by a truck with the aim of 
creating a safety culture in the industry. The group is composed of the Victorian Road 
Transport Association, Transport Workers Union, VicRoads, Bus Association of Victoria, 
Monash University Accident Research Centre, Victoria Police and the Victorian WorkCover 
Authority. In addition, the State Coroner has observer status (somewhat ironically given that 
his inquest findings on the relationship of fatigue to truck fatalities played a crucial role in 
establishing the Group). This Inquiry believes the inclusion of the coroner represents a 
crucially important link given Perrone’s analysis and other evidence presented to it, helping to 
bridge some key historical divides. The Transport Industry Safety Group has made a 
concerted effort to address the issue of fatigue. It has helped to create a greater awareness of 
OHS in the trucking industry and to achieve a level of co-operation between the industry, 
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union, police and other regulatory authorities which seems to exceed that achieved in other 
jurisdictions.  
 
In addition, a Victorian Enforcement Liaison Group was established in 1992 to improve the 
relationship between enforcement agencies and transport industry participants. Membership 
of the group includes the Transport Workers Union, Victoria Police, VicRoads, Victorian 
Workcover Authority, Environment Protection Agency, Country Fire Authority, Metropolitan 
Fire Brigade, Driver Education Centre of Australia, Bus Association of Victoria, Sherriff’s 
Office, Victorian Road Transport Association and numerous transport companies. The 
Victorian Transport Enforcement Liaison Group meets regularly and provides a useful venue 
for not only getting a better interchange of ideas on effective enforcement measures but also 
in facilitating the distribution of information raising operator awareness of hazard problems 
and areas of regulatory concern. In its Member Alert bulletin the Victorian Road Transport 
Association publicises the outcomes of liaison group meetings and regulatory developments, 
including highlighting specific hazards/incidents (recent issues dealt with falls from heights, 
hazards posed by road reconstruction, a police blitz and improving diet to combat fatigue. 
VRTA Member Alert No.12-15 August to September 2000). According to Roger Sanders from 
the Victorian Road Transport Association many hundreds of industry specific issues have 
been dealt with during this time including concerns about the operations of companies, 
enforcement agency procedures through to direct input into proposed legislative amendments. 
He argued the success of the group has been its ability to solve problems or issues of concern 
without being weighed down with red tape and that all agencies involved endeavoured to 
provide immediate response to issues raised. In its written submission, the Victorian Road 
Transport Association also pointed to joint Police/WorkCover operations although it 
expressed the view that where these did not involve injury or death they were not especially 
resource effective. 
 
Both the Transport Industry Safety Group and the Victorian Enforcement Liaison Group 
appear to have played a useful role in promoting OHS within the trucking industry. The 
Inquiry has drawn some lessons from this in making its recommendations. 
 
In its submission, Queensland Transport (written submission, page 23) stated it had achieved 
a close working relationship with the Queensland Police Service, reflected in a number of 
working groups and planning forums, involving both senior management and operational 
staff. These bodies included the Road Freight Industry Council, Queensland Transport and 
Queensland Police Liaison Meeting, Intelligent Transport Systems Executive Steering Group, 
Pacific Motorway Enforcement Working Group, Legislation and Enforcement Committee and 
Heavy Vehicle Management and Logistics Steering Committee. The submission also pointed 
to joint operations targeting specific issues, some involving a number of jurisdictions, such as 
the recent Aust-Trans operation (see above) which were expected to result in a number of 
'chain of responsibility' prosecutions. At the same time, the submission identified areas where 
further improvements in coordination were being sought, most notably the establishment of a 
shared Queensland Transport/Queensland Police compliance database that was currently 
being explored. As already noted, the issue of data sharing and coordination is an issue that 
was raised repeatedly in the NSW context as a necessary step towards more effective 
enforcement. 
 
6.2 Resourcing 
 
Many if not most major organisations (industry associations, insurers, the TWU amongst 
others), making submissions to the Inquiry, argued regulatory agencies and their enforcement 
activities were seriously under-resourced. Some evidence supporting this view has been 
presented in earlier sections of this Report. The point was made in relation to all three 
agencies that are or could be involved in enforcement, namely the police, RTA and 
WorkCover. In some cases it was even suggested that resourcing had been cut back. For 
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example, some operational police complained of a significant (ie around 10%) reduction in 
the number of highway patrol officers over the past eight years with flow-on effects to the 
number of infringement notices issued and kilometers travelled. This claim received support 
from a number of truck drivers and operators. The suggestion was made that the heavy 
trucking industry was not viewed as sufficiently critical in terms of overall crime reduction 
but the Inquiry was unable to investigate the veracity of this.  
 
In its submission, the Australian Trucking Association (ATA) stated that in relation to the 
extent of proper enforcement: 
 
The industry believes that this area is severely under-resourced. This has been exacerbated by 
the reduction in the real numbers of enforcement officers dedicated towards the industry 
combined with an increase in vehicle numbers (written submission, ATA p4).  
 
For its part, NRMA argued: 
 
If the RTA was to continue as the lead body in terms of regulating the industry then an 
increase in resourcing needs to be considered. NRMA understands that there are 
approximately 330 inspectors in total NSW. This number represents all staff, including field 
staff using mobile weighing devices and randomly stopping trucks to check weight, log books 
etc. The random nature of this component of the regulatory systems suggests that it is a most 
effective method of identifying non-complying drivers and companies. NRMA believes more 
resources should be applied to this area to increase the chance of detecting transgressing 
drivers (written submission NRMA).  
 
The Victorian Road Transport Association (oral submission) believed the WorkCover 
Authority was under-resourced if, as it advocated, WorkCover inspectors were to take a far 
more active enforcement role in the long haul trucking industry. This was especially the case 
given the time and expense of the very serious prosecutions the agency was likely to be 
involved in. The Inquiry accepts this argument and believes it would apply to other 
jurisdictions, including NSW. 
 
In terms of funding additional resources a number of proposals were made. In its written 
submission NRMA, for example, supported an allocation of revenue from truck driving 
infringements to increase resources for enforcing regulations governing long haul road 
transport. 
 
As the ATA’s position implies, concerns about under-resourcing of regulatory activities in the 
road transport industry is by no means confined to NSW. The Victorian Road Transport 
Association, for example, argued that all three main regulatory agencies (police, WorkCover 
and road transport authorities) failed to allocate the financial resources, training, equipment or 
manpower sufficient to effectively police the industry. It also argued the agencies needed 
stronger powers of search and discovery (written submission, TMA/VRTA). 
 
Of course, the issue of resourcing cannot be divorced from questions about the effective use 
of available resources. As is clear from the previous first part of this section, increased 
coordination amongst regulatory agencies at both state and national level has the potential for 
making better use of available resources. There is also the question of agencies making the 
best use of available resources, including achieving the optimal mix of compliance 
instruments. In its written submission, Queensland Transport (page 24) argued making the 
best use of available resources required careful prioritisation and targeting (citing an increase 
in the number of infringement notices for mass in the past 18 months as evidence of this). To 
create a higher perceived risk of detection of non-compliance, Queensland Transport has 
implemented a randomised enforcement strategy (REDS), a computerised database designed 
to analyse strategic data and direct enforcement to targeted locations. Queensland Transport 
 292
argued the system identified locations that might otherwise not be selected and random 
deployment helped to create uncertainty amongst operators, thereby maximising the deterrent 
effect. Current issues for targeting included the road damage caused by overloaded vehicles, 
heavy vehicle fatigue crashes, heavy and light vehicle crashes due to defects and unregistered 
vehicles/non-payment of third party insurance. 
 
This issue clearly overlaps with a number of areas already canvassed by the Inquiry. An 
obvious example is the issue of alternative compliance schemes. Queensland Transport 
(written submission, page 24) argued that tough penalties and innovative sanctions must be 
utilised for serious offence. At the same time, alternative compliance schemes provided a tool 
of educating the industry to practices that were both more efficient and safer as well as freeing 
up resources to target those operators most likely to breach regulations. 
 
In a similar vein, it was argued that a reduction in the number highway patrol officers in NSW 
was justified by the increasing use of technology (speed cameras, breath testing etc). 
However, several operational police and ex police spoken to by the Inquiry were of the view 
the effectiveness of these measures or alternative compliance regimes had not been properly 
researched, including gathering feedback from highway patrol officers about the best way of 
tackling problems. 
 
Most of the submissions pointing to more efficient use of compliance resources referred to a 
relatively conventional package of offences and target offenders (ie drivers and operators) 
rather the remedies addressing the underlying causes of these problems and the other parties 
that may influence operator behaviour (such as consignors).  This was not a view shared by 
the EPA that pointed to the deterrent value of prosecuting parties towards the top of the 
decision-making chain. Nor was it the view of the Victorian Road Transport Association. The 
Association endorsed targeting of prime offenders for serious offences and questioned the 
value of some joint Police/WorkCover exercises where there had been no serious injuries, 
arguing these proved to be very resource intensive and involved dealing with large volumes of 
documents prior to a successful prosecution (written submission). The ATA too called for a 
more targeted approach, including using the supply chain model to address illegal practices at 
all levels (oral submission, Mike Edmonds, ATA). It, like a number of other bodies, argued 
that the regulatory authorities already often knew who the problem operators etc were but 
continued to use a broad-brush approach that wasted resources and sent conflicting or 
ambiguous compliance messages to the industry. The point was reinforced by David 
Anderson (oral submission) from NatRoad, who referred to the enforcement resources spent 
addressing the issue of bug deflectors (see discussion earlier in the Report) or small 
dimension/positioning problems with wide-load signs. While such criticism can be easily 
misconstrued (minor offences – and defining what is minor is not unproblematic - still require 
some level of enforcement) the Inquiry formed the view that there had been insufficient 
strategic targeting of enforcement activities. In particular, the demonstrable pursuit of 
systemic offenders such as recalcitrant operators as well as prosecutions against higher chain 
parties such as customers and consignors is likely to have a far more substantial deterrent 
effect than present activities.  
 
The Inquiry believes regulatory agencies are moving in this direction but too slowly. Similar 
problems can be identified in the early period of enforcement following the introduction of 
post-Robens model OHS legislation in Australia in the 1980s. To accelerate this process, it 
would be valuable if part of the increase in enforcement funding was specifically devoted to 
this issue, including retraining regulatory agencies. At the same time, some attention needs to 
be given to the level of resourcing of on-road enforcement, including the number of highway 
patrol vehicles covering particular routes. 
 293
6.3 Conclusion 
 
The Inquiry concludes that coordination and resourcing of regulatory activities in 
relation to safety in the long distance trucking industry are major issues that should be 
addressed as a matter of urgency. Specific recommendations are made to address this as 
part of the Code of Practice proposed. 
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SECTION 7 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: INDUSTRY CODE OF PRACTICE 
 
The community expects a high level of safety in all areas of transport. Road users have a right 
to travel the nation's highways without encountering speeding trucks or those driven by 
fatigued drivers. Long haul truck drivers and their families have a right to expect that they can 
perform their tasks efficiently without pressure or inducement to break road safety or other 
regulations, and without exposing themselves to appreciably greater risk than other workers. 
Small, medium and large transport companies have a right to expect that they can undertake 
their business diligently and efficiently within existing regulatory standards and without being 
undercut by less scrupulous operators. Customers/clients, consignors and brokers have a right 
to expect that freight will be delivered efficiently at the lowest price but not a rate or schedule 
that effectively compromises safety standards. Other modes of transport have a right to expect 
that they will not suffer a competitive disadvantage because lower safety standards are 
applied to road transport and there is widespread flouting of even these standards. The 
community has a right to expect that government and its agencies will, as far as possible, 
ensure these outcomes which benefit the community as whole by addressing and if need be 
prosecuting any party failing to meets its obligations under legislation. 
 
As this Report has shown, commercial arrangements that are common in the industry, the 
current regulatory framework and compliance strategies are not conducive to achieving the 
optimal level of safety performance in the industry. Rather, they have resulted in an outcome 
that falls far short of this.  
The key is to address these issues. In other words, there is a critical need to deal with the 
underlying causes of the problems plaguing the industry rather than quick-fix solutions that 
merely address the symptoms.  
 
The Inquiry brief was to develop a Code of Practice for the Industry to address any serious 
problems identified. Codes of Practice, including Industry Codes of Practice, developed under 
occupational health and safety legislation and similar statutes are not voluntary instruments 
(at most they permit more than one method for achieving compliance with an accepted 
standard). Following careful consideration it is also the strongly held view of this Inquiry that 
a voluntary code would be inappropriate and ineffective in the long haul road transport 
industry. The reasons the Inquiry has come to this conclusion are detailed in the Report (but 
see especially Section 5). The Inquiry is aware of discussions of a voluntary national Code of 
Conduct at national level that picks up a number of the problems addressed by this Inquiry. 
While cognizant of the desirability of a nationally consistent this has toe weighed against the 
prospects of such measures actually achieving anything. The Inquiry cannot support a 
voluntary code because to do so would be tantamount to conceding that the safety problems 
faced in the industry should be allowed fester. A similar point can be made in relation to self-
regulation. Transport operators, drivers and other parties like consignors should be 
encouraged to take a more responsible approach. However, as many parties made clear, this 
was only likely to occur in the of context of vigorously enforced external regulation that lifted 
the baseline of safety performance and targeted those operators etc undercutting legitimate 
operators trying to do their business in a professional, legal and ethical manner.   
 
The Code of Practice recommended has four key elements along with eight subsidiary 
elements or recommendations. The four key elements are designed to address problems that 
are the Inquiry found to be the root cause of poor safety performance in the long haul trucking 
industry, including industry structure and commercial practices.  
 
First, there is a pressing need to address a serious coordination problem amongst regulatory 
agencies responsible for safety in the long distance trucking industry to achieve a more 
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coordinated, strategic and effective compliance program. It is recommended that a Long 
Distance Trucking Safety Authority be established in New South Wales with the 
responsibility of coordinating safety strategies in relation to the industry and undertaking its 
own investigative and compliance activities. The Authority should include a small 
inspectorate to undertake targeted compliance programs under the NSW OHS Act. Inspectors 
will also have powers under Road Transport and Industrial Relations legislation. 
 
Second, there is universal agreement that one of the key problems that beset the industry is 
that it is too easy for inexperienced, ill-prepared and heavily indebted operators to enter the 
industry and for rogue operators to continue to operate with impunity. Existing reactive forms 
of regulation and enforcement are incapable of addressing this situation and what is needed is 
a more proactive and resource efficient method of ensuring that those wishing to enter the 
industry meet certain basic standards and that those already operating meet basic safety 
performance standards. Therefore, the second element of the Code is an operator licensing 
system that extends to consignors and loading agents (so that they too meet certain basic 
standards). The Long Distance Trucking Safety Authority will be responsible for 
administering a compulsory licensing system covering operators (including owner/drivers), 
freight forwarders, consignors and brokers/agents. The licensing system will ensure all 
operators meet basic business skill, OHS and other performance standards so they can 
undertake their tasks safely and so other parties, like consignors and agents are fully aware of 
their OHS and public safety responsibilities. 
 
Third, there is overwhelming evidence that the existing logbook system fails to regulate 
driving hours while there is also need for a simple document detailing other safety-related 
matters so that customers, freight forwarders, operators and drivers can plan trips safely 
(commensurate with their responsibility and control). Regulators and enforcement officers 
also need a document that specifies basic safety information to assist their compliance 
activities. Thus, another key element of the code is replacing the existing logbook system with 
a trip-based document. All trucks undertaking one way trips of more than 100km in NSW will 
be required to carry a Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement with copies of the 
plan to held and signed off by both the transport company and the client/consignor. This 
requirement will apply to any truck travelling more than 100km in NSW, including those 
crossing into NSW from other states that travel more than 100km in NSW. Failure to comply 
with the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement requirement is to be deemed as 
a breach as of regulation in its own right as well as prima facie evidence of a breach of the 
general duty provisions of the NSW OHS Act. The components of the Safe Driving Plan or 
Safe Driving Method Statement are detailed in the Report. 
 
Fourth, the final key element in the Code is the enforcement of minimum payments to drivers, 
including owner/drivers. Minimum award rates to employee drivers and safety-based 
payments for owner/drivers are essential for long-term safety in the industry. To address these 
two overlapping issues there are two sets of recommendations. First, it is recommended that 
additional resources be allocated to award enforcement in NSW and that more proactive 
forms of enforcement be undertaken. Further, the NSW government should seek the 
collaboration of other jurisdictions in matching measures. Second, that minimum legally 
enforceable 'safety rates' be established for owner/drivers to be decided by panel of the 
Industrial Relations Commission of NSW from applications made to it by the Long Distance 
Trucking Authority. Further, it is recommended that the NSW government seek 
corresponding measures from other jurisdictions. 
 
The remainder of this section will outline the elements of the Code in detail.  
 
7.1 Achieving a coordinated strategic approach to regulating safety in long haul road 
transport 
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There is a pressing need to address a serious coordination problem amongst regulatory 
agencies responsible for safety in the long distance trucking industry to achieve a more 
coordinated, strategic and effective compliance program. To achieve this in NSW a 
coordinating mechanism is required which could serve a number of related functions, without 
compromising the legitimate and essential roles of the Police, RTA etc.  What is needed is 
more than committee-based collaboration as the role is too demanding and this approach has 
been tried and failed in the past.  Rather, there is need to establish a formal body. As noted in 
the body of the Report, there is already a model for this with the Tow Truck Authority of New 
South Wales, which has worked well. In New South Wales there are approximately 7,000 tow 
trucks registered with the Tow Truck Authority whereas, by way of comparison, time there 
are at least 30,000 registered for-hire long haul trucks operating in this state. If the 
government considers it appropriate to set up the Tow Truck Authority to govern that industry 
it seems that it would be appropriate for it to set up this recommended Authority for the long 
haul trucking industry. Not only are the number of people involved much greater but the 
industry itself is more vital to the overall economic well being of the community. As set out in 
this Report, the considerations sufficient to justify establishment of such an authority are 
extensive and serious and require that firm and positive methods be adopted to rectify the 
situation.  
 
The function of the Authority would be to coordinate information exchange (and the 
collection of relevant information from various agencies) and compliance strategies in 
relation to safety in the long distance trucking industry as well as to directly carry out a 
number of specific functions identified below.  
 
It is therefore recommended that the Parliament of the State of New South Wales pass 
appropriate legislation to establish a new Authority that could be known as the Long Haul 
Road Trucking Safety Authority or by some other suitable name. Legislation should also be 
enacted to effect the other recommendations set out herein, either in the Act that establishes 
the Authority or by amendments to other relevant statutes. The recommended legislation 
could be called the Trucking Safety Authority Act. It is envisaged that the proposed new 
legislation would to a considerable degree unify and bring together the various aspects of the 
different acts that apply to the industry. The Authority itself would then in addition coordinate 
other regulations and the activities of other bodies in so far as they apply to the industry. 
 
It would be the purpose of the Long Haul Trucking Safety Authority to - 
(a) coordinate with other departments and authorities in NSW in so far as these are 
related to long haul truck operation including the collection of relevant information 
from all agencies,  
 
(b) make recommendations to those departments and authorities with regard to the 
development, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, 
  
(c) implement the reforms which the government would legislate to apply the 
recommendations set out herein and others which it considers appropriate,  
 
(d) run the inspectorate with primary powers of enforcement under the NSW 
Occupational Health and Safety Act as well as relevant sections of road transport and 
industrial relations legislation, to liaise with industry organisations to facilitate the 
safe and efficient operation of the industry in all its aspects, 
 
(e) promote an awareness amongst clients, consignors, brokers and other parties aside 
from operators and drivers of their responsibilities in relation to safety in the long 
haul road transport industry 
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(f) provide personnel to educate those involved in the industry on the best and most 
appropriate means of achieving the purposes of the industry for the overall benefit of 
the community  
 
(g) liaise with relevant agencies in other jurisdictions and at national level 
 
The Authority would be governed by a Council that would also act as the formal coordination 
mechanism for government agencies responsible for truck safety along with representation of 
truck drivers, transport operators and the community and other road users. The Council could 
be established by the legislation used to establish the Authority and the Board (see below), the 
proposed Trucking Authority Act. 
 
It is proposed that the Council consist of the following representatives: 
 
(a) the General Manager of the Authority itself 
(b) one person appointed by the Minister or Ministers responsible as representatives of each 
of the following organisations: 
(i) The NSW Police Force 
(ii) The Roads and Traffic Authority  
(iii) WorkCover NSW 
(iv) The Motor Accidents Authority  
(v) The Department of Industrial Relations,  
(vi) The NSW Coroner 
(vii) The NSW Road Transport Association,  
(viii) The Transport Workers Union  
(ix) The Concerned Families of Australian Truckies  
 
This structure ensures that all key agencies are represented along with the major NSW 
industry association, the union representing drivers, a body representing the families of 
drivers and the NRMA, representing motorists/road users. In the course of investigation the 
Inquiry was convinced of the justification of nominating these organisations as especially 
important, and evidence supporting this selection can be found in the Report. While other 
bodies have legitimate interest in trucking safety, they claims to inclusion are not as 
compelling as those included and to add to membership adds the risk of making the Council 
unwieldy. 
 
Above the level of the Council, a Board should be established to oversee the immediate 
operations of the Authority. The Board should consist of the General Manager, a chairperson 
and a deputy chairperson would run the proposed Authority. It would be the responsibility of 
the General Manager to actually administer the Authority on a day-to-day basis. The 
chairperson and the deputy chairperson would be appointed by the responsible Minister or 
Ministers as part time members and as representative of the government of the day. The 
Board would determine the aims and policies of the Authority and the General Manger would 
administer the Authority in accordance with those aims and policies as determined by the 
Board. As well as determining the aims and general policies of the Authority the Board would 
be responsible for the overall planning of the work to be done by the Authority, including all 
of the obligations that might be imposed on the Authority by any statute. The General 
Manager would apply the decisions of the Board in all areas and the Board would be 
responsible for seeing that the General Manger was carrying out his responsibilities in 
accordance with their determinations. 
 
It is proposed that such an Authority would be self-financing rather than financed by the 
community at large.  Although the benefits accruing from the operations of the Authority will 
be for the whole community it is nevertheless primarily for the industry and those involved in 
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the industry to enable it to function properly and effectively. It is appropriate therefore that it 
be financed by the industry itself rather than be a burden on the whole community. 
 
Initially it would need to be financed by the government in order that it be able to be 
established and so that it can itself set up the framework for the self financing of its 
operations. As the benefits to the overall community are in an industry which is vital to the 
operations of the economy it is appropriate that the community should be willing to pay this 
price to make sure that this industry runs effectively, efficiently and safely. Once it has been 
established the Authority could fund itself on a continuing basis from the revenues to be 
received from the following - 
 
(a) the licence fees which would be made compulsory under the proposed legislation 
(b) the revenue deriving from the enforcement activities of the Authority itself 
(c) a levy of Compulsory Third Party Insurance premiums 
(d) other funding activities which the Authority might consider to be appropriate in the 
conduct of its operations 
 
In order to facilitate information flows the Trucking Safety Authority should establish an 
Internet site that would include up-to-date information on:  
 
• Up to date national and state data on OHS performance in the industry with sector 
breakdowns (eg livestock) where possible and international benchmarks 
• Government or Authorities policies  
• accreditation requirements 
• any new or proposed trucking legislation  
• industrial rights and entitlements 
• fatigue management 
• load securing 
• ergonomics 
• vehicle performance comparisons  
• manual handling 
• trucking industry statistics and data base not specific to OHS 
• drug and alcohol education programs 
• business skills education 
• occupational health and safety information aside from the data mentioned above 
(including survey results, relevant publications etc) 
• training and qualification issues 
• electronic training Internet program 
• environmental issues 
• new technology 
• regular list of principal contractors and their subcontractors 
 
It is proposed that the site would contain links to other trucking industry web sites and 
industry electronic surveys. 
 
The Inquiry recognises that, while a statutory authority is its preferred option, another 
structural arrangement may achieve the same outcome, namely establishing a Permanent 
Taskforce chaired by the Motor Accidents Authority and with representatives of all the 
relevant government agencies to carry out the role identified in relation to the Authority. If the 
latter option is pursued then suitable safeguards (including meaningful benchmarks and 
reporting requirements) should be put in place to ensure the Taskforce can and does carry out 
its task of facilitating a more coordinated and proactive approach to regulation. Further, if the 
Taskforce rather than Authority option is pursued then suitable arrangements will need to be 
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made for administering the licensing system, inspectorate and other compliance measures 
proposed below. As the New Zealand experience all too clearly shows, if the compliance 
regime is not suitably resourced and implemented then it will amount to little more than 
tokenism. 
  
Authority Inspectorate 
 
To ensure that the Authority can carry out its functions effectively the Authority requires a 
small inspectorate. The two most critical functions of the inspectorate will be in the areas of 
detecting and prosecuting serious breaches of OHS legislation (especially in connection to the 
Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement) and helping to administer/enforce the 
new operator licensing system proposed below. The grounds for the latter will be discussed 
below but in relation to the former the following points can be made.  
 
As the Inquiry has been at some pains to demonstrate, the long distance trucking industry is 
presently subject to a piecemeal array of legislation directly addressing or significantly 
affecting safety including road transport legislation, environmental legislation, OHS 
legislation and industrial relations legislation. In short, the industry is governed by various 
pieces of legislation that are applied by different departments and authorities with varying 
degrees of effectiveness. Overall, current enforcement practices remain too driver focused 
leaving other parties such as operators and more especially consignors, agents/brokers and 
customers largely exempt from responsibility for the safety consequences of their actions. 
Attempts to address these deficiencies have their own limitations. For example, the ‘three 
strikes’ scheme has encountered serious jurisdictional hurdles. Likewise, chain of 
responsibility initiative, while having potential, is seriously deficient in a number of respects 
including scope, the level of penalties, as well as a proven pattern implementation sufficient 
to change industry practices. There is also insufficient proactive compliance activity in 
relation to award evasion. Finally, while the OHS Act does cover the industry and provides 
both in the view of this Inquiry and an opinion prepared by a eminent legal expert (see 
Appendix 3), an demonstrably superior remedy (in terms of scope and remedies) for serious 
breaches it has not been used. This situation must be rectified and a better mix of enforcement 
tools provided for. 
 
It is recommended that the Authority inspectors be given the full power under the NSW OHS 
Act of WorkCover inspectors (with appropriate training) plus some inspectoral powers under 
road transport and perhaps industrial relations legislation. The primary object of Authority 
inspectors will be to enforce provisions of the NSW OHS Act. Inspectors will receive both 
training appropriate to this as well as training in matters relevant to trucking industry. 
Existing knowledge of the industry may be a distinct advantage to inspectors and this may be 
taken into account in selection. Granting them some powers under road transport legislation is 
primarily to ensure that inspectors are aware of technical specifications (relating to vehicles, 
overloading and the like) and requirements of road transport legislation and can work 
effectively with RTA inspectors and Police during coordinated campaigns or blitzes and the 
like. Authority inspectors will not take on the tasks now undertaken by the RTA and Police 
but will be able to cooperate with them and enable an optimal mix of compliance tools are 
used to meet the circumstances of both particular incidents and the enforcement strategy as 
whole. The alternative of WorkCover allocating some of its own inspectors to this task is not 
favoured. The WorkCover submission to the Inquiry expressed reservations about taking a 
strong role in road transport (preferring the RTA as the lead agency) and its resources are 
already arguable stretched. Far more importantly, there are distinct advantages in having a 
dedicated inspectorate in an industry with a complex array of overlapping legislation and need 
to collaborate with other agencies, as well as the need to understand specific commercial 
arrangements and the long history of regulatory evasion.  The Inspectorate will also play a 
critical role in terms of detecting and the launching of ‘up the chain’ (ie operators, consignors, 
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freight forwarders and clients) prosecutions for failure to comply with OHS Act general 
duties using the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement discussed below. 
 
The Authority would need to be able to recruit inspectors from persons already involved in 
the industry who were suitable. It would also need to have a program of continuing 
recruitment and education so that it could maintain an appropriate supply of inspectors to 
carry out this work of supervision and enforcement. 
 
Prosecutions under the Trucking Industry Authority Act would, as with other prosecutions 
under the NSW OHS Act be lodged with the Industrial Relations Commission by the 
Inspectorate. 
 
Licensing of Operators, Freight Forwarders, Consignors and others  
 
It is proposed that the legislation that establishes the Authority should also require all for-hire 
long haul operators, suppliers, freight forwarders, consignors to hold a licence for this 
purpose. It would not be legal for anyone to operate in the industry without such a licence and 
any such operation would be appropriately penalised. 
 
The reasons for recommending this change are detailed at considerable length in the Report 
but can be briefly summarised here. Virtually every party giving evidence to the Inquiry 
accepted that the combination of ease of entry to the industry, poor business practices and 
limited knowledge of OHS and other vital information was a serious safety problem. The 
National Road Freight Industrial Inquiry (May et al 1984) proposed this should be addressed 
by a mandatory licensing system so operators and other key players needed to meet basic 
performance standards. It is now history that the proposal was legislated for but not 
implemented, and safety in the industry deteriorated, culminating in the Cowper smash in 
1989 (the Inquest into which echoed the need for operator licensing). A vigorous legislative 
response but not licensing achieved improvements over the next two years but since then no 
improvement in the absolute level of fatalities has been recorded. The present level of 
fatalities involving articulated trucks remains unacceptable and there are other disturbing 
trends that we ignore at our peril. In the view of this Inquiry the reasons advanced by the 
National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et al 1984) for operator licensing were and 
remain sound, especially as like this Inquiry it recognised the critical impact of commercial 
practices on safety. As recent events in air transport indicate, such observations are hardly 
confined to road transport.  
 
Given the complex and diverse web of commercial arrangements pertaining to the delivery of 
freight, as well as the capacity of other parties to affect this, licensing should extend to 
consignors and freight forwarders. This principle was accepted as part of the operator-
licensing model proposed by the May Inquiry in 1984. While parties to this Inquiry expressed 
differing opinions as to whether lifting operator standards could be achieved by voluntary 
accreditation schemes (perhaps with incentives) such as TruckSafe or needs to be mandated 
the firm conclusion drawn here is that only the latter will achieve the desired result. For 
reasons expanded on in the Report no voluntary has indicated anywhere near the potential to 
recruit a substantial number of operators. The use of incentives is very unlikely to alter this 
and carries its own limitations. Further, those operators most resistant to voluntary schemes 
are precisely those who should be obliged to demonstrate a certain level of competence.  
 
The Inquiry examined reasons advanced for not adopting the licensing model. The argument 
that a voluntary system will achieve the same result had already been dealt with. Other 
arguments were that the licensing model was impractical, would not work and that license 
fees would be used to raise funds rather than simply administer the scheme. In terms of 
practicality/effectiveness, the Inquiry will simply make several observations. First, operator-
licensing schemes have been introduced in a number of other countries including the UK and 
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New Zealand. The licensing system was established in New Zealand under the Transport 
Services Licensing Act (1989). This Act establishes that before any person can hold the 
relevant licence in New Zealand then he or she has to show that they have a working 
knowledge of the law and practice with regard to the safe and proper operation of the industry 
in which they are engaged. The Act also provides that where a person does not conduct 
themselves in the industry in accordance with the requirements of public and industry safety 
then they can lose their licence and be removed from the industry. While, the effectiveness of 
schemes has been subject to some debate, with apparently better outcomes in the UK than 
New Zealand, the Inquiry believes that limitations here are largely a product of failings in 
terms of implementation/enforcement of the scheme rather than the general principle. Second, 
while operator licensing is seen as unacceptable by some sections of the road transport 
industry this is a proactive form of regulation, which places the burden of compliance on the 
operator rather than the enforcement agency. It is generally regarded as more cost efficient 
and effective than reactive enforcement (ie detecting and punishing offenders) - an approach 
some sections of the industry are all too adept at flouting. Further, the necessity and value of 
operator licensing is not questioned with regard to other modes of transport such as rail and 
air transport. It seems wholly unacceptable to this Inquiry that, notwithstanding some recent 
events, generally rigorous operator licensing is applied to air and rail transport in the interests 
of public and occupational safety but no similar requirement is applied to long haul road 
transport. Despite the fact the long haul road transport industry poses a far greater danger as 
measured by deaths and serious injury to its workers and the public it escapes the burden of 
meeting even a very basic version of the requirements placed on its major competitor. This is 
not logical in terms of transport policy and it is unacceptable in terms of public safety and 
OHS policies.  
 
The Inquiry is sympathetic to the view that licensing should not become a revenue-raising 
device. This is not an argument against operator licensing per se. The fees raised from 
licensing should be restricted to covering the costs of administering the scheme and 
promoting higher standards of safety in the industry.  
 
 
(i) Basic Licence Requirements for Operators and Freight Forwarders 
 
Prior to the granting of a license it would be necessary for the applicant to be able to show a 
minimum standard of knowledge with regard to the areas relevant to the industry, for example 
- 
 
• Safe Driving Plan and community responsibilities 
• applicable legislation 
• knowledge of work pricing 
• driver rights and obligations 
• occupational health and safety 
• vehicle loading, load restraint and maintenance 
• management of fatigue 
• drug awareness 
• communication 
• business practices and marketing 
• employer rights and obligations 
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 The license requirement will apply to all for-hire freight operators. Some consideration should 
be given for large (ie with more than 20 trucks) not-for-hire operators of heavy vehicles 
engaged in long haul road freight transport tasks but the licensing system should not be 
directed at small not-for-hire truck fleet owners.  
 
The Authority will be empowered to set the appropriate benchmarks for meeting the terms of 
the license and the procedures for establishing whether license conditions have been met, and 
appropriate auditing devices to ensure that these standards are maintained after issuing of the 
license.  
 
Appropriate training mechanisms for delivery of appropriate training to meet license 
standards should be developed in conjunction with TAFE. The licensing system would remain 
distinct from the eight or so voluntary accreditation schemes such as TruckSafe, Truckcare 
and TransCare, There is room for accreditation schemes to exist alongside the proposed 
licensing system. Because of the small number of operators actually covered by the voluntary 
accreditation schemes there is no question of competing interests. The licensing system will 
apply to all who are involved in the industry. The accreditation schemes will still be open, as 
they are now, to those who wish to participate. They may develop a valuable niche in terms of 
moving from often very basic schemes to helping operators to achieve performance levels 
beyond those required for licensing purposes. 
 
Transitional arrangements will apply to existing operators. These operators will be given a set 
period to demonstrate knowledge in the key areas identified above and obtain a license. This 
may be achieved in progressive stages so long as a overall deadline is met. It is the view of 
this Inquiry that all operators should hold a basic license within two years of the 
commencement of the scheme at the very latest. It might be appropriate that an entrant into 
the industry be allowed to operate on a very minimum knowledge of these matters for a 
period of time with activities subject to certain restrictions. To get a full licence the applicant 
would then need to show a more extensive knowledge of these various areas. 
 
(ii) Consignors, Loading Agents/Brokers and Certain Shippers/Suppliers also to be licensed 
 
The need for an operating license will also extend to consignors, loading agents and certain 
suppliers/load owners (namely those moving more than 10 long distance loads per year). This 
modified license will require these parties to demonstrate their knowledge of applicable 
legislation and regulatory requirements in relation to safety (including the Safe Driving Plan). 
They will also need to demonstrate knowledge their own specific responsibilities in terms the 
safety 'chain'. 
 
(iii) Appropriate Financial Advice 
 
As pointed out previously in this report one of the problems in the industry is that operators 
have no real financial knowledge or understanding of the industry and this can lead them into 
real financial difficulties. It might be made a condition of the granting of a full operators 
licence that such operator be able to provide evidence that he had received proper advise from 
an accredited financial adviser. 
 
The Authority could keep a register of persons accredited to provide such advice and any 
suitably qualified adviser would be permitted to be included on the register subject to 
satisfying the Authority of his or her qualifications. 
 
(iii) Penalties/Withdrawal of the Licence 
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The ultimate instrument for enforcing the necessary standards within the industry will be the 
power of the Authority, through its inspectorate, to withdraw the licence of an operator. 
 
With regard to ordinary breaches of regulations and safety standards the Authority would be 
expected to impose a fine or some other penalty. Where an operator consistently shows a 
deliberate or reckless disregard for the overall welfare of the industry and the community then 
the Authority will be able to remove or suspend that party from participation in the industry. 
 
Offences would be dealt with by a Magistrate in the Local Court or by the Industrial 
Commission. 
 
Penalties would be, where applicable, those imposed by the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act. A percentage of these impositions could be allocated to financing the Trucking Industry 
Authority. This would also give the Authority an incentive to pursue its obligations with some 
vigour. 
 
7.2 Introduction of Safety Driving Plan Trip Document  
 
The second main recommendation of this Inquiry for inclusion in the Code of Practice is the 
creation of a new one-page safe work statement to be issued for every freight delivery task of 
more than 100 kilometers (for a discussion of legal aspects of implementing the plan see 
Appendix 2). This document to be known as the 'Safe Driving Plan’ or ‘Safe Driving Method 
Statement' will replace the present logbook system and also provide a single (and therefore 
easily accessible) reference point for critical safety-related information, directly related to the 
risk factors identified in this Inquiry.  As the document will be prepared and signed in 
conjunction by the customer/consignor and the transport operator completing the task it will 
provide (with multiple copies to be retained by the parties and carried on the truck) it will 
bring all parties into the 'regulatory loop'. The Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method 
Statement will also provide a ready basis for auditing/enforcement in relation to on-road 
inspections and the detection of systematic evasion by a party over a period of time.  
 
In brief, the reasons for recommending the introduction of the Safe Driving Plan or Safe 
Driving Method Statement trip document are as follows: 
 
• Evidence provided to the Inquiry by drivers, companies and industry associations, 
government bodies, the TWU and others was virtually unanimous in suggesting the 
logbook system was not working and, indeed, had been abused over many years. The 
reasons for this are detailed in the report but include the ease of forging entries and the 
onus placed on the driver who may be pressured or induced to cheat the system. For 
reasons that will be detailed below the new system avoids most if not all of these 
problems. It should be noted that the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et al, 
1984:174-183) proposed a standard industry trip document addressing a range of safety 
issues in response to some of the very problems identified by this Inquiry.  
• By requiring specification of driving, work and significant rest breaks over the 24 hours 
prior to the trip, the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement will be 
compatible with enforcement of the new fatigue management regimes being used in the 
industry than the present log book system. 
• There is a need to bring all key safety relevant material into a single accessible source, 
which identifies and is signed by the responsible parties. The Safe Driving Plan or Safe 
Driving Method Statement provides a means to directly address the link between 
commercial practices and safety. At the same time the system will afford protection to 
those parties who undertake their commercial practices legally by providing a means of 
demonstrating due diligence in this regard. Again, it should be noted that the model trip 
plan proposed under the National Road Freight Industry Inquiry (May et al 1984:176-
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177) specifically included shipper/load owner and prime contractor details. In other 
words, the need to include these bodies has long been recognised. 
• The Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement document will be a single page 
A4 document that can be readily copied or faxed (if not transmitted electronically). The 
Plan will also counter the growing problem for enforcement agencies of e-commerce 
eliminating a paper trail of verifiable documents. 
• As detailed in the Report and Driver Survey (Appendix 3), safe work plan systems have 
been successfully used in other industries, notably construction which, like road transport, 
has a large number of small operators/subcontractors (and if anything more complex array 
of tasks to address in terms of this plan). 
• By establishing multiple copies held and signed by the responsible parties the risk of 
misunderstanding or possibility of forging the document is greatly reduced and the 
document provides a basis of auditing and prosecution. By providing an independent set 
of records it will reduce the current unsatisfactory onus on drivers having to testify 
against their employer or customer, with the risk (made all too clear to this Inquiry) of 
losing their job/damaging future work prospects. 
 
Details of the Scheme 
 
A one-page document entitled a 'Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement' is to be 
introduced into the long haul road transport industry with a specified format and unique 
identifier to be issued to operators by the Long Haul Trucking Safety Authority. The 
introduction of this scheme could be accomplished under the Trucking Authority Act with 
accompanying amendments to Road Transport and OHS legislation in NSW. 
 
A model for the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement is attached (see Special 
Appendix) but the main contents are: 
 
(i) drivers details and operating license number 
 
(ii) name and contact details of owner of vehicle including operating license plus 
principle contractor details where the task has been subcontracted 
 
(iii) name and contact details of customer including industry operating license 
 
(iv) insurance details 
 
(v) speedometer reading on truck prior to departure 
 
(vi) details of trip, specifying departure point and time, destination, route to be used and 
time for journey (expressed as range of a minimum number of hours with allowances 
for variations). A central database could be established through the Authority to 
provide calculations of reasonable trip times on different routes and at different times 
which could be accessed by companies. 
(vii) details (totals and time periods) of time driver spent in 24 hours immediately prior to 
departure in (1) driving including local deliveries (2) other work activities such as 
loading, and (3) significant rest breaks (ie six hours or more). In practice, the Safe 
Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement document/s relating to the prior 24 
hours will assist in the preparation of any subsequent document by indicating hours 
spent driving. Each plan should identify the unique number of the most recent plan 
completed prior to the current trip. 
 
(viii) rate paid to driver for the job (For employee drivers this will be at least the relevant 
minimum award rate expressed as a total amount. For owner/drivers it will be at least 
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the 'safety rate'  [see below] expressed as a total amount) and specifying payment to 
be made within 14 days. This claim to be made against the principle contractor where 
a subcontracting of the freight task has occurred. The Safe Driving Plan or Safe 
Driving Method Statement document will constitute evidence of the claim that will 
proceed on the basis of a rebuttable presumption (ie the onus will be on the employer 
or contractor to demonstrate the payment is not owed) before a Magistrate in a Local 
Court or the Industrial Relations Commission. The use of bonus/penalty payments in 
connection with delivery times/schedules is prohibited [see below]. 
 
(ix) the demurrage rate (and payment to driver) to apply if the truck is not unloaded 
within one hour of arrival (demurrage to be mandatory and payment to drivers at least 
the award rate for employee drivers and the 'safety rate' [see below] for owner 
drivers). 
 
(x) an undertaking by the operator that the truck has no defects/maintenance problems 
and the load has been properly restrained 
 
(xi) an undertaking by both the operator and client that the truck has not been overloaded 
 
(xii) identifying whether hazardous/dangerous freight are being carried 
 
These details (apart from driver details and precise departure date) will be agreed to between 
the transport operator and the consignor/freight forwarder or load owner. When a driver 
collects a load he and the consignor/freight forwarder/client will complete outstanding details 
on the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement. The plan form will need to entail 
multiple copies, and. self-carbonating paper would seem to be appropriate. Both parties will 
then sign the form.  
 
A copy of the completed form will stay with the freight forwarder/consignor 
(a) Two copies will go with the driver along with one copy of the Safe Driving Plan for the 
trip completed by that driver immediately prior to this trip (for use as verification by on-
road enforcement officers) 
(b) At arrival at the delivery point the driver and the recipient will complete the details on the 
speedometer reading at time of arrival, actual arrival time, total time taken for rest breaks 
and any other trips or side trips. 
 
It will be necessary for the recipient then to execute the form and retain a copy for his own 
records and for audit by the RTA or Authority inspectorate. 
 
Two copies of the plan are to be carried by every truck (along with one copy of the plan 
pertaining to the previous trip undertaken by that driver) and further copies are to be held by 
both the client/consignor.  The Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement will 
provide an audit trail for the courts and the agencies responsible for safety in the long haul 
trucking industry, namely the NSW Police, RTA and Long Haul Trucking Authority 
inspectorate. This would provide a practical means by which these organisations are able to 
enforce legislative and regulatory requirements and provide owner/drivers a mechanism to 
address belated payment. An authorised officer (RTA, Police or Inspectorate) could retain one 
of the copies held on a truck during an on-road inspection (so long as this is duly noted on the 
remaining copy). 
For reasons identified in the Report but summarised below, the requirement for a Safe 
Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement should primarily be enacted under the NSW 
Occupational Health and Safety Act. However there should be corresponding provisions in 
road transport legislation so Police and the RTA can undertake on-road enforcement and so 
offences in relation to the plan can be used under the RTA's 'three strikes' program (including 
use of Safe-T-Cam). The requirement to carry a plan would apply to any for-hire freight truck 
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originating in NSW that carries freight on a single trip more than 100 kilometers and any for-
hire freight truck originating outside NSW that carries freight on a single trip more than 100 
kilometers on a NSW road.  
 
Failure of a truck so designated to carry a plan, to carry an inaccurate or forged plan or the 
issuing of false or misleading plans by a transport operator, freight forwarder, consignor or 
supplier, or the failure of these parties to retain or supply records to an authorised inspector 
will constitute an offence under the Act (with suitable extension of this to the Police and RTA 
under road transport legislation). Failure to comply will also be deemed to be prima facie 
evidence of a breach of the relevant general duty provisions of the NSW Occupational Health 
and Safety Act (measures for achieving this are presented in the legal issues paper prepared 
by Associate Professor Richard Johnstone. See Appendix 2). Trucking Authority inspectors, 
Police, RTA and associations registered under the Industrial Relations Acts will also be 
empowered to check Driving Plan documents against wage-books/time sheets, tachograph 
records, Safe-T-Cam records and other relevant sources. The option of the RTA suspending 
or cancelling the driving privileges of operators, including interstate operators will extend to 
those operators refusing to supply their Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement 
records.  
 
Because the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement is completed at different 
stages and by three different parties it will be more difficult to forge and it is less likely that 
there will be collusion between the various parties involved in the transaction. Should it ever 
be shown that this has taken place then the penalties under the Act should be severe in order 
to discourage the development of any such practice. In such a situation the penalties should be 
directed against receiver and sender. This would act as an incentive to discourage any party 
from allowing any other party to indulge in any such practice. 
 
There are a number of clear advantages in using the NSW Occupational Health and Safety 
Act as the relevant head of power for the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method 
Statement.  
 
First, the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act includes wide-ranging general duty 
provisions and there is a proven basis for enforcing these. This includes coverage of 
consignors and clients, although a limitation affecting both their and others duties in Sections 
8 and 9 of the Act has been identified in the legal advice appended to this Report. This 
limitation, which is confined to the NSW Act and not found in other jurisdictions, should be 
addressed and an amendment to achieve this is recommended to achieve this. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, the attached legal opinion finds that, in comparison to 'chain 
of responsibility' road transport legislation, the Occupational Health and Safety has the 
potential to provide for more comprehensive regulation of the long distance trucking industry. 
The Act provides remedies demonstrably more likely to deter serious 'system' and higher 
chain (ie freight forwarder, consignor and client) offences.  
 
Second, as any truck travelling in NSW can and should be deemed a NSW workplace there is 
no jurisdictional issue in terms of invoking the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method 
Statement requirement on both NSW-based and interstate vehicles. Irrespective of whether 
the jurisdictional issues raised in connection with state and federal road transport legislation 
are exaggerated or not, the Occupational Health and Safety Act should provide a platform 
where these issues are simply irrelevant. 
 
Third, as a single page document the plan represents a simple device that nonetheless brings 
critical safety-related issues together and while relatively straightforward to prepare will 
encourage more systematic assessment and management of safety by the operator that is 
integrated into their normal business functions. 
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Fourth, the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement has a good fit with the 
fatigue management regimes being implemented by more progressive companies in the 
industry. It can also be used in conjunction with a specific risk assessment document and 
several models of this are attached to the full Report. 
 
The Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement provides the basis for simple and 
effective enforcement of key safety issues. For LDTSA inspectors the plans establish an audit 
trail of documents than be crosschecked in relation to the driver, the transport 
company/freight forwarder and consignor/load owner. Unlike logbooks, the plans have to be 
verified/endorsed by the transport operator and load owner (in keeping with their 
responsibilities) and as there are multiple copies of each plan, evasion or doctoring is more 
difficult and any inconsistency between copies would immediately alert LDTSA inspectors to 
a problem. As already noted, failure to comply the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method 
Statement requirements in any way should be deemed as prima facie evidence of a breach of 
the relevant general duty provisions of the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act. This, in 
turn, can readily lead to an action against the driver but more importantly against the transport 
company/principal transport contractor (where a subcontracting chain exists) or the client or 
load owner. In other words, the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement provides 
an instrument for implementing a chain of responsibility and one that, unlike the current road 
transport chain model, can conceivably deal with all major aspects of safety. By following the 
OHS regulatory model it is not only able to draw on a clear record of successful prosecutions 
for serious offences but also invoke, where warranted, far more severe penalties than those 
currently available under chain of responsibility in road transport legislation. Thus, it provides 
a way of shifting compliance balance away from an overwhelmingly driver-based focus to a 
more systems focus on all the parties (including drivers) with responsibilities for OHS.  
 
It is the strongly held belief of this Report that this regime will encourage the patterns of 
internal responsibility that a number of industry spokespersons have been calling for. It will 
be in the interest of all operators to ensure that their trucks are driven in compliance with 
existing laws and to take actions to achieve this (through driver selection, training and 
supervision; contract/tendering arrangements; work scheduling and the like). Likewise, load 
owners will able to ensure that in relation to those aspects which they have control, trucks are 
not used in a manner which breaches legislation.  
 
The Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement also provides a platform for a more 
integrated compliance regime in terms of the various regulatory agencies. As a one-page 
document the plan can be readily consulted and assessed, not just by LDTSA inspectors but 
also by on-road RTA inspectors and police officers (with a minimal amount of training).  
 
7.3 Amend section 8(2) of the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000 
 
To facilitate the more effective implementation of the above recommendation the expression 
“while they are at the employer’s place of work” should be removed from section 8(2) of the 
OHSA 2000 (NSW), so that it resembles section 22 of the Victorian Act. Similar amendments 
should be made to section 9 of the OHSA(NSW) (the self-employed person’s duty). 
 
7.4 Prohibition of bonus/ penalty payments in relation to delivery time/scheduling 
 
Evidence given to this Inquiry has confirmed the findings of earlier research and inquiries that 
the payment of bonuses or penalties in relation to arrival time constitutes a powerful 
inducement to unsafe driving practices such as speeding and 'out of hours' driving. In one 
instance evidence was given that a driver subjected to these pressure took risks that ultimately 
resulted in the death of his son who was travelling with him. More responsible operators the 
Inquiry interviewed do not use bonus/penalty payments because they are only too well aware 
of the safety consequences of such inducements. The Inquiry also received evidence that the 
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use of bonus/penalties by transport operators was, at least in part, a response to the pressure 
and unrealistic schedule expectations of some clients and consignors, as well as a more 
general attempt to keep business in a competitive market. The situation where the lives of 
drivers and other road users are endangered the pressure imposed by bonus/penalties is 
unacceptable. This Inquiry strongly recommends that any form of bonus/penalty system in 
relation to delivery time/scheduling be expressly prohibited (this might be done as part of the 
Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement discussed above).  
 
7.5 Enforcement of minimum award rates and introduction of a safety rate for 
owner/drivers 
 
Evidence presented to the Inquiry indicates that low payments to drivers, including the failure 
to enforce minimum award rates for employee drivers and the lack of an enforceable system 
of rates for owner/drivers, is directly related to safety problems in the industry. As already 
implied there are two aspects to this problem, the failure to effectively enforce minimum 
award rates in relation to employed drivers and the absence of a minimum rate for 
owner/drivers. To address these overlapping but distinct problems the Inquiry would make 
two sets of recommendations. 
 
Award enforcement and Employee Drivers 
 
Award enforcement in the long distance trucking industry has been largely if not entirely 
complaint based in recent years and this approach, as recognised by industry associations as 
well as the TWU, has little impact on dissuading what amounts to evasion of the law. The 
Inquiry recommends that a more proactive and better-resourced approach is urgently needed. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that the NSW government allocate additional inspectors with 
specific responsibilities to this area from inspectors from the proposed Long Distance 
Trucking Safety Authority be empowered to undertake these tasks. Regions or operators most 
likely to be engaged in award evasion should be identified and targeted. Evidence given to the 
Inquiry provides some indication of those areas deserving of investigation.  
 
Given the interstate nature of the industry it is also recommended that the NSW Government 
or its Department of Industrial Relations approach counterpart agencies at state and federal 
level to achieve a coordinated approach to increased enforcement activity in this industry. 
Like the recent federal fatigue inquiry, this Inquiry noted with great concern evidence it 
received on Australian Workplace Agreements which presumed average speeds that may well 
give rise to a breach of road transport legislation, occupational health and safety legislation or 
both. This situation requires urgent attention. As far as NSW is concerned, the Inquiry 
recommends that it be requirement to demonstrate that any enterprise agreement covering 
road transport does not compromise standards laid down in appropriate road transport or 
occupational health and safety legislation before it is ratified. 
 
Regulating a safety rate for owner/drivers 
 
There can be no question that the payment of low rates to owner/drivers which do not cover 
normal operating and capital costs and encourage cuts in relation to vehicle maintenance or 
efforts to fit in extra jobs constitute a serious risk to safety. To resolve safety problems in the 
industry it is therefore essential that the issue of rates is addressed to the extent it impacts on 
safety.  
 
The recommendation of the inquiry therefore is that there be established under the existing 
Industrial Relations Commission a special Transport Panel to hear an application from the 
Trucking Industry Authority to set sustainable safe minimum rates, a safety rate. These rates 
would then become part of the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement (see 
above) and be enforceable under occupational health and safety legislation. 
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Prior to making such an application the Authority would consult with the various 
organisations and bodies associated with and involved in the industry. The Authority, under 
its occupational, health and safety powers would then be in a position to enforce the rates 
fixed in this way. Enforcement would then be conducted through the Inspectorate under the 
control of the Trucking Industry Authority. 
 
It must be pointed out that these proposals would only be concerned with fixing the minimum 
safety rate.  They would not be concerned with the overall regulation of the rates that would 
be fixed by the market by those forces at work in the market place. It is plain however that 
there is a necessity for a safety rate to apply. This rate is not only required by the need to 
protect those involved in the industry but on account of the high cost that is presently being 
exacted from the community because of the lack of such a rate. 
 
(i) Transport Panel  
For the proposed purpose it could be appropriate for the Government to appoint a Transport 
Panel under the Industrial Relations Commission. This would have the advantage of tying the 
new body into an existing legal structure and of making use of the resources of an 
organisation that is already established and held in repute by the community. With this would 
come the provisions that already exist to enable the Transport Panel to enforce its rulings 
through the powers of the Commission, especially under the NSW Occupational Health and 
Safety Act.  As noted in the appended legal advice, it is quite feasible for the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act to be amended so that failure to pay the safety rate determined by the 
Transport Panel or another rate (like the federal or state awards covering long distance 
drivers, even if the consignor and driver concerned is not technically covered by the award) is 
prima facie a breach of the relevant general duty provision.     
 
This Transport Panel would be responsible for fixing the minimum sustainable safety rate for 
the industry. The Transport Panel would consist of a specified number of persons with wide 
experience and understanding of the various facets of the industry.  
 
Periodically, the Trucking Industry Authority or other parties would make application to the 
Transport Panel to fix the minimum safety rate in the long haul trucking industry. The 
Trucking Authority would make a submission to the Transport Panel. The Transport Panel 
would then consider that submission and, in doing so, would make itself available to hear 
further submissions from those other parties deemed appropriate under the Industrial 
Relations Act.  The determination of the Transport Panel would, when made, apply to the 
industry until such time as a further application was made by the Authority under its powers 
and determined once again by the Transport Panel. 
 
(ii) Calculations   
The Trucking Authority, when making its application to the Transport Panel for the 
determination of the minimum sustainable safety rate would do this initially by a written 
submission. Such submission would set out the rate that it is applying to have fixed as the 
minimum sustainable safety rate by the Transport Panel. In addition it would need to provide 
the Transport Panel with detailed advice with regard to those matters that it considers to be 
appropriate for the Transport Panel to consider in making its determination. Matters normally 
considered when calculating costs would include the following: 
  
The various types of trucks and trailers 
Distance travelled 
Finance costs 
Insurance costs 
Registration costs 
Fuel costs 
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Administration costs 
Accounting costs 
Taxation 
Industry subscriptions 
Mobile phone charges 
Protective clothing costs 
Loading agents fees 
Load insurance 
Tyres 
Repairs and maintenance 
Owner/driver margin 
Return for labour and administration services 
Profit margin 
 
When an application for determination was lodged by the Authority with the Transport Panel, 
then it would be required for the Authority to notify predetermined parties as set out in the 
Trucking Industry Authority Act and as designated by the Transport Panel itself.  
 
(iii) Deductions from safety rate prohibited 
It shall be an offence for any customer, freight forwarder or operator contracting a driver to 
make any deduction from the safety rate. This is in addition to the prohibition on 
bonus/penalty payments based on delivery time, and includes any deduction made for 
‘administration’, ‘pallet fees’, insurance and the like.  
 
(iv) Waiting Time 
As distinct from the rate referred to above the Transport Panel would also determine the rate 
that should be paid for “waiting time”. At present one of the great difficulties of the industry 
is the waste of time of operators on account of poor scheduling. This is a major contributor to 
the lack of economic viability of the operators, the fatigue and drug use. To resolve this 
problem it is proposed that there be fixed a minimum return for waiting time in the form of a 
fixed hourly rate and that this rate be determined by the Transport Panel as part of its fixing of 
the minimum sustainable safety rate. It is accepted that a certain amount of waiting time is 
inevitable so it therefore appropriate that the rate for “waiting time” should only apply after 
the expiration of a period of one hour from the driver being at the point of delivery at the 
scheduled time. 
 
7.6 Protection for Police when stopping trucks 
 
Legislation needs to be enacted to provide protection to the Police where it is necessary for 
them in the interests of public safety to stop a vehicle from proceeding on its journey. 
Currently Police may be exposed to civil action for damages resulting from their stopping a 
vehicle. 
 
Part of the operation of the Safe Driving Plan or Safe Driving Method Statement is that it 
includes details of owners of the goods and a contact number. This is so that where a driver is 
engaging in acts that put road users at risk, the police can contact the owner of the goods to 
inform them of these activities and to stop the truck. The police would be in a position to 
advise the owner that he or she would need to engage alternative transport for the goods. A 
reference would automatically logged with the RTA and LDTSA so that records of the 
incident are collected and further investigative action taken where warranted. 
 
From Police perspective this enables them to address the immediate risks posed by safety 
breach in a direct and proactive manner that places the burden of compliance with the 
operator/owner as distinct from the issuing of an infringement notice which may have little 
deterrent effect. From a broader policy perspective this assures that the safety risk to the 
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community and the driver are dealt with in a direct and immediate fashion rather than via an 
indirect financial penalty or belated prosecution. Some may view stopping a truck as a drastic 
step, but it can be defended both on public safety grounds and in terms of the message that 
such actions will send back to the transport company and load owner, and the capacity for 
them to take remedial action. In contrast, the current situation is that the load owner may be 
totally unaware that the driver of the truck delivering their goods has been charged with ‘out 
of hours’ or other offences relating to their logbook or are, for example, driving a defective 
vehicle at speed. 
 
7.7 Protection for contractors and drivers who refuse to engage in unsafe working 
practices 
 
Evidence given to the Inquiry included a disturbingly large number of cases where drivers and 
trucking companies were threatened with cancellation of contracts if they were not willing to 
engage in practices that are unsafe. Some of the submissions to the Inquiry indicated a level 
of indifference/ruthlessness on the part of some consignors/freight forwarders and load 
owners/customers that one would not expect in a civilised community. No driver or operator 
should be placed in a situation where they are threatened with economic or job loss unless 
they meet schedules etc that breach safety or other laws. The Inquiry therefore recommends 
that appropriate legislation be put in place to protect owner/drivers, contractors, company 
operators and others who are threatened with termination of contracts on account of their 
refusal to engage in any practices. It also recommends that allegations of such threats be 
vigorously investigated and, if proved, prosecuted by the Long Distance Trucking Safety 
Authority.  
 
7.8 Road user education in relation to heavy vehicles 
  
A limited understanding of the very different turning, handling and overtaking characteristics 
of heavy vehicles amongst other drivers clearly exacerbates the risk of death and serious 
injury on our major highways. Consideration should be given to improving road user 
understanding of sharing the road with heavy vehicles, including those issues most relevant to 
safety such as overtaking/length, turning characteristics of long/articulated vehicles and 
breaking distances. The addition of these issues in driver education and license testing should 
be considered as well as support for programs such as the National Sharing the Roads with 
Heavy Vehicles scheme. 
 
7.9 Driver Training  
 
The Inquiry finds that current driver training methods should be evaluated with a view to 
identifying deficiencies and to also to provide a basis for progressive enhancement of driver 
competencies. Driving a truck should be regarded as a life long learning experience, with 
periodic re-testing and upgrading of skills. 
 
7.10 Workers’ Compensation and Entitlements 
 
This Inquiry found clear evidence that many long haul truck drivers are inadequately 
protected in the case of serious injury at work. A significant number of owner/drivers carry no 
private insurance or workers’ compensation cover and others are unaware of their 
entitlements. Amongst employee drivers, a substantial number of those in small fleets had 
little knowledge of their entitlement to workers’ compensation and some were afraid to make 
claims due to fear of losing their job or active discouragement on the part of some transport 
companies. It is recommended that WorkCover NSW take measures to address these issues, 
by raising awareness of entitlements (or the need to have some insurance cover in the case of 
owner/drivers). Further, WorkCover should investigate complaints of active claim 
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suppression by some companies as well as undertaking an random audit designed to detect 
such illegal practices. 
 
7.11 Heavy Vehicle Mass, Configuration and Vibration 
 
Without ignoring differences in truck configuration between Australia and the USA, recent 
US findings suggest the health and safety implications of longer/larger and heavier trucks and 
particular trailer configurations require more serious consideration, unless it can be shown the 
Australian research has taken all the above-mentioned factors into account. The Inquiry was 
unable to investigate this matter fully but believes it warrants further investigation along with 
the effects of changes in vehicle configuration to vibration, braking, and suspension raised by 
Dr Arnold McLean. It therefore recommends that the RTA investigate both issues and report 
its findings to the relevant minister. 
 
7.12 Parking Bays/Rest Areas 
 
The RTA should involve industry associations and the TWU in developing and implementing 
an action plan on the upgrading of parking bays/rest areas. Measures for enhancing the 
quality/suitability of food, comfort and rest afforded by roadhouses should also be explored. 
 
7.13 A Final Note on Interstate/National Coordination 
 
The effectiveness of a number of the recommendations made by this Inquiry would 
undoubtedly be enhanced were they to be introduced at a national level. Many of the 
problems identified by this Inquiry (such as problems with logbooks, drug use, excessive 
hours, speeding and inter-agency coordination) are not peculiar to NSW. The Inquiry received 
considerable assistance from other jurisdictions, which helped it to identify common problems 
as well as identifying several promising initiatives in other states (a number of which are 
detailed in the main body of the Report). It is the view of this Inquiry that the current national 
framework fails to effectively address commercial practices which are a critical factor 
underlying unsafe practices in the industry. The Inquiry would urge that the NSW 
Government seek cooperation from other states and territories, as well as the federal 
government, to advance the major recommendations of this Inquiry. Even cooperation 
amongst the three eastern seaboard states would be sufficient to effect a significant change, as 
this would encompass at least 90% of the long distance trucking industry. The appended legal 
advice to this Inquiry (Appendix 2) canvasses a number of methods of achieving national 
coordination of key recommendations made by this Inquiry. 
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Safe Driving Plan/Safe Driving Method Statement  
DRIVER / OPERATOR DETAILS RATES TO BE PAID INSURANCE DETAILS 
Name of Driver and address of driver 
............................................................
............................................................
Drivers licence number and class 
............................................................
Operators licence details 
............................................................
Name and Contact details of Owner of vehicle 
including operator licence ............................................................
Name and contact details of Customer including 
operator licence details ............................................................
Provide details of rates paid.......................................................
Agreed Rate to be paid within 14 days $ amount 
....................................................................................................
Demurrage Rate applies after waiting one hour after arrival. 
 Paid by the hour .......................................................................
 
Provide Insurance details of vehicle (Include name of 
Insurer, amount insured, policy number and policy 
expiration date 
 
Amount Insured..........................................................................
Policy number.............................................................................
Policy expiry date.......................................................................
DETAILS OF TRIP  
Trip From: .......................................................................................................  
Trip To:............................................................................................................  
Route to be taken.............................................................................................  
.........................................................................................................................  
Kms on Speedo at start of trip.........................................................................  
Departure time  
Estimated Arrival time ....................................................................................  
Sender to sign ..................................................................................................  
 
Kms on Speedo at time of arrival .........................................................
Actual arrival time.................................................................................
Total Time taken for rest breaks  
Receiver to sign.....................................................................................
Details of Trips completed over 100kms in the last 24 hours  
...............................................................................................................
Has the driver had a 6 hours continuous break in the last 24 hours? ..
Details of  local Trips completed in the last 24 hours (less than 
100kms) including loading and unloading times  
  
  
Has the Driver had 2 rest breaks in the last 12 hours including one 
30minute break outside the vehicle? 
..................................................................................................................
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Terms of reference and information distributed to interested parties 
 
 
 
Safety Inquiry into Long Haul Trucking Industry 
 
Call for Written Submissions 
 
The Motor Accidents Authority of New South Wales is co-ordinating and funding an Inquiry into 
safety in the long haul road transport industry. 
 
The aim of the Inquiry is to produce a report on safety in the industry, including occupational 
problems. The report will include a Draft Code of Practice for improving safety in the long haul road 
transport industry as well as recommendations on changes to regulation, compliance infrastructure and 
policies where appropriate. 
 
The inquiry will be undertaken by Professor Michael Quinlan, School of Industrial Relations and 
Organisational Behaviour, University of New South Wales. A steering committee has been established 
consisting of representatives of the Motor Accidents Authority, Roads and Traffic Authority, 
WorkCover NSW, Transport Workers Union and the Australian Trucking Association. The inquiry will 
have the following terms of reference; 
 
1. Impact of clients' and consignors' requirements on the drivers including: 
• Industry tendering practices; 
• Transport contacts between road transport companies and major clients;  
• Methods of pricing; 
• Lack of client responsibility for driving hours, driver performance and remuneration 
for drivers; 
• Client/consignor requirements as to delivery times. 
 
2. Extent of proper enforcement in the industry of driving hours, speeding and drug use. 
 
3. Current forms of regulation in the industry, whether a self-regulation or external regulation 
model is most appropriate for the road transport industry and what forms this should take. 
 
4. Whether current regulatory bodies with responsibility for the industry are properly co-
ordinated with each other and sufficiently resourced. 
 
Written submissions from interested parties are requested. The closing date for submissions is 21 
June 2000. 
 
For further information contact: Mr Leicester Ramsey Ph 0419214726, email yesmar@internet-
australia.com Written submissions should be sent to: Professor Michael Quinlan, School of 
Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 
2052. Ph 93857149, Fax 96628531, email m.quinlan@unsw.edu.au 
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Appendix Two  
 
Safety Inquiry into the Long Haul Trucking Industry - Legal Issues 
 
Richard Johnstone 
 
11 October 2000 
 
 
This document outlines approaches to some of the legal issues that have been raised in the 
New South Wales Safety Inquiry into the Long Haul Trucking Industry. In particular, it: 
(i) examines whether the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) 
(OHSA(NSW)) imposes general duty obligations upon load owners and trucking 
companies; 
(ii) compares the “chain of responsibility” provisions under the NSW road transport 
legislation with the general duties under the OHSA(NSW); 
(iii) outlines suggestions for the regulation of the proposed safe driving plan requirement;  
(iv) discusses issues in the development of uniform minimum rates awards; and 
(v) canvasses issues involved in establishing a long haul trucking inspectorate. 
 
 
 
1. Long Haul Truck Safety and the General Duty Provisions in the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) 
 
Although often seen as primarily a road safety issue, safety in the long haul trucking industry 
is just as appropriately conceptualised as an OHS issue. Indeed, given the broad contextual 
issues that have an impact on truck safety (particularly economic pressures on drivers to drive 
long hours, at fast speeds, and under the influence of drugs), the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 2000 (NSW) (OHSA(NSW)) provides a particularly good framework for 
regulating long haul truck safety.  
 
Standard setting in the OHSA(NSW) hinges around a set of “general duties”, covering all 
parties having an impact upon OHS. These are supplemented by regulations and codes of 
practice, which adopt a combination of performance, process and specification standards. 
“Performance standards” define the duty holder’s duty in terms of goals they must achieve, or 
problems they must solve, and leaves it to the initiative of the duty holder to work out the best 
and most efficient method for achieving the specified standard. “Process requirements” 
prescribe a process, or series of steps, that must be followed by a duty holder in managing 
specific hazards, or OHS generally. They are often used when the regulator has difficulty 
specifying a goal or outcome, but has confidence that the risk of illness or injury will be 
significantly reduced if the specified process is followed. A typical example of a process 
requirement is the hazard identification and risk assessment process incorporated into many 
OHS regulations and codes of practice. Process-based standards have spawned greater 
reliance on “documentation requirements”. Increasingly OHS statutes are requiring duty 
holders to document measures they have taken to comply with process-based standards, 
performance standards and principle-based standards. The safe driving plan proposed in the 
inquiry’s main report is an example of a documentation requirment. “Specification” or 
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“prescriptive” standards tell duty holders precisely how to control hazards by setting out the 
specific types of safeguarding methods or procedures to be adopted, or the practices to be 
refrained from, in specific situations. 
 
“General duties” are often confused with performance standards, but they are quite different 
in their approach. Unlike performance standards, the general duty provisions do not specify 
goals. Rather they require the duty holder to exercise reasonable care in establishing and 
implementing safe work systems. Following the pattern in all of the Australian OHS statutes, 
the OHSA(NSW) imposes general duties on a range of duty holders, including employers, 
self-employed persons, employees, controllers of premises, manufacturers, suppliers and 
importers of plant, equipment and substances, designers, erectors and installers of plant and 
equipment. Each of these parties owes a “general duty”, and the duties are owed to a number 
of different persons.  
 
There is considerable overlap between the general duties owed by the various parties. It is 
well accepted that in any one work system, more than one general duty can be owed 
simultaneously, by one or more parties. For example, a person may owe a duty as an 
employer to employees, and to non-employees, and may also owe a duty as a controller of 
workplace, and/or as a designer of plant used in the workplace. At the same time, a contractor 
engaged by the employer may owe a duty to its own employees, the employer’s employees, 
and other contractors and their employees. The fact that one person has breached a general 
duty does not provide a defence for a second person charged with a contravention of another 
general duty based on the same facts (OHSA(NSW) section 29(1)). 
 
In a sense, the OHSA(NSW), similar to the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic 
Management)(Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 (NSW) (discussed in 3. Below), makes 
provision for “chain of responsibility” regulation of the long haul trucking industry. That is, it 
imposes duties on a range of parties involved in the road trucking contractual chain. This 
advice will first describe the relevant general duties, and will then show how they apply to the 
long haul road transport industry. 
 
Section 8(1) of the OHSA(NSW) (formerly section 15 of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 1983 (NSW)) provides that an “employer must ensure the health, safety and welfare at 
work of all the employees of the employer.”  
 
Section 8(2) provides that employers “shall ensure that persons (other than employees of the 
employer) are not exposed to risks to their health or safety arising from the conduct of the 
undertaking while they are at the employer’s place of work.” Section 9 imposes a similar duty 
on self-employed persons. (Both of these duties were set out in section 16 of the 1983 Act). A 
“self-employed person” is defined in section 4 to be “a person who works for gain and reward 
other than under a contract of employment or apprenticeship, whether or not employing 
others. 
 
Section 10(1) provides that “a person who has control of premises used by people as a place 
of work must ensure that the premises are safe and without risks to health.” Section 10(2) 
requires a “person who has control of any plant or substance used by people at work” to 
“ensure that the plant or substance is safe and without risks to health when properly used.” 
Similar provisions were found in section 17 of the 1983 Act. The provision may apply to 
consignors or trucking companies who make an unsafe workplace (for example, a loading 
area, or a truck) available to a self-employed truck driver. 
 
Finally, section 11(1) provides that “a person who designs, manufactures or supplies any plant 
or substance for use by people at work must (a) ensure that the plant or substance is safe and 
without risks to health when properly used, and (b) provide, or arrange for the provision of, 
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adequate information about the plant or substance to the persons to whom it is supplied to 
ensure its safe use.” The equivalent provision in the 1983 Act was section 18. 
Section 20 (formerly section 19 of the 1983 Act) imposes a duty on employees to take 
reasonable care for the health and safety of people at the employee’s place of work. 
 
These provisions lay down non-delegable absolute duties1 on employers, self-employed 
persons and others, subject only to the defence in section 28 that “it was not reasonably 
practicable for the person to comply with the provision, or that the commission of the offence 
was due to factors over which the person had no control and against the happening of which it 
was impracticable for the person to make provision.” 
 
It is important to note that proof of a general duty offence “is not dependent on there having 
been an accident and injury to an employee” or any other person to whom the duty is owed.2 
 
Applying these provisions to the long haul transport industry, section 8(1) clearly imposes a 
general duty of care upon long haul trucking companies in relation to their own employee 
truck drivers. Where trucking companies carry out their operations using their own employee 
truck drivers, then section 8(1) requires the company to ensure that the conditions under 
which their employee drivers work are, as far as is reasonably practicable, safe and without 
risks to their health. Technically, an owner operator who incorporates his or her business, so 
that she or he is one of the controlling shareholders and directors of the company which runs 
his or her business, can be employed by the company so that the company, as employer, owes 
a duty to the owner operator as an employee. 
 
The OHSA(NSW) also makes provision for offences by directors and managers of 
corporations. Section 26 provides that when a corporation contravenes any provision in the 
Act, including a general duty, each manager and director of the company is taken to have 
contravened the same provision unless that person satisfies the court that she was not in a 
position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to the contravention, or, being 
in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the contravention by the corporation. In 
the case of owner drivers who incorporate their business, this might mean that a breach of the 
employer’s general duty to them, as employees, under section 8(1) might then be imputed to 
the directors under section 26, with the result that the owner driver and his or her fellow 
directors (often a spouse) might be liable for the offence. 
 
As the main report resulting from this inquiry points out, much, if not most, of the New South 
Wales’ long haul truck work is carried out by owner drivers engaged as contractors by 
trucking companies, or engaged directly by clients and consignors. As the main report notes, 
in many cases clients and consignors impose conditions upon drivers (whether or not they are 
in a direct contractual relationship with drivers) which are not conducive to safe loading or 
driving practices. Does the OHSA(NSW) cover trucking companies in relation to owner 
drivers engaged by the trucking company? Do the provisions in the OHSA(NSW) impose 
OHS obligations upon clients or consignors of transport companies or owner drivers?  
 
                                                     
1  See Carrington Slipways Pty Ltd v Callaghan (1985) 11 IR 467; State Rail Authority of 
New South Wales v Dawson (1990) 37 IR 110; Boral Gas (NSW) Pty Ltd v Magill 
(1995) 58 IR 363; Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1988] VR 411 at 415; R v British Steel 
plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356; R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846; Austin 
Rover Ltd v Inspector of Factories [1989] 1 WLR 520 at 523; R v Board of Trustees of 
the Science Museum [1993] ICR 876; R v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 
78 at 81 and 82. 
2  R v Australian Char Pty Ltd (1996) 64 IR 387 at 400; and Haynes v C I and D 
Manufacturing Pty Ltd (1995) 60 IR 149 at 158. 
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The key provisions in this regard are sections 8(2) and 9(1). As noted above, they impose 
obligations upon employers and self-employed persons in relation to persons other than the 
employer’s employees. The duty is to ensure that such persons are not exposed to risks to 
their health and safety arising from the conduct of the employer or self-employed person’s 
undertaking.  
 
Depending on whether they fall within the category of “employer” or “self-employed person”, 
clients or consignors will either owe a duty to truck drivers under section 8(2) or section 9(1). 
Either clients or consignors will employ their own employees to carry out their everyday 
operations, in which case they are “employers” for the purposes of section 8 of the 
OHSA(NSW),3 or clients or consignors will be self-employed persons, and will owe the duty 
under section 9. Sections 8(2) and 9, in effect, require employers and self-employed persons 
to ensure that self-employed truck drivers, while at the client’s or consignors’s workplace, are 
not exposed to risks to their health and safety arising from the conduct of the 
client/consignor’s undertaking. In exploring the scope of the consignor/client’s duty, three 
key expressions in sections 8(2) and 9(1) need to be examined. 
 
First, the expression “exposed to risks to their health and safety” has been generously 
interpreted by the English Court of Appeal in R v Board of Trustees of the Science Museum.4 
Noting the preventive aims of the OHS legislation, the court said that the ordinary meaning of 
the word “‘risks’ conveys the idea of a possibility of danger”, 5  rather than narrower meaning 
of “actual danger”. “The word ‘exposed’ simply makes it clear that the section is concerned 
with persons potentially affected by the risks.” 6 In other words, the person owed the duty 
does not have to suffer injury or ill-health, but rather need only be exposed to a significant 
risk of injury or ill-health. “It is not necessary … that actual injury or defect to health ensue”.7 
 
The other key expression is “conduct of the undertaking”. It is well established that in New 
South Wales there must be a causal relationship between the alleged breach and the fact of 
detriment to safety, not between the undertaking and the hazard.8 In the Victorian Supreme 
Court decision in Whittaker v Delmina Pty Ltd9 Hansen J in said that the Victorian equivalent 
of section 8(2) “applies to potential risks to health or safety that arise from the conduct of an 
undertaking even if those risks may be present or operate outside the place at which the 
undertaking is conducted.” The expression “conduct of the undertaking” not limited to the 
operation of industrial processes, and includes ancillary matters, such as cleaning, repairing 
and maintaining the plant, obtaining supplies and making deliveries,10 as well as trading, and 
                                                     
3  In Rech v F M Hire Pty Ltd (1998) 83 IR 293 the Industrial Relations Commission of 
New South Wales in Court Session held that it had not been proved to the satisfaction 
of the Commission that Nomel Pty Ltd employed any employees at all. The evidence 
suggested that Nomel Pty Ltd hired labour and equipment from others, with the 
management function also being performed by an independent contractor. The 
Commission referred to decisions such as Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 
CH D 654 at 671-672 and Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016 at 1027 as 
establishing that a director of a corporation is not, without more, an employee of the 
corporation. 
4  [1993] ICR 876. 
5  [1993] ICR 876 at 882. 
6  [1993] ICR 876 at 882. 
7  Hansen J in Whittakerv Delmina Pty Ltd (1998) 87 IR 268 at  281. 
8  See CSR Limited t/as CSR Wood Panels v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(Inspector Reid) unreported, Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales 
(Bauer J) 10 August 1995, at 25. 
9  (1998) 87 IR 268 at 281. 
10  R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846 at 851-852; R v Mara [1987] 1 WLR 
87. 
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supplying and selling to customers.11 The courts have rejected the argument that an activity 
carried out by an independent contractor is not part of the conduct of the undertaking if the 
employer or self-employed person engaging the contractor does not have control over the 
activity.12  The expression “conduct of the undertaking”  
 
is broad in its meaning. … [I]t means the business or enterprise of the employer … and 
the word “conduct” refers to the activity or what is done in the course of carrying on 
the business or enterprise. A business or enterprise … may be seen to be conducting its 
operation, performing work or providing services at one or more places, permanent or 
temporary and whether or not possessing a defined physical boundary. The 
circumstances may be as infinite as they may be variable. .. [The] word “undertaking” 
should not be read as synonymous with “workplace”. It is neither helpful nor necessary 
to do so. 13 
 
From this it is arguable that all trucking activities (including consignment and transport 
arrangements affecting driver behaviour) would form part of the “conduct of the undertaking” 
of a consignor or client of a trucking company or an owner driver.14 In other words, the 
transportation of the client or consignor’s goods from its premises to other premises would 
easily come within the meaning of “conduct of the undertaking”. Thus, where it can be shown 
that there is a causal nexus between activities involved in the conduct of the client’s 
undertaking (scheduling loading of trucks, not taking loading, unloading or local delivery 
times into account when drawing up schedules, requiring journeys to be done in too short a 
period of time, requiring drivers to wait for long periods before being loaded with goods, low 
levels of remuneration, requiring drivers to drive too fast or for long periods without rest etc) 
and risks to the health and safety of drivers (from fatigue, drug use, speeding etc), then prima 
facie there has been a contravention of the duty. 
 
An effective regulatory regime for long haul trucking would require clients or consignors to 
identify all hazards involved in all phases their operations (including road transport activities 
conducted by contractors), and the assessment and control of all risks. In short, this would 
include routine risk assessment of all aspects of transport operations. Sections 8(2) and 9 of 
                                                     
11  Sterling-Winthrop Group Limited v Allen (1987) SCCR 25, noted in Wright, F, Law of 
Health and Safety at Work,  Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997, 83. 
12  R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846. But see WorkCover Authority of 
New South Wales advice on “Self-employed workers”, dated 7 September, which 
asserts that “the notion of ‘undertaking’ suggests some degree of control by the 
employer over the relevant place of work (the vehicle).” With respect, this is 
inconsistent with the well-reasoned decision in Associated Octel. 
13        Hansen J in Whittaker v Delmina Pty Ltd (1998) 87 IR 268 at 280-281. Note that the 
New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission in WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (Inspector Keenan) v Technical and Further Education Commission 
[1999] NSWIRComm 218 (12 May 1999) at 10 took a narrow approach to the 
expression “conduct of the undertaking” which was regarded (obiter) as too narrow 
approach to the expression by the Full Bench on appeal in WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (Inspector Keenan) v Technical and Further Education Commission 
(1999) 92 IR 251 at 263. 
14  But see WorkCover Authority of New South Wales advice on “Self-employed 
workers”, dated 7 September, 2000, which strongly asserts that “in many cases of truly 
self-employed truck drivers – ie sole traders and partners who own their own truck and 
operate in a contractual agreement” – will not be covered by any of the provisions in ss 
8-11 of the OHSA(NSW). This opinion would appear to take too narrow a view of the 
meaning of “conduct of the undertaking”. See further the discussion of the requirement 
of the employer’s place of work below for a genuine restriction on the duty. 
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the OHSA(NSW) would appear to a good statutory vehicle for this approach, and support 
such an approach. 
 
There is, however, a significant limitation on the scope of the employer (or self-employed 
person’s) duty in sections 8(2) and 9 of the OHSA (NSW). The duty is owed to non-
employees (truck drivers) only “while they are at the employer or self-employed person’s 
place of work.” “Place of work” is defined in section 4 to be “premises where persons work.” 
“Premises” are defined to include “any land, building or part of a building, or any vehicle, 
vessel or aircraft…” The expression “place of work” has been scrutinised by the courts15. The 
leading cases on the meaning of the expression in the OHSA(NSW) make it clear that the 
expression includes every area which may be affected by the work being done.16 
 
In other words, it is arguable that consignors and clients owe duties to drivers under sections 
8(2) and 9(1) only while drivers are at the consignor’s “place of work”. Even though this 
geographical limitation (which is not to be found in the corresponding Victorian and 
Queensland provisions) severely restricts the scope of section 8(2) in its application to the 
relationship between consignors and drivers, it might be argued that this duty still 
encompasses important aspects of the loading and transport of freight. The duty refers to the 
“exposure” of drivers to risks while at the employer’s place of work. It clearly covers the way 
in which goods are loaded onto trucks at the employer’s place of work, especially for risks 
(such as manual handling injuries) during the loading. It also arguably covers situations in 
which employer activities placing drivers at risk take place at the workplace, even though the 
risk may only eventuate away from the actual workplace: for example, where drivers are 
required by the consignor to wait for long periods at the employer’s workplace until goods are 
to be loaded, thus depriving drivers of necessary rest before driving. The crucial issue is 
whether the risks must actually occur while the driver is at the workplace, or whether the 
drivers must be at the workplace when the relevant parts of the undertaking are being 
conducted. On the face of the statute, this is not clear. The most restrictive interpretation, and 
the interpretation which seems to most accepted, is that the duty is only owed while drivers 
are at the workplace. In other words, the section only covers risks at the workplace. But there 
is a strong argument that the ordinary grammatical meaning of sections 8(2) and 9(1) is that it 
is the “exposure” to risk only that must occur while the driver is at the consignor or client’s 
workplace. This interpretation would mean that provided the truck driver was at the client’s 
workplace when the activity which exposed the driver to risk occurred (for example, waiting 
in a queue and being deprived of necessary rest), the duty is owed to the driver. It still would 
not cover contractual dealings between the client and trucking company engaging the owner 
driver, or dealings between the driver and the client/consignor while the driver was not at the 
workplace. 
 
Similar considerations arise in relation to the obligations of a trucking company in relation to 
contractor owner drivers. Although each case would depend on its particular facts, the truck 
would in most cases not constitute the trucking company’s “place of work”, and therefore the 
company’s duty to drivers would be limited to situations where the driver was at the 
company’s workplace, or, taking the broader meaning, when the truck driver was at the 
workplace when exposed to the risk, even if the risk only materialised away from the 
workplace. 
 
                                                     
15  See Johnstone, R, Occupational Health and Safety Law and Policy, LBC Information 
Services, 1997 at 212-123, and WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector 
Clarke) v Mainbrace Construction Pty Ltd (2000) 94 IR 451, and WorkCover Authority 
of New South Wales (Inspector Keenan) v Technical and Further Education 
Commission (1999) 92 IR 251 at 257 and 262. 
16  WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Clarke) v Mainbrace 
Construction Pty Ltd (2000) 94 IR 451 at 460. 
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Section 9 would apply to owner/drivers themselves, and would require them to take care for 
the safety of others (other road users, pedestrians and members of the public) while they are 
driving their trucks. But, once again, the scope of this duty is clouded by the requirement that 
the person to whom the duty is owed must be “at the self-employed person’s place of work.” 
 
The upshot is that the section 8(2) and section 9 duties are compromised in their application to 
the relationship between consignors and contractor drivers (whether the drivers are employees 
of a trucking company or owner drivers) because of the geographical restriction to the 
workplace. And as the discussion in the previous paragraphs has shown, there it is not clear as 
to what exactly is limited to the workplace – the exposure to risk, or the actualisation of the 
risk. Even if the better view is that the exposure to risk (not the actualisation of the risk) must 
take place while the driver is at the workplace, the coverage of the duty is still dependent on 
whether or not the person who is owed the duty is actually at the workplace when exposed to 
the risk. This is an inappropriate, and, as the earlier discussion indicates, one that leads to 
finicky hairsplitting. The section 8(2) and section 9 duties are arguably the most important 
duties in the OHSA(NSW) for the purposes of regulating long haul truck safety. The 
provisions are in urgent need of reform. 
 
The need for reform of section 8(2) and 9(1) is apparent when other examples, not related to 
truck driving, are considered. A person walking past a workplace emitting toxic substances 
would not be covered by the duty, but the same person would be covered if they set foot on 
the premises. Home-based workers who are categorised as independent contractors would not 
be covered by the section 8(2) or 9 duties. Similarly, labour hire workers engaged by a labour 
hire agency on terms making it clear that the worker is not an employee of the agency, would 
not be covered by the section 8(2) duty because they would not be working at the labour hire 
company’s place of work. This places workers who are not categorised as employees under a 
significant and unfair disadvantage when compared with the position of employees.17  
 
The requirement that the person to whom the duty is owed to be at the duty holder’s 
workplace is inappropriate in an age of greater work flexibility, when workers are 
increasingly being engaged (i) in work relationships other than the employment relationship 
and (ii) are working away from the workplace of the person who has engaged them. 
 
This difficulty does not arise in relation to section 22 of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 1985 (Vic) or sections 28(2) and 29 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld). 
The Victorian and Queensland provisions are similar to the section 8(2) and 9(1) duties in the 
OHSA(NSW), except that they are not qualified by the expression “while they are at the 
employer [or self-employed person’s] place of work.” These provisions operate most 
satisfactorily. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The OHSA(NSW) contains a range of general duty provisions which cover the major parties 
to long haul trucking arrangements. Of particular importance are the general duties in section 
8(1) (employers to employees), 8(2) (employers to persons other than employees and 9 (self-
employed persons to persons other than employees. These latter two duties have the potential 
to impose important duties upon trucking companies, clients and consignors in relation to 
owner drivers, but their operation in this area is severely constrained by the provision in 
                                                     
17    For a discussion of issues in the categorisation of labour hire workers as “employees” 
or otherwise, see Swift Placements Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(Inspector May) (2000) 96 IR 69. For an analysis of the extent of a labour hire agency’s 
duties to employees, see Drake Personnell Limited v WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales ((Inspector Ch’ng) (1999) 90 IR 432.  
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section 8(2) and 9 that the duties only extend to persons exposed to risks “while they are at 
the employer [or self-employed person’s] place of work.” 
 
Recommendation. 
 
The report resulting from this inquiry should strongly recommend that the expression “while 
they are at the employer’s place of work” should be removed from section 8(2) of the OHSA 
2000 (NSW), so that it resembles section 22 of the Victorian Act. Similar amendments should 
be made to section 9 of the OHSA(NSW) (the self-employed person’s duty). 
 
 
2. Comparison of the Chain of Responsibility” Provisions in the Road Transport 
Legislation and the General Duty Provisions under the OHSA(NSW) 
 
The previous section outlined the general duty provisions in the OHSA(NSW), and explained 
how they had the potential to provide a comprehensive regulatory regime for the long haul 
trucking industry. This section compares these provisions with the corresponding provisions 
in the road transport legislation in New South Wales.18  
 
The road transport “chain of responsibility” provisions are to be found in the Road Transport 
(Safety and Traffic Management)(Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 (NSW). These provisions 
are based upon model provisions developed by the National Road Transport Authority’s 
National Reform process. They replace the provisions of Schedule O of the Motor Traffic 
Regulations 1935 (NSW), and contain provisions designed to minimise the number of road 
accidents involving heavy trucks (defined in regulation 8(1)) and commercial buses that arise 
from driver fatigue. 
 
Part 2 of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management)(Driver Fatigue) Regulation 
1999 provides for offences where drivers’ total driving times over a relevant period exceed 
maximum driving times (12 hours driving per 24 hours, and 72 hours driving a week); total 
work times over a relevant period exceed specified maximum work times (14 hours in 24 
hours); where drivers fail to take required minimum rest times. Maximum penalties are $2200 
per offence, and section 129 limits the number of offences that can be committed. “Driving 
time” and “work time” are defined in regulations 12 and 13. Part 2 does not apply to heavy 
truck drivers who are registered as driver participants, or are employed by employers 
registered as an employer participant, in a Transitional Fatigue Management Scheme (TFMS). 
 
Part 3 imposes offences on the driver if the driver is registered in a TFMS and exceeds the 
maximum driving and work times outlined in the Part; fails to take the minimum rest times 
outlined in the Part; requires self-employed drivers to manage their driving, and keep proper 
records; provides for medical examinations; and authorises the Roads and Traffic Authority to 
attend an approved fatigue management training course etc. The section also imposes 
obligations on employers who are registered as an employer participant in TFMS (including a 
"general obligation" in regulation 39 to manage heavy truck drivers so that they can comply 
with their obligations). 
 
Part 4 regulates driving records. It outlines the requirements for drivers to keep driving 
records (eg logbooks) for non-local work (ie work outside a 100km radius from the driver’s 
base), and by employers or drivers or self-employed drivers for local work. It also makes 
provision for inspections of driving records; for employed drivers to provide their employers 
                                                     
18  Note that section 6 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 provides that an Act 
forming part of the road transport legislation prevails over any other Act or statutory 
rule to the extent of any inconsistency. 
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with copies of records of non-local driving work; for the keeping of driving records; and for 
offences pertaining to driving records. 
 
Part 5 then sets out a series of extended offences upon: 
 
(i) "persons" who request, require or direct, directly or indirectly, a driver to do something 
thing if the person knows or reasonably ought to know that by complying the driver would be 
likely to commit a “core driving offence” (listed in section 74 to include offences relating to 
maximum driving and work times, and minimum rest times in Parts 3 and 4), a driving record 
offence or a speeding offence; 
 
(ii) consignors (defined in section 11 to be a person who engages another directly or through 
an agent to transport goods or persons by road, and has possession of the goods before they 
are transported and is not the employer of the truck driver), not to engage someone to 
transport goods etc if the consignor knows or ought reasonably to know that by complying 
with an express or implied condition of the engagement the driver would be likely to commit 
a core driving offence, a driving record offence or a speeding offence; 
 
(iii) a special obligation on employers not to allow a driver to drive a truck if the employer 
knows or ought reasonably to know that by driving the vehicle the driver would be likely to 
commit a core driving offence; 
 
(iv) more specific obligations on employers and responsible employees of employers not to 
roster, schedule etc driving, rest or work time of an employed driver if the employer etc 
knows or ought reasonably to know that by in complying with the roster etc the driver would 
be likely to commit a core driving offence 
 
A breach of any of these provisions subjects the offender to a maximum penalty of $2200. 
According to the Roads and Traffic Authority’s submission to this inquiry, there have been no 
prosecutions of consignors or clients under these provisions. The principal reason for this 
inactivity seems to be the difficulty of obtaining evidence of the client or consignor’s 
“knowledge” the likelihood that the driver would commit the specified offences (see above). 
In addition, disaffected drivers are unlikely to give evidence of breaches in court, for fear of 
implicating themselves in offences, or of blacking their name in the industry. 
 
The provisions in the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management)(Driver Fatigue) 
Regulation 1999 are not drafted in the same style as the modern Australian OHS statutes, 
which, as noted in 1. above, combine principle-based general duty provisions with 
performance (specified goals to be achieved) and process-based (usually hazard identification 
and risk assessment and control) regulations. The current Road Transport provisions are 
narrower in scope, more akin to the old-style prescriptive OHS obligations which preceded 
the modern, Robens-style enactments. It should be noted, however, that there has been 
discussion of introducing a Fatigue Management Program approach, which would free 
companies from compliance with prescriptive driving, work and rest limits, and would instead 
require operators to demonstrate that they had implemented systems properly to manage 
driver fatigue. 
 
However, at the moment, none of the Road Transport provisions outlined approximate the 
general duty provisions in the OHS legislation, although the consignor duty comes closest, 
and is more extensive in the driver fatigue regulations than is section 8(2) of the OHSA 
because it is not, unlike section 8(2)) confined to the consignor's workplace. The consignor 
duty, though, is limited the express or implied conditions of the engagement which induce the 
driver to commit certain road transport offences, and does not impose a general duty of care 
upon the consignor to ensure the safety of truck drivers engaged. In addition, as noted above, 
the Part 5 extended offences require evidence of subjective or constructive knowledge, which 
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has provided to be an impediment to their enforcement. The OHSA(NSW) general duties, on 
the other hand, are absolute liability offences, subject only to the reasonable practicability 
defence.  
 
Further, as noted above in 1., section 26 of the OHSA(NSW) provides that when a 
corporation contravenes any provision in the Act, including a general duty, each manager and 
director of the company is taken to have contravened the same provision unless that person 
satisfies the court that she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in 
relation to the contravention, or, being in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the 
contravention by the corporation. The equivalent provision in the Road Transport (General) 
Act 1999 (section 42) is much more difficult to prosecute, as it requires the director or 
manager to “knowingly authorise or permit the contravention.” 
 
Finally, the penalties for contraventions of the OHSA general duties far exceed the maximum 
penalties for the road transport offences ($2200, although it should be noted that Part 3 
Divisions 7 and 8 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 also empowers a court to make a 
number of other orders, including compensation for damages and other losses and 
impounding or forfeiture of vehicles). Contraventions of the general duties in sections 8 to 11 
of the OHSA (the employer’s, self-employed persons and designer’s, manufacturer’s etc 
duties) are $550,000 for a corporation ($775,000 for a further offence) and $55,000 for an 
individual ($77,500 for a further offence). Further, the OHSA(NSW) also provides for other 
important sanctions for duty holders convicted of contraventions of the general duties, in the 
form of court orders that the offender take steps necessary to remedy any matter caused by the 
commission of the offence (section 113), orders that the offender publicise the offence, 
penalty and related matters (section 115) and orders that offenders undertake OHS projects 
(section 116). In short, the OHSA(NSW) provides for much tougher, and more flexible, 
sanctions that are available under the road transport legislation. 
 
This comparison of the provisions in the road transport regulations and in the OHSA(NSW) 
clearly shows why the OHSA(NSW) needs to play an important part in the regulation of long 
haul trucking. The impact of the OHSA(NSW) will be enhanced if the suggested reforms to 
sections 8(2) and 9 outlined above are implemented. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The road transport “chain of responsibility” provisions are to be found in the Road Transport 
(Safety and Traffic Management)(Driver Fatigue) Regulation 1999 (NSW). Inter alia, they 
impose maximum driving and work hours, and minimum rest times, upon drivers; and 
provide for offences where “persons”, “consignors” and employers engage in specified 
activities where the person, consignor or employer “knows, or ought to know” that because of 
the activity a driver would be likely to commit specified offences. These provisions establish 
narrower duties than those to be found in the general duty provisions in the OHSA(NSW), 
discussed above in 1. The flexibility and reach of its general duty provisions, and the larger 
sanctions, of OHSA(NSW) make it, on balance, the best regime to regulate long haul trucking 
in New South Wales. These advantages would be enhanced if the recommendations outlined 
in 1. above were adopted. 
 
3. The Safe Driving Plan and the General Duty Obligations 
 
The proposed safe driving plan would constitute a one page document containing the outcome 
of a risk assessment in relation to the specified journey, and would indicate the key conditions 
of the journey, including trip time, pay rates and other safety information. The safe driving 
plan is essentially a documentation requirement (see 1. above). It is discussed in detail in the 
main report, and is discussed further in Appendix 1 to the main report. 
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This advice discusses options for incorporating this mechanism into a regulatory regime. In 
principle, the safe driving plan should set out a safe plan; copies of the plan must be given to 
all relevant parties, including the driver, the client/consignor and the trucking company; the 
driver must comply with the plan; and the trucking company and client/consignor must 
provide the driver with the conditions to fulfil the requirements of the plan, and must not do 
anything to divert the driver from following the plan.  
 
In order to implement this approach: 
 
1. The plan must outline a safe way of conducting the journey. If, on its face, the plan 
specifies driving conditions which are unsafe if followed, the relevant legislative 
provision must provide that the maker of the plan has committed an offence, in addition 
to the breach of the person’s duty (to provide a safe system of work) to the driver, other 
drivers and members of the public. An approved code of practice, or guidance material, 
will need to specify the criteria for an acceptable safe driving plan. A safe driving plan is, 
in practice, likely to be quite simple. It will cover the basic conditions for the journey – 
the client, trip time, the cartage rate, the departure date, the loading and driving times etc.  
2. All parties associated with the journey (the driver, client/consignor, truck company etc) 
must have copies of the plan. It must be an offence for a party not to have a copy of the 
plan, or for there to be differences in the provisions of the plans held by the various 
parties. 
3. The driver must comply with a safe driving plan, and the persons responsible for 
engaging the driver (the transport company and/or consignor) must ensure that the driver 
complies with the safe driving plan. Either: 
 
(a) it must be an offence for a driver not to comply with an acceptable safe driving plan, 
or for a transport company, consignor or any other party to do anything which 
induces the driver not to follow a safe driving plan. This should be specified in the 
legislative provisions establishing safe driving plans. The legislation will have to 
outline acceptable defences to the alleged offence: for example, if the proposed route 
is barred due to road construction or maintenance work, natural disaster, or industrial 
action; or 
 
(b) alternatively, the legislative provisions should specify that failure to have an 
acceptable safe driving plan, or a failure to abide by an acceptable safe driving plan, 
is prima facie evidence of a contravention of the relevant general duty provision (the 
employer’s duty to employee truck drivers; the consignor’s duty to truck drivers; the 
trucking company’s duty to owner drivers; the employee driver’s duty to members of 
the public, other drivers, other employees or herself; or the owner-driver’s duty to 
others). This could be specified in a number of ways:  
(i) the legislative provision could provide that failure to comply with a 
safe driving plan is taken to be an offence, unless, (A) if the driver is 
charged, the driver can provide a reason for not following the plan 
(pressure from the consignor or trucking company etc – in which case 
the party imposing the pressure will be charged) or (B) if the trucking 
company or consignor is charged, the person charged can show that the 
conditions imposed upon the driver were as safe, or safer than, the 
conditions specified in the safe driving plan. Another possible defence 
might be that the conditions specified in the plan were impossible to 
execute for reasons beyond the control of any of the parties (for 
example, there was government initiated road work or a natural disaster 
which blocked the proposed route), and that the parties modified the 
plan to provide the safest alternative plan. This effectively reverses the 
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onus of proof onto the defendant once it is shown that the safe driving 
plan was not followed. This approach follows that taken in the 
Victorian, South Australian, Tasmanian, Northern Territory and 
Commonwealth OHS statutes in relation to compliance with an 
approved code of practice.  
(ii) The legislative provision could simply provide that a failure to comply 
with an acceptable safe driving plan is evidence of a contravention of the 
relevant general duty provision. In the absence of other evidence, this would 
probably be enough to prove an offence. This is the approach taken in the 
OHSA(NSW) in relation to breaches of Industry Codes of Practice 
(OHSA(NSW) s 46). 
 
Proposal (i)(B) and proposal (ii) are consistent with a proposal (see 4. and 5. below) that there 
be a presumption of a breach of the relevant general duty provision in the OHSA if the 
cartage rate for the trip is below the rate fixed in the relevant federal award.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A key proposal of the inquiry is the safe driving plan, a one page document containing the 
outcome of a risk assessment in relation to the specified journey, indicating the key conditions 
of the journey, including trip time, pay rates and other safety information. The most effective 
way of incorporating the safe driving plan into the regulatory regime is legislate that failure to 
comply with a safe driving plan is taken to be an offence, unless, (A) if the driver is charged, 
the driver can provide a reason for not following the plan (pressure from the consignor or 
trucking company etc – in which case the party imposing the pressure will be charged) or (B) 
if the trucking company or consignor is charged, the person charged can show that the 
conditions imposed upon the driver were as safe, or safer than, the conditions specified in the 
safe driving plan, or that it was not possible to comply with the safe driving plan (for 
example, because of government initiated road works or natural disaster), and that the plan 
was modified to provide the safest alternative plan. 
 
4. Uniform Minimum Award Rates 
 
Australia has a complex federal industrial relations system. The complexity arises principally 
from the limited power given to the Federal government, in section 51(xxxv) of the Federal 
constitution, to legislate for “conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one state.” This means that the federal 
government cannot regulate directly for wage rates or to impose occupational health and 
safety (OHS) standards, and can only establish the machinery to facilitate the prevention and 
settlement by instruments (such as awards) of industrial disputes involving parties who have 
some nexus with an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one state. The federal 
system (see the Workplace Relations Act 1996) at the moment covers all employees in 
Victoria. It exists side by side with state systems in the remaining States, including New 
South Wales. The state systems have the potential to cover all employees within the state, and 
do not suffer the kinds of constitutional limitations imposed on the federal system. Where a 
federal award and a State award both purport to cover the same parties, the Federal award will 
prevail to the extent of the inconsistency (see section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, 
and section 152 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)).  
 
One of the important issues identified in the submissions to this review is the need for a 
uniform minimum award rate for long haul trucking. The details of this minimum rate are not 
important to this advice, and are canvassed in the main part of the report. Rather, the issues to 
be canvassed here are: (i) how a consistent award rate can be established for state and federal 
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award provisions covering long haul trucking work; and (ii) how the rate can be enforced. 
This latter issue is examined later in this advice. 
 
In New South Wales, Federal and State awards cover the long haul trucking industry. The 
Federal award is the Transport Workers (Long Distance Drivers) Award 1993, and New 
South Wales award is the Transport Industry (State) Award. The Federal award covers all the 
employees of employers or employer organisations who are party to the award. The Schedule 
to the award indicates which parties have been served with a log of claims and made party to 
the award. The New South Wales award is a “common rule” award,19 meaning that it purports 
to cover all employers in the industry not covered by the Federal award. 
 
While these principles are simple to state, in practice award coverage in the NSW long haul 
trucking industry is confusing. This is because the technicalities of federal award coverage are 
difficult to understand, and many truck drivers are unaware of the way in which the award 
systems operate.  
 
As noted above, unless covered by the Federal award, all employers and employees in the 
industry are covered by the State award. While the Federal system can only cover “disputes 
extending beyond the limits of any one State”, in practice it is very easy to satisfy this 
“interstateness” requirement. All that is required is that the federally registered union serve a 
common log on employers in more than one State. Employers not already party to the Federal 
award can be “roped in” to the principal award by the union serving a log of claims on the 
employer, and persuading the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to make an order 
varying the principal award to include the newly served employer in the Schedule. This is a 
costly and time-consuming process, because it requires the union to know of the existence of 
the employer, and to serve the employer with the relevant documents. It also requires the 
parties to be able to satisfy that Australian Industrial Relations Commission that it can 
exercise its jurisdiction to make an award. This point is discussed in the following paragraph. 
 
“Roping in” an employer previously covered by the common rule state award would result in 
the employer effectively being removed from the State award, and covered by the Federal 
award. The Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), and its predecessors, in section 111(1)(g)(ii) 
empowered the Federal Commission to refrain from dealing with a dispute on the ground that 
the dispute “has been dealt with, is being dealt with or is proper to be dealt with by a State 
arbitrator”. Until the mid-1970s, the Federal Commission tended to interpret this provision in 
favour of maintaining State coverage in all but exceptional circumstances.20 Since that time, 
the Federal Commission has been more willing to extend federal coverage. However, the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) has attempted to redress this movement towards 
expanding federal jurisdiction. Section 111AAA(1) provides that the Commission must cease 
dealing with an industrial dispute in relation to employees where it is satisfied that “a State 
award or State employment agreement governs the wages and conditions of employment” of 
employees whose terms and conditions are subject to a dispute before the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission. Section 111AAA contains a proviso that the Commission 
must be satisfied that ceasing to deal with the matter would not be contrary to the “public 
interest”. In order to determine the public interest the Commission must give “primary 
consideration” to the views of the employers and employees concerned, and must inform 
itself of these views as quickly as it can and in whatever manner it thinks fit. There is very 
little guidance available as to what would constitute “the public interest” for the purposes of 
                                                     
19   See Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) section 12, which provides that a New South 
Wales award is, subject to its terms, “to all employees and employers” engaged in the 
industry, “whether or not they were a party to the award”.  
20  See B Creighton and A Stewart, Labour Law: An Introduction, 3rd ed, Federation Press, 
Sydney, 2000 at 114. 
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determining the exceptional circumstances under which the Federal Commission can make an 
award in relation to a dispute already covered by a State award. These provisions clearly place 
a strong onus on those seeking to change award coverage from a State to the Federal system 
to show that it would be contrary to the public interest for the Federal Commission to cease to 
deal with the matter. The clear intent of the provision is that the Commission should decline 
jurisdiction in all but exceptional circumstances. Section 111AAA also leaves the provisions 
in section 111(1)(g) with very little scope for operation.21 
 
A further difficulty in establishing common award provisions for all long haul truck drivers is 
that the Federal award system applies to employers and employees only. A large proportion of 
long haul truck drivers are owner drivers, and do not fit within the award framework. New 
South Wales is the only State that regulates, through Contract Determinations made under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW),22 the terms and conditions of owner drivers (contract 
carriers) by principal contractors. Examples in the transport industry are the General Carrier 
(Contract) Determination, and the Interstate Carrying (Contract) Determination, which has 
not been updated in recent times, is rarely complied with, and covers only interstate trucking.  
 
In addition, the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission has power, under section 
106, of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), to review “any contract or arrangement or 
any related condition or collateral arrangement under which a person performs work in any 
industry” where the work is performed in New South Wales, or, if the work is performed 
outside New South Wales, the contract is governed by the law of New South Wales. The 
Commission must consider whether the contract or arrangement is unfair, harsh or 
unconscionable; whether it is against the public interest; whether it provides remuneration 
which is less than the person performing the work would have received as an employee; or 
whether it is designed to or does avoid the provisions of an award, industrial agreement or 
contract determination. If the Commission finds any of these circumstances to be made out, it 
may vary the contract or arrangement, declare any part of it to be void, and may make orders 
for the payment of money, or to prohibit any further unfair contracts or arrangements from 
being made.23 A similar power is available to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
in section 127A of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). None of these provisions, 
however, offer a solution to the issue of creating uniform reward structures for long haul 
trucking work. 
 
Given all of these difficulties, one possible means of vesting the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission with jurisdiction would be for the Federal government to amend the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 to apply to all interstate trucking activity, utilising the head of 
power in section 51(i) of the Federal constitution, which deals with “trade and commerce with 
other countries and among the States”. This power enables the federal government to regulate 
employment conditions of persons or firms engaged in interstate trade and commerce. It has 
been used to regulate the working conditions of flight crew officers, maritime workers and 
waterside workers. In principle, it could be used to give the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission jurisdiction over all interstate trucking, including the rates to be paid to owner 
drivers. Freed of the constraints of the wording of section 51(xxxv), the Commission could be 
given the power to make a common rule covering all employers in the industry involved in 
interstate truck work. It could also regulate the rates to be paid by consignors and clients.  
 
                                                     
21  See Creighton and Stewart, 2000 at 115. 
22  See Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) sections 306-21. Sections 322-31 make 
provision for agreements concerning contract conditions. 
23     See J Macken,, P O’Grady and C Sappideen, The Law of Employment, 4 ed, Sydney, 
LBC Information Services, 1997:479-561. 
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One difficulty with this proposal is that, arguably, it would not cover intrastate truck driving. 
As Creighton and Stewart note, however:24 
 
“One line of argument that would considerably expand the significance of s 51(1) is 
that because interstate trade and intrastate trade are economically interdependent, the 
Commonwealth’s power over the former must extend by inference to the latter, so as to 
make the regulation of interstate trade more effective. But while this reasoning has 
been adopted in relation to the equivalent power in the United State Constitution …, the 
High Court has to date refused to accept it in the Australian context.”  
 
The other constitutional heads of power which might solve the problem are (i) the 
“corporations power” (section 51(xx) of the Commonwealth Constitution); (ii) the “external 
affairs” power (section 51(xxix)), if there was an international convention pertaining to truck 
safety which could be implemented; or (iii) the possibility of State governments referring the 
relevant powers to the Federal government under section 51(xxxvii) of the Commonwealth 
Constitution. This latter approach was taken by the Victorian government late in 1996 to 
merge the Victorian Industrial Relations system into the Federal system. It has also recently 
been used in relation to the Corporations Law. The difficulty with the referral of powers 
approach is that, first, each State must be willing to refer its relevant powers (though it might 
be sufficient for the Eastern states to refer their powers), and, second, that each state would be 
free to withdraw its referral whenever it wished to do so.  The corporations power approach 
would require clients/consignors, truck companies and owner drivers to be corporations. I am 
unaware of the rates of incorporation in the industry, but I would be surprised if they would 
be sufficient to support the use of the power. The Federal government has shown great 
reluctance to use the external affairs power, and so the most likely basis for federal legislation 
would be the interstate trade and commerce power.  
 
Another difficulty with the proposal give the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
power to regulate the rates for all long haul trucking work is the political infeasibility of the 
current federal government legislating to expand the jurisdiction of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission. Since 1996 the Federal government has been committed to reducing 
the powers of the Australian Industrial Commission, and is unlikely to regard favourably a 
proposal to increase the Commission’s powers in any area. 
 
Another way of ensuring consistency between the Federal award and the State awards, so as 
to ensure a common “benchmark” for award conditions, is to ensure that the Federal and state 
awards contain the same provisions. This will be difficult where each award has traditionally 
contained different provisions, and where each tribunal operates under different processes and 
principles. Ideally, the State tribunals would vary the State awards to bring them into line with 
the Federal award, so that the State awards “mirror” the Federal award. The Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 contains several provisions relevant to the issue of the interaction between 
the Federal and State industrial relations systems, which may facilitate this process of 
bringing the various awards into line with each other. Sections 171 and 172 require the 
President of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and the Registrar to convene 
regular meetings of heads of tribunals and registrars respectively to discuss matters of mutual 
concern. The Federal and State statutes also contain provisions enabling members of the 
Federal Commission to deal with requests by heads of State authorities to deal with disputes 
or claims with which the State authority is empowered to deal, and vice versa (see sections 
173 and 174 of the Workplace Relations Act).  Section 175 makes provision for joint sittings 
of State and federal tribunals, and section 176 provides for co-ordination between State and 
federal tribunals as to outcomes. In the absence of a single federal award rate, the report 
emanating from this inquiry should recommend that the Australian and New South Wales 
                                                     
24  At 115. 
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Industrial Relations Commissions, and all relevant industrial parties, take steps to harmonise 
the Federal and New South Wales awards and determinations covering long haul truck 
driving. 
 
In sum, the jurisdictional issues in ensuring a uniform set of rates in the long haul transport 
industry are complex. This advice suggests that the most effective solution will be for the 
federal government to use the interstate trade and commerce power to legislate to give the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission full jurisdiction in relation to interstate truck 
rates. 
 
There are, however, other ways of approaching the issue, both involving amendments of New 
South Wales legislation. The issue of minimum award rates is crucial to this inquiry because 
low cartage rates resulting from unscrupulous competition in the long haul trucking industry 
has led to reduced driver and public safety as drivers to work long hours, suffer severe 
fatigue, and breach regulatory requirements in order to make a living.  
 
One possible way of dealing with the issue of minimum cartage rates is for the New South 
Wales government to amend the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) to require the New 
South Wales Industrial Relations Commission to adopt the relevant rates in the federal 
Transport Workers (Long Distance Drivers) Award 1993 into corresponding New South 
Wales awards and determinations covering owner drivers performing long haul truck driving.  
 
Building on the existing provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) in relation to 
award making and contract determinations (see above), the New South Wales Parliament 
arguably has legislative power to enact laws covering terms and conditions pertaining to long 
haul trucking within and beyond New South Wales borders. In 1970, the Full Bench of the 
Industrial Relations Commission in Court Session,25 in a report after an inquiry under section 
88 of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW), held that the New South Wales Parliament 
has legislative power to empower the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission to 
determine terms and conditions of owner drivers in relation to contracts involving journeys 
which take place in New South Wales, and in addition, journeys which take place outside 
New South Wales, provided that the journey has a real connection with New South Wales. At 
page 723 of the report, the Commission stated that: 
 
“We think that it is clear that, under the Constitution Act, 1902, the Parliament of New 
South Wales has power to pass laws authorising a tribunal to determine the remuneration 
to be paid to and the conditions to be afforded to an owner driver on an interstate journey, 
in relation to that part of the journey which takes place in New South Wales. But such a 
law would not be very effective if it did not more than that, because the remuneration in 
respect of the part of the journey which took place outside New South Wales could be 
reduced to nullify any advantages for the owner driver under the State law. To be 
effective, the Law would need to have some operation outside the State of New South 
Wales.” 
 
After examining the relevant case law, the Commission continued, at pages 724-725: 
 
“The fact that work is done within a state provides a sufficient ground for the legislature of 
the state to pass a valid law related to the doing of that work and having some extra-
territorial operation, and this is so both where the contract pursuant to which the work is 
done has been made within the state or outside the state.” 
 
Consequently, the New South Wales Parliament would appear to have power to legislate to 
vest the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission with the power to make 
                                                     
25   Inquiry and Recommendations dated 23 February 1970. 
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minimum rates covering owner drivers contracted to do long haul truck work, provided that 
part of the journey is through New South Wales. The Commission would be so empowered 
even if the party engaging the owner driver was based outside New South Wales. 
 
Another option worth considering is for the New South Wales government to amend the 
OHSA (NSW) to provide that an arrangement to carry freight at a rate below the rate in the 
relevant federal award (even if the award technically does not cover the consignor and the 
owner driver) is prima facie a breach of the relevant general duty provision in the 
OHSA(NSW) (see 1. above for a discussion of these duties). For example, a consignor 
engaging an owner driver to carry freight at a rate below the relevant federal award would be 
presumed to be breaching section 8(2) of the OHSA 2000 (NSW) (as amended along the lines 
suggested in 1.), unless the consignor could provide evidence clearly showing that the 
arrangements for the trip expressly dealt with driver and public safety. The presumption that 
the general duty had been breached would be a very strong presumption, and evidence in 
rebuttal would have to deal with the pressures in the owner driver to complete the trip quickly 
or to take other short cuts in order to earn a satisfactory living. 
 
It might be argued that this device (a strong presumption that failure to pay the federal rate is 
a breach of the relevant general duty in the OHSA) involves a State agency or a State court or 
tribunal enforcing the federal award provision. This, however is not what is proposed. The 
federal award rate represents a rate of pay that is compatible with the truck driver carrying out 
the journey following driving schedules, a driving route, and a travelling speed that do not 
place the driver at risk of a collision or other incident which might pose a risk to the safety of 
the driver or any member of the public. What is being proposed is simply an evidentiary 
provision: that failure to pay rates equivalent to those set out in the relevant federal award 
raises a presumption that the person paying the rates is providing strong incentives for the 
truck driver receiving those lower rates to execute the journey in a manner that poses a risk to 
the driver, the public, or both the driver and the public. This does not involve enforcing the 
federal award provision, but rather accepting that the federal award provides a benchmark 
accepted by the community as being a rate of payment that enables the work to be carried out 
safely. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has canvassed a range of possible measures to introduce uniform award rates for 
long haul trucking work. The three best options would appear to be 
(i) the federal government legislating to use the “trade and commerce” power in the 
federal constitution to amend the Workplace Relations Act 1996 to empower the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission to make common rule award provisions 
for interstate long haul trucking work carried out by both employee truck drivers and 
owner drivers; or  
(ii) the New South Wales parliament using the full extent of its legislative powers to 
empower the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission with jurisdiction to 
make award provisions and contract determinations in relation to the terms and 
conditions of long haul trucking work conducted by employee drivers and owner 
drivers, where all or part of the journey is in New South Wales; and/or 
(iii) the New South Wales parliament amending the OHSA (NSW) to provide that an 
arrangement to carry freight at a rate below the rate in the relevant federal award 
(even if the award technically does not cover the consignor and the owner driver) is 
prima facie a breach of the relevant general duty provision in the OHSA(NSW). 
Similarly, the amendment might specify that a failure to pay the relevant rate in a 
State award or contract determination would, prima facie, be a breach of the relevant 
general duty in the OHSA(NSW). For further discussion of these issues, see 5. below. 
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5. A Special Long Haul Trucking Industry Safety Inspectorate 
Five regulatory regimes potentially cover the NSW long haul trucking industry: awards under 
the Federal Industrial Relations system; awards under the NSW Industrial Relations system; 
the NSW road transport legislation (specifically, the Road Transport (General) Act 1999, and 
the Road Tansport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 and regulations made under the 
latter Act); the Road and Rail Transport (Dangerous Goods) Act 1999 and regulations made 
under that Act; and the OHSA(NSW). Each of these regimes has its own enforcement agency. 
This leads to complex issues of enforcement, as it is undesirable to have five different 
enforcement agencies seeking to enforce provisions covering long haul trucking in New South 
Wales. The issue is further complicated by the fact that a small percentage of trucking crosses 
state borders, thereby multiplying the various state regulatory regimes and enforcement 
agencies.  
 
There are at least four possible solutions to this question. For the purposes of this inquiry (and 
subject to the approach taken to the issues outlined in 4. Above), the most important 
regulatory regimes covering long haul trucking are the award provisions, the road transport 
provisions, and the OHS provisions.  
 
The ideal solution would be to have one national regulatory regime covering long haul 
trucking, with one federal statute setting out the relevant provisions covering the industry, and 
one enforcement agency charged with enforcing the statute. Failing a single national 
regulatory system, a single national long haul road trucking inspectorate would be the next 
best option. The inspectorate would have powers to enforce all of the relevant statutory 
provisions covering long haul trucking (see above). A third option is to have a New South 
Wales long haul trucking authority, with an inspectorate. This inspectorate would be given the 
powers already given to each enforcement agency charged with enforcing the various New 
South Wales statutes. A fourth possibility would be to rely on the WorkCover inspectorate, 
and to amend the OHSA(NSW) to provide that failure to pay relevant award rates, or to 
comply the relevant Roads and Traffic Authority regulatory requirements (see above, 4. and 
2.), is prima facie a contravention of the pertinent general duty under the OHSA(NSW). 
 
A New South Wales long haul trucking inspectorate (the third option outlined at the 
beginning of this section) could simply be established by legislation passed by the New South 
Wales government. The legislation could establish a long haul trucking inspectorate as an 
independent entity, or alternatively within, say, WorkCover or the Roads and Traffic 
Authority. The legislation would give long haul trucking inspectors the inspection, 
investigation and enforcement powers under the New South Wales OHSA, the road transport 
legislation (see 3. above), and Industrial Relations Acts. To avoid confusion, each of the Acts 
(OHSA(NSW), the road transport legislation, and the Industrial Relations Act) could be 
amended to make it clear that the long haul trucking inspectorate has been vested with the 
enforcement powers of each of the inspectorates, at least in relation to long haul trucking 
activities. The OHSA(NSW) already provides, in section 47, that WorkCover may appoint as 
inspectors for the purposes of the OHSA(NSW) a statutory officer, a public servant, a person 
employed by a public or local authority or a person belonging to a class of persons prescribed 
by the regulations. Likewise, under the New South Wales road transport legislation, 
enforcement activities are carried out by “authorised officers”, which include police officers, 
persons appointed for the time being by the Roads and Traffic Authority as an authorised 
officer for the purposes of the provision for which the expression is used, or a person 
prescribed by the regulations (see section 3 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 
(NSW). It may be, therefore, that no legislative amendment is required to some of the statutes, 
and members of the new long haul trucking inspectorate can simply be appointed following 
existing procedures. 
 
There are no constitutional impediments to the New South Wales Parliament enacting these 
provisions. Subject to legislative powers vested in the Commonwealth government, State 
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governments have plenary powers to legislate within their own jurisdictions. The only 
restriction on the New South Wales Parliament’s power to legislate for a New South Wales 
long haul trucking inspectorate pertains to Federal award provisions covering the long haul 
trucking industry (see 4. above). If the proposed New South Wales long haul trucking 
inspectorate was to be empowered to enforce Federal award, an amendment to the Federal 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 would be required. The amendment would delegate inspection 
and enforcement powers to the new inspectorate. There would appear to be no constitutional 
impediment to such a legislative arrangement. The High Court has in the past upheld State 
and Federal legislation purporting to give an industrial tribunal in the New South Wales coal 
industry powers under both the State and Federal industrial relations legislation.26 In the 
1980s an award in the vehicle building industry included comprehensive general duty OHS 
legislation, and made provision for “inspectors”, who might be State OHS inspectors, to be 
appointed under the award.27 
 
Other States could introduce their own long haul trucking inspectorates using a similar 
approach. The limitations of this approach would be that each State inspectorate would only 
have power to enforce the OHS, industrial and road transport provisions passed in that 
jurisdiction. A national approach (the first two options outlined above) would require further 
measures. 
 
As discussed in 4. above, the establishment of a national long haul trucking regulatory regime 
(the first option outlined above) or a national long haul trucking inspectorate (the second 
option) inspectorate is a more complex issue.  As discussed above (see 4.), either a co-
operative solution is required, or the Federal government would have to legislate, using one or 
more of the heads of power outlined in 4. above.  
 
The most complex solution would be for the Commonwealth and each state to legislate to 
amend the relevant OHS, road transport and industrial relations statutes to provide that the 
national long haul trucking inspectorate has the powers of inspectors under each of the 
statutes. To avoid unnecessary complexity, each government would need to legislate in 
exactly the same terms. Such consistency would be facilitated by template legislation being 
passed, for example, by the New South Wales Parliament, and adopted by each of the other 
Parliaments. This is an extremely cumbersome process, and it is unlikely that the degree of 
co-operation required of each of the State and federal governments would be forthcoming. 
 
An alternative solution would be for the federal government to pass national legislation, 
establishing a national inspectorate under the auspices of, for example, the National Road 
Transport Authority. The Commonwealth government could even go further, and enact 
national long haul trucking safety legislation, which mirrored, for example, the New South 
Wales provisions discussed above.  
 
Second, the inspectorate, or even a national long haul trucking regulatory regime, could be 
introduced by the Federal government, after each state government had referred the relevant 
legislative power to the Federal government under section 51(xxxvii) of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, as discussed above.  
 
A third option is that the Commonwealth Parliament could legislate unilaterally using one of 
the other powers in section 51 of the Commonwealth Constitution. As discussed above, the 
most likely provision would be section 51(i) (“trade and commerce … amongst the States”). 
                                                     
26  R v Duncan; Ex Parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 158 CLR 535; Re 
Cram; Ex Parte NSW Colliery Proprieters’ Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 117 at 
127-131. 
27  See AMI Toyota v Association of Draughting, Supervisory and Technical Employees 
(1986) 17 IR 1. 
 352
The final option builds upon the discussions in 3. and 4. above. In effect the OHS legislation 
can become the central legislative provision for the regulation of the long haul trucking, and 
the OHS inspectorates the principal enforcement agency. The OHS statutes could be amended 
to provide that failure of any party to pay the cartage rate specified in the relevant award, or to 
impose conditions which led to drivers being pressured to contravene technical requirements 
for driving, work or rest times under the Road Transport regulations etc, is rebuttable proof of 
a contravention of the relevant general duty provision. This would enable the OHS 
inspectorate (for example, the NSW WorkCover Authority) to take appropriate enforcement 
action, including prosecutions (with the prospect of heavy financial penalties).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The most feasible solution to this issue is likely to be the creation of a New South Wales long 
haul trucking authority, with an inspectorate empowered by New South Wales legislate to 
exercise the inspection and enforcement powers under the OHSA(NSW), the New South 
Wales road transport legislation, and the New South Wales Industrial Relations Act 1996. 
Federal legislation would be required to vest the inspectorate with powers to enforce Federal 
awards, as an agent of the Commonwealth workplace relations inspectorate. Alternatively, the 
inspectorate could simply be given power to enforce the OHSA(NSW), and the OHSA(NSW) 
itself could be amended ) to provide that failure to pay relevant award rates, or to comply the 
relevant Roads and Traffic Authority regulatory requirements (see above, 3.), is prima facie a 
contravention of the pertinent general duty under the OHSA(NSW). 
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